From b4d67e3484c8d98bf76e8e173d7bbc8285a1d7dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Lachner Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 07:58:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] haproxy: Update HAProxy to v1.8.20 - Update haproxy download URL and hash - Add new patches Signed-off-by: Christian Lachner --- net/haproxy/Makefile | 6 +- net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh | 2 +- ...e-the-listener-exist-before-using-it.patch | 50 - ...tp_req_ctr-only-one-time-per-request.patch | 40 + ...-previous-frag-frame-but-len-changed.patch | 83 ++ ...e-counters-accurate-under-saturation.patch | 67 -- ...ly-attempt-to-free-startup_logs-once.patch | 37 - ...o-pass-frag_ctx-info-during-encoding.patch | 71 ++ ...ossible-segfault-on-deinit_51degrees.patch | 35 - ...ity-Typos-and-fix-the-reject-example.patch | 38 + ...header-is-NULL-dont-try-to-strdup-it.patch | 36 + ...arning-about-ssl-min-max-ver-support.patch | 34 - ..._CST-when-using-the-newer-atomic-API.patch | 49 - ...-last-changelog-date-in-haproxy-spec.patch | 23 + ...-segfault-during-show-map-acl-on-CLI.patch | 67 ++ ...-to-take-into-account-epoll_fd-pipes.patch | 34 - ...alization-of-thread-dependent-fields.patch | 54 - ...er-of-consecutive-accepts-is-handled.patch | 79 ++ ...-POST-data-are-read-from-the-channel.patch | 92 -- ...-maxaccept-during-the-config-parsing.patch | 44 + ...-missing-increment-of-fe--srv_aborts.patch | 30 - ...r--maxaccept-when-nbproc-is-set-to-1.patch | 34 + ...sing-ssl-default-server-ciphersuites.patch | 36 - ...NOR-threads-Implement-HA_ATOMIC_LOAD.patch | 54 + ...range-Make-the-ring-buffer-lock-free.patch | 116 +++ ...plog-is-no-longer-valid-in-a-backend.patch | 26 - ...checks-segfault-during-tcpcheck_main.patch | 40 - ...ssl.patch => 012-deprecated-openssl.patch} | 0 ...k-around-an-old-bug-in-GNU-make-3-80.patch | 35 - ...ever-pass-a-NULL-target-to-vsnprintf.patch | 42 - ...le-fix-build-of-IPv6-header-on-aix51.patch | 27 - ...NUX_SOURCE_COMPAT-to-build-on-AIX-51.patch | 27 - ...file-disable-shared-cache-on-AIX-5-1.patch | 35 - ...ctly-handle-abns-in-show-cli-sockets.patch | 33 - ...sses-by-a-prefix-in-show-cli-sockets.patch | 45 - ...sion-is-not-cleanly-reset-on-release.patch | 168 --- ...D-use-inttypes-h-instead-of-stdint-h.patch | 251 ----- ...-connection-fix-naming-of-ip_v-field.patch | 50 - ...s-after-checking-the-config-validity.patch | 54 - ...POE-applet-is-attached-to-the-stream.patch | 42 - ...g-is-encoded-for-fragmented-messages.patch | 34 - ...ix-the-process-range-of-thread-masks.patch | 30 - ...OR-lists-Implement-locked-variations.patch | 175 ---- ...the-case-were-removing-the-first-elt.patch | 37 - ...-rollback-on-addq-in-the-locked-liss.patch | 33 - ..._LOCKEDs-removal-of-the-last-pointer.patch | 34 - ...iers-when-updating-elements-and-head.patch | 66 -- ...delete-and-pop-operations-idempotent.patch | 44 - ..._POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-last-element.patch | 44 - ...DIUM-list-fix-again-LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED.patch | 43 - ...pointer-unlocking-in-LIST_DEL_LOCKED.patch | 32 - ...the-listener-lock-in-listener_accept.patch | 274 ----- ...lf-locked-list-for-the-dequeue-lists.patch | 247 ----- ...istener-never-accepts-too-many-conns.patch | 217 ---- ...ner-Silent-a-few-signedness-warnings.patch | 37 - ...R-skip-get_gmtime-where-tm-is-unused.patch | 28 - ...hannel-depending-on-the-keyword-used.patch | 976 ------------------ ...e-the-default-value-when-its-present.patch | 38 - ...perly-detect-pattern-type-SMP_T_ADDR.patch | 34 - ...ks-in-set-map-and-add-acl-HTTP-rules.patch | 48 - ...nel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch | 30 - ...nel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch | 30 - ...up-SPOE-stream-in-the-applet-handler.patch | 29 - 63 files changed, 689 insertions(+), 3957 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MAJOR-listener-Make-sure-the-listener-exist-before-using-it.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MINOR-http-Call-stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr-only-one-time-per-request.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-arg-len-encoded-in-previous-frag-frame-but-len-changed.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-listener-keep-accept-rate-counters-accurate-under-saturation.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/002-BUG-MEDIUM-logs-Only-attempt-to-free-startup_logs-once.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/002-MINOR-spoe-Use-the-sample-context-to-pass-frag_ctx-info-during-encoding.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/003-BUG-MEDIUM-51d-fix-possible-segfault-on-deinit_51degrees.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/003-DOC-contrib-modsecurity-Typos-and-fix-the-reject-example.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MEDIUM-contrib-modsecurity-If-host-header-is-NULL-dont-try-to-strdup-it.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MINOR-ssl-fix-warning-about-ssl-min-max-ver-support.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/005-MEDIUM-threads-Use-__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST-when-using-the-newer-atomic-API.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/005-MINOR-examples-Use-right-locale-for-the-last-changelog-date-in-haproxy-spec.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MAJOR-map-acl-real-fix-segfault-during-show-map-acl-on-CLI.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MEDIUM-threads-fd-do-not-forget-to-take-into-account-epoll_fd-pipes.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MAJOR-spoe-Fix-initialization-of-thread-dependent-fields.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-Fix-how-unlimited-number-of-consecutive-accepts-is-handled.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/008-BUG-MAJOR-stats-Fix-how-huge-POST-data-are-read-from-the-channel.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/008-MINOR-config-Test-validity-of-tune-maxaccept-during-the-config-parsing.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/009-BUG-MINOR-http-counters-fix-missing-increment-of-fe--srv_aborts.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/009-CLEANUP-config-Dont-alter-listener--maxaccept-when-nbproc-is-set-to-1.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/010-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-ability-to-set-TLS-1-3-ciphers-using-ssl-default-server-ciphersuites.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/010-MINOR-threads-Implement-HA_ATOMIC_LOAD.patch create mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/011-BUG-MEDIUM-port_range-Make-the-ring-buffer-lock-free.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/011-DOC-The-option-httplog-is-no-longer-valid-in-a-backend.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/012-BUG-MAJOR-checks-segfault-during-tcpcheck_main.patch rename net/haproxy/patches/{048-deprecated-openssl.patch => 012-deprecated-openssl.patch} (100%) delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/013-BUILD-makefile-work-around-an-old-bug-in-GNU-make-3-80.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/014-MINOR-tools-make-memvprintf-never-pass-a-NULL-target-to-vsnprintf.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/015-BUILD-makefile-fix-build-of-IPv6-header-on-aix51.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/016-BUILD-makefile-add-_LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT-to-build-on-AIX-51.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/017-BUILD-Makefile-disable-shared-cache-on-AIX-5-1.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/018-BUG-MINOR-cli-correctly-handle-abns-in-show-cli-sockets.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/019-MINOR-cli-start-addresses-by-a-prefix-in-show-cli-sockets.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/020-BUG-MEDIUM-peers-fix-a-case-where-peer-session-is-not-cleanly-reset-on-release.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/021-BUILD-use-inttypes-h-instead-of-stdint-h.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/022-BUILD-connection-fix-naming-of-ip_v-field.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/023-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-assign-pattern-IDs-after-checking-the-config-validity.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/024-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Queue-message-only-if-no-SPOE-applet-is-attached-to-the-stream.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/025-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Return-an-error-if-nothing-is-encoded-for-fragmented-messages.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/026-BUG-MINOR-threads-fix-the-process-range-of-thread-masks.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/027-MINOR-lists-Implement-locked-variations.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/028-BUG-MEDIUM-lists-Properly-handle-the-case-were-removing-the-first-elt.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/029-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-the-rollback-on-addq-in-the-locked-liss.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/030-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-LIST_POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-the-last-pointer.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/031-BUG-MEDIUM-list-add-missing-store-barriers-when-updating-elements-and-head.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/032-MINOR-list-make-the-delete-and-pop-operations-idempotent.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/033-BUG-MEDIUM-list-correct-fix-for-LIST_POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-last-element.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/034-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-again-LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/035-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-incorrect-pointer-unlocking-in-LIST_DEL_LOCKED.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/036-MAJOR-listener-do-not-hold-the-listener-lock-in-listener_accept.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/037-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-use-a-self-locked-list-for-the-dequeue-lists.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/038-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-make-sure-the-listener-never-accepts-too-many-conns.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/039-BUILD-MINOR-listener-Silent-a-few-signedness-warnings.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/040-MINOR-skip-get_gmtime-where-tm-is-unused.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/041-BUG-MAJOR-http_fetch-Get-the-channel-depending-on-the-keyword-used.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/042-BUG-MEDIUM-maps-only-try-to-parse-the-default-value-when-its-present.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/043-BUG-MINOR-acl-properly-detect-pattern-type-SMP_T_ADDR.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/044-BUG-MEDIUM-thread-http-Add-missing-locks-in-set-map-and-add-acl-HTTP-rules.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/045-BUG-MINOR-51d-Get-the-request-channel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/046-BUG-MINOR-da-Get-the-request-channel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch delete mode 100644 net/haproxy/patches/047-BUG-MINOR-spoe-Dont-systematically-wakeup-SPOE-stream-in-the-applet-handler.patch diff --git a/net/haproxy/Makefile b/net/haproxy/Makefile index c99c9eabff..b42bc59583 100644 --- a/net/haproxy/Makefile +++ b/net/haproxy/Makefile @@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=haproxy -PKG_VERSION:=1.8.19 -PKG_RELEASE:=4 +PKG_VERSION:=1.8.20 +PKG_RELEASE:=1 PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/ -PKG_HASH:=64f5fbfd4e09ffeaf26cb6667398ba780704a14e96e60000caa8bf69962ba734 +PKG_HASH:=3228f78d5fe1dfbaccf41bf387e36b08eeef6e16330053cafde5fa303e262b16 PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(BUILD_VARIANT)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION) PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0 diff --git a/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh b/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh index e6cd59c555..f4b683ecf0 100755 --- a/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh +++ b/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/bash CLONEURL=http://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy-1.8.git -BASE_TAG=v1.8.19 +BASE_TAG=v1.8.20 TMP_REPODIR=tmprepo PATCHESDIR=patches diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MAJOR-listener-Make-sure-the-listener-exist-before-using-it.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MAJOR-listener-Make-sure-the-listener-exist-before-using-it.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7d9708ed50..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MAJOR-listener-Make-sure-the-listener-exist-before-using-it.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -commit 7c3fd37724c58cf09359e0d381a9be305dd7869b -Author: Olivier Houchard -Date: Mon Feb 25 16:18:16 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MAJOR: listener: Make sure the listener exist before using it. - - In listener_accept(), make sure we have a listener before attempting to - use it. - An another thread may have closed the FD meanwhile, and set fdtab[fd].owner - to NULL. - As the listener is not free'd, it is ok to attempt to accept() a new - connection even if the listener was closed. At worst the fd has been - reassigned to another connection, and accept() will fail anyway. - - Many thanks to Richard Russo for reporting the problem, and suggesting the - fix. - - This should be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit d16a9dfed80e75d730754b717370515265698cdd) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit a2511ed1fcdfa8047dbe2268fc0259f9b06cf891) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - -diff --git a/src/listener.c b/src/listener.c -index a30efe03..5f6fafbc 100644 ---- a/src/listener.c -+++ b/src/listener.c -@@ -441,8 +441,8 @@ void delete_listener(struct listener *listener) - void listener_accept(int fd) - { - struct listener *l = fdtab[fd].owner; -- struct proxy *p = l->bind_conf->frontend; -- int max_accept = l->maxaccept ? l->maxaccept : 1; -+ struct proxy *p; -+ int max_accept; - int expire; - int cfd; - int ret; -@@ -450,6 +450,10 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - static int accept4_broken; - #endif - -+ if (!l) -+ return; -+ p = l->bind_conf->frontend; -+ max_accept = l->maxaccept ? l->maxaccept : 1; - if (HA_SPIN_TRYLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock)) - return; - diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MINOR-http-Call-stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr-only-one-time-per-request.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MINOR-http-Call-stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr-only-one-time-per-request.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4449df1ccd --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MINOR-http-Call-stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr-only-one-time-per-request.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +commit cf2f1243373be97249567ffd259e975cc87068b8 +Author: Christopher Faulet +Date: Mon Apr 29 13:12:02 2019 +0200 + + BUG/MINOR: http: Call stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr() only one time per request + + The function stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr() is called at the beginning of the + analysers AN_REQ_HTTP_PROCESS_FE/BE. It as an effect only on the backend. But we + must be careful to call it only once. If the processing of HTTP rules is + interrupted in the middle, when the analyser is resumed, we must not call it + again. Otherwise, the tracked counters of the backend are incremented several + times. + + This bug was reported in github. See issue #74. + + This fix should be backported as far as 1.6. + + (cherry picked from commit 1907ccc2f75b78ace1ee4acdfc60d48a76e3decd) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + (cherry picked from commit 319921866ea9ecc46215fea5679abc8efdfcbea5) + [cf: HTX part was removed] + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c +index ccacd6a4..556cabad 100644 +--- a/src/proto_http.c ++++ b/src/proto_http.c +@@ -3420,8 +3420,10 @@ int http_process_req_common(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit, s + req->buf->i, + req->analysers); + +- /* just in case we have some per-backend tracking */ +- stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr(s); ++ /* just in case we have some per-backend tracking. Only called the first ++ * execution of the analyser. */ ++ if (!s->current_rule || s->current_rule_list != &px->http_req_rules) ++ stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr(s); + + /* evaluate http-request rules */ + if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&px->http_req_rules)) { diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-arg-len-encoded-in-previous-frag-frame-but-len-changed.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-arg-len-encoded-in-previous-frag-frame-but-len-changed.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ef9507652 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-arg-len-encoded-in-previous-frag-frame-but-len-changed.patch @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +commit c1620a52a3def02b4837376385c416c03ca874c4 +Author: Kevin Zhu +Date: Fri Apr 26 14:00:01 2019 +0800 + + BUG/MEDIUM: spoe: arg len encoded in previous frag frame but len changed + + Fragmented arg will do fetch at every encode time, each fetch may get + different result if SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE, for example res.payload, but + the length already encoded in first fragment of the frame, that will + cause SPOA decode failed and waste resources. + + This patch must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. + + (cherry picked from commit f7f54280c8106e92a55243f5d60f8587e79602d1) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + (cherry picked from commit 3a838e526cdbc00ded5362e66f1ef3a441abc3c1) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/include/proto/spoe.h b/include/proto/spoe.h +index 002cf7d7..2cdca10b 100644 +--- a/include/proto/spoe.h ++++ b/include/proto/spoe.h +@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ spoe_decode_buffer(char **buf, char *end, char **str, uint64_t *len) + * many bytes has been encoded. If <*off> is zero at the end, it means that all + * data has been encoded. */ + static inline int +-spoe_encode_data(struct sample *smp, unsigned int *off, char **buf, char *end) ++spoe_encode_data(unsigned int *len, struct sample *smp, unsigned int *off, char **buf, char *end) + { + char *p = *buf; + int ret; +@@ -183,15 +183,16 @@ spoe_encode_data(struct sample *smp, unsigned int *off, char **buf, char *end) + ret = spoe_encode_frag_buffer(chk->str, chk->len, &p, end); + if (ret == -1) + return -1; ++ *len = chk->len; + } + else { + /* The sample has been fragmented, encode remaining data */ +- ret = MIN(chk->len - *off, end - p); ++ ret = MIN(*len - *off, end - p); + memcpy(p, chk->str + *off, ret); + p += ret; + } + /* Now update <*off> */ +- if (ret + *off != chk->len) ++ if (ret + *off != *len) + *off += ret; + else + *off = 0; +diff --git a/include/types/spoe.h b/include/types/spoe.h +index 53e7200c..cfaa42f8 100644 +--- a/include/types/spoe.h ++++ b/include/types/spoe.h +@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ struct spoe_context { + struct spoe_message *curmsg; /* SPOE message from which to resume encoding */ + struct spoe_arg *curarg; /* SPOE arg in from which to resume encoding */ + unsigned int curoff; /* offset in from which to resume encoding */ ++ unsigned int curlen; /* length of need to be encode, for SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE data */ + unsigned int flags; /* SPOE_FRM_FL_* */ + } frag_ctx; /* Info about fragmented frames, valid on if SPOE_CTX_FL_FRAGMENTED is set */ + }; +diff --git a/src/flt_spoe.c b/src/flt_spoe.c +index f6109778..0c0b3794 100644 +--- a/src/flt_spoe.c ++++ b/src/flt_spoe.c +@@ -2172,6 +2172,7 @@ spoe_encode_message(struct stream *s, struct spoe_context *ctx, + list_for_each_entry(arg, &msg->args, list) { + ctx->frag_ctx.curarg = arg; + ctx->frag_ctx.curoff = UINT_MAX; ++ ctx->frag_ctx.curlen = 0; + + encode_argument: + if (ctx->frag_ctx.curoff != UINT_MAX) +@@ -2186,7 +2187,7 @@ spoe_encode_message(struct stream *s, struct spoe_context *ctx, + + /* Fetch the arguement value */ + smp = sample_process(s->be, s->sess, s, dir|SMP_OPT_FINAL, arg->expr, NULL); +- ret = spoe_encode_data(smp, &ctx->frag_ctx.curoff, buf, end); ++ ret = spoe_encode_data(&ctx->frag_ctx.curlen, smp, &ctx->frag_ctx.curoff, buf, end); + if (ret == -1 || ctx->frag_ctx.curoff) + goto too_big; + } diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-listener-keep-accept-rate-counters-accurate-under-saturation.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-listener-keep-accept-rate-counters-accurate-under-saturation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1edac3a2c9..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-listener-keep-accept-rate-counters-accurate-under-saturation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -commit 78714ea673cefa83d3dff5aa9aa5e97726cfb5cd -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Mon Feb 25 15:02:04 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MINOR: listener: keep accept rate counters accurate under saturation - - The test on l->nbconn forces to exit the loop before updating the freq - counters, so the last session which reaches a listener's limit will not - be accounted for in the session rate measurement. - - Let's move the test at the beginning of the loop and mark the listener - as saturated on exit. - - This may be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 741b4d6b7aad1e4a66dd8584b5eff729b08fade7) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - (cherry picked from commit 5c7c7e447df84a04bda88c40382b652cdb77a079) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - -diff --git a/src/listener.c b/src/listener.c -index 5f6fafbc..b94d823c 100644 ---- a/src/listener.c -+++ b/src/listener.c -@@ -457,11 +457,6 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - if (HA_SPIN_TRYLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock)) - return; - -- if (unlikely(l->nbconn >= l->maxconn)) { -- listener_full(l); -- goto end; -- } -- - if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED) && global.sps_lim) { - int max = freq_ctr_remain(&global.sess_per_sec, global.sps_lim, 0); - -@@ -520,7 +515,7 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - * worst case. If we fail due to system limits or temporary resource - * shortage, we try again 100ms later in the worst case. - */ -- while (max_accept--) { -+ while (l->nbconn < l->maxconn && max_accept--) { - struct sockaddr_storage addr; - socklen_t laddr = sizeof(addr); - unsigned int count; -@@ -627,11 +622,6 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - goto transient_error; - } - -- if (l->nbconn >= l->maxconn) { -- listener_full(l); -- goto end; -- } -- - /* increase the per-process number of cumulated connections */ - if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) { - count = update_freq_ctr(&global.sess_per_sec, 1); -@@ -659,6 +649,9 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - limit_listener(l, &global_listener_queue); - task_schedule(global_listener_queue_task, tick_first(expire, global_listener_queue_task->expire)); - end: -+ if (l->nbconn >= l->maxconn) -+ listener_full(l); -+ - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock); - } - diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/002-BUG-MEDIUM-logs-Only-attempt-to-free-startup_logs-once.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/002-BUG-MEDIUM-logs-Only-attempt-to-free-startup_logs-once.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d72636015f..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/002-BUG-MEDIUM-logs-Only-attempt-to-free-startup_logs-once.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -commit 4c82743abd299f0aa8105e98ec92b76375a7f344 -Author: Olivier Houchard -Date: Thu Mar 7 14:19:24 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: logs: Only attempt to free startup_logs once. - - deinit_log_buffers() can be called once per thread, however startup_logs - is common to all threads. So only attempt to free it once. - - This should be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 7c49711d6041d1afc42d5b310ddfd7d6f6817c3c) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - (cherry picked from commit bc3e21b27849275306a0580488613b7dfd4d8eb5) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - -diff --git a/src/log.c b/src/log.c -index b3f33662..9c112255 100644 ---- a/src/log.c -+++ b/src/log.c -@@ -1380,11 +1380,15 @@ int init_log_buffers() - /* Deinitialize log buffers used for syslog messages */ - void deinit_log_buffers() - { -+ void *tmp_startup_logs; -+ - free(logheader); - free(logheader_rfc5424); - free(logline); - free(logline_rfc5424); -- free(startup_logs); -+ tmp_startup_logs = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&startup_logs, NULL); -+ free(tmp_startup_logs); -+ - logheader = NULL; - logheader_rfc5424 = NULL; - logline = NULL; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/002-MINOR-spoe-Use-the-sample-context-to-pass-frag_ctx-info-during-encoding.