From 90a0684e60853190b6d67206ac1076ebf47be705 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Kemper Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2019 18:53:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] asterisk-16.x: add fixes for AST-2019-006 and 007 https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2019-006.html https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2019-007.html Signed-off-by: Sebastian Kemper --- net/asterisk-16.x/Makefile | 2 +- .../patches/170-AST-2019-006-16.diff | 73 +++++++++++++++++++ .../patches/180-AST-2019-007-16.diff | 46 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 net/asterisk-16.x/patches/170-AST-2019-006-16.diff create mode 100644 net/asterisk-16.x/patches/180-AST-2019-007-16.diff diff --git a/net/asterisk-16.x/Makefile b/net/asterisk-16.x/Makefile index 8a26a4b..cbe9b59 100644 --- a/net/asterisk-16.x/Makefile +++ b/net/asterisk-16.x/Makefile @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk AST_MAJOR_VERSION:=16 PKG_NAME:=asterisk$(AST_MAJOR_VERSION) PKG_VERSION:=$(AST_MAJOR_VERSION).3.0 -PKG_RELEASE:=4 +PKG_RELEASE:=5 PKG_SOURCE:=asterisk-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases diff --git a/net/asterisk-16.x/patches/170-AST-2019-006-16.diff b/net/asterisk-16.x/patches/170-AST-2019-006-16.diff new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f589b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/asterisk-16.x/patches/170-AST-2019-006-16.diff @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From 8cdaa93e658a46e7baf6b606468b5e2c88a0133b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ben Ford +Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 14:55:06 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] chan_sip.c: Prevent address change on unauthenticated SIP request. + +If the name of a peer is known and a SIP request is sent using that +peer's name, the address of the peer will change even if the request +fails the authentication challenge. This means that an endpoint can +be altered and even rendered unusuable, even if it was in a working +state previously. This can only occur when the nat option is set to the +default, or auto_force_rport. + +This change checks the result of authentication first to ensure it is +successful before setting the address and the nat option. + +ASTERISK-28589 #close + +Change-Id: I581c5ed1da60ca89f590bd70872de2b660de02df +--- + +diff --git a/channels/chan_sip.c b/channels/chan_sip.c +index 6ac2e61..4d79a47 100644 +--- a/channels/chan_sip.c ++++ b/channels/chan_sip.c +@@ -19245,18 +19245,6 @@ + bogus_peer = NULL; + } + +- /* build_peer, called through sip_find_peer, is not able to check the +- * sip_pvt->natdetected flag in order to determine if the peer is behind +- * NAT or not when SIP_PAGE3_NAT_AUTO_RPORT or SIP_PAGE3_NAT_AUTO_COMEDIA +- * are set on the peer. So we check for that here and set the peer's +- * address accordingly. +- */ +- set_peer_nat(p, peer); +- +- if (p->natdetected && ast_test_flag(&peer->flags[2], SIP_PAGE3_NAT_AUTO_RPORT)) { +- ast_sockaddr_copy(&peer->addr, &p->recv); +- } +- + if (!ast_apply_acl(peer->acl, addr, "SIP Peer ACL: ")) { + ast_debug(2, "Found peer '%s' for '%s', but fails host access\n", peer->name, of); + sip_unref_peer(peer, "sip_unref_peer: check_peer_ok: from sip_find_peer call, early return of AUTH_ACL_FAILED"); +@@ -19325,6 +19313,21 @@ + ast_string_field_set(p, peermd5secret, NULL); + } + if (!(res = check_auth(p, req, peer->name, p->peersecret, p->peermd5secret, sipmethod, uri2, reliable))) { ++ ++ /* build_peer, called through sip_find_peer, is not able to check the ++ * sip_pvt->natdetected flag in order to determine if the peer is behind ++ * NAT or not when SIP_PAGE3_NAT_AUTO_RPORT or SIP_PAGE3_NAT_AUTO_COMEDIA ++ * are set on the peer. So we check for that here and set the peer's ++ * address accordingly. The address should ONLY be set once we are sure ++ * authentication was a success. If, for example, an INVITE was sent that ++ * matched the peer name but failed the authentication check, the address ++ * would be updated, which is bad. ++ */ ++ set_peer_nat(p, peer); ++ if (p->natdetected && ast_test_flag(&peer->flags[2], SIP_PAGE3_NAT_AUTO_RPORT)) { ++ ast_sockaddr_copy(&peer->addr, &p->recv); ++ } ++ + /* If we have a call limit, set flag */ + if (peer->call_limit) + ast_set_flag(&p->flags[0], SIP_CALL_LIMIT); +@@ -19424,6 +19427,7 @@ + } + } + sip_unref_peer(peer, "check_peer_ok: sip_unref_peer: tossing temp ptr to peer from sip_find_peer"); ++ + return res; + } + diff --git a/net/asterisk-16.x/patches/180-AST-2019-007-16.diff b/net/asterisk-16.x/patches/180-AST-2019-007-16.diff new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f187c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/asterisk-16.x/patches/180-AST-2019-007-16.diff @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 7574be5110e049a44b8c8ead52cd1c2a5d442afa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: George Joseph +Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 11:41:23 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] manager.c: Prevent the Originate action from running the Originate app + +If an AMI user without the "system" authorization calls the +Originate AMI command with the Originate application, +the second Originate could run the "System" command. + +Action: Originate +Channel: Local/1111 +Application: Originate +Data: Local/2222,app,System,touch /tmp/owned + +If the "system" authorization isn't set, we now block the +Originate app as well as the System, Exec, etc. apps. + +ASTERISK-28580 +Reported by: Eliel Sardañons + +Change-Id: Ic4c9dedc34c426f03c8c14fce334a71386d8a5fa +--- + +diff --git a/doc/UPGRADE-staging/AMI-Originate.txt b/doc/UPGRADE-staging/AMI-Originate.txt +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..f2d3133 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/doc/UPGRADE-staging/AMI-Originate.txt +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++Subject: AMI ++ ++The AMI Originate action, which optionally takes a dialplan application as ++an argument, no longer accepts "Originate" as the application due to ++security concerns. +diff --git a/main/manager.c b/main/manager.c +index f138801..1963151 100644 +--- a/main/manager.c ++++ b/main/manager.c +@@ -5744,6 +5744,7 @@ + EAGI(/bin/rm,-rf /) */ + strcasestr(app, "mixmonitor") || /* MixMonitor(blah,,rm -rf) */ + strcasestr(app, "externalivr") || /* ExternalIVR(rm -rf) */ ++ strcasestr(app, "originate") || /* Originate(Local/1234,app,System,rm -rf) */ + (strstr(appdata, "SHELL") && (bad_appdata = 1)) || /* NoOp(${SHELL(rm -rf /)}) */ + (strstr(appdata, "EVAL") && (bad_appdata = 1)) /* NoOp(${EVAL(${some_var_containing_SHELL})}) */ + )) { -- 2.30.2