From d97b46a64674a267bc41c9e16132ee2a98c3347d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cyrill Gorcunov Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 16:26:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] syscalls, x86: add __NR_kcmp syscall While doing the checkpoint-restore in the user space one need to determine whether various kernel objects (like mm_struct-s of file_struct-s) are shared between tasks and restore this state. The 2nd step can be solved by using appropriate CLONE_ flags and the unshare syscall, while there's currently no ways for solving the 1st one. One of the ways for checking whether two tasks share e.g. mm_struct is to provide some mm_struct ID of a task to its proc file, but showing such info considered to be not that good for security reasons. Thus after some debates we end up in conclusion that using that named 'comparison' syscall might be the best candidate. So here is it -- __NR_kcmp. It takes up to 5 arguments - the pids of the two tasks (which characteristics should be compared), the comparison type and (in case of comparison of files) two file descriptors. Lookups for pids are done in the caller's PID namespace only. At moment only x86 is supported and tested. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up selftests, warnings] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: include errno.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Andrey Vagin Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Glauber Costa Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Matt Helsley Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu Cc: Michal Marek Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 + include/linux/kcmp.h | 17 ++ include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 + kernel/Makefile | 3 + kernel/kcmp.c | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/Makefile | 29 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/kcmp_test.c | 94 +++++++++++ 10 files changed, 348 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/kcmp.h create mode 100644 kernel/kcmp.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/kcmp_test.c diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl index 29f9f0554f7d..7a35a6e71d44 100644 --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -355,3 +355,4 @@ 346 i386 setns sys_setns 347 i386 process_vm_readv sys_process_vm_readv compat_sys_process_vm_readv 348 i386 process_vm_writev sys_process_vm_writev compat_sys_process_vm_writev +349 i386 kcmp sys_kcmp diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index dd29a9ea27c5..51171aeff0dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -318,6 +318,8 @@ 309 common getcpu sys_getcpu 310 64 process_vm_readv sys_process_vm_readv 311 64 process_vm_writev sys_process_vm_writev +312 64 kcmp sys_kcmp + # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact # for native 64-bit operation. diff --git a/include/linux/kcmp.h b/include/linux/kcmp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2dcd1b3aafc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/kcmp.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +#ifndef _LINUX_KCMP_H +#define _LINUX_KCMP_H + +/* Comparison type */ +enum kcmp_type { + KCMP_FILE, + KCMP_VM, + KCMP_FILES, + KCMP_FS, + KCMP_SIGHAND, + KCMP_IO, + KCMP_SYSVSEM, + + KCMP_TYPES, +}; + +#endif /* _LINUX_KCMP_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index 3de3acb84a95..19439c75c5b2 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -858,4 +858,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_writev(pid_t pid, unsigned long riovcnt, unsigned long flags); +asmlinkage long sys_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, + unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2); #endif diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 6c07f30fa9b7..80be6ca0cc75 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ endif obj-y += sched/ obj-y += power/ +ifeq ($(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE),y) +obj-$(CONFIG_X86) += kcmp.o +endif obj-$(CONFIG_FREEZER) += freezer.o obj-$(CONFIG_PROFILING) += profile.o obj-$(CONFIG_STACKTRACE) += stacktrace.o diff --git a/kernel/kcmp.c b/kernel/kcmp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..30b7b225306c --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/kcmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons. + * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we + * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead. + * + * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with + * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space. + * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to + * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product + * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is + * relative prime to 2^n). + * + * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed + * it can be changed to an alternate scheme. + */ +static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly; + +static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type) +{ + return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1]; +} + +/* + * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2 + * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2 + * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2 + * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future) + */ +static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type) +{ + long ret; + + ret = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type) - kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type); + + return (ret < 0) | ((ret > 0) << 1); +} + +/* The caller must have pinned the task */ +static struct file * +get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx) +{ + struct file *file = NULL; + + task_lock(task); + rcu_read_lock(); + + if (task->files) + file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx); + + rcu_read_unlock(); + task_unlock(task); + + return file; +} + +static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2) +{ + if (likely(m2 != m1)) + mutex_unlock(m2); + mutex_unlock(m1); +} + +static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2) +{ + int err; + + if (m2 > m1) + swap(m1, m2); + + err = mutex_lock_killable(m1); + if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) { + err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + if (err) + mutex_unlock(m1); + } + + return err; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type, + unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2) +{ + struct task_struct *task1, *task2; + int ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + /* + * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only. + */ + task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1); + task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2); + if (!task1 || !task2) + goto err_no_task; + + get_task_struct(task1); + get_task_struct(task2); + + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * One should have enough rights to inspect task details. + */ + ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex, + &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + if (ret) + goto err; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) || + !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto err_unlock; + } + + switch (type) { + case KCMP_FILE: { + struct file *filp1, *filp2; + + filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1); + filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2); + + if (filp1 && filp2) + ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE); + else + ret = -EBADF; + break; + } + case KCMP_VM: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM); + break; + case KCMP_FILES: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES); + break; + case KCMP_FS: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS); + break; + case KCMP_SIGHAND: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND); + break; + case KCMP_IO: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO); + break; + case KCMP_SYSVSEM: +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list, + task2->sysvsem.undo_list, + KCMP_SYSVSEM); +#else + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + +err_unlock: + kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex, + &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex); +err: + put_task_struct(task1); + put_task_struct(task2); + + return ret; + +err_no_task: + rcu_read_unlock(); + return -ESRCH; +} + +static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void) +{ + int i; + + get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies)); + + for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++) + cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1); + + return 0; +} +arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init); diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 47bfa16430d7..dbff751e4086 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -203,3 +203,6 @@ cond_syscall(sys_fanotify_mark); cond_syscall(sys_name_to_handle_at); cond_syscall(sys_open_by_handle_at); cond_syscall(compat_sys_open_by_handle_at); + +/* compare kernel pointers */ +cond_syscall(sys_kcmp); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile index 14972017a43e..a4162e15c25f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -TARGETS = breakpoints mqueue vm +TARGETS = breakpoints kcmp mqueue vm all: for TARGET in $(TARGETS); do \ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dc79b86ea65c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +uname_M := $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not) +ARCH ?= $(shell echo $(uname_M) | sed -e s/i.86/i386/) +ifeq ($(ARCH),i386) + ARCH := X86 + CFLAGS := -DCONFIG_X86_32 -D__i386__ +endif +ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64) + ARCH := X86 + CFLAGS := -DCONFIG_X86_64 -D__x86_64__ +endif + +CFLAGS += -I../../../../arch/x86/include/generated/ +CFLAGS += -I../../../../include/ +CFLAGS += -I../../../../usr/include/ +CFLAGS += -I../../../../arch/x86/include/ + +all: +ifeq ($(ARCH),X86) + gcc $(CFLAGS) kcmp_test.c -o run_test +else + echo "Not an x86 target, can't build kcmp selftest" +endif + +run-tests: all + ./kcmp_test + +clean: + rm -fr ./run_test + rm -fr ./test-file diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/kcmp_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/kcmp_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..358cc6bfa35d --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/kcmp_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static long sys_kcmp(int pid1, int pid2, int type, int fd1, int fd2) +{ + return syscall(__NR_kcmp, pid1, pid2, type, fd1, fd2); +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char kpath[] = "kcmp-test-file"; + int pid1, pid2; + int fd1, fd2; + int status; + + fd1 = open(kpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); + pid1 = getpid(); + + if (fd1 < 0) { + perror("Can't create file"); + exit(1); + } + + pid2 = fork(); + if (pid2 < 0) { + perror("fork failed"); + exit(1); + } + + if (!pid2) { + int pid2 = getpid(); + int ret; + + fd2 = open(kpath, O_RDWR, 0644); + if (fd2 < 0) { + perror("Can't open file"); + exit(1); + } + + /* An example of output and arguments */ + printf("pid1: %6d pid2: %6d FD: %2ld FILES: %2ld VM: %2ld " + "FS: %2ld SIGHAND: %2ld IO: %2ld SYSVSEM: %2ld " + "INV: %2ld\n", + pid1, pid2, + sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_FILE, fd1, fd2), + sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_FILES, 0, 0), + sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_VM, 0, 0), + sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_FS, 0, 0), + sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_SIGHAND, 0, 0), + sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_IO, 0, 0), + sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_SYSVSEM, 0, 0), + + /* This one should fail */ + sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_TYPES + 1, 0, 0)); + + /* This one should return same fd */ + ret = sys_kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_FILE, fd1, fd1); + if (ret) { + printf("FAIL: 0 expected but %d returned\n", ret); + ret = -1; + } else + printf("PASS: 0 returned as expected\n"); + + /* Compare with self */ + ret = sys_kcmp(pid1, pid1, KCMP_VM, 0, 0); + if (ret) { + printf("FAIL: 0 expected but %li returned\n", ret); + ret = -1; + } else + printf("PASS: 0 returned as expected\n"); + + exit(ret); + } + + waitpid(pid2, &status, P_ALL); + + return 0; +} -- 2.30.2