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/002-MINOR-spoe-Use-the-sample-context-to-pass-frag_ctx-info-during-encoding.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c26629c816 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/002-MINOR-spoe-Use-the-sample-context-to-pass-frag_ctx-info-during-encoding.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +commit 72fdff1fdb5b82685dc3d2db23ece042195a0cbd +Author: Christopher Faulet +Date: Fri Apr 26 14:30:15 2019 +0200 + + MINOR: spoe: Use the sample context to pass frag_ctx info during encoding + + This simplifies the API and hide the details in the sample. This way, only + string and binary are aware of these info, because other types cannot be + partially encoded. + + This patch may be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. + + (cherry picked from commit 85db3212b87b33f1a39a688546f4f53a5c4ba4da) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + (cherry picked from commit b93366e3ee44f5de93f01569fcdcd602f6d0703f) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/include/proto/spoe.h b/include/proto/spoe.h +index 2cdca10b..cce13e50 100644 +--- a/include/proto/spoe.h ++++ b/include/proto/spoe.h +@@ -117,11 +117,9 @@ spoe_decode_buffer(char **buf, char *end, char **str, uint64_t *len) + * + * If the value is too big to be encoded, depending on its type, then encoding + * failed or the value is partially encoded. Only strings and binaries can be +- * partially encoded. In this case, the offset <*off> is updated to known how +- * many bytes has been encoded. If <*off> is zero at the end, it means that all +- * data has been encoded. */ ++ * partially encoded. */ + static inline int +-spoe_encode_data(unsigned int *len, struct sample *smp, unsigned int *off, char **buf, char *end) ++spoe_encode_data(struct sample *smp, char **buf, char *end) + { + char *p = *buf; + int ret; +@@ -164,12 +162,16 @@ spoe_encode_data(unsigned int *len, struct sample *smp, unsigned int *off, char + + case SMP_T_STR: + case SMP_T_BIN: { ++ /* If defined, get length and offset of the sample by reading the sample ++ * context. ctx.a[0] is the pointer to the length and ctx.a[1] is the ++ * pointer to the offset. If the offset is greater than 0, it means the ++ * sample is partially encoded. In this case, we only need to encode the ++ * reamining. When all the sample is encoded, the offset is reset to 0. ++ * So the caller know it can try to encode the next sample. */ + struct chunk *chk = &smp->data.u.str; ++ unsigned int *len = (smp->ctx.a[0] ? smp->ctx.a[0] : 0); ++ unsigned int *off = (smp->ctx.a[1] ? smp->ctx.a[1] : 0); + +- /* Here, we need to know if the sample has already been +- * partially encoded. If yes, we only need to encode the +- * remaining, <*off> reprensenting the number of bytes +- * already encoded. */ + if (!*off) { + /* First evaluation of the sample : encode the + * type (string or binary), the buffer length +diff --git a/src/flt_spoe.c b/src/flt_spoe.c +index 0c0b3794..66d8b045 100644 +--- a/src/flt_spoe.c ++++ b/src/flt_spoe.c +@@ -2187,7 +2187,9 @@ spoe_encode_message(struct stream *s, struct spoe_context *ctx, + + /* Fetch the arguement value */ + smp = sample_process(s->be, s->sess, s, dir|SMP_OPT_FINAL, arg->expr, NULL); +- ret = spoe_encode_data(&ctx->frag_ctx.curlen, smp, &ctx->frag_ctx.curoff, buf, end); ++ smp->ctx.a[0] = &ctx->frag_ctx.curlen; ++ smp->ctx.a[1] = &ctx->frag_ctx.curoff; ++ ret = spoe_encode_data(smp, buf, end); + if (ret == -1 || ctx->frag_ctx.curoff) + goto too_big; + } diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUG-MEDIUM-51d-fix-possible-segfault-on-deinit_51degrees.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUG-MEDIUM-51d-fix-possible-segfault-on-deinit_51degrees.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3c9078f0ca..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUG-MEDIUM-51d-fix-possible-segfault-on-deinit_51degrees.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -commit 63f5dbf1b9fcdc5b10537d733b0e0798905ff1dc -Author: Dragan Dosen -Date: Thu Mar 7 15:24:23 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: 51d: fix possible segfault on deinit_51degrees() - - When haproxy is built with 51Degrees support, but not configured to use - 51Degrees database, a segfault can occur when deinit_51degrees() - function is called, eg. during soft-stop on SIGUSR1 signal. - - Only builds that use Pattern algorithm are affected. - - This fix must be backported to all stable branches where 51Degrees - support is available. Additional adjustments are required for some - branches due to API and naming changes. - - (cherry picked from commit bc6218e1b02860c6cdad0d2bb4dc8874557087f8) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - (cherry picked from commit 4e0363e84cb3f6ca341e1f83c6fd490c76c9ae6b) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - -diff --git a/src/51d.c b/src/51d.c -index a36333ef..03101136 100644 ---- a/src/51d.c -+++ b/src/51d.c -@@ -639,7 +639,8 @@ static void deinit_51degrees(void) - - free(global_51degrees.header_names); - #ifdef FIFTYONEDEGREES_H_PATTERN_INCLUDED -- fiftyoneDegreesWorksetPoolFree(global_51degrees.pool); -+ if (global_51degrees.pool) -+ fiftyoneDegreesWorksetPoolFree(global_51degrees.pool); - #endif - #ifdef FIFTYONEDEGREES_H_TRIE_INCLUDED - free(global_51degrees.device_offsets.firstOffset); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/003-DOC-contrib-modsecurity-Typos-and-fix-the-reject-example.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/003-DOC-contrib-modsecurity-Typos-and-fix-the-reject-example.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..514c4c568d --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/003-DOC-contrib-modsecurity-Typos-and-fix-the-reject-example.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +commit dfc3718f0a302ea3deb5f1a325d35fce0e4cfa48 +Author: Yann Cézard +Date: Thu Apr 25 14:48:38 2019 +0200 + + DOC: contrib/modsecurity: Typos and fix the reject example + + Thanks to https://www.mail-archive.com/haproxy@formilux.org/msg30056.html + + This patch may be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. + + (cherry picked from commit 494ddbff478d880e48de490f2689607addac70bc) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + (cherry picked from commit 850896603086877641272d6e4075e66bd91f2e50) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/contrib/modsecurity/README b/contrib/modsecurity/README +index e6cb305e..8031389d 100644 +--- a/contrib/modsecurity/README ++++ b/contrib/modsecurity/README +@@ -88,15 +88,15 @@ HAProxy configuration. For example: + balance roundrobin + timeout connect 5s + timeout server 3m +- server iprep1 127.0.0.1:12345 ++ server modsec1 127.0.0.1:12345 + + The modsecurity action is returned in a variable called txn.modsec.code. It + contains the HTTP returned code. If the variable contains 0, the request is + clean. + +- tcp-request content reject if { var(txn.modsec.code) -m int gt 0 } ++ http-request deny if { var(txn.modsec.code) -m int gt 0 } + +-With this rule, all the request not clean are reected. ++With this rule, all the request not clean are rejected. + + + Known bugs, limitations and TODO list diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MEDIUM-contrib-modsecurity-If-host-header-is-NULL-dont-try-to-strdup-it.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MEDIUM-contrib-modsecurity-If-host-header-is-NULL-dont-try-to-strdup-it.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..af49cc2f41 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MEDIUM-contrib-modsecurity-If-host-header-is-NULL-dont-try-to-strdup-it.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +commit 95cf225d099dcb49eefcf4f5b648be604414ae0c +Author: Yann Cézard +Date: Thu Apr 25 14:30:23 2019 +0200 + + BUG/MEDIUM: contrib/modsecurity: If host header is NULL, don't try to strdup it + + I discovered this bug when running OWASP regression tests against HAProxy + + modsecurity-spoa (it's a POC to evaluate how it is working). I found out that + modsecurity spoa will crash when the request doesn't have any Host header. + + See the pull request #86 on github for details. + + This patch must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. + + (cherry picked from commit bf60f6b8033deddc86de5357d6099c7593fe44cc) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + (cherry picked from commit d988e3dddcbe1f48f3b24d1bb529fc9ecefde180) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/contrib/modsecurity/modsec_wrapper.c b/contrib/modsecurity/modsec_wrapper.c +index 271ec15d..2f3987b4 100644 +--- a/contrib/modsecurity/modsec_wrapper.c ++++ b/contrib/modsecurity/modsec_wrapper.c +@@ -325,7 +325,11 @@ int modsecurity_process(struct worker *worker, struct modsecurity_parameters *pa + req->content_type = apr_table_get(req->headers_in, "Content-Type"); + req->content_encoding = apr_table_get(req->headers_in, "Content-Encoding"); + req->hostname = apr_table_get(req->headers_in, "Host"); +- req->parsed_uri.hostname = chunk_strdup(req, req->hostname, strlen(req->hostname)); ++ if (req->hostname != NULL) { ++ req->parsed_uri.hostname = chunk_strdup(req, req->hostname, strlen(req->hostname)); ++ } else { ++ req->parsed_uri.hostname = NULL; ++ } + + lang = apr_table_get(req->headers_in, "Content-Languages"); + if (lang != NULL) { diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MINOR-ssl-fix-warning-about-ssl-min-max-ver-support.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MINOR-ssl-fix-warning-about-ssl-min-max-ver-support.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6c1fac8a89..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MINOR-ssl-fix-warning-about-ssl-min-max-ver-support.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -commit 57e2606f70fa8d26fe4b5563ba72a6c7f2a25655 -Author: Lukas Tribus -Date: Tue Mar 5 23:14:32 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MINOR: ssl: fix warning about ssl-min/max-ver support - - In 84e417d8 ("MINOR: ssl: support Openssl 1.1.1 early callback for - switchctx") the code was extended to also support OpenSSL 1.1.1 - (code already supported BoringSSL). A configuration check warning - was updated but with the wrong logic, the #ifdef needs a && instead - of an ||. - - Reported in #54. - - Should be backported to 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 1aabc939780d5eab1f88089d01fb077ad9315c65) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - (cherry picked from commit f407d16b8f4cf2afb148668a23a1ba1cc4dd942a) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - -diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c -index 7736c324..afdb1fce 100644 ---- a/src/ssl_sock.c -+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c -@@ -7418,7 +7418,7 @@ static int parse_tls_method_minmax(char **args, int cur_arg, struct tls_version_ - - static int ssl_bind_parse_tls_method_minmax(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct ssl_bind_conf *conf, char **err) - { --#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10101000L) || !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) -+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10101000L) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) - ha_warning("crt-list: ssl-min-ver and ssl-max-ver are not supported with this Openssl version (skipped).\n"); - #endif - return parse_tls_method_minmax(args, cur_arg, &conf->ssl_methods, err); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/005-MEDIUM-threads-Use-__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST-when-using-the-newer-atomic-API.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/005-MEDIUM-threads-Use-__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST-when-using-the-newer-atomic-API.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4acae7d32a..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/005-MEDIUM-threads-Use-__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST-when-using-the-newer-atomic-API.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -commit 62aec002ccd6a7129b4f5e2e88be1957a6b2308b -Author: Olivier Houchard -Date: Thu Mar 7 18:48:22 2019 +0100 - - MEDIUM: threads: Use __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST when using the newer atomic API. - - When using the new __atomic* API, ask the compiler to generate barriers. - A variant of those functions that don't generate barriers will be added later. - Before that, using HA_ATOMIC* would not generate any barrier, and some parts - of the code should be reviewed and missing barriers should be added. - - This should probably be backported to 1.8 and 1.9. - - (cherry picked from commit 113537967c8680f94977473e18c9e14dc09c3356) - [wt: this is in fact a real bug fix : all these atomics do not provide - the slightest sequential consistency by default as the value 0 is - __ATOMIC_RELAXED, which will definitely cause random issues with - threads on non-x86 platforms]. - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit e5d1670f5fa95972fed6391201c0da8982bb9f94) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/hathreads.h b/include/common/hathreads.h -index 24fb1d1a..8a738aaf 100644 ---- a/include/common/hathreads.h -+++ b/include/common/hathreads.h -@@ -213,14 +213,14 @@ static inline unsigned long thread_isolated() - }) - #else - /* gcc >= 4.7 */ --#define HA_ATOMIC_CAS(val, old, new) __atomic_compare_exchange_n(val, old, new, 0, 0, 0) --#define HA_ATOMIC_ADD(val, i) __atomic_add_fetch(val, i, 0) --#define HA_ATOMIC_XADD(val, i) __atomic_fetch_add(val, i, 0) --#define HA_ATOMIC_SUB(val, i) __atomic_sub_fetch(val, i, 0) --#define HA_ATOMIC_AND(val, flags) __atomic_and_fetch(val, flags, 0) --#define HA_ATOMIC_OR(val, flags) __atomic_or_fetch(val, flags, 0) --#define HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(val, new) __atomic_exchange_n(val, new, 0) --#define HA_ATOMIC_STORE(val, new) __atomic_store_n(val, new, 0) -+#define HA_ATOMIC_CAS(val, old, new) __atomic_compare_exchange_n(val, old, new, 0, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) -+#define HA_ATOMIC_ADD(val, i) __atomic_add_fetch(val, i, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) -+#define HA_ATOMIC_XADD(val, i) __atomic_fetch_add(val, i, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) -+#define HA_ATOMIC_SUB(val, i) __atomic_sub_fetch(val, i, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) -+#define HA_ATOMIC_AND(val, flags) __atomic_and_fetch(val, flags, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) -+#define HA_ATOMIC_OR(val, flags) __atomic_or_fetch(val, flags, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) -+#define HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(val, new) __atomic_exchange_n(val, new, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) -+#define HA_ATOMIC_STORE(val, new) __atomic_store_n(val, new, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) - #endif - - #define HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(val, new) \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/005-MINOR-examples-Use-right-locale-for-the-last-changelog-date-in-haproxy-spec.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/005-MINOR-examples-Use-right-locale-for-the-last-changelog-date-in-haproxy-spec.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..310dc0f4f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/005-MINOR-examples-Use-right-locale-for-the-last-changelog-date-in-haproxy-spec.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +commit 86860896dc1841eb59cb95832d76a8093e8dc8c5 +Author: Christopher Faulet +Date: Tue Apr 30 10:55:38 2019 +0200 + + MINOR: examples: Use right locale for the last changelog date in haproxy.spec + + The last changelog entry was stamped with the wrong locale. + + No need to backport, it is specific to 1.8 + +diff --git a/examples/haproxy.spec b/examples/haproxy.spec +index f3e0c7e0..fe5215d7 100644 +--- a/examples/haproxy.spec ++++ b/examples/haproxy.spec +@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ fi + %attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/rc.d/init.d/%{name} + + %changelog +-* jeu. avril 25 2019 Christopher Faulet ++* Thu Apr 25 2019 Christopher Faulet + - updated to 1.8.20 + + * Mon Feb 11 2019 Willy Tarreau diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MAJOR-map-acl-real-fix-segfault-during-show-map-acl-on-CLI.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MAJOR-map-acl-real-fix-segfault-during-show-map-acl-on-CLI.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e961294770 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MAJOR-map-acl-real-fix-segfault-during-show-map-acl-on-CLI.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +commit 83af1f6b65806982640679823228976deebf5202 +Author: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue Apr 30 11:43:43 2019 +0200 + + BUG/MAJOR: map/acl: real fix segfault during show map/acl on CLI + + A previous commit 8d85aa44d ("BUG/MAJOR: map: fix segfault during + 'show map/acl' on cli.") was provided to address a concurrency issue + between "show acl" and "clear acl" on the CLI. Sadly the code placed + there was copy-pasted without changing the element type (which was + struct stream in the original code) and not tested since the crash + is still present. + + The reproducer is simple : load a large ACL file (e.g. geolocation + addresses), issue "show acl #0" in loops in one window and issue a + "clear acl #0" in the other one, haproxy crashes. + + This fix was also tested with threads enabled and looks good since + the locking seems to work correctly in these areas though. It will + have to be backported as far as 1.6 since the commit above went + that far as well... + + (cherry picked from commit 49ee3b2f9a9e5d0b8d394938df527aa645ce72b4) + Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau + (cherry picked from commit ac4be10f62ef72962d9cf0e6f2619e1e1c370d62) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/src/pattern.c b/src/pattern.c +index 7eea9d96..21639569 100644 +--- a/src/pattern.c ++++ b/src/pattern.c +@@ -1651,7 +1651,7 @@ int pat_ref_delete_by_id(struct pat_ref *ref, struct pat_ref_elt *refelt) + LIST_DEL(&bref->users); + LIST_INIT(&bref->users); + if (elt->list.n != &ref->head) +- LIST_ADDQ(&LIST_ELEM(elt->list.n, struct stream *, list)->back_refs, &bref->users); ++ LIST_ADDQ(&LIST_ELEM(elt->list.n, typeof(elt), list)->back_refs, &bref->users); + bref->ref = elt->list.n; + } + list_for_each_entry(expr, &ref->pat, list) +@@ -1691,7 +1691,7 @@ int pat_ref_delete(struct pat_ref *ref, const char *key) + LIST_DEL(&bref->users); + LIST_INIT(&bref->users); + if (elt->list.n != &ref->head) +- LIST_ADDQ(&LIST_ELEM(elt->list.n, struct stream *, list)->back_refs, &bref->users); ++ LIST_ADDQ(&LIST_ELEM(elt->list.n, typeof(elt), list)->back_refs, &bref->users); + bref->ref = elt->list.n; + } + list_for_each_entry(expr, &ref->pat, list) +@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ void pat_ref_reload(struct pat_ref *ref, struct pat_ref *replace) + LIST_DEL(&bref->users); + LIST_INIT(&bref->users); + if (elt->list.n != &ref->head) +- LIST_ADDQ(&LIST_ELEM(elt->list.n, struct stream *, list)->back_refs, &bref->users); ++ LIST_ADDQ(&LIST_ELEM(elt->list.n, typeof(elt), list)->back_refs, &bref->users); + bref->ref = elt->list.n; + } + LIST_DEL(&elt->list); +@@ -2175,7 +2175,7 @@ void pat_ref_prune(struct pat_ref *ref) + LIST_DEL(&bref->users); + LIST_INIT(&bref->users); + if (elt->list.n != &ref->head) +- LIST_ADDQ(&LIST_ELEM(elt->list.n, struct stream *, list)->back_refs, &bref->users); ++ LIST_ADDQ(&LIST_ELEM(elt->list.n, typeof(elt), list)->back_refs, &bref->users); + bref->ref = elt->list.n; + } + LIST_DEL(&elt->list); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MEDIUM-threads-fd-do-not-forget-to-take-into-account-epoll_fd-pipes.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MEDIUM-threads-fd-do-not-forget-to-take-into-account-epoll_fd-pipes.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 68cd98a7e0..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MEDIUM-threads-fd-do-not-forget-to-take-into-account-epoll_fd-pipes.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -commit 1dfa4fd4be313a87f2a4861e81d0ad8ea8214223 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu Mar 14 19:10:55 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: threads/fd: do not forget to take into account epoll_fd/pipes - - Each thread uses one epoll_fd or kqueue_fd, and a pipe (thus two FDs). - These ones have to be accounted for in the maxsock calculation, otherwise - we can reach maxsock before maxconn. This is difficult to observe but it - in fact happens when a server connects back to the frontend and has checks - enabled : the check uses its FD and serves to fill the loop. In this case - all FDs planed for the datapath are used for this. - - This needs to be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 2c58b41c96e70f567d0f9ae876a80770630c06ee) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 26d110ba04cba02b337beff53a83847320e4fcdb) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/haproxy.c b/src/haproxy.c -index 68367627..5c3febdd 100644 ---- a/src/haproxy.c -+++ b/src/haproxy.c -@@ -1828,6 +1828,9 @@ static void init(int argc, char **argv) - global.hardmaxconn = global.maxconn; /* keep this max value */ - global.maxsock += global.maxconn * 2; /* each connection needs two sockets */ - global.maxsock += global.maxpipes * 2; /* each pipe needs two FDs */ -+ global.maxsock += global.nbthread; /* one epoll_fd/kqueue_fd per thread */ -+ global.maxsock += 2 * global.nbthread; /* one wake-up pipe (2 fd) per thread */ -+ - /* compute fd used by async engines */ - if (global.ssl_used_async_engines) { - int sides = !!global.ssl_used_frontend + !!global.ssl_used_backend; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MAJOR-spoe-Fix-initialization-of-thread-dependent-fields.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MAJOR-spoe-Fix-initialization-of-thread-dependent-fields.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f4d448c212..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MAJOR-spoe-Fix-initialization-of-thread-dependent-fields.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -commit a3cfe8f4bc2ec98fdbe25c49f2c21699b6d09d2b -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Mon Mar 18 13:57:42 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MAJOR: spoe: Fix initialization of thread-dependent fields - - A bug was introduced in the commit b0769b ("BUG/MEDIUM: spoe: initialization - depending on nbthread must be done last"). The code depending on global.nbthread - was moved from cfg_parse_spoe_agent() to spoe_check() but the pointer on the - agent configuration was not updated to use the filter's one. The variable - curagent is a global variable only valid during the configuration parsing. In - spoe_check(), conf->agent must be used instead. - - This patch must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit fe261551b9980fe33990eb34d2153bf1de24b20f) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit 7a93d271d549144a8ed8c816f5694a51ab62b90c) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/flt_spoe.c b/src/flt_spoe.c -index e4453882..66d26f34 100644 ---- a/src/flt_spoe.c -+++ b/src/flt_spoe.c -@@ -2937,20 +2937,20 @@ spoe_check(struct proxy *px, struct flt_conf *fconf) - if (global.nbthread == 1) - conf->agent->flags |= SPOE_FL_ASYNC; - -- if ((curagent->rt = calloc(global.nbthread, sizeof(*curagent->rt))) == NULL) { -+ if ((conf->agent->rt = calloc(global.nbthread, sizeof(*conf->agent->rt))) == NULL) { - ha_alert("Proxy %s : out of memory initializing SPOE agent '%s' declared at %s:%d.\n", - px->id, conf->agent->id, conf->agent->conf.file, conf->agent->conf.line); - return 1; - } - for (i = 0; i < global.nbthread; ++i) { -- curagent->rt[i].frame_size = curagent->max_frame_size; -- curagent->rt[i].applets_act = 0; -- curagent->rt[i].applets_idle = 0; -- curagent->rt[i].sending_rate = 0; -- LIST_INIT(&curagent->rt[i].applets); -- LIST_INIT(&curagent->rt[i].sending_queue); -- LIST_INIT(&curagent->rt[i].waiting_queue); -- HA_SPIN_INIT(&curagent->rt[i].lock); -+ conf->agent->rt[i].frame_size = conf->agent->max_frame_size; -+ conf->agent->rt[i].applets_act = 0; -+ conf->agent->rt[i].applets_idle = 0; -+ conf->agent->rt[i].sending_rate = 0; -+ LIST_INIT(&conf->agent->rt[i].applets); -+ LIST_INIT(&conf->agent->rt[i].sending_queue); -+ LIST_INIT(&conf->agent->rt[i].waiting_queue); -+ HA_SPIN_INIT(&conf->agent->rt[i].lock); - } - - free(conf->agent->b.name); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-Fix-how-unlimited-number-of-consecutive-accepts-is-handled.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-Fix-how-unlimited-number-of-consecutive-accepts-is-handled.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e54c530fbe --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-Fix-how-unlimited-number-of-consecutive-accepts-is-handled.