From eba659cbbac0bd31889eb7ca58bf9c86f7dd0feb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 08:01:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] hostapd: backport fix for CVE-2015-1863, refresh patches Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau SVN-Revision: 45567 --- ...D-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ .../hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch | 4 +- .../hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch | 2 +- .../patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch | 2 +- .../hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch | 2 +- 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e408fbe3839 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it + (CVE-2015-1863) + +This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in +p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes) +was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in +arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the +dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the +heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P +peer discovery purposes. + +This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program +behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service +due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation, +and potentially arbitrary code execution. + +Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart +hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c ++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c +@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, + if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) + os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); + if (msg.ssid && ++ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) && + (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN || + os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN) + != 0)) { diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch index 07a146d1a0b..032e2072a35 100644 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #ifdef ANDROID #include -@@ -155,59 +156,46 @@ int os_gmtime(os_time_t t, struct os_tm +@@ -155,59 +156,46 @@ int os_gmtime(os_time_t t, struct os_tm return 0; } @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ -#else /* __APPLE__ */ -#define os_daemon daemon -#endif /* __APPLE__ */ -- +- -int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file) -{ -#if defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__) diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch index 993caf41498..ea235e67780 100644 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ #include "drivers/driver.h" #include "wpa_supplicant_i.h" #include "config.h" -@@ -277,6 +278,10 @@ static void calculate_update_time(const +@@ -277,6 +278,10 @@ static void calculate_update_time(const static void wpa_bss_copy_res(struct wpa_bss *dst, struct wpa_scan_res *src, struct os_reltime *fetch_time) { diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch index b56e5e16323..da887321c6e 100644 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ /** * wpa_hexdump_ascii_key - conditional hex dump, hide keys -@@ -144,8 +179,14 @@ void wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level, const +@@ -144,8 +179,14 @@ void wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level, const * bytes per line will be shown. This works like wpa_hexdump_ascii(), but by * default, does not include secret keys (passwords, etc.) in debug output. */ diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch index bce4929d9b6..87ebd4552f4 100644 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ /* Initialize the driver interface */ if (!(b[0] | b[1] | b[2] | b[3] | b[4] | b[5])) b = NULL; -@@ -381,8 +393,6 @@ static void hostapd_global_deinit(const +@@ -381,8 +393,6 @@ static void hostapd_global_deinit(const #endif /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */ eap_server_unregister_methods(); -- 2.30.2