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +commit 7bd7a8d2b8889f604b807c21190d2e70328d6674 +Author: Christopher Faulet +Date: Tue Apr 30 12:17:13 2019 +0200 + + BUG/MEDIUM: listener: Fix how unlimited number of consecutive accepts is handled + + There is a bug when global.tune.maxaccept is set to -1 (no limit). It is pretty + visible with one process (nbproc sets to 1). The functions listener_accept() and + accept_queue_process() don't expect to handle negative maxaccept values. So + instead of accepting incoming connections without any limit, none are never + accepted and HAProxy loop infinitly in the scheduler. + + When there are 2 or more processes, the bug is a bit more subtile. The limit for + a listener is set to 1. So only one connection is accepted at a time by a given + listener. This happens because the listener's maxaccept value is an unsigned + integer. In check_config_validity(), it is first set to UINT_MAX (-1 casted in + an unsigned integer), and then some calculations on it leads to an integer + overflow. + + To fix the bug, the listener's maxaccept value is now a signed integer. So, if a + negative value is set for global.tune.maxaccept, we keep it untouched for the + listener and no calculation is made on it. Then, in the listener code, this + signed value is casted to a unsigned one. It simplifies all tests instead of + dealing with negative values. So, it limits the number of connections accepted + at a time to UINT_MAX at most. But, honestly, it not an issue. + + This patch must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. + + (cherry picked from commit 102854cbbaa4d22466dddec9035d411db244082f) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + (cherry picked from commit bca4fb2d9d7f2966d9f8270fa1796fdc0dfc866d) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/include/types/listener.h b/include/types/listener.h +index ea2eadb5..16ef6d7a 100644 +--- a/include/types/listener.h ++++ b/include/types/listener.h +@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ struct listener { + int nbconn; /* current number of connections on this listener */ + int maxconn; /* maximum connections allowed on this listener */ + unsigned int backlog; /* if set, listen backlog */ +- unsigned int maxaccept; /* if set, max number of connections accepted at once */ ++ int maxaccept; /* if set, max number of connections accepted at once (-1 when disabled) */ + struct list proto_list; /* list in the protocol header */ + int (*accept)(struct listener *l, int fd, struct sockaddr_storage *addr); /* upper layer's accept() */ + enum obj_type *default_target; /* default target to use for accepted sessions or NULL */ +diff --git a/src/listener.c b/src/listener.c +index 821c931a..74990c45 100644 +--- a/src/listener.c ++++ b/src/listener.c +@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) + { + struct listener *l = fdtab[fd].owner; + struct proxy *p; +- int max_accept; ++ unsigned int max_accept; + int next_conn = 0; + int next_feconn = 0; + int next_actconn = 0; +@@ -420,6 +420,10 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) + if (!l) + return; + p = l->bind_conf->frontend; ++ ++ /* if l->maxaccept is -1, then max_accept is UINT_MAX. It is not really ++ * illimited, but it is probably enough. ++ */ + max_accept = l->maxaccept ? l->maxaccept : 1; + + if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED) && global.sps_lim) { +@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) + * worst case. If we fail due to system limits or temporary resource + * shortage, we try again 100ms later in the worst case. + */ +- for (; max_accept-- > 0; next_conn = next_feconn = next_actconn = 0) { ++ for (; max_accept; next_conn = next_feconn = next_actconn = 0, max_accept--) { + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + socklen_t laddr = sizeof(addr); + unsigned int count; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/008-BUG-MAJOR-stats-Fix-how-huge-POST-data-are-read-from-the-channel.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/008-BUG-MAJOR-stats-Fix-how-huge-POST-data-are-read-from-the-channel.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2b293e4779..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/008-BUG-MAJOR-stats-Fix-how-huge-POST-data-are-read-from-the-channel.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -commit 3c6ad99924236bf8b7741030bd163aacb820d451 -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Wed Feb 27 15:30:57 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MAJOR: stats: Fix how huge POST data are read from the channel - - When the body length is greater than a chunk size (so if length of POST data - exceeds the buffer size), the requests is rejected with the status code - STAT_STATUS_EXCD. Otherwise the stats applet will wait to have all the data to - copy and parse them. But there is a problem when the total request size - (including the headers) is just lower than the buffer size but greater the - buffer size less the reserve. In such case, the body length is considered as - enough small to be processed but not entierly received. So the stats applet - waits for more data. But because outgoing data are still there, the channel's - buffer is considered as full and nothing more can be read, leading to a freeze - of the session. - - Note this bug is pretty easy to reproduce with the legacy HTTP. It is harder - with the HTX but still possible. To fix the bug, in the stats applet, when the - request is not fully received, we check if at least the reserve remains - available the channel's buffer. - - This patch must be backported as far as 1.5. But because the HTX does not exist - in 1.8 and lower, it will have to be adapted for these versions. - - (cherry picked from commit 2f9a41d52b28b88d44aab063bb2b88025a388981) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 18a5b1eece7e12047c1dc371c42f72d9d129ce0a) - [cf: HTX code removed and calls to the new buffer API replaced to use the old - one] - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/stats.c b/src/stats.c -index 4973bb8a..0a6c15f6 100644 ---- a/src/stats.c -+++ b/src/stats.c -@@ -2441,6 +2441,7 @@ static void stats_dump_html_info(struct stream_interface *si, struct uri_auth *u - "Action not processed because of invalid parameters." - "
    " - "
  • The action is maybe unknown.
    • " -+ "
  • Invalid key parameter (empty or too long).
    • " - "
  • The backend name is probably unknown or ambiguous (duplicated names).
    • " - "
  • Some server names are probably unknown or ambiguous (duplicated names in the backend).
    • " - "
" -@@ -2634,17 +2635,20 @@ static int stats_process_http_post(struct stream_interface *si) - int reql; - - temp = get_trash_chunk(); -- if (temp->size < s->txn->req.body_len) { -- /* too large request */ -- appctx->ctx.stats.st_code = STAT_STATUS_EXCD; -- goto out; -- } - -+ /* we need more data */ -+ if (s->txn->req.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_DONE) { -+ /* check if we can receive more */ -+ if (buffer_total_space(s->req.buf) <= global.tune.maxrewrite) { -+ appctx->ctx.stats.st_code = STAT_STATUS_EXCD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ goto wait; -+ } - reql = co_getblk(si_oc(si), temp->str, s->txn->req.body_len, s->txn->req.eoh + 2); - if (reql <= 0) { -- /* we need more data */ -- appctx->ctx.stats.st_code = STAT_STATUS_NONE; -- return 0; -+ appctx->ctx.stats.st_code = STAT_STATUS_EXCD; -+ goto out; - } - - first_param = temp->str; -@@ -2673,7 +2677,7 @@ static int stats_process_http_post(struct stream_interface *si) - strncpy(key, cur_param + poffset, plen); - key[plen - 1] = '\0'; - } else { -- appctx->ctx.stats.st_code = STAT_STATUS_EXCD; -+ appctx->ctx.stats.st_code = STAT_STATUS_ERRP; - goto out; - } - -@@ -2929,6 +2933,9 @@ static int stats_process_http_post(struct stream_interface *si) - } - out: - return 1; -+ wait: -+ appctx->ctx.stats.st_code = STAT_STATUS_NONE; -+ return 0; - } - - diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/008-MINOR-config-Test-validity-of-tune-maxaccept-during-the-config-parsing.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/008-MINOR-config-Test-validity-of-tune-maxaccept-during-the-config-parsing.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c5d88967a --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/008-MINOR-config-Test-validity-of-tune-maxaccept-during-the-config-parsing.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +commit 6e580b6e744011e87c337ebe2c082acfd5ca835a +Author: Christopher Faulet +Date: Tue Apr 30 14:03:56 2019 +0200 + + MINOR: config: Test validity of tune.maxaccept during the config parsing + + Only -1 and positive integers from 0 to INT_MAX are accepted. An error is + triggered during the config parsing for any other values. + + This patch may be backported to all supported versions. + + (cherry picked from commit 6b02ab87348090efec73b1dd24f414239669f279) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + (cherry picked from commit 2bbc40f8bc9a52ba0d03b25270ac0129cca29bba) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c +index c178538b..8e325416 100644 +--- a/src/cfgparse.c ++++ b/src/cfgparse.c +@@ -789,6 +789,8 @@ int cfg_parse_global(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, int kwm) + global.tune.maxpollevents = atol(args[1]); + } + else if (!strcmp(args[0], "tune.maxaccept")) { ++ long max; ++ + if (alertif_too_many_args(1, file, linenum, args, &err_code)) + goto out; + if (global.tune.maxaccept != 0) { +@@ -801,7 +803,13 @@ int cfg_parse_global(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, int kwm) + err_code |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; + goto out; + } +- global.tune.maxaccept = atol(args[1]); ++ max = atol(args[1]); ++ if (/*max < -1 || */max > INT_MAX) { ++ ha_alert("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' expects -1 or an integer from 0 to INT_MAX.\n", file, linenum, args[0]); ++ err_code |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ global.tune.maxaccept = max; + } + else if (!strcmp(args[0], "tune.chksize")) { + if (alertif_too_many_args(1, file, linenum, args, &err_code)) diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/009-BUG-MINOR-http-counters-fix-missing-increment-of-fe--srv_aborts.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/009-BUG-MINOR-http-counters-fix-missing-increment-of-fe--srv_aborts.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ae1a0e553a..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/009-BUG-MINOR-http-counters-fix-missing-increment-of-fe--srv_aborts.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -commit f5ed1f24a9f7bb3b58f6f29b403963e0155e44a9 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Mon Mar 18 11:02:57 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MINOR: http/counters: fix missing increment of fe->srv_aborts - - When a server aborts a transfer, we used to increment the backend's - counter but not the frontend's during the forwarding phase. This fixes - it. It might be backported to all supported versions (possibly removing - the htx part) though it is of very low importance. - - (cherry picked from commit d1fd6f5f64e4d05d4993f2d43c1ee8c79a16fec1) - [wt: s/_HA_ATOMIC/HA_ATOMIC/] - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 8aa5c6f660ecc9ed79e759a70112e1dbfd59831d) - [cf: HTX code removed] - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c -index efd318e7..8b087c5b 100644 ---- a/src/proto_http.c -+++ b/src/proto_http.c -@@ -6150,6 +6150,7 @@ int http_response_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *res, int an_bit - if (!buffer_pending(res->buf)) { - if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK)) - s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL; -+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.srv_aborts, 1); - HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.srv_aborts, 1); - if (objt_server(s->target)) - HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.srv_aborts, 1); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/009-CLEANUP-config-Dont-alter-listener--maxaccept-when-nbproc-is-set-to-1.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/009-CLEANUP-config-Dont-alter-listener--maxaccept-when-nbproc-is-set-to-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4bcae444fe --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/009-CLEANUP-config-Dont-alter-listener--maxaccept-when-nbproc-is-set-to-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +commit c6e03c1495fa51f9a98ed0bbe3230313c7c7201c +Author: Christopher Faulet +Date: Tue Apr 30 14:08:41 2019 +0200 + + CLEANUP: config: Don't alter listener->maxaccept when nbproc is set to 1 + + This patch only removes a useless calculation on listener->maxaccept when nbproc + is set to 1. Indeed, the following formula has no effet in such case: + + listener->maxaccept = (listener->maxaccept + nbproc - 1) / nbproc; + + This patch may be backported as far as 1.5. + + (cherry picked from commit 02f3cf19ed803d20aff9294ce7cb732489951ff5) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + (cherry picked from commit 14203e3cf9404e57de5e274b453f0fe4f2174924) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c +index 8e325416..3f6ea352 100644 +--- a/src/cfgparse.c ++++ b/src/cfgparse.c +@@ -9018,9 +9018,8 @@ out_uri_auth_compat: + * is bound to. Rememeber that maxaccept = -1 must be kept as it is + * used to disable the limit. + */ +- if (listener->maxaccept > 0) { +- if (nbproc > 1) +- listener->maxaccept = (listener->maxaccept + 1) / 2; ++ if (listener->maxaccept > 0 && nbproc > 1) { ++ listener->maxaccept = (listener->maxaccept + 1) / 2; + listener->maxaccept = (listener->maxaccept + nbproc - 1) / nbproc; + } + diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/010-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-ability-to-set-TLS-1-3-ciphers-using-ssl-default-server-ciphersuites.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/010-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-ability-to-set-TLS-1-3-ciphers-using-ssl-default-server-ciphersuites.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0fb3c0a910..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/010-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-ability-to-set-TLS-1-3-ciphers-using-ssl-default-server-ciphersuites.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -commit a2919cab08fff3fad434c574506b5ae23b4db131 -Author: Pierre Cheynier -Date: Thu Mar 21 16:15:47 2019 +0000 - - BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: ability to set TLS 1.3 ciphers using ssl-default-server-ciphersuites - - Any attempt to put TLS 1.3 ciphers on servers failed with output 'unable - to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites'. - - This was due to usage of SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list instead of - SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites in the TLS 1.3 block (protected by - OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L & so). - - This should be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - Signed-off-by: Pierre Cheynier - Reported-by: Damien Claisse - Cc: Emeric Brun - (cherry picked from commit bc34cd1de2ee80de63b5c4d319a501fc0d4ea2f5) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 4a8b9e3d5f4e76295c571900771fd1728bec474f) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c -index afdb1fce..fbb7cf2b 100644 ---- a/src/ssl_sock.c -+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c -@@ -4696,7 +4696,7 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct server *srv) - - #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) - if (srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites && -- !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites)) { -+ !SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites)) { - ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] : unable to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites to '%s'.\n", - curproxy->id, srv->id, - srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/010-MINOR-threads-Implement-HA_ATOMIC_LOAD.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/010-MINOR-threads-Implement-HA_ATOMIC_LOAD.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30e8cd4d72 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/010-MINOR-threads-Implement-HA_ATOMIC_LOAD.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +commit f95cf6ad70565ee2322cf23bc519b7bb0b3831b2 +Author: Olivier Houchard +Date: Tue Apr 30 13:38:02 2019 +0200 + + MINOR: threads: Implement HA_ATOMIC_LOAD(). + + The same way we have HA_ATOMIC_STORE(), implement HA_ATOMIC_LOAD(). + + This should be backported to 1.8 and 1.9, as we need it for a bug fix + in port ranges. + + (cherry picked from commit 9ce62b5498b27fbf4217d9c25779d5b2ceca23f2) + Signed-off-by: Olivier Houchard + (cherry picked from commit 358c979611370fa2bc3b8e47ed50a325cf9126cf) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/include/common/hathreads.h b/include/common/hathreads.h +index 8134839a..11d7cab6 100644 +--- a/include/common/hathreads.h ++++ b/include/common/hathreads.h +@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum { tid = 0 }; + *(val) = new; \ + __old_xchg; \ + }) ++#define HA_ATOMIC_LOAD(val) *(val) + #define HA_ATOMIC_STORE(val, new) ({*(val) = new;}) + #define HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(val, new) \ + ({ \ +@@ -203,6 +204,16 @@ static inline unsigned long thread_isolated() + } while (!__sync_bool_compare_and_swap(__val_xchg, __old_xchg, __new_xchg)); \ + __old_xchg; \ + }) ++ ++#define HA_ATOMIC_LOAD(val) \ ++ ({ \ ++ typeof(*(val)) ret; \ ++ __sync_synchronize(); \ ++ ret = *(volatile typeof(val))val; \ ++ __sync_synchronize(); \ ++ ret; \ ++ }) ++ + #define HA_ATOMIC_STORE(val, new) \ + ({ \ + typeof((val)) __val_store = (val); \ +@@ -221,6 +232,8 @@ static inline unsigned long thread_isolated() + #define HA_ATOMIC_OR(val, flags) __atomic_or_fetch(val, flags, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) + #define HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(val, new) __atomic_exchange_n(val, new, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) + #define HA_ATOMIC_STORE(val, new) __atomic_store_n(val, new, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) ++#define HA_ATOMIC_LOAD(val) __atomic_load_n(val, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST) ++ + #endif + + #define HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(val, new) \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/011-BUG-MEDIUM-port_range-Make-the-ring-buffer-lock-free.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/011-BUG-MEDIUM-port_range-Make-the-ring-buffer-lock-free.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68332fdde4 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/haproxy/patches/011-BUG-MEDIUM-port_range-Make-the-ring-buffer-lock-free.patch @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +commit 31470e2ba2aabb4c6340fbc15cb5486ceb8c69c8 +Author: Olivier Houchard +Date: Mon Apr 29 18:52:06 2019 +0200 + + BUG/MEDIUM: port_range: Make the ring buffer lock-free. + + Port range uses a ring buffer, and unfortunately, when making haproxy + multithreaded, it's been overlooked, and the ring buffer is not thread-safe. + When specifying a source range, 2 or more threads could pick the same + port, and of course only one of them could use the port, the others would + always fail the connection. + To fix this, make it a lock-free ring buffer. This is easier than usual + because we know the ring buffer can never be full. + + This should be backported to 1.8 and 1.9. + + (cherry picked from commit 07425de71777b688e77a9c70a7088c13e66e41e9) + Signed-off-by: Olivier Houchard + (cherry picked from commit bffb51147a4a5939e344b3c838628f9a944febef) + Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet + +diff --git a/include/proto/port_range.h b/include/proto/port_range.h +index 8c63faca..f7e3f1d5 100644 +--- a/include/proto/port_range.h ++++ b/include/proto/port_range.h +@@ -24,18 +24,22 @@ + + #include + ++#define GET_NEXT_OFF(range, off) ((off) == (range)->size - 1 ? 0 : (off) + 1) ++ + /* return an available port from range , or zero if none is left */ + static inline int port_range_alloc_port(struct port_range *range) + { + int ret; ++ int get; ++ int put; + +- if (!range->avail) +- return 0; +- ret = range->ports[range->get]; +- range->get++; +- if (range->get >= range->size) +- range->get = 0; +- range->avail--; ++ get = HA_ATOMIC_LOAD(&range->get); ++ do { ++ put = HA_ATOMIC_LOAD(&range->put_t); ++ if (unlikely(put == get)) ++ return 0; ++ ret = range->ports[get]; ++ } while (!(HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&range->get, &get, GET_NEXT_OFF(range, get)))); + return ret; + } + +@@ -45,14 +49,28 @@ static inline int port_range_alloc_port(struct port_range *range) + */ + static inline void port_range_release_port(struct port_range *range, int port) + { ++ int put; ++ + if (!port || !range) + return; + +- range->ports[range->put] = port; +- range->avail++; +- range->put++; +- if (range->put >= range->size) +- range->put = 0; ++ put = range->put_h; ++ /* put_h is reserved for producers, so that they can each get a ++ * free slot, put_t is what is used by consumers to know if there's ++ * elements available or not ++ */ ++ /* First reserve or slot, we know the ring buffer can't be full, ++ * as we will only ever release port we allocated before ++ */ ++ while (!(HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&range->put_h, &put, GET_NEXT_OFF(range, put)))); ++ HA_ATOMIC_STORE(&range->ports[put], port); ++ /* Wait until all the threads that got a slot before us are done */ ++ while ((volatile int)range->put_t != put) ++ __ha_compiler_barrier(); ++ /* Let the world know we're done, and any potential consumer they ++ * can use that port. ++ */ ++ HA_ATOMIC_STORE(&range->put_t, GET_NEXT_OFF(range, put)); + } + + /* return a new initialized port range of N ports. The ports are not +@@ -62,8 +80,10 @@ static inline struct port_range *port_range_alloc_range(int n) + { + struct port_range *ret; + ret = calloc(1, sizeof(struct port_range) + +- n * sizeof(((struct port_range *)0)->ports[0])); +- ret->size = ret->avail = n; ++ (n + 1) * sizeof(((struct port_range *)0)->ports[0])); ++ ret->size = n + 1; ++ /* Start at the first free element */ ++ ret->put_h = ret->put_t = n; + return ret; + } + +diff --git a/include/types/port_range.h b/include/types/port_range.h +index 1d010f77..33455d2d 100644 +--- a/include/types/port_range.h ++++ b/include/types/port_range.h +@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@ + #include + + struct port_range { +- int size, get, put; /* range size, and get/put positions */ +- int avail; /* number of available ports left */ ++ int size, get, put_h, put_t; /* range size, and get/put positions */ + uint16_t ports[0]; /* array of ports, in host byte order */ + }; + diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/011-DOC-The-option-httplog-is-no-longer-valid-in-a-backend.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/011-DOC-The-option-httplog-is-no-longer-valid-in-a-backend.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9d913dda17..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/011-DOC-The-option-httplog-is-no-longer-valid-in-a-backend.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -commit 6e9787fcc677b15cb9fc0baea8de545127b4fb85 -Author: Freddy Spierenburg -Date: Mon Mar 25 14:35:17 2019 +0100 - - DOC: The option httplog is no longer valid in a backend. - - This can be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit e88b77351b3fe34a83d5208773a63f78fb140722) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 79b70b0f8f86315230323e7f826796dffba4b85b) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt -index 8d75d568..3608a897 100644 ---- a/doc/configuration.txt -+++ b/doc/configuration.txt -@@ -2118,7 +2118,7 @@ option http-tunnel (*) X X X X - option http-use-proxy-header (*) X X X - - option httpchk X - X X - option httpclose (*) X X X X --option httplog X X X X -+option httplog X X X - - option http_proxy (*) X X X X - option independent-streams (*) X X X X - option ldap-check X - X X diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/012-BUG-MAJOR-checks-segfault-during-tcpcheck_main.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/012-BUG-MAJOR-checks-segfault-during-tcpcheck_main.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4d9fc029e9..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/012-BUG-MAJOR-checks-segfault-during-tcpcheck_main.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -commit ed3951cf6d9c7846fc780042fdddc194dda47c8d -Author: Ricardo Nabinger Sanchez -Date: Thu Mar 28 21:42:23 2019 -0300 - - BUG/MAJOR: checks: segfault during tcpcheck_main - - When using TCP health checks (tcp-check connect), it is possible to - crash with a segfault when, for reasons yet to be understood, the - protocol family is unknown. - - In the function tcpcheck_main(), proto is dereferenced without a prior - test in case it is NULL, leading to the segfault during proto->connect - dereference. - - The line has been unmodified since it was introduced, in commit - 69e273f3fcfbfb9cc0fb5a09668faad66cfbd36b. This was the only use of - proto (or more specifically, the return of protocol_by_family()) that - was unprotected; all other callsites perform the test for a NULL - pointer. - - This patch should be backported to 1.9, 1.8, 1.7, and 1.6. - - (cherry picked from commit 4bccea98912c74fa42c665ec25e417c2cca4eee7) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 2cefb36087f240b66b2aa4824a317ef5f9b85e68) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c -index e04f1146..fdebf931 100644 ---- a/src/checks.c -+++ b/src/checks.c -@@ -2771,7 +2771,7 @@ static int tcpcheck_main(struct check *check) - conn_install_mux(conn, &mux_pt_ops, cs); - - ret = SF_ERR_INTERNAL; -- if (proto->connect) -+ if (proto && proto->connect) - ret = proto->connect(conn, - 1 /* I/O polling is always needed */, - (next && next->action == TCPCHK_ACT_EXPECT) ? 0 : 2); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/048-deprecated-openssl.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/012-deprecated-openssl.patch similarity index 100% rename from net/haproxy/patches/048-deprecated-openssl.patch rename to net/haproxy/patches/012-deprecated-openssl.patch diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/013-BUILD-makefile-work-around-an-old-bug-in-GNU-make-3-80.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/013-BUILD-makefile-work-around-an-old-bug-in-GNU-make-3-80.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ba4ec2c043..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/013-BUILD-makefile-work-around-an-old-bug-in-GNU-make-3-80.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -commit 795773be8c3ddc8380f134adc7e2ccfde2d8469b -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Mar 29 17:17:52 2019 +0100 - - BUILD: makefile: work around an old bug in GNU make-3.80 - - GNU make-3.80 fails on the .build_opts target, expecting the closing - brace before the first semi-colon in the shell command, it probably - uses a more limited parser for dependencies. Actually it appears it's - enough to place this command in a variable and reference the variable - there. Since it doesn't affect later versions (and the resulting string - is always empty anyway), let's apply the minor change to continue to - comply with the announced dependencies. - - This could be backported as far as 1.6. - - (cherry picked from commit 509a009c5dd06e680bc2fff6ebc45f7f42aaee3e) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 953b732eef96689f2b11bc2768ba05f28feac9a5) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index 94e04738..bdf5a2d0 100644 ---- a/Makefile -+++ b/Makefile -@@ -905,7 +905,8 @@ INCLUDES = $(wildcard include/*/*.h ebtree/*.h) - DEP = $(INCLUDES) .build_opts - - # Used only to force a rebuild if some build options change --.build_opts: $(shell rm -f .build_opts.new; echo \'$(TARGET) $(BUILD_OPTIONS) $(VERBOSE_CFLAGS)\' > .build_opts.new; if cmp -s .build_opts .build_opts.new; then rm -f .build_opts.new; else mv -f .build_opts.new .build_opts; fi) -+build_opts = $(shell rm -f .build_opts.new; echo \'$(TARGET) $(BUILD_OPTIONS) $(VERBOSE_CFLAGS)\' > .build_opts.new; if cmp -s .build_opts .build_opts.new; then rm -f .build_opts.new; else mv -f .build_opts.new .build_opts; fi) -+.build_opts: $(build_opts) - - haproxy: $(OPTIONS_OBJS) $(EBTREE_OBJS) $(OBJS) - $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ $(LDOPTS) diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/014-MINOR-tools-make-memvprintf-never-pass-a-NULL-target-to-vsnprintf.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/014-MINOR-tools-make-memvprintf-never-pass-a-NULL-target-to-vsnprintf.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 776fae4b19..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/014-MINOR-tools-make-memvprintf-never-pass-a-NULL-target-to-vsnprintf.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -commit 36b50ee589a4fda66d222af7de8ad866d30613c7 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Mar 29 19:13:23 2019 +0100 - - MINOR: tools: make memvprintf() never pass a NULL target to vsnprintf() - - Most modern platforms don't touch the output buffer when the size - argument is null, but there exist a few old ones (like AIX 5 and - possibly Tru64) where the output will be dereferenced anyway, probably - to write the trailing null, crashing the process. memprintf() uses this - to measure the desired length. - - There is a very simple workaround to this consisting in passing a pointer - to a character instead of a NULL pointer. It was confirmed to fix the issue - on AIX 5.1. - - (cherry picked from commit e0609f5f49f55b122e7da9bd1d3b1b786366e80c) - [wt: it likely makes sense to backport this to all supported branches] - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 1719b6be375bf9478c2cfe78caccd818d37a4d50) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/standard.c b/src/standard.c -index 38c4f3f2..69cddcea 100644 ---- a/src/standard.c -+++ b/src/standard.c -@@ -3402,12 +3402,14 @@ char *memvprintf(char **out, const char *format, va_list orig_args) - return NULL; - - do { -+ char buf1; -+ - /* vsnprintf() will return the required length even when the - * target buffer is NULL. We do this in a loop just in case - * intermediate evaluations get wrong. - */ - va_copy(args, orig_args); -- needed = vsnprintf(ret, allocated, format, args); -+ needed = vsnprintf(ret ? ret : &buf1, allocated, format, args); - va_end(args); - if (needed < allocated) { - /* Note: on Solaris 8, the first iteration always diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/015-BUILD-makefile-fix-build-of-IPv6-header-on-aix51.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/015-BUILD-makefile-fix-build-of-IPv6-header-on-aix51.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6a81dc4a64..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/015-BUILD-makefile-fix-build-of-IPv6-header-on-aix51.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -commit 369d595d95f4945f0e14dd02757cf64eaf8512d9 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Mar 29 17:40:23 2019 +0100 - - BUILD: makefile: fix build of IPv6 header on aix51 - - ip6_hdr is called ip6hdr there and is only defined when STEVENS_API is - defined. - - (cherry picked from commit 6f4fd1b183fc70863926bdc31d7f0b4739c92c56) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 99903a0c6419edb515a07a6e1fba4b8bc78babd1) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index bdf5a2d0..81e70e02 100644 ---- a/Makefile -+++ b/Makefile -@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ ifeq ($(TARGET),aix51) - # This is for AIX 5.1 - USE_POLL = implicit - USE_LIBCRYPT = implicit -- TARGET_CFLAGS = -Dss_family=__ss_family -+ TARGET_CFLAGS = -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dip6_hdr=ip6hdr -DSTEVENS_API - DEBUG_CFLAGS = - else - ifeq ($(TARGET),aix52) diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/016-BUILD-makefile-add-_LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT-to-build-on-AIX-51.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/016-BUILD-makefile-add-_LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT-to-build-on-AIX-51.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9c7d9809cf..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/016-BUILD-makefile-add-_LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT-to-build-on-AIX-51.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -commit 0ddf04ee66d3a2ff9c47d0c91a2d3c7bc06b34e9 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Mar 29 17:56:13 2019 +0100 - - BUILD: makefile: add _LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT to build on AIX-51 - - Not tested on later versions, but at least there _LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT - must be defined to access the CMSG_SPACE() and CMSG_LEN() macros. - - (cherry picked from commit 891d65a67280bea35f8ae38e4dcfe7c2330ddd10) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 20faac416072cabffb13a7e41a58dd5b56fc21b0) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index 81e70e02..955f1188 100644 ---- a/Makefile -+++ b/Makefile -@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ ifeq ($(TARGET),aix51) - # This is for AIX 5.1 - USE_POLL = implicit - USE_LIBCRYPT = implicit -- TARGET_CFLAGS = -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dip6_hdr=ip6hdr -DSTEVENS_API -+ TARGET_CFLAGS = -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dip6_hdr=ip6hdr -DSTEVENS_API -D_LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT - DEBUG_CFLAGS = - else - ifeq ($(TARGET),aix52) diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/017-BUILD-Makefile-disable-shared-cache-on-AIX-5-1.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/017-BUILD-Makefile-disable-shared-cache-on-AIX-5-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 39fe46d515..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/017-BUILD-Makefile-disable-shared-cache-on-AIX-5-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -commit f78f501857cec8bb682b76faa9cbd5cc1e0dcad4 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Mar 29 18:56:54 2019 +0100 - - BUILD: Makefile: disable shared cache on AIX 5.1 - - AIX 5.1 is missing the following builtins used for atomic locking of the - shared inter-process cache : - - .__sync_val_compare_and_swap_4 - .__sync_lock_test_and_set_4 - .__sync_sub_and_fetch_4 - - Let's simply use the private cache by default since nobody cares on - such old systems. No test was made on a more recent version. - - (cherry picked from commit 13d9b0231abe6e1d6c404725746308a98bdab8c6) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 3349375d3f5820f261f9c3058ca6e5ced67f3505) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index 955f1188..36df7b29 100644 ---- a/Makefile -+++ b/Makefile -@@ -358,7 +358,8 @@ ifeq ($(TARGET),aix51) - # This is for AIX 5.1 - USE_POLL = implicit - USE_LIBCRYPT = implicit -- TARGET_CFLAGS = -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dip6_hdr=ip6hdr -DSTEVENS_API -D_LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT -+ USE_PRIVATE_CACHE = implicit -+ TARGET_CFLAGS = -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dip6_hdr=ip6hdr -DSTEVENS_API -D_LINUX_SOURCE_COMPAT -Dunsetenv=my_unsetenv - DEBUG_CFLAGS = - else - ifeq ($(TARGET),aix52) diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/018-BUG-MINOR-cli-correctly-handle-abns-in-show-cli-sockets.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/018-BUG-MINOR-cli-correctly-handle-abns-in-show-cli-sockets.patch deleted file mode 100644 index baf41ee782..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/018-BUG-MINOR-cli-correctly-handle-abns-in-show-cli-sockets.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -commit 9ffd35ec59b1ade094b4828b880bdb4971f0c69e -Author: William Lallemand -Date: Mon Apr 1 11:30:04 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: cli: correctly handle abns in 'show cli sockets' - - The 'show cli sockets' was not handling the abns sockets. This is a - problem since it uses the AF_UNIX family, it displays nothing - in the path column because the path starts by \0. - - Should be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 75812a7a3cdc853ceee0b3fb2173db060057ba35) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit d06619b5adf8a718ad840dbddbc9d2c83fbb01b1) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/cli.c b/src/cli.c -index 079d8d9b..39744c7a 100644 ---- a/src/cli.c -+++ b/src/cli.c -@@ -972,7 +972,10 @@ static int cli_io_handler_show_cli_sock(struct appctx *appctx) - const struct sockaddr_un *un; - - un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&l->addr; -- chunk_appendf(&trash, "%s ", un->sun_path); -+ if (un->sun_path[0] == '\0') -+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "abns@%s ", un->sun_path+1); -+ else -+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "%s ", un->sun_path); - } else if (l->addr.ss_family == AF_INET) { - addr_to_str(&l->addr, addr, sizeof(addr)); - port_to_str(&l->addr, port, sizeof(port)); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/019-MINOR-cli-start-addresses-by-a-prefix-in-show-cli-sockets.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/019-MINOR-cli-start-addresses-by-a-prefix-in-show-cli-sockets.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 006305cb6d..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/019-MINOR-cli-start-addresses-by-a-prefix-in-show-cli-sockets.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -commit d33b1dd5193df4dfc1dcbea22ade1ee53c89009e -Author: William Lallemand -Date: Mon Apr 1 11:30:05 2019 +0200 - - MINOR: cli: start addresses by a prefix in 'show cli sockets' - - Displays a prefix for every addresses in 'show cli sockets'. - It could be 'unix@', 'ipv4@', 'ipv6@', 'abns@' or 'sockpair@'. - - Could be backported in 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit e58915f07f7e7a83a7aece909f115bb40887cd55) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit 97a9b60016159140ba3c001f7427d8ff52d1d311) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/cli.c b/src/cli.c -index 39744c7a..f0c41b06 100644 ---- a/src/cli.c -+++ b/src/cli.c -@@ -972,18 +972,19 @@ static int cli_io_handler_show_cli_sock(struct appctx *appctx) - const struct sockaddr_un *un; - - un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&l->addr; -- if (un->sun_path[0] == '\0') -+ if (un->sun_path[0] == '\0') { - chunk_appendf(&trash, "abns@%s ", un->sun_path+1); -- else -- chunk_appendf(&trash, "%s ", un->sun_path); -+ } else { -+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "unix@%s ", un->sun_path); -+ } - } else if (l->addr.ss_family == AF_INET) { - addr_to_str(&l->addr, addr, sizeof(addr)); - port_to_str(&l->addr, port, sizeof(port)); -- chunk_appendf(&trash, "%s:%s ", addr, port); -+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "ipv4@%s:%s ", addr, port); - } else if (l->addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) { - addr_to_str(&l->addr, addr, sizeof(addr)); - port_to_str(&l->addr, port, sizeof(port)); -- chunk_appendf(&trash, "[%s]:%s ", addr, port); -+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "ipv6@[%s]:%s ", addr, port); - } else - continue; - diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/020-BUG-MEDIUM-peers-fix-a-case-where-peer-session-is-not-cleanly-reset-on-release.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/020-BUG-MEDIUM-peers-fix-a-case-where-peer-session-is-not-cleanly-reset-on-release.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 277667dc10..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/020-BUG-MEDIUM-peers-fix-a-case-where-peer-session-is-not-cleanly-reset-on-release.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,168 +0,0 @@ -commit 3bb33335816c1c9549d21bcc14bed29519b938a3 -Author: Emeric Brun -Date: Tue Apr 2 17:22:01 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: peers: fix a case where peer session is not cleanly reset on release. - - The deinit took place in only peer_session_release, but in the a case of a - previous call to peer_session_forceshutdown, the session cursors - won't be reset, resulting in a bad state for new session of the same - peer. For instance, a table definition message could be dropped and - so all update messages will be dropped by the remote peer. - - This patch move the deinit processing directly in the force shutdown - funtion. Killed session remains in "ST_END" state but ref on peer was - reset to NULL and deinit will be skipped on session release function. - - The session release continue to assure the deinit for "active" sessions. - - This patch should be backported on all stable version since proto - peers v2. - - (cherry picked from commit 9ef2ad7844e577b505019695c59284f4a439fc33) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit 14831989a081f3944cf891afd56e6d9f6086c3ed) - [cf: global variabled connected_peers and active_peers don't exist in 1.8] - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/peers.c b/src/peers.c -index 465ffe85..d7dc51d8 100644 ---- a/src/peers.c -+++ b/src/peers.c -@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ enum { - #define PEER_DWNGRD_MINOR_VER 0 - - struct peers *cfg_peers = NULL; --static void peer_session_forceshutdown(struct appctx *appctx); -+static void peer_session_forceshutdown(struct peer *peer); - - /* This function encode an uint64 to 'dynamic' length format. - The encoded value is written at address *str, and the -@@ -492,15 +492,53 @@ static int peer_prepare_ackmsg(struct shared_table *st, char *msg, size_t size) - return (cursor - msg) + datalen; - } - -+/* -+ * Function to deinit connected peer -+ */ -+void __peer_session_deinit(struct peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct stream_interface *si; -+ struct stream *s; -+ struct peers *peers; -+ -+ if (!peer->appctx) -+ return; -+ -+ si = peer->appctx->owner; -+ if (!si) -+ return; -+ -+ s = si_strm(si); -+ if (!s) -+ return; -+ -+ peers = strm_fe(s)->parent; -+ if (!peers) -+ return; -+ -+ /* Re-init current table pointers to force announcement on re-connect */ -+ peer->remote_table = peer->last_local_table = NULL; -+ peer->appctx = NULL; -+ if (peer->flags & PEER_F_LEARN_ASSIGN) { -+ /* unassign current peer for learning */ -+ peer->flags &= ~(PEER_F_LEARN_ASSIGN); -+ peers->flags &= ~(PEERS_F_RESYNC_ASSIGN|PEERS_F_RESYNC_PROCESS); -+ -+ /* reschedule a resync */ -+ peers->resync_timeout = tick_add(now_ms, MS_TO_TICKS(5000)); -+ } -+ /* reset teaching and learning flags to 0 */ -+ peer->flags &= PEER_TEACH_RESET; -+ peer->flags &= PEER_LEARN_RESET; -+ task_wakeup(peers->sync_task, TASK_WOKEN_MSG); -+} -+ - /* - * Callback to release a session with a peer - */ - static void peer_session_release(struct appctx *appctx) - { -- struct stream_interface *si = appctx->owner; -- struct stream *s = si_strm(si); - struct peer *peer = appctx->ctx.peers.ptr; -- struct peers *peers = strm_fe(s)->parent; - - /* appctx->ctx.peers.ptr is not a peer session */ - if (appctx->st0 < PEER_SESS_ST_SENDSUCCESS) -@@ -509,24 +547,9 @@ static void peer_session_release(struct appctx *appctx) - /* peer session identified */ - if (peer) { - HA_SPIN_LOCK(PEER_LOCK, &peer->lock); -- if (peer->appctx == appctx) { -- /* Re-init current table pointers to force announcement on re-connect */ -- peer->remote_table = peer->last_local_table = NULL; -- peer->appctx = NULL; -- if (peer->flags & PEER_F_LEARN_ASSIGN) { -- /* unassign current peer for learning */ -- peer->flags &= ~(PEER_F_LEARN_ASSIGN); -- peers->flags &= ~(PEERS_F_RESYNC_ASSIGN|PEERS_F_RESYNC_PROCESS); -- -- /* reschedule a resync */ -- peers->resync_timeout = tick_add(now_ms, MS_TO_TICKS(5000)); -- } -- /* reset teaching and learning flags to 0 */ -- peer->flags &= PEER_TEACH_RESET; -- peer->flags &= PEER_LEARN_RESET; -- } -+ if (peer->appctx == appctx) -+ __peer_session_deinit(peer); - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(PEER_LOCK, &peer->lock); -- task_wakeup(peers->sync_task, TASK_WOKEN_MSG); - } - } - -@@ -704,7 +727,7 @@ switchstate: - * for a while. - */ - curpeer->reconnect = tick_add(now_ms, MS_TO_TICKS(50 + random() % 2000)); -- peer_session_forceshutdown(curpeer->appctx); -+ peer_session_forceshutdown(curpeer); - } - if (maj_ver != (unsigned int)-1 && min_ver != (unsigned int)-1) { - if (min_ver == PEER_DWNGRD_MINOR_VER) { -@@ -1832,11 +1855,14 @@ static struct applet peer_applet = { - .release = peer_session_release, - }; - -+ - /* - * Use this function to force a close of a peer session - */ --static void peer_session_forceshutdown(struct appctx *appctx) -+static void peer_session_forceshutdown(struct peer *peer) - { -+ struct appctx *appctx = peer->appctx; -+ - /* Note that the peer sessions which have just been created - * (->st0 == PEER_SESS_ST_CONNECT) must not - * be shutdown, if not, the TCP session will never be closed -@@ -1849,6 +1875,8 @@ static void peer_session_forceshutdown(struct appctx *appctx) - if (appctx->applet != &peer_applet) - return; - -+ __peer_session_deinit(peer); -+ - appctx->st0 = PEER_SESS_ST_END; - appctx_wakeup(appctx); - } -@@ -2094,8 +2122,7 @@ static struct task *process_peer_sync(struct task * task) - */ - ps->reconnect = tick_add(now_ms, MS_TO_TICKS(50 + random() % 2000)); - if (ps->appctx) { -- peer_session_forceshutdown(ps->appctx); -- ps->appctx = NULL; -+ peer_session_forceshutdown(ps); - } - } - } diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/021-BUILD-use-inttypes-h-instead-of-stdint-h.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/021-BUILD-use-inttypes-h-instead-of-stdint-h.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ca79b057c9..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/021-BUILD-use-inttypes-h-instead-of-stdint-h.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,251 +0,0 @@ -commit 7948348cdc115389700242901c91d323192850a8 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Mar 29 17:26:33 2019 +0100 - - BUILD: use inttypes.h instead of stdint.h - - I found on an (old) AIX 5.1 machine that stdint.h didn't exist while - inttypes.h which is expected to include it does exist and provides the - desired functionalities. - - As explained here, stdint being just a subset of inttypes for use in - freestanding environments, it's probably always OK to switch to inttypes - instead: - - https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009696799/basedefs/stdint.h.html - - Also it's even clearer here in the autoconf doc : - - https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.61/html_node/Header-Portability.html - - "The C99 standard says that inttypes.h includes stdint.h, so there's - no need to include stdint.h separately in a standard environment. - Some implementations have inttypes.h but not stdint.h (e.g., Solaris - 7), but we don't know of any implementation that has stdint.h but not - inttypes.h" - - (cherry picked from commit a1bd1faeebd03825677d111a1350ee04d625f165) - [wt: dropped include/proto/protocol_buffers.h] - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 19f364bb4ad0205e134dc527e5164b7a21c2ad07) - [cf: missing files removed] - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/contrib/hpack/gen-rht.c b/contrib/hpack/gen-rht.c -index b1b90317..4260ffbe 100644 ---- a/contrib/hpack/gen-rht.c -+++ b/contrib/hpack/gen-rht.c -@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ - * 00 => 0x0a, 01 => 0x0d, 10 => 0x16, 11 => EOS - */ - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/contrib/plug_qdisc/plug_qdisc.c b/contrib/plug_qdisc/plug_qdisc.c -index 294994eb..606a834c 100644 ---- a/contrib/plug_qdisc/plug_qdisc.c -+++ b/contrib/plug_qdisc/plug_qdisc.c -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/contrib/spoa_example/include/spop_functions.h b/contrib/spoa_example/include/spop_functions.h -index 8319e41b..cff45321 100644 ---- a/contrib/spoa_example/include/spop_functions.h -+++ b/contrib/spoa_example/include/spop_functions.h -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - #ifndef _SPOP_FUNCTIONS_H - #define _SPOP_FUNCTIONS_H - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - -diff --git a/contrib/wireshark-dissectors/peers/packet-happp.c b/contrib/wireshark-dissectors/peers/packet-happp.c -index a1983316..6fca353a 100644 ---- a/contrib/wireshark-dissectors/peers/packet-happp.c -+++ b/contrib/wireshark-dissectors/peers/packet-happp.c -@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ - */ - - #include --#include -+#include - #include - #include - -diff --git a/include/common/hpack-dec.h b/include/common/hpack-dec.h -index b03398a4..bea2d521 100644 ---- a/include/common/hpack-dec.h -+++ b/include/common/hpack-dec.h -@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ - #ifndef _COMMON_HPACK_DEC_H - #define _COMMON_HPACK_DEC_H - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/include/common/hpack-enc.h b/include/common/hpack-enc.h -index 0a44dfc7..fee56fd4 100644 ---- a/include/common/hpack-enc.h -+++ b/include/common/hpack-enc.h -@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ - #ifndef _COMMON_HPACK_ENC_H - #define _COMMON_HPACK_ENC_H - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/include/common/hpack-huff.h b/include/common/hpack-huff.h -index 85ca4171..04276d2c 100644 ---- a/include/common/hpack-huff.h -+++ b/include/common/hpack-huff.h -@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ - #ifndef _PROTO_HPACK_HUFF_H - #define _PROTO_HPACK_HUFF_H - --#include -+#include - - int huff_enc(const char *s, char *out); - int huff_dec(const uint8_t *huff, int hlen, char *out, int olen); -diff --git a/include/common/hpack-tbl.h b/include/common/hpack-tbl.h -index 2cbc2bf6..ca3f2aa9 100644 ---- a/include/common/hpack-tbl.h -+++ b/include/common/hpack-tbl.h -@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ - #ifndef _COMMON_HPACK_TBL_H - #define _COMMON_HPACK_TBL_H - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/include/common/http-hdr.h b/include/common/http-hdr.h -index a0bb341b..db1bfa14 100644 ---- a/include/common/http-hdr.h -+++ b/include/common/http-hdr.h -@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ - #ifndef _COMMON_HTTP_HDR_H - #define _COMMON_HTTP_HDR_H - --#include -+#include - #include - - /* a header field made of a name and a value. Such structure stores 4 longs so -diff --git a/include/proto/shctx.h b/include/proto/shctx.h -index 55cb2a77..3b42ed3b 100644 ---- a/include/proto/shctx.h -+++ b/include/proto/shctx.h -@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ - #include - #include - --#include -+#include - - #ifndef USE_PRIVATE_CACHE - #ifdef USE_PTHREAD_PSHARED -diff --git a/src/h2.c b/src/h2.c -index 5c83d6b6..d7a03405 100644 ---- a/src/h2.c -+++ b/src/h2.c -@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ - * OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. - */ - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/src/hpack-dec.c b/src/hpack-dec.c -index 3fd4224d..ad5b23a8 100644 ---- a/src/hpack-dec.c -+++ b/src/hpack-dec.c -@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ - * OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. - */ - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/src/hpack-enc.c b/src/hpack-enc.c -index cb0767ed..685c9f3d 100644 ---- a/src/hpack-enc.c -+++ b/src/hpack-enc.c -@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ - * OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. - */ - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/src/hpack-huff.c b/src/hpack-huff.c -index cbf1fa02..bdcff7fe 100644 ---- a/src/hpack-huff.c -+++ b/src/hpack-huff.c -@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ - */ - - #include --#include -+#include - #include - - #include -diff --git a/src/hpack-tbl.c b/src/hpack-tbl.c -index e2d4426f..21aa4bc8 100644 ---- a/src/hpack-tbl.c -+++ b/src/hpack-tbl.c -@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ - * OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. - */ - --#include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -diff --git a/src/sha1.c b/src/sha1.c -index 3b562b55..b7c2d709 100644 ---- a/src/sha1.c -+++ b/src/sha1.c -@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ - - /* this is only to get definitions for memcpy(), ntohl() and htonl() */ - #include --#include -+#include - #include - - #include -diff --git a/src/xxhash.c b/src/xxhash.c -index 5702e64f..4792f128 100644 ---- a/src/xxhash.c -+++ b/src/xxhash.c -@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static void* XXH_memcpy(void* dest, const void* src, size_t size) - // Basic Types - //************************************** - #if defined (__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L // C99 --# include -+# include - typedef uint8_t BYTE; - typedef uint16_t U16; - typedef uint32_t U32; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/022-BUILD-connection-fix-naming-of-ip_v-field.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/022-BUILD-connection-fix-naming-of-ip_v-field.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a3a245b1d8..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/022-BUILD-connection-fix-naming-of-ip_v-field.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -commit a49725beede82687afd6603384f318afe9e60432 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Mar 29 17:35:32 2019 +0100 - - BUILD: connection: fix naming of ip_v field - - AIX defines ip_v as ip_ff.ip_fv in netinet/ip.h using a macro, and - unfortunately we do have a local variable with such a name and which - uses the same header file. Let's rename the variable to ip_ver to fix - this. - - (cherry picked from commit 0ca24aa028159874d77677076a835930de79ba8d) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 0a5e7a9a39e14dccba4caa7df20cd3970f354078) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/connection.c b/src/connection.c -index 7403e8ae..f57ef60a 100644 ---- a/src/connection.c -+++ b/src/connection.c -@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ int conn_recv_netscaler_cip(struct connection *conn, int flag) - { - char *line; - uint32_t hdr_len; -- uint8_t ip_v; -+ uint8_t ip_ver; - - /* we might have been called just after an asynchronous shutr */ - if (conn->flags & CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH) -@@ -765,9 +765,9 @@ int conn_recv_netscaler_cip(struct connection *conn, int flag) - goto missing; - - /* Get IP version from the first four bits */ -- ip_v = (*line & 0xf0) >> 4; -+ ip_ver = (*line & 0xf0) >> 4; - -- if (ip_v == 4) { -+ if (ip_ver == 4) { - struct ip *hdr_ip4; - struct my_tcphdr *hdr_tcp; - -@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ int conn_recv_netscaler_cip(struct connection *conn, int flag) - - conn->flags |= CO_FL_ADDR_FROM_SET | CO_FL_ADDR_TO_SET; - } -- else if (ip_v == 6) { -+ else if (ip_ver == 6) { - struct ip6_hdr *hdr_ip6; - struct my_tcphdr *hdr_tcp; - diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/023-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-assign-pattern-IDs-after-checking-the-config-validity.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/023-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-assign-pattern-IDs-after-checking-the-config-validity.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cea387229d..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/023-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-assign-pattern-IDs-after-checking-the-config-validity.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -commit 3bd00f356783d331deba80de76c989d416e4a52e -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu Apr 11 14:47:08 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: pattern: assign pattern IDs after checking the config validity - - Pavlos Parissis reported an interesting case where some map identifiers - were not assigned (appearing as -1 in show map). It turns out that it - only happens for log-format expressions parsed in check_config_validity() - that involve maps (log-format, use_backend, unique-id-header), as in the - sample configuration below : - - frontend foo - bind :8001 - unique-id-format %[src,map(addr.lst)] - log-format %[src,map(addr.lst)] - use_backend %[src,map(addr.lst)] - - The reason stems from the initial introduction of unique IDs in 1.5 via - commit af5a29d5f ("MINOR: pattern: Each pattern is identified by unique - id.") : the unique_id assignment was done before calling - check_config_validity() so all maps loaded after this call are not - properly configured. From what the function does, it seems they will not - be able to use a cache, will not have a unique_id assigned and will not - be updatable from the CLI. - - This fix must be backported to all supported versions. - - (cherry picked from commit 0f93672dfea805268d674c97573711fbff7e0e70) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - (cherry picked from commit ba475a5b390f58450756da67dbf54bf063f2dbef) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/haproxy.c b/src/haproxy.c -index 5c3febdd..105cde6f 100644 ---- a/src/haproxy.c -+++ b/src/haproxy.c -@@ -1570,14 +1570,14 @@ static void init(int argc, char **argv) - exit(1); - } - -- pattern_finalize_config(); -- - err_code |= check_config_validity(); - if (err_code & (ERR_ABORT|ERR_FATAL)) { - ha_alert("Fatal errors found in configuration.\n"); - exit(1); - } - -+ pattern_finalize_config(); -+ - /* recompute the amount of per-process memory depending on nbproc and - * the shared SSL cache size (allowed to exist in all processes). - */ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/024-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Queue-message-only-if-no-SPOE-applet-is-attached-to-the-stream.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/024-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Queue-message-only-if-no-SPOE-applet-is-attached-to-the-stream.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cecf42f0f7..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/024-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Queue-message-only-if-no-SPOE-applet-is-attached-to-the-stream.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -commit 308f39235ca8ce09442bf89cd8aa7f4f6b74f214 -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Wed Apr 10 14:02:12 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: spoe: Queue message only if no SPOE applet is attached to the stream - - If a SPOE applet is already attached to a stream to handle its messages, we must - not queue them. Otherwise it could be handled by another applet leading to - errors. This happens with fragmented messages only. When the first framgnent is - sent, the SPOE applet sending it is attached to the stream. It should be used to - send all other fragments. - - This patch must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 3e86cec05ec9cf848abd8f9a79928410874b778d) - [wla: s/_HA_ATOMIC_ADD/HA_ATOMIC_ADD/ in context] - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - (cherry picked from commit c3468fe1de262c9977510efb1ae47ff1a04c299c) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/flt_spoe.c b/src/flt_spoe.c -index 66d26f34..64601e3f 100644 ---- a/src/flt_spoe.c -+++ b/src/flt_spoe.c -@@ -2086,11 +2086,14 @@ spoe_queue_context(struct spoe_context *ctx) - return -1; - } - -- /* Add the SPOE context in the sending queue and update all running -- * info */ -- LIST_ADDQ(&agent->rt[tid].sending_queue, &ctx->list); -+ /* Add the SPOE context in the sending queue if the stream has no applet -+ * already assigned and wakeup all idle applets. Otherwise, don't queue -+ * it. */ - if (agent->rt[tid].sending_rate) - agent->rt[tid].sending_rate--; -+ if (ctx->frag_ctx.spoe_appctx) -+ return 1; -+ LIST_ADDQ(&agent->rt[tid].sending_queue, &ctx->list); - - SPOE_PRINTF(stderr, "%d.%06d [SPOE/%-15s] %s: stream=%p" - " - Add stream in sending queue" diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/025-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Return-an-error-if-nothing-is-encoded-for-fragmented-messages.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/025-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Return-an-error-if-nothing-is-encoded-for-fragmented-messages.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0c89d2dcdb..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/025-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Return-an-error-if-nothing-is-encoded-for-fragmented-messages.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -commit ebc65295f5ab943955ea6ae9772932c32e39d02c -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Wed Apr 10 14:21:51 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: spoe: Return an error if nothing is encoded for fragmented messages - - If the maximum frame size is very small with a large message or argument name, - it is possible to be unable to encode anything. In such case, it is important to - stop processing returning an error otherwise we will retry in loop to encode the - message, failing each time because of the too small frame size. - - This patch must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit a715ea82eacf4ccf7f447bf4dd4111cc29fe171e) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - (cherry picked from commit 3c76e4d79669329ae972f3348e441fea7316813f) - [cf: Adapted to use old buffer API] - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/flt_spoe.c b/src/flt_spoe.c -index 64601e3f..95f30898 100644 ---- a/src/flt_spoe.c -+++ b/src/flt_spoe.c -@@ -2276,7 +2276,9 @@ spoe_encode_messages(struct stream *s, struct spoe_context *ctx, - return 1; - - too_big: -- if (!(agent->flags & SPOE_FL_SND_FRAGMENTATION)) { -+ /* Return an error if fragmentation is unsupported or if nothing has -+ * been encoded because its too big and not splittable. */ -+ if (!(agent->flags & SPOE_FL_SND_FRAGMENTATION) || p == ctx->buffer->p) { - ctx->status_code = SPOE_CTX_ERR_TOO_BIG; - return -1; - } diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/026-BUG-MINOR-threads-fix-the-process-range-of-thread-masks.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/026-BUG-MINOR-threads-fix-the-process-range-of-thread-masks.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 791cf2c961..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/026-BUG-MINOR-threads-fix-the-process-range-of-thread-masks.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -commit c56c82b4a55f0e03b28248f1230d6d6cd4f40484 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Sat Feb 2 13:18:01 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MINOR: threads: fix the process range of thread masks - - Commit 421f02e ("MINOR: threads: add a MAX_THREADS define instead of - LONGBITS") used a MAX_THREADS macros to fix threads limits. However, - one change was wrong as it affected the upper bound of the process - loop when setting threads masks. No backport is needed. - - (cherry picked from commit bbcf2b9e0d17d83609ac529a21a258d2f2ea7bb8) - [wt: this should be backported to 1.8 as well] - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 1a3ae41964f934a4317e37ed0e0680f252dea4af) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/listener.c b/src/listener.c -index b94d823c..45d9c252 100644 ---- a/src/listener.c -+++ b/src/listener.c -@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static int bind_parse_process(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct - - conf->bind_proc |= proc; - if (thread) { -- for (i = 0; i < MAX_THREADS; i++) -+ for (i = 0; i < LONGBITS; i++) - if (!proc || (proc & (1UL << i))) - conf->bind_thread[i] |= thread; - } diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/027-MINOR-lists-Implement-locked-variations.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/027-MINOR-lists-Implement-locked-variations.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b8f082daa6..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/027-MINOR-lists-Implement-locked-variations.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,175 +0,0 @@ -commit d66183efc6ee57c86400afba3b9b3f8635d3245e -Author: Olivier Houchard -Date: Fri Jan 18 17:26:26 2019 +0100 - - MINOR: lists: Implement locked variations. - - Implement LIST_ADD_LOCKED(), LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED(), LIST_DEL_LOCKED() and - LIST_POP_LOCKED(). - - LIST_ADD_LOCKED, LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED and LIST_DEL_LOCKED work the same as - LIST_ADD, LIST_ADDQ and LIST_DEL, except before any manipulation it locks - the relevant elements of the list, so it's safe to manipulate the list - with multiple threads. - LIST_POP_LOCKED() removes the first element from the list, and returns its - data. - - (cherry picked from commit a8434ec14612d9a04e50e1c51e58f663dad46e96) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 15a9450b508a3c9fc2ad2463931e89157c4331f1) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index 2988d2c2..b3f396ef 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -163,5 +163,149 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - &item->member != (list_head); \ - item = back, back = LIST_ELEM(back->member.n, typeof(back), member)) - -+#include -+#define LLIST_BUSY ((struct list *)1) -+ -+/* -+ * Locked version of list manipulation macros. -+ * It is OK to use those concurrently from multiple threads, as long as the -+ * list is only used with the locked variants. The only "unlocked" macro you -+ * can use with a locked list is LIST_INIT. -+ */ -+#define LIST_ADD_LOCKED(lh, el) \ -+ do { \ -+ while (1) { \ -+ struct list *n; \ -+ struct list *p; \ -+ n = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&(lh)->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (n == LLIST_BUSY) \ -+ continue; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ p = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (p == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -+ (lh)->n = n; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ continue; \ -+ } \ -+ (el)->n = n; \ -+ (el)->p = p; \ -+ n->p = (el); \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ p->n = (el); \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ break; \ -+ } \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+#define LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED(lh, el) \ -+ do { \ -+ while (1) { \ -+ struct list *n; \ -+ struct list *p; \ -+ p = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&(lh)->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (p == LLIST_BUSY) \ -+ continue; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ n = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&p->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (n == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -+ (lh)->n = p; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ continue; \ -+ } \ -+ (el)->n = n; \ -+ (el)->p = p; \ -+ n->p = (el); \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ p->n = (el); \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ break; \ -+ } \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+#define LIST_DEL_LOCKED(el) \ -+ do { \ -+ while (1) { \ -+ struct list *n, *n2; \ -+ struct list *p, *p2; \ -+ n = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&(el)->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (n == LLIST_BUSY) \ -+ continue; \ -+ p = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&(el)->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (p == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -+ (el)->n = n; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ continue; \ -+ } \ -+ if (p != (el)) { \ -+ p2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&p->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (p2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -+ (el)->p = p; \ -+ (el)->n = n; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ continue; \ -+ } \ -+ } \ -+ if (n != (el)) { \ -+ n2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (n2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -+ p2->n = (el); \ -+ (el)->p = p; \ -+ (el)->n = n; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ continue; \ -+ } \ -+ } \ -+ n->p = p; \ -+ p->n = n; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ break; \ -+ } \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+ -+/* Remove the first element from the list, and return it */ -+#define LIST_POP_LOCKED(lh, pt, el) \ -+ ({ \ -+ void *_ret; \ -+ while (1) { \ -+ struct list *n, *n2; \ -+ struct list *p, *p2; \ -+ n = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&(lh)->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (n == LLIST_BUSY) \ -+ continue; \ -+ if (n == (lh)) { \ -+ (lh)->n = lh; \ -+ _ret = NULL; \ -+ break; \ -+ } \ -+ p = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (p == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -+ (lh)->n = n; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ continue; \ -+ } \ -+ n2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (n2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -+ n->p = p; \ -+ (lh)->n = n; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ continue; \ -+ } \ -+ p2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n2->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ if (p2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -+ n->n = n2; \ -+ n->p = p; \ -+ (lh)->n = n; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ continue; \ -+ } \ -+ (lh)->n = n2; \ -+ (n2)->p = (lh); \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ _ret = LIST_ELEM(n, pt, el); \ -+ break; \ -+ } \ -+ (_ret); \ -+ }) - - #endif /* _COMMON_MINI_CLIST_H */ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/028-BUG-MEDIUM-lists-Properly-handle-the-case-were-removing-the-first-elt.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/028-BUG-MEDIUM-lists-Properly-handle-the-case-were-removing-the-first-elt.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 80306cea62..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/028-BUG-MEDIUM-lists-Properly-handle-the-case-were-removing-the-first-elt.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -commit 982bf2a0481648a0885b100cc565add399762028 -Author: Olivier Houchard -Date: Tue Feb 26 18:46:07 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: lists: Properly handle the case we're removing the first elt. - - In LIST_DEL_LOCKED(), initialize p2 to NULL, and only attempt to set it back - to its previous value if we had a previous element, and thus p2 is non-NULL. - - (cherry picked from commit db64489aac2135c6ceceec47fe98dc42c0558466) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit a3d6a2b9dac9775c55a10ed6b60deca219f06ff6) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index b3f396ef..aebeec38 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - do { \ - while (1) { \ - struct list *n, *n2; \ -- struct list *p, *p2; \ -+ struct list *p, *p2 = NULL; \ - n = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&(el)->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ - if (n == LLIST_BUSY) \ - continue; \ -@@ -248,7 +248,8 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - if (n != (el)) { \ - n2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ - if (n2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -- p2->n = (el); \ -+ if (p2 != NULL) \ -+ p2->n = (el); \ - (el)->p = p; \ - (el)->n = n; \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/029-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-the-rollback-on-addq-in-the-locked-liss.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/029-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-the-rollback-on-addq-in-the-locked-liss.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f959dd88dc..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/029-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-the-rollback-on-addq-in-the-locked-liss.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -commit 66322aef6533597ed5100916696c0f552513911d -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu Feb 28 11:09:56 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: list: fix the rollback on addq in the locked liss - - Commit a8434ec14 ("MINOR: lists: Implement locked variations.") - introduced locked lists which use the elements pointers as locks - for concurrent operations. A copy-paste typo in LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED() - causes corruption in the list in case the next pointer is already - held, as it restores the previous pointer into the next one. It - may impact the server pools. - - This will have to be backported if the commit above is backported. - - (cherry picked from commit bd20ad58748eafbded464f574ed84dbbdad31e8d) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit d4b726dc9e1659cb7fe3508862dfa8b3d23d823a) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index aebeec38..779f81da 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - n = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&p->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ - if (n == LLIST_BUSY) { \ -- (lh)->n = p; \ -+ (lh)->p = p; \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - continue; \ - } \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/030-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-LIST_POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-the-last-pointer.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/030-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-LIST_POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-the-last-pointer.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 92ff5a0ee5..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/030-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-LIST_POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-the-last-pointer.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -commit 8caa2434cd52ac4056f4ec32b423d11a4dc7eaf5 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu Feb 28 15:55:18 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: list: fix LIST_POP_LOCKED's removal of the last pointer - - There was a typo making the last updated pointer be the pre-last element's - prev instead of the last's prev element. It didn't show up during early - tests because the contention is very rare on this one and it's implicitly - recovered when updating the pointers to go to the next element, but it was - clearly visible in the listener_accept() tests by having all threads block - on LIST_POP_LOCKED() with n==p==LLIST_BUSY. - - This will have to be backported if commit a8434ec14 ("MINOR: lists: - Implement locked variations.") is backported. - - (cherry picked from commit 285192564d2a7d6eff077d91758b603ba7f2b10a) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 20fcf3a0e188551ef185c02c7fb28314de6e412e) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index 779f81da..51c61051 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - continue; \ - } \ -- p2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n2->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ p2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ - if (p2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ - n->n = n2; \ - n->p = p; \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/031-BUG-MEDIUM-list-add-missing-store-barriers-when-updating-elements-and-head.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/031-BUG-MEDIUM-list-add-missing-store-barriers-when-updating-elements-and-head.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a4810c7952..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/031-BUG-MEDIUM-list-add-missing-store-barriers-when-updating-elements-and-head.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -commit cee000f97c9300dbbae50118838c6d3e8d5eb9cf -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu Feb 28 11:14:22 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: list: add missing store barriers when updating elements and head - - Commit a8434ec14 ("MINOR: lists: Implement locked variations.") - introduced locked lists which use the elements pointers as locks - for concurrent operations. Under heavy stress the lists occasionally - fail. The cause is a missing barrier at some points when updating - the list element and the head : nothing prevents the compiler (or - CPU) from updating the list head first before updating the element, - making another thread jump to a wrong location. This patch simply - adds the missing barriers before these two opeations. - - This will have to be backported if the commit above is backported. - - (cherry picked from commit 690d2ad4d207da5c8821b84ab467090bd515eedf) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit c2aa5cb8b8ff3af27f1a962541e53f792745bc4a) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index 51c61051..92a995c9 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - } \ - (el)->n = n; \ - (el)->p = p; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ - n->p = (el); \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - p->n = (el); \ -@@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - } \ - (el)->n = n; \ - (el)->p = p; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ - n->p = (el); \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - p->n = (el); \ -@@ -276,6 +278,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - continue; \ - if (n == (lh)) { \ - (lh)->n = lh; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ - _ret = NULL; \ - break; \ - } \ -@@ -288,6 +291,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - n2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->n, LLIST_BUSY); \ - if (n2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ - n->p = p; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ - (lh)->n = n; \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - continue; \ -@@ -296,6 +300,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - if (p2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ - n->n = n2; \ - n->p = p; \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ - (lh)->n = n; \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - continue; \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/032-MINOR-list-make-the-delete-and-pop-operations-idempotent.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/032-MINOR-list-make-the-delete-and-pop-operations-idempotent.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 292b1a4b9b..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/032-MINOR-list-make-the-delete-and-pop-operations-idempotent.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -commit f4be23cefd779894ca85680d85b1d66cd22d42b6 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu Feb 28 15:05:53 2019 +0100 - - MINOR: list: make the delete and pop operations idempotent - - These operations previously used to return a "locked" element, which is - a constraint when multiple threads try to delete the same element, because - the second one will block indefinitely. Instead, let's make sure that both - LIST_DEL_LOCKED() and LIST_POP_LOCKED() always reinitialize the element - after deleting it. This ensures that the second thread will immediately - unblock and succeed with the removal. It also secures the pop vs delete - competition that may happen when trying to remove an element that's about - to be dequeued. - - (cherry picked from commit 4c747e86cda5d7eab46390779447f216ce9aa5de) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 731853a3e19b2ce314c1626360dc5b1dcba5baa1) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index 92a995c9..d4861ccc 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -261,6 +261,9 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - n->p = p; \ - p->n = n; \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ (el)->p = (el); \ -+ (el)->n = (el); \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ - break; \ - } \ - } while (0) -@@ -308,6 +311,9 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - (lh)->n = n2; \ - (n2)->p = (lh); \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ -+ (n)->p = (n); \ -+ (n)->n = (n); \ -+ __ha_barrier_store(); \ - _ret = LIST_ELEM(n, pt, el); \ - break; \ - } \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/033-BUG-MEDIUM-list-correct-fix-for-LIST_POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-last-element.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/033-BUG-MEDIUM-list-correct-fix-for-LIST_POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-last-element.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3a22df987f..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/033-BUG-MEDIUM-list-correct-fix-for-LIST_POP_LOCKEDs-removal-of-last-element.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -commit c4a54648f510771e792ed0c0bc16e4cf8be8bb9a -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu Feb 28 16:51:28 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: list: correct fix for LIST_POP_LOCKED's removal of last element - - As seen with Olivier, in the end the fix in commit 285192564 ("BUG/MEDIUM: - list: fix LIST_POP_LOCKED's removal of the last pointer") is wrong, - the code there was right but the bug was triggered by another bug in - LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED() which doesn't properly update the list's head by - inserting in the wrong order. - - This will have to be backported if the commit above is backported. - - (cherry picked from commit 4ef6801cd4db450b4ac3a21e58ca5fce5256189b) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 92f771c7efd9a82ef189d2be7c2fcfa6a6703e07) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index d4861ccc..9ad53aa0 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -216,9 +216,9 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - (el)->n = n; \ - (el)->p = p; \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ -- n->p = (el); \ -+ n->n = (el); \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ -- p->n = (el); \ -+ p->p = (el); \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - break; \ - } \ -@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - continue; \ - } \ -- p2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ -+ p2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n2->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ - if (p2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ - n->n = n2; \ - n->p = p; \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/034-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-again-LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/034-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-again-LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5a4770ab0e..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/034-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-again-LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -commit 43dbd48e8f39b56f77493a4a0e786bd310a8e682 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Mon Mar 4 11:19:49 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: list: fix again LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED - - Well, that's becoming embarrassing. Now this fixes commit 4ef6801c - ("BUG/MEDIUM: list: correct fix for LIST_POP_LOCKED's removal of last - element") which itself tried to fix commit 285192564. This fix only - works under low contention and was tested with the listener's queue. - With the idle conns it's obvious that it's still wrong since adding - more than one element to the list leaves a LLIST_BUSY pointer into - the list's head. This was visible when accumulating idle connections - in a server's list. - - This new version of the fix almost goes back to the original code, - except that since then we addressed issues with expectedly idempotent - operations that were not. Now the code has been verified on paper again - and has survived 300 million connections spread over 4 threads. - - This will have to be backported if the commit above is backported. - - (cherry picked from commit 967de20a43665715e4513c7cc7a67e36a36a9955) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 76eeabc45943cc6a493a2212130cedcde803e432) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index 9ad53aa0..27128a2c 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -216,9 +216,9 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - (el)->n = n; \ - (el)->p = p; \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ -- n->n = (el); \ -+ p->n = (el); \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ -- p->p = (el); \ -+ n->p = (el); \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ - break; \ - } \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/035-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-incorrect-pointer-unlocking-in-LIST_DEL_LOCKED.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/035-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-incorrect-pointer-unlocking-in-LIST_DEL_LOCKED.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c1b0d3127f..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/035-BUG-MEDIUM-list-fix-incorrect-pointer-unlocking-in-LIST_DEL_LOCKED.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -commit 4c20fedc4302aec6e5f4409274b832d524aef44d -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Wed Mar 13 14:03:28 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: list: fix incorrect pointer unlocking in LIST_DEL_LOCKED() - - Injecting on a saturated listener started to exhibit some deadlocks - again between LIST_POP_LOCKED() and LIST_DEL_LOCKED(). Olivier found - it was due to a leftover from a previous debugging session. This patch - fixes it. - - This will have to be backported if the other LIST_*_LOCKED() patches - are backported. - - (cherry picked from commit b0cef35b097c89ff675e055186e71239e105eb01) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit bf7cc16958e288219989949add02c8a97ed9cf6f) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/mini-clist.h b/include/common/mini-clist.h -index 27128a2c..454089ff 100644 ---- a/include/common/mini-clist.h -+++ b/include/common/mini-clist.h -@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ struct cond_wordlist { - n2 = HA_ATOMIC_XCHG(&n->p, LLIST_BUSY); \ - if (n2 == LLIST_BUSY) { \ - if (p2 != NULL) \ -- p2->n = (el); \ -+ p->n = p2; \ - (el)->p = p; \ - (el)->n = n; \ - __ha_barrier_store(); \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/036-MAJOR-listener-do-not-hold-the-listener-lock-in-listener_accept.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/036-MAJOR-listener-do-not-hold-the-listener-lock-in-listener_accept.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f30696cdc2..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/036-MAJOR-listener-do-not-hold-the-listener-lock-in-listener_accept.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -commit db4bf546d72a37f998a7bf25f00126611af58184 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Mon Feb 25 19:23:37 2019 +0100 - - MAJOR: listener: do not hold the listener lock in listener_accept() - - This function used to hold the listener's lock as a way to stay safe - against concurrent manipulations, but it turns out this is wrong. First, - the lock is held during l->accept(), which itself might indirectly call - listener_release(), which, if the listener is marked full, could result - in __resume_listener() to be called and the lock being taken twice. In - practice it doesn't happen right now because the listener's FULL state - cannot change while we're doing this. - - Second, all the code does is now protected against concurrent accesses. - It used not to be the case in the early days of threads : the frequency - counters are thread-safe. The rate limiting doesn't require extreme - precision. Only the nbconn check is not thread safe. - - Third, the parts called here will have to be called from different - threads without holding this lock, and this becomes a bigger issue - if we need to keep this one. - - This patch does 3 things which need to be addressed at once : - 1) it moves the lock to the only 2 functions that were not protected - since called form listener_accept() : - - limit_listener() - - listener_full() - - 2) it makes sure delete_listener() properly checks its state within - the lock. - - 3) it updates the l->nbconn tracking to make sure that it is always - properly reported and accounted for. There is a point of particular - care around the situation where the listener's maxconn is reached - because the listener has to be marked full before accepting the - connection, then resumed if the connection finally gets dropped. - It is not possible to perform this change without removing the - lock due to the deadlock issue explained above. - - This patch almost doubles the accept rate in multi-thread on a shared - port between 8 threads, and multiplies by 4 the connection rate on a - tcp-request connection reject rule. - - (cherry picked from commit 3f0d02bbc2d12cd083fe1c1a051c42cdccb7bc4a) - [wt: this patch is mandatory for the next fixes to be backported, - it has been cooking almost 2 months in 2.0 with no bad behaviour - and seems reasonable to backport now] - - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit b44ae2d0a6eeffe2af3edd37f7829a8d26b85d43) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/listener.c b/src/listener.c -index 45d9c252..9ef3d5e8 100644 ---- a/src/listener.c -+++ b/src/listener.c -@@ -226,32 +226,30 @@ int resume_listener(struct listener *l) - - /* Marks a ready listener as full so that the stream code tries to re-enable - * it upon next close() using resume_listener(). -- * -- * Note: this function is only called from listener_accept so is already -- * locked. - */ - static void listener_full(struct listener *l) - { -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock); - if (l->state >= LI_READY) { - if (l->state == LI_LIMITED) { - HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); - LIST_DEL(&l->wait_queue); - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); - } -- -- fd_stop_recv(l->fd); -- l->state = LI_FULL; -+ if (l->state != LI_FULL) { -+ fd_stop_recv(l->fd); -+ l->state = LI_FULL; -+ } - } -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock); - } - - /* Marks a ready listener as limited so that we only try to re-enable it when - * resources are free again. It will be queued into the specified queue. -- * -- * Note: this function is only called from listener_accept so is already -- * locked. - */ - static void limit_listener(struct listener *l, struct list *list) - { -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock); - if (l->state == LI_READY) { - HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); - LIST_ADDQ(list, &l->wait_queue); -@@ -259,6 +257,7 @@ static void limit_listener(struct listener *l, struct list *list) - fd_stop_recv(l->fd); - l->state = LI_LIMITED; - } -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock); - } - - /* This function adds all of the protocol's listener's file descriptors to the -@@ -422,15 +421,14 @@ int create_listeners(struct bind_conf *bc, const struct sockaddr_storage *ss, - */ - void delete_listener(struct listener *listener) - { -- if (listener->state != LI_ASSIGNED) -- return; -- - HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &listener->lock); -- listener->state = LI_INIT; -- LIST_DEL(&listener->proto_list); -- listener->proto->nb_listeners--; -- HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&jobs, 1); -- HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&listeners, 1); -+ if (listener->state == LI_ASSIGNED) { -+ listener->state = LI_INIT; -+ LIST_DEL(&listener->proto_list); -+ listener->proto->nb_listeners--; -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&jobs, 1); -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&listeners, 1); -+ } - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &listener->lock); - } - -@@ -443,6 +441,7 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - struct listener *l = fdtab[fd].owner; - struct proxy *p; - int max_accept; -+ int next_conn = 0; - int expire; - int cfd; - int ret; -@@ -454,8 +453,6 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - return; - p = l->bind_conf->frontend; - max_accept = l->maxaccept ? l->maxaccept : 1; -- if (HA_SPIN_TRYLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock)) -- return; - - if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED) && global.sps_lim) { - int max = freq_ctr_remain(&global.sess_per_sec, global.sps_lim, 0); -@@ -515,11 +512,29 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - * worst case. If we fail due to system limits or temporary resource - * shortage, we try again 100ms later in the worst case. - */ -- while (l->nbconn < l->maxconn && max_accept--) { -+ for (; max_accept-- > 0; next_conn = 0) { - struct sockaddr_storage addr; - socklen_t laddr = sizeof(addr); - unsigned int count; - -+ /* pre-increase the number of connections without going too far */ -+ do { -+ count = l->nbconn; -+ if (count >= l->maxconn) { -+ /* the listener was marked full or another -+ * thread is going to do it. -+ */ -+ next_conn = 0; -+ goto end; -+ } -+ next_conn = count + 1; -+ } while (!HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&l->nbconn, &count, next_conn)); -+ -+ if (next_conn == l->maxconn) { -+ /* we filled it, mark it full */ -+ listener_full(l); -+ } -+ - if (unlikely(actconn >= global.maxconn) && !(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) { - limit_listener(l, &global_listener_queue); - task_schedule(global_listener_queue_task, tick_add(now_ms, 1000)); /* try again in 1 second */ -@@ -562,6 +577,7 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - goto transient_error; - case EINTR: - case ECONNABORTED: -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&l->nbconn, 1); - continue; - case ENFILE: - if (p) -@@ -588,26 +604,34 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - } - } - -+ /* The connection was accepted, it must be counted as such */ -+ if (l->counters) -+ HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&l->counters->conn_max, next_conn); -+ -+ if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) { -+ count = update_freq_ctr(&global.conn_per_sec, 1); -+ HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&global.cps_max, count); -+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&actconn, 1); -+ } -+ - if (unlikely(cfd >= global.maxsock)) { - send_log(p, LOG_EMERG, - "Proxy %s reached the configured maximum connection limit. Please check the global 'maxconn' value.\n", - p->id); -+ if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&actconn, 1); - close(cfd); - limit_listener(l, &global_listener_queue); - task_schedule(global_listener_queue_task, tick_add(now_ms, 1000)); /* try again in 1 second */ - goto end; - } - -- /* increase the per-process number of cumulated connections */ -- if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) { -- count = update_freq_ctr(&global.conn_per_sec, 1); -- HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&global.cps_max, count); -- HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&actconn, 1); -- } -- -- count = HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&l->nbconn, 1); -- if (l->counters) -- HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&l->counters->conn_max, count); -+ /* past this point, l->accept() will automatically decrement -+ * l->nbconn and actconn once done. Setting next_conn=0 allows -+ * the error path not to rollback on nbconn. It's more convenient -+ * than duplicating all exit labels. -+ */ -+ next_conn = 0; - - ret = l->accept(l, cfd, &addr); - if (unlikely(ret <= 0)) { -@@ -622,7 +646,9 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - goto transient_error; - } - -- /* increase the per-process number of cumulated connections */ -+ /* increase the per-process number of cumulated sessions, this -+ * may only be done once l->accept() has accepted the connection. -+ */ - if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) { - count = update_freq_ctr(&global.sess_per_sec, 1); - HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&global.sps_max, count); -@@ -634,7 +660,7 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - } - #endif - -- } /* end of while (max_accept--) */ -+ } /* end of for (max_accept--) */ - - /* we've exhausted max_accept, so there is no need to poll again */ - stop: -@@ -649,10 +675,21 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - limit_listener(l, &global_listener_queue); - task_schedule(global_listener_queue_task, tick_first(expire, global_listener_queue_task->expire)); - end: -- if (l->nbconn >= l->maxconn) -- listener_full(l); -+ if (next_conn) -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&l->nbconn, 1); - -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock); -+ if (l->nbconn < l->maxconn && l->state == LI_FULL) { -+ /* at least one thread has to this when quitting */ -+ resume_listener(l); -+ -+ /* Dequeues all of the listeners waiting for a resource */ -+ if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&global_listener_queue)) -+ dequeue_all_listeners(&global_listener_queue); -+ -+ if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&p->listener_queue) && -+ (!p->fe_sps_lim || freq_ctr_remain(&p->fe_sess_per_sec, p->fe_sps_lim, 0) > 0)) -+ dequeue_all_listeners(&p->listener_queue); -+ } - } - - /* Notify the listener that a connection initiated from it was released. This diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/037-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-use-a-self-locked-list-for-the-dequeue-lists.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/037-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-use-a-self-locked-list-for-the-dequeue-lists.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f565f92821..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/037-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-use-a-self-locked-list-for-the-dequeue-lists.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,247 +0,0 @@ -commit e75d8efec35de2d22d14bf03f4aa9b8490658788 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu Feb 28 10:27:18 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: listener: use a self-locked list for the dequeue lists - - There is a very difficult to reproduce race in the listener's accept - code, which is much easier to reproduce once connection limits are - properly enforced. It's an ABBA lock issue : - - - the following functions take l->lock then lq_lock : - disable_listener, pause_listener, listener_full, limit_listener, - do_unbind_listener - - - the following ones take lq_lock then l->lock : - resume_listener, dequeue_all_listener - - This is because __resume_listener() only takes the listener's lock - and expects to be called with lq_lock held. The problem can easily - happen when listener_full() and limit_listener() are called a lot - while in parallel another thread releases sessions for the same - listener using listener_release() which in turn calls resume_listener(). - - This scenario is more prevalent in 2.0-dev since the removal of the - accept lock in listener_accept(). However in 1.9 and before, a different - but extremely unlikely scenario can happen : - - thread1 thread2 - ............................ enter listener_accept() - limit_listener() - ............................ long pause before taking the lock - session_free() - dequeue_all_listeners() - lock(lq_lock) [1] - ............................ try_lock(l->lock) [2] - __resume_listener() - spin_lock(l->lock) =>WAIT[2] - ............................ accept() - l->accept() - nbconn==maxconn => - listener_full() - state==LI_LIMITED => - lock(lq_lock) =>DEADLOCK[1]! - - In practice it is almost impossible to trigger it because it requires - to limit both on the listener's maxconn and the frontend's rate limit, - at the same time, and to release the listener when the connection rate - goes below the limit between poll() returns the FD and the lock is - taken (a few nanoseconds). But maybe with threads competing on the - same core it has more chances to appear. - - This patch removes the lq_lock and replaces it with a lockless queue - for the listener's wait queue (well, technically speaking a self-locked - queue) brought by commit a8434ec14 ("MINOR: lists: Implement locked - variations.") and its few subsequent fixes. This relieves us from the - need of the lq_lock and removes the deadlock. It also gets rid of the - distinction between __resume_listener() and resume_listener() since the - only difference was the lq_lock. All listener removals from the list - are now unconditional to avoid races on the state. It's worth noting - that the list used to never be initialized and that it used to work - only thanks to the state tests, so the initialization has now been - added. - - This patch must carefully be backported to 1.9 and very likely 1.8. - It is mandatory to be careful about replacing all manipulations of - l->wait_queue, global.listener_queue and p->listener_queue. - - (cherry picked from commit 01abd025084b4fe50e84189d1a83499cbf4825ed) - [wt: there are some suspicions that this bug might have been hit in - 1.9 so it's about time to backport this fix. All occurrences of the - elements switched to self-locked list were inspected and none of - them differred from 2.0so that the patch doesn't need to be adjusted] - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 434c7f8419fc38b6ced1945fa4ce6e84c063e835) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/hathreads.h b/include/common/hathreads.h -index 8a738aaf..8134839a 100644 ---- a/include/common/hathreads.h -+++ b/include/common/hathreads.h -@@ -344,7 +344,6 @@ enum lock_label { - TASK_WQ_LOCK, - POOL_LOCK, - LISTENER_LOCK, -- LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, - PROXY_LOCK, - SERVER_LOCK, - UPDATED_SERVERS_LOCK, -@@ -467,7 +466,6 @@ static inline const char *lock_label(enum lock_label label) - case TASK_WQ_LOCK: return "TASK_WQ"; - case POOL_LOCK: return "POOL"; - case LISTENER_LOCK: return "LISTENER"; -- case LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK: return "LISTENER_QUEUE"; - case PROXY_LOCK: return "PROXY"; - case SERVER_LOCK: return "SERVER"; - case UPDATED_SERVERS_LOCK: return "UPDATED_SERVERS"; -diff --git a/src/listener.c b/src/listener.c -index 9ef3d5e8..dab07a5e 100644 ---- a/src/listener.c -+++ b/src/listener.c -@@ -39,9 +39,6 @@ - #include - #include - -- /* listner_queue lock (same for global and per proxy queues) */ --__decl_hathreads(static HA_SPINLOCK_T lq_lock); -- - /* List head of all known bind keywords */ - static struct bind_kw_list bind_keywords = { - .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(bind_keywords.list) -@@ -94,11 +91,7 @@ static void disable_listener(struct listener *listener) - goto end; - if (listener->state == LI_READY) - fd_stop_recv(listener->fd); -- if (listener->state == LI_LIMITED) { -- HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- LIST_DEL(&listener->wait_queue); -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- } -+ LIST_DEL_LOCKED(&listener->wait_queue); - listener->state = LI_LISTEN; - end: - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &listener->lock); -@@ -134,11 +127,7 @@ int pause_listener(struct listener *l) - goto end; - } - -- if (l->state == LI_LIMITED) { -- HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- LIST_DEL(&l->wait_queue); -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- } -+ LIST_DEL_LOCKED(&l->wait_queue); - - fd_stop_recv(l->fd); - l->state = LI_PAUSED; -@@ -157,7 +146,7 @@ int pause_listener(struct listener *l) - * stopped it. If the resume fails, 0 is returned and an error might be - * displayed. - */ --static int __resume_listener(struct listener *l) -+int resume_listener(struct listener *l) - { - int ret = 1; - -@@ -199,8 +188,7 @@ static int __resume_listener(struct listener *l) - if (l->state == LI_READY) - goto end; - -- if (l->state == LI_LIMITED) -- LIST_DEL(&l->wait_queue); -+ LIST_DEL_LOCKED(&l->wait_queue); - - if (l->nbconn >= l->maxconn) { - l->state = LI_FULL; -@@ -214,16 +202,6 @@ static int __resume_listener(struct listener *l) - return ret; - } - --int resume_listener(struct listener *l) --{ -- int ret; -- -- HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- ret = __resume_listener(l); -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- return ret; --} -- - /* Marks a ready listener as full so that the stream code tries to re-enable - * it upon next close() using resume_listener(). - */ -@@ -231,11 +209,7 @@ static void listener_full(struct listener *l) - { - HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock); - if (l->state >= LI_READY) { -- if (l->state == LI_LIMITED) { -- HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- LIST_DEL(&l->wait_queue); -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- } -+ LIST_DEL_LOCKED(&l->wait_queue); - if (l->state != LI_FULL) { - fd_stop_recv(l->fd); - l->state = LI_FULL; -@@ -251,9 +225,7 @@ static void limit_listener(struct listener *l, struct list *list) - { - HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_LOCK, &l->lock); - if (l->state == LI_READY) { -- HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- LIST_ADDQ(list, &l->wait_queue); -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -+ LIST_ADDQ_LOCKED(list, &l->wait_queue); - fd_stop_recv(l->fd); - l->state = LI_LIMITED; - } -@@ -292,17 +264,14 @@ int disable_all_listeners(struct protocol *proto) - /* Dequeues all of the listeners waiting for a resource in wait queue . */ - void dequeue_all_listeners(struct list *list) - { -- struct listener *listener, *l_back; -+ struct listener *listener; - -- HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- list_for_each_entry_safe(listener, l_back, list, wait_queue) { -+ while ((listener = LIST_POP_LOCKED(list, struct listener *, wait_queue))) { - /* This cannot fail because the listeners are by definition in -- * the LI_LIMITED state. The function also removes the entry -- * from the queue. -+ * the LI_LIMITED state. - */ -- __resume_listener(listener); -+ resume_listener(listener); - } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); - } - - /* Must be called with the lock held. Depending on value, it does -@@ -313,11 +282,7 @@ void do_unbind_listener(struct listener *listener, int do_close) - if (listener->state == LI_READY) - fd_stop_recv(listener->fd); - -- if (listener->state == LI_LIMITED) { -- HA_SPIN_LOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- LIST_DEL(&listener->wait_queue); -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(LISTENER_QUEUE_LOCK, &lq_lock); -- } -+ LIST_DEL_LOCKED(&listener->wait_queue); - - if (listener->state >= LI_PAUSED) { - if (do_close) { -@@ -399,6 +364,7 @@ int create_listeners(struct bind_conf *bc, const struct sockaddr_storage *ss, - - l->fd = fd; - memcpy(&l->addr, ss, sizeof(*ss)); -+ LIST_INIT(&l->wait_queue); - l->state = LI_INIT; - - proto->add(l, port); -@@ -1039,7 +1005,6 @@ static void __listener_init(void) - sample_register_fetches(&smp_kws); - acl_register_keywords(&acl_kws); - bind_register_keywords(&bind_kws); -- HA_SPIN_INIT(&lq_lock); - } - - /* diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/038-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-make-sure-the-listener-never-accepts-too-many-conns.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/038-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-make-sure-the-listener-never-accepts-too-many-conns.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a1ca73b2e4..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/038-BUG-MEDIUM-listener-make-sure-the-listener-never-accepts-too-many-conns.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,217 +0,0 @@ -commit c98cdf7cc755c579a8b9cceee4809089267615ce -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Wed Feb 27 19:32:32 2019 +0100 - - BUG/MEDIUM: listener: make sure the listener never accepts too many conns - - We were not checking p->feconn nor the global actconn soon enough. In - older versions this could result in a frontend accepting more connections - than allowed by its maxconn or the global maxconn, exactly N-1 extra - connections where N is the number of threads, provided each of these - threads were running a different listener. But with the lock removal, - it became worse, the excess could be the listener's maxconn multiplied - by the number of threads. Among the nasty side effect was that LI_FULL - could be removed while the limit was still over and in some cases the - polling on the socket was no re-enabled. - - This commit takes care of updating and checking p->feconn and the global - actconn *before* processing the connection, so that the listener can be - turned off before accepting the socket if needed. This requires to move - some of the bookkeeping operations form session to listen, which totally - makes sense in this context. - - Now the limits are properly respected, even if a listener's maxconn is - over a frontend's. This only applies on top of the listener lock removal - series and doesn't have to be backported. - - (cherry picked from commit 82c9789ac4f0cba9a74d16c1b730fc64e1f95a6e) - [wt: backported since it fixes the previous patch set] - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit f54a86a229e1ee4b256d5614c0a65924f447df09) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/listener.c b/src/listener.c -index dab07a5e..68c84fbe 100644 ---- a/src/listener.c -+++ b/src/listener.c -@@ -408,6 +408,8 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - struct proxy *p; - int max_accept; - int next_conn = 0; -+ int next_feconn = 0; -+ int next_actconn = 0; - int expire; - int cfd; - int ret; -@@ -478,12 +480,15 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - * worst case. If we fail due to system limits or temporary resource - * shortage, we try again 100ms later in the worst case. - */ -- for (; max_accept-- > 0; next_conn = 0) { -+ for (; max_accept-- > 0; next_conn = next_feconn = next_actconn = 0) { - struct sockaddr_storage addr; - socklen_t laddr = sizeof(addr); - unsigned int count; - -- /* pre-increase the number of connections without going too far */ -+ /* pre-increase the number of connections without going too far. -+ * We process the listener, then the proxy, then the process. -+ * We know which ones to unroll based on the next_xxx value. -+ */ - do { - count = l->nbconn; - if (count >= l->maxconn) { -@@ -501,15 +506,42 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - listener_full(l); - } - -- if (unlikely(actconn >= global.maxconn) && !(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) { -- limit_listener(l, &global_listener_queue); -- task_schedule(global_listener_queue_task, tick_add(now_ms, 1000)); /* try again in 1 second */ -- goto end; -+ if (p) { -+ do { -+ count = p->feconn; -+ if (count >= p->maxconn) { -+ /* the frontend was marked full or another -+ * thread is going to do it. -+ */ -+ next_feconn = 0; -+ goto end; -+ } -+ next_feconn = count + 1; -+ } while (!HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&p->feconn, &count, next_feconn)); -+ -+ if (unlikely(next_feconn == p->maxconn)) { -+ /* we just filled it */ -+ limit_listener(l, &p->listener_queue); -+ } - } - -- if (unlikely(p && p->feconn >= p->maxconn)) { -- limit_listener(l, &p->listener_queue); -- goto end; -+ if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) { -+ do { -+ count = actconn; -+ if (count >= global.maxconn) { -+ /* the process was marked full or another -+ * thread is going to do it. -+ */ -+ next_actconn = 0; -+ goto end; -+ } -+ next_actconn = count + 1; -+ } while (!HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&actconn, &count, next_actconn)); -+ -+ if (unlikely(next_actconn == global.maxconn)) { -+ limit_listener(l, &global_listener_queue); -+ task_schedule(global_listener_queue_task, tick_add(now_ms, 1000)); /* try again in 1 second */ -+ } - } - - #ifdef USE_ACCEPT4 -@@ -544,6 +576,10 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - case EINTR: - case ECONNABORTED: - HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&l->nbconn, 1); -+ if (p) -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&p->feconn, 1); -+ if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&actconn, 1); - continue; - case ENFILE: - if (p) -@@ -574,18 +610,20 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - if (l->counters) - HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&l->counters->conn_max, next_conn); - -+ if (p) -+ HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&p->fe_counters.conn_max, next_feconn); -+ -+ proxy_inc_fe_conn_ctr(l, p); -+ - if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) { - count = update_freq_ctr(&global.conn_per_sec, 1); - HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&global.cps_max, count); -- HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&actconn, 1); - } - - if (unlikely(cfd >= global.maxsock)) { - send_log(p, LOG_EMERG, - "Proxy %s reached the configured maximum connection limit. Please check the global 'maxconn' value.\n", - p->id); -- if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) -- HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&actconn, 1); - close(cfd); - limit_listener(l, &global_listener_queue); - task_schedule(global_listener_queue_task, tick_add(now_ms, 1000)); /* try again in 1 second */ -@@ -593,11 +631,13 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - } - - /* past this point, l->accept() will automatically decrement -- * l->nbconn and actconn once done. Setting next_conn=0 allows -- * the error path not to rollback on nbconn. It's more convenient -- * than duplicating all exit labels. -+ * l->nbconn, feconn and actconn once done. Setting next_*conn=0 -+ * allows the error path not to rollback on nbconn. It's more -+ * convenient than duplicating all exit labels. - */ - next_conn = 0; -+ next_feconn = 0; -+ next_actconn = 0; - - ret = l->accept(l, cfd, &addr); - if (unlikely(ret <= 0)) { -@@ -644,7 +684,14 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - if (next_conn) - HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&l->nbconn, 1); - -- if (l->nbconn < l->maxconn && l->state == LI_FULL) { -+ if (p && next_feconn) -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&p->feconn, 1); -+ -+ if (next_actconn) -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&actconn, 1); -+ -+ if ((l->state == LI_FULL && l->nbconn < l->maxconn) || -+ (l->state == LI_LIMITED && ((!p || p->feconn < p->maxconn) && (actconn < global.maxconn)))) { - /* at least one thread has to this when quitting */ - resume_listener(l); - -@@ -668,8 +715,11 @@ void listener_release(struct listener *l) - - if (!(l->options & LI_O_UNLIMITED)) - HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&actconn, 1); -+ if (fe) -+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&fe->feconn, 1); - HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&l->nbconn, 1); -- if (l->state == LI_FULL) -+ -+ if (l->state == LI_FULL || l->state == LI_LIMITED) - resume_listener(l); - - /* Dequeues all of the listeners waiting for a resource */ -diff --git a/src/session.c b/src/session.c -index b91d67ee..c1515261 100644 ---- a/src/session.c -+++ b/src/session.c -@@ -53,10 +53,6 @@ struct session *session_new(struct proxy *fe, struct listener *li, enum obj_type - vars_init(&sess->vars, SCOPE_SESS); - sess->task = NULL; - sess->t_handshake = -1; /* handshake not done yet */ -- HA_ATOMIC_UPDATE_MAX(&fe->fe_counters.conn_max, -- HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&fe->feconn, 1)); -- if (li) -- proxy_inc_fe_conn_ctr(li, fe); - HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&totalconn, 1); - HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&jobs, 1); - } -@@ -65,7 +61,6 @@ struct session *session_new(struct proxy *fe, struct listener *li, enum obj_type - - void session_free(struct session *sess) - { -- HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&sess->fe->feconn, 1); - if (sess->listener) - listener_release(sess->listener); - session_store_counters(sess); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/039-BUILD-MINOR-listener-Silent-a-few-signedness-warnings.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/039-BUILD-MINOR-listener-Silent-a-few-signedness-warnings.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 02a851ea78..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/039-BUILD-MINOR-listener-Silent-a-few-signedness-warnings.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -commit 06ffb1175eb87684eaccb4fd7ac9d4936ca9b8f7 -Author: David Carlier -Date: Wed Mar 27 16:08:42 2019 +0000 - - BUILD/MINOR: listener: Silent a few signedness warnings. - - Silenting couple of warnings related to signedness, due to a mismatch of - signed and unsigned ints with l->nbconn, actconn and p->feconn. - - (cherry picked from commit 5671662f08536c979ff91bc46f94d086bf286540) - [wt: s/_HA/HA/] - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit f5e9bf696b0b46c140d742cee23d0d54df66bb2f) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/listener.c b/src/listener.c -index 68c84fbe..821c931a 100644 ---- a/src/listener.c -+++ b/src/listener.c -@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - goto end; - } - next_conn = count + 1; -- } while (!HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&l->nbconn, &count, next_conn)); -+ } while (!HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&l->nbconn, (int *)&count, next_conn)); - - if (next_conn == l->maxconn) { - /* we filled it, mark it full */ -@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ void listener_accept(int fd) - goto end; - } - next_actconn = count + 1; -- } while (!HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&actconn, &count, next_actconn)); -+ } while (!HA_ATOMIC_CAS(&actconn, (int *)&count, next_actconn)); - - if (unlikely(next_actconn == global.maxconn)) { - limit_listener(l, &global_listener_queue); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/040-MINOR-skip-get_gmtime-where-tm-is-unused.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/040-MINOR-skip-get_gmtime-where-tm-is-unused.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fab1cb3012..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/040-MINOR-skip-get_gmtime-where-tm-is-unused.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -commit 5d9e3238ae9474051b2020a04af2cbb11b613f98 -Author: Robin H. Johnson -Date: Wed Apr 10 21:08:15 2019 +0000 - - MINOR: skip get_gmtime where tm is unused - - For LOG_FMT_TS (%Ts), the tm variable is not used, so save some cycles - on the call to get_gmtime. - - Backport: 1.9 1.8 - Signed-off-by: Robin H. Johnson - (cherry picked from commit 543d4507ca4ddd9ece5eb4e869b20ee1d2afedac) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 0ab133673a28fb91679f2b8471ed13ce265aa8a6) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/log.c b/src/log.c -index 9c112255..313fa55d 100644 ---- a/src/log.c -+++ b/src/log.c -@@ -1651,7 +1651,6 @@ int build_logline(struct stream *s, char *dst, size_t maxsize, struct list *list - break; - - case LOG_FMT_TS: // %Ts -- get_gmtime(s->logs.accept_date.tv_sec, &tm); - if (tmp->options & LOG_OPT_HEXA) { - iret = snprintf(tmplog, dst + maxsize - tmplog, "%04X", (unsigned int)s->logs.accept_date.tv_sec); - if (iret < 0 || iret > dst + maxsize - tmplog) diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/041-BUG-MAJOR-http_fetch-Get-the-channel-depending-on-the-keyword-used.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/041-BUG-MAJOR-http_fetch-Get-the-channel-depending-on-the-keyword-used.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3f8fb1c32e..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/041-BUG-MAJOR-http_fetch-Get-the-channel-depending-on-the-keyword-used.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,976 +0,0 @@ -commit b05ee4aa74a95be49c78198ca601000b47c93da2 -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Wed Apr 17 12:02:59 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MAJOR: http_fetch: Get the channel depending on the keyword used - - All HTTP samples are buggy because the channel tested in the prefetch functions - (HTX and legacy HTTP) is chosen depending on the sample direction and not the - keyword really used. It means the request channel is used if the sample is - called during the request analysis and the response channel is used if it is - called during the response analysis, regardless the sample really called. For - instance, if you use the sample "req.ver" in an http-response rule, the response - channel will be prefeched because it is called during the response analysis, - while the request channel should have been used instead. So some assumptions on - the validity of the sample may be made on the wrong channel. It is the first - bug. - - Then the same error is done in some samples themselves. So fetches are performed - on the wrong channel. For instance, the header extraction (req.fhdr, res.fhdr, - req.hdr, res.hdr...). If the sample "req.hdr" is used in an http-response rule, - then the matching is done on the response headers and not the request ones. It - is the second bug. - - Finally, the last one but not the least, in some samples, the right channel is - used. But because the prefetch was done on the wrong one, this channel may be in - a undefined state. For instance, using the sample "req.ver" in an http-response - rule leads to a matching on a posibility released buffer. - - To fix all these bugs, the right channel is now chosen in sample fetches, before - the prefetch. If the same function is used to fetch requests and responses - elements, then the keyword is used to choose the right one. This channel is then - used by the functions smp_prefetch_htx() and smp_prefetch_http(). Of course, it - is also used by the samples themselves to extract information. - - This patch must be backported to all supported versions. For version 1.8 and - priors, it must be totally refactored. First because there is no HTX into these - versions. Then the buffers API has changed in HAProxy 1.9. The files - http_fetch.{ch} doesn't exist on old versions. - - (cherry picked from commit 89dc49935997856dd4f864b654d3601107ec1967) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit a89ca0b50b6b30ab75fbb7193a1132c0f89520fc) - [cf: Changes made in src/proto_http.c because src/http_fetch.c doesn't exist] - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/proto/proto_http.h b/include/proto/proto_http.h -index 50efff4c..a2b365da 100644 ---- a/include/proto/proto_http.h -+++ b/include/proto/proto_http.h -@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ struct action_kw *action_http_res_custom(const char *kw); - int val_hdr(struct arg *arg, char **err_msg); - - int smp_prefetch_http(struct proxy *px, struct stream *s, unsigned int opt, -- const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, int req_vol); -+ const struct channel *chn, struct sample *smp, int req_vol); - - enum act_return http_action_req_capture_by_id(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px, - struct session *sess, struct stream *s, int flags); -@@ -144,11 +144,11 @@ int parse_qvalue(const char *qvalue, const char **end); - /* Note: these functions *do* modify the sample. Even in case of success, at - * least the type and uint value are modified. - */ --#define CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST() \ -- do { int r = smp_prefetch_http(smp->px, smp->strm, smp->opt, args, smp, 1); if (r <= 0) return r; } while (0) -+#define CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn) \ -+ do { int r = smp_prefetch_http(smp->px, smp->strm, smp->opt, (chn), smp, 1); if (r <= 0) return r; } while (0) - --#define CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST_PERM() \ -- do { int r = smp_prefetch_http(smp->px, smp->strm, smp->opt, args, smp, 0); if (r <= 0) return r; } while (0) -+#define CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST_PERM(chn) \ -+ do { int r = smp_prefetch_http(smp->px, smp->strm, smp->opt, (chn), smp, 0); if (r <= 0) return r; } while (0) - - static inline void http_req_keywords_register(struct action_kw_list *kw_list) - { -diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c -index 93cb86d2..d40c012a 100644 ---- a/src/hlua.c -+++ b/src/hlua.c -@@ -6458,7 +6458,7 @@ static int hlua_applet_http_init(struct appctx *ctx, struct proxy *px, struct st - const char *error; - - /* Wait for a full HTTP request. */ -- if (!smp_prefetch_http(px, strm, 0, NULL, &smp, 0)) { -+ if (!smp_prefetch_http(px, strm, 0, req, &smp, 0)) { - if (smp.flags & SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE) - return -1; - return 0; -diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c -index 8b087c5b..9beaa137 100644 ---- a/src/proto_http.c -+++ b/src/proto_http.c -@@ -9447,6 +9447,8 @@ struct redirect_rule *http_parse_redirect_rule(const char *file, int linenum, st - /************************************************************************/ - /* The code below is dedicated to ACL parsing and matching */ - /************************************************************************/ -+#define SMP_REQ_CHN(smp) (smp->strm ? &smp->strm->req : NULL) -+#define SMP_RES_CHN(smp) (smp->strm ? &smp->strm->res : NULL) - - - /* This function ensures that the prerequisites for an L7 fetch are ready, -@@ -9463,7 +9465,7 @@ struct redirect_rule *http_parse_redirect_rule(const char *file, int linenum, st - * 1 if an HTTP message is ready - */ - int smp_prefetch_http(struct proxy *px, struct stream *s, unsigned int opt, -- const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, int req_vol) -+ const struct channel *chn, struct sample *smp, int req_vol) - { - struct http_txn *txn; - struct http_msg *msg; -@@ -9472,7 +9474,7 @@ int smp_prefetch_http(struct proxy *px, struct stream *s, unsigned int opt, - * initialization (eg: tcp-request connection), so this function is the - * one responsible for guarding against this case for all HTTP users. - */ -- if (!s) -+ if (!s || !chn) - return 0; - - if (!s->txn) { -@@ -9481,78 +9483,78 @@ int smp_prefetch_http(struct proxy *px, struct stream *s, unsigned int opt, - http_init_txn(s); - } - txn = s->txn; -- msg = &txn->req; - -- /* Check for a dependency on a request */ - smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; - -- if ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) { -- /* If the buffer does not leave enough free space at the end, -- * we must first realign it. -- */ -- if (s->req.buf->p > s->req.buf->data && -- s->req.buf->i + s->req.buf->p > s->req.buf->data + s->req.buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite) -- buffer_slow_realign(s->req.buf); -- -- if (unlikely(txn->req.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) { -- if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) -- return 0; -+ if (chn->flags & CF_ISRESP) { -+ /* Check for a dependency on a response */ -+ if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY) { -+ smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ goto end; -+ } - -- /* Try to decode HTTP request */ -- if (likely(msg->next < s->req.buf->i)) -- http_msg_analyzer(msg, &txn->hdr_idx); -+ /* Check for a dependency on a request */ -+ msg = &txn->req; - -- /* Still no valid request ? */ -- if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) { -- if ((msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || -- buffer_full(s->req.buf, global.tune.maxrewrite)) { -- return 0; -- } -- /* wait for final state */ -- smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; -- return 0; -- } -+ if (req_vol && (smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) { -+ return 0; /* data might have moved and indexes changed */ -+ } - -- /* OK we just got a valid HTTP request. We have some minor -- * preparation to perform so that further checks can rely -- * on HTTP tests. -- */ -+ /* If the buffer does not leave enough free space at the end, we must -+ * first realign it. -+ */ -+ if (chn->buf->p > chn->buf->data && -+ chn->buf->i + chn->buf->p > chn->buf->data + chn->buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite) -+ buffer_slow_realign(chn->buf); - -- /* If the request was parsed but was too large, we must absolutely -- * return an error so that it is not processed. At the moment this -- * cannot happen, but if the parsers are to change in the future, -- * we want this check to be maintained. -- */ -- if (unlikely(s->req.buf->i + s->req.buf->p > -- s->req.buf->data + s->req.buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite)) { -- msg->err_state = msg->msg_state; -- msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR; -- smp->data.u.sint = 1; -- return 1; -- } -+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) { -+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) -+ return 0; - -- txn->meth = find_http_meth(msg->chn->buf->p, msg->sl.rq.m_l); -- if (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_GET || txn->meth == HTTP_METH_HEAD) -- s->flags |= SF_REDIRECTABLE; -+ /* Try to decode HTTP request */ -+ if (likely(msg->next < chn->buf->i)) -+ http_msg_analyzer(msg, &txn->hdr_idx); - -- if (unlikely(msg->sl.rq.v_l == 0) && !http_upgrade_v09_to_v10(txn)) -+ /* Still no valid request ? */ -+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) { -+ if ((msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || -+ buffer_full(chn->buf, global.tune.maxrewrite)) { - return 0; -+ } -+ /* wait for final state */ -+ smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; -+ return 0; - } - -- if (req_vol && txn->rsp.msg_state != HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE) { -- return 0; /* data might have moved and indexes changed */ -+ /* OK we just got a valid HTTP message. We have some minor -+ * preparation to perform so that further checks can rely -+ * on HTTP tests. -+ */ -+ -+ /* If the message was parsed but was too large, we must absolutely -+ * return an error so that it is not processed. At the moment this -+ * cannot happen, but if the parsers are to change in the future, -+ * we want this check to be maintained. -+ */ -+ if (unlikely(chn->buf->i + chn->buf->p > -+ chn->buf->data + chn->buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite)) { -+ msg->err_state = msg->msg_state; -+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR; -+ smp->data.u.sint = 1; -+ return 1; - } - -- /* otherwise everything's ready for the request */ -- } -- else { -- /* Check for a dependency on a response */ -- if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY) { -- smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; -+ txn->meth = find_http_meth(chn->buf->p, msg->sl.rq.m_l); -+ if (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_GET || txn->meth == HTTP_METH_HEAD) -+ s->flags |= SF_REDIRECTABLE; -+ -+ if (unlikely(msg->sl.rq.v_l == 0) && !http_upgrade_v09_to_v10(txn)) - return 0; -- } - } - -+ end: - /* everything's OK */ - smp->data.u.sint = 1; - return 1; -@@ -9592,19 +9594,21 @@ static int pat_parse_meth(const char *text, struct pattern *pattern, int mflags, - static int - smp_fetch_meth(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - int meth; - struct http_txn *txn; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST_PERM(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST_PERM(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - meth = txn->meth; - smp->data.type = SMP_T_METH; - smp->data.u.meth.meth = meth; - if (meth == HTTP_METH_OTHER) { -- if (txn->rsp.msg_state != HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE) -+ if ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) { - /* ensure the indexes are not affected */ - return 0; -+ } - smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST; - smp->data.u.meth.str.len = txn->req.sl.rq.m_l; - smp->data.u.meth.str.str = txn->req.chn->buf->p; -@@ -9646,15 +9650,16 @@ static struct pattern *pat_match_meth(struct sample *smp, struct pattern_expr *e - static int - smp_fetch_rqver(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - char *ptr; - int len; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - len = txn->req.sl.rq.v_l; -- ptr = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.v; -+ ptr = chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.v; - - while ((len-- > 0) && (*ptr++ != '/')); - if (len <= 0) -@@ -9671,18 +9676,17 @@ smp_fetch_rqver(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - static int - smp_fetch_stver(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_RES_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - char *ptr; - int len; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; -- if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY) -- return 0; - - len = txn->rsp.sl.st.v_l; -- ptr = txn->rsp.chn->buf->p; -+ ptr = chn->buf->p; - - while ((len-- > 0) && (*ptr++ != '/')); - if (len <= 0) -@@ -9700,18 +9704,19 @@ smp_fetch_stver(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - static int - smp_fetch_stcode(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_RES_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - char *ptr; - int len; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY) - return 0; - - len = txn->rsp.sl.st.c_l; -- ptr = txn->rsp.chn->buf->p + txn->rsp.sl.st.c; -+ ptr = chn->buf->p + txn->rsp.sl.st.c; - - smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; - smp->data.u.sint = __strl2ui(ptr, len); -@@ -9746,20 +9751,21 @@ smp_fetch_uniqueid(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, v - static int - smp_fetch_hdrs(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_msg *msg; - struct hdr_idx *idx; - struct http_txn *txn; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - idx = &txn->hdr_idx; - msg = &txn->req; - - smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; -- smp->data.u.str.str = msg->chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(idx); -+ smp->data.u.str.str = chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(idx); - smp->data.u.str.len = msg->eoh - hdr_idx_first_pos(idx) + 1 + -- (msg->chn->buf->p[msg->eoh] == '\r'); -+ (chn->buf->p[msg->eoh] == '\r'); - - return 1; - } -@@ -9780,7 +9786,7 @@ smp_fetch_hdrs(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - static int - smp_fetch_hdrs_bin(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -- struct http_msg *msg; -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct chunk *temp; - struct hdr_idx *idx; - const char *cur_ptr, *cur_next, *p; -@@ -9793,7 +9799,7 @@ smp_fetch_hdrs_bin(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, v - char *buf; - char *end; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - temp = get_trash_chunk(); - buf = temp->str; -@@ -9801,11 +9807,10 @@ smp_fetch_hdrs_bin(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, v - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - idx = &txn->hdr_idx; -- msg = &txn->req; - - /* Build array of headers. */ - old_idx = 0; -- cur_next = msg->chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(idx); -+ cur_next = chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(idx); - while (1) { - cur_idx = idx->v[old_idx].next; - if (!cur_idx) -@@ -9880,25 +9885,23 @@ smp_fetch_hdrs_bin(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, v - static int - smp_fetch_body(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_msg *msg; - unsigned long len; - unsigned long block1; - char *body; - struct chunk *temp; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - -- if ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) -- msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; -- else -- msg = &smp->strm->txn->rsp; -+ msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; - - len = http_body_bytes(msg); -- body = b_ptr(msg->chn->buf, -http_data_rewind(msg)); -+ body = b_ptr(chn->buf, -http_data_rewind(msg)); - - block1 = len; -- if (block1 > msg->chn->buf->data + msg->chn->buf->size - body) -- block1 = msg->chn->buf->data + msg->chn->buf->size - body; -+ if (block1 > chn->buf->data + chn->buf->size - body) -+ block1 = chn->buf->data + chn->buf->size - body; - - if (block1 == len) { - /* buffer is not wrapped (or empty) */ -@@ -9911,7 +9914,7 @@ smp_fetch_body(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - /* buffer is wrapped, we need to defragment it */ - temp = get_trash_chunk(); - memcpy(temp->str, body, block1); -- memcpy(temp->str + block1, msg->chn->buf->data, len - block1); -+ memcpy(temp->str + block1, chn->buf->data, len - block1); - smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; - smp->data.u.str.str = temp->str; - smp->data.u.str.len = len; -@@ -9927,15 +9930,12 @@ smp_fetch_body(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - static int - smp_fetch_body_len(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_msg *msg; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -- -- if ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) -- msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; -- else -- msg = &smp->strm->txn->rsp; -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - -+ msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; - smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; - smp->data.u.sint = http_body_bytes(msg); - -@@ -9951,15 +9951,12 @@ smp_fetch_body_len(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, v - static int - smp_fetch_body_size(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_msg *msg; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -- -- if ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) -- msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; -- else -- msg = &smp->strm->txn->rsp; -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - -+ msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; - smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; - smp->data.u.sint = msg->body_len; - -@@ -9972,14 +9969,15 @@ smp_fetch_body_size(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - static int - smp_fetch_url(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; - smp->data.u.str.len = txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; -- smp->data.u.str.str = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u; -+ smp->data.u.str.str = chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u; - smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_1ST | SMP_F_CONST; - return 1; - } -@@ -9987,13 +9985,14 @@ smp_fetch_url(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void * - static int - smp_fetch_url_ip(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - struct sockaddr_storage addr; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; -- url2sa(txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u, txn->req.sl.rq.u_l, &addr, NULL); -+ url2sa(chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u, txn->req.sl.rq.u_l, &addr, NULL); - if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_family != AF_INET) - return 0; - -@@ -10006,13 +10005,14 @@ smp_fetch_url_ip(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, voi - static int - smp_fetch_url_port(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - struct sockaddr_storage addr; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; -- url2sa(txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u, txn->req.sl.rq.u_l, &addr, NULL); -+ url2sa(chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u, txn->req.sl.rq.u_l, &addr, NULL); - if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_family != AF_INET) - return 0; - -@@ -10032,6 +10032,8 @@ smp_fetch_url_port(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, v - static int - smp_fetch_fhdr(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ /* possible keywords: req.fhdr, res.fhdr */ -+ struct channel *chn = ((kw[2] == 'q') ? SMP_REQ_CHN(smp) : SMP_RES_CHN(smp)); - struct hdr_idx *idx; - struct hdr_ctx *ctx = smp->ctx.a[0]; - const struct http_msg *msg; -@@ -10056,10 +10058,9 @@ smp_fetch_fhdr(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - occ = args[1].data.sint; - } - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -- -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - idx = &smp->strm->txn->hdr_idx; -- msg = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &smp->strm->txn->req : &smp->strm->txn->rsp; -+ msg = (!(chn->flags & CF_ISRESP) ? &smp->strm->txn->req : &smp->strm->txn->rsp); - - if (ctx && !(smp->flags & SMP_F_NOT_LAST)) - /* search for header from the beginning */ -@@ -10089,9 +10090,10 @@ smp_fetch_fhdr(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - static int - smp_fetch_fhdr_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ /* possible keywords: req.fhdr_cnt, res.fhdr_cnt */ -+ struct channel *chn = ((kw[2] == 'q') ? SMP_REQ_CHN(smp) : SMP_RES_CHN(smp)); - struct hdr_idx *idx; - struct hdr_ctx ctx; -- const struct http_msg *msg; - int cnt; - const char *name = NULL; - int len = 0; -@@ -10101,14 +10103,12 @@ smp_fetch_fhdr_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, v - len = args->data.str.len; - } - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - idx = &smp->strm->txn->hdr_idx; -- msg = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &smp->strm->txn->req : &smp->strm->txn->rsp; -- - ctx.idx = 0; - cnt = 0; -- while (http_find_full_header2(name, len, msg->chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx)) -+ while (http_find_full_header2(name, len, chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx)) - cnt++; - - smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; -@@ -10120,24 +10120,24 @@ smp_fetch_fhdr_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, v - static int - smp_fetch_hdr_names(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ /* possible keywords: req.hdr_names, res.hdr_names */ -+ struct channel *chn = ((kw[2] == 'q') ? SMP_REQ_CHN(smp) : SMP_RES_CHN(smp)); - struct hdr_idx *idx; - struct hdr_ctx ctx; -- const struct http_msg *msg; - struct chunk *temp; - char del = ','; - - if (args && args->type == ARGT_STR) - del = *args[0].data.str.str; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - idx = &smp->strm->txn->hdr_idx; -- msg = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &smp->strm->txn->req : &smp->strm->txn->rsp; - - temp = get_trash_chunk(); - - ctx.idx = 0; -- while (http_find_next_header(msg->chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx)) { -+ while (http_find_next_header(chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx)) { - if (temp->len) - temp->str[temp->len++] = del; - memcpy(temp->str + temp->len, ctx.line, ctx.del); -@@ -10160,6 +10160,8 @@ smp_fetch_hdr_names(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - static int - smp_fetch_hdr(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ /* possible keywords: req.hdr / hdr, res.hdr / shdr */ -+ struct channel *chn = ((kw[0] == 'h' || kw[2] == 'q') ? SMP_REQ_CHN(smp) : SMP_RES_CHN(smp)); - struct hdr_idx *idx; - struct hdr_ctx *ctx = smp->ctx.a[0]; - const struct http_msg *msg; -@@ -10184,10 +10186,10 @@ smp_fetch_hdr(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void * - occ = args[1].data.sint; - } - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - idx = &smp->strm->txn->hdr_idx; -- msg = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &smp->strm->txn->req : &smp->strm->txn->rsp; -+ msg = (!(chn->flags & CF_ISRESP) ? &smp->strm->txn->req : &smp->strm->txn->rsp); - - if (ctx && !(smp->flags & SMP_F_NOT_LAST)) - /* search for header from the beginning */ -@@ -10216,9 +10218,10 @@ smp_fetch_hdr(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void * - static int - smp_fetch_hdr_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ /* possible keywords: req.hdr_cnt / hdr_cnt, res.hdr_cnt / shdr_cnt */ -+ struct channel *chn = ((kw[0] == 'h' || kw[2] == 'q') ? SMP_REQ_CHN(smp) : SMP_RES_CHN(smp)); - struct hdr_idx *idx; - struct hdr_ctx ctx; -- const struct http_msg *msg; - int cnt; - const char *name = NULL; - int len = 0; -@@ -10228,14 +10231,13 @@ smp_fetch_hdr_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, vo - len = args->data.str.len; - } - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - idx = &smp->strm->txn->hdr_idx; -- msg = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &smp->strm->txn->req : &smp->strm->txn->rsp; - - ctx.idx = 0; - cnt = 0; -- while (http_find_header2(name, len, msg->chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx)) -+ while (http_find_header2(name, len, chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx)) - cnt++; - - smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; -@@ -10300,13 +10302,14 @@ smp_fetch_hdr_ip(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, voi - static int - smp_fetch_path(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - char *ptr, *end; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; -- end = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; -+ end = chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; - ptr = http_get_path(txn); - if (!ptr) - return 0; -@@ -10333,16 +10336,17 @@ smp_fetch_path(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - static int - smp_fetch_base(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - char *ptr, *end, *beg; - struct hdr_ctx ctx; - struct chunk *temp; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - ctx.idx = 0; -- if (!http_find_header2("Host", 4, txn->req.chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx) || !ctx.vlen) -+ if (!http_find_header2("Host", 4, chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx) || !ctx.vlen) - return smp_fetch_path(args, smp, kw, private); - - /* OK we have the header value in ctx.line+ctx.val for ctx.vlen bytes */ -@@ -10353,7 +10357,7 @@ smp_fetch_base(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - smp->data.u.str.len = ctx.vlen; - - /* now retrieve the path */ -- end = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; -+ end = chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; - beg = http_get_path(txn); - if (!beg) - beg = end; -@@ -10380,17 +10384,18 @@ smp_fetch_base(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - int - smp_fetch_base32(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - struct hdr_ctx ctx; - unsigned int hash = 0; - char *ptr, *beg, *end; - int len; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - ctx.idx = 0; -- if (http_find_header2("Host", 4, txn->req.chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) { -+ if (http_find_header2("Host", 4, chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) { - /* OK we have the header value in ctx.line+ctx.val for ctx.vlen bytes */ - ptr = ctx.line + ctx.val; - len = ctx.vlen; -@@ -10399,7 +10404,7 @@ smp_fetch_base32(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, voi - } - - /* now retrieve the path */ -- end = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; -+ end = chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; - beg = http_get_path(txn); - if (!beg) - beg = end; -@@ -10466,13 +10471,14 @@ smp_fetch_base32_src(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - static int - smp_fetch_query(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - char *ptr, *end; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; -- ptr = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u; -+ ptr = chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u; - end = ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; - - /* look up the '?' */ -@@ -10491,11 +10497,13 @@ smp_fetch_query(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - static int - smp_fetch_proto_http(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); -+ - /* Note: hdr_idx.v cannot be NULL in this ACL because the ACL is tagged - * as a layer7 ACL, which involves automatic allocation of hdr_idx. - */ - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST_PERM(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST_PERM(chn); - - smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; - smp->data.u.sint = 1; -@@ -10515,11 +10523,12 @@ smp_fetch_http_first_req(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char - static int - smp_fetch_http_auth(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - - if (!args || args->type != ARGT_USR) - return 0; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - if (!get_http_auth(smp->strm)) - return 0; -@@ -10534,10 +10543,12 @@ smp_fetch_http_auth(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - static int - smp_fetch_http_auth_grp(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); -+ - if (!args || args->type != ARGT_USR) - return 0; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - if (!get_http_auth(smp->strm)) - return 0; -@@ -10828,10 +10839,10 @@ smp_fetch_capture_res_ver(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char - */ - int smp_fetch_cookie(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -- struct http_txn *txn; -+ /* possible keywords: req.cookie / cookie / cook, res.cookie / scook / set-cookie */ -+ struct channel *chn = ((kw[0] == 'c' || kw[2] == 'q') ? SMP_REQ_CHN(smp) : SMP_RES_CHN(smp)); - struct hdr_idx *idx; - struct hdr_ctx *ctx = smp->ctx.a[2]; -- const struct http_msg *msg; - const char *hdr_name; - int hdr_name_len; - char *sol; -@@ -10848,17 +10859,14 @@ int smp_fetch_cookie(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - smp->ctx.a[2] = ctx; - } - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - -- txn = smp->strm->txn; - idx = &smp->strm->txn->hdr_idx; - -- if ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) { -- msg = &txn->req; -+ if (!(chn->flags & CF_ISRESP)) { - hdr_name = "Cookie"; - hdr_name_len = 6; - } else { -- msg = &txn->rsp; - hdr_name = "Set-Cookie"; - hdr_name_len = 10; - } -@@ -10872,7 +10880,7 @@ int smp_fetch_cookie(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - * next one. - */ - -- sol = msg->chn->buf->p; -+ sol = chn->buf->p; - if (!(smp->flags & SMP_F_NOT_LAST)) { - /* search for the header from the beginning, we must first initialize - * the search parameters. -@@ -10929,10 +10937,10 @@ int smp_fetch_cookie(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - static int - smp_fetch_cookie_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -- struct http_txn *txn; -+ /* possible keywords: req.cook_cnt / cook_cnt, res.cook_cnt / scook_cnt */ -+ struct channel *chn = ((kw[0] == 'c' || kw[2] == 'q') ? SMP_REQ_CHN(smp) : SMP_RES_CHN(smp)); - struct hdr_idx *idx; - struct hdr_ctx ctx; -- const struct http_msg *msg; - const char *hdr_name; - int hdr_name_len; - int cnt; -@@ -10942,22 +10950,19 @@ smp_fetch_cookie_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - if (!args || args->type != ARGT_STR) - return 0; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - -- txn = smp->strm->txn; - idx = &smp->strm->txn->hdr_idx; - -- if ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) { -- msg = &txn->req; -+ if (!(chn->flags & CF_ISRESP)) { - hdr_name = "Cookie"; - hdr_name_len = 6; - } else { -- msg = &txn->rsp; - hdr_name = "Set-Cookie"; - hdr_name_len = 10; - } - -- sol = msg->chn->buf->p; -+ sol = chn->buf->p; - val_end = val_beg = NULL; - ctx.idx = 0; - cnt = 0; -@@ -11287,6 +11292,7 @@ smp_fetch_param(char delim, const char *name, int name_len, const struct arg *ar - static int - smp_fetch_url_param(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_msg *msg; - char delim = '?'; - const char *name; -@@ -11308,16 +11314,16 @@ smp_fetch_url_param(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - delim = *args[1].data.str.str; - - if (!smp->ctx.a[0]) { // first call, find the query string -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; - -- smp->ctx.a[0] = find_param_list(msg->chn->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u, -+ smp->ctx.a[0] = find_param_list(chn->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u, - msg->sl.rq.u_l, delim); - if (!smp->ctx.a[0]) - return 0; - -- smp->ctx.a[1] = msg->chn->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u + msg->sl.rq.u_l; -+ smp->ctx.a[1] = chn->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u + msg->sl.rq.u_l; - - /* Assume that the context is filled with NULL pointer - * before the first call. -@@ -11339,6 +11345,7 @@ smp_fetch_url_param(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - static int - smp_fetch_body_param(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_msg *msg; - unsigned long len; - unsigned long block1; -@@ -11357,19 +11364,15 @@ smp_fetch_body_param(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - } - - if (!smp->ctx.a[0]) { // first call, find the query string -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -- -- if ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) -- msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; -- else -- msg = &smp->strm->txn->rsp; -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - -+ msg = &smp->strm->txn->req; - len = http_body_bytes(msg); -- body = b_ptr(msg->chn->buf, -http_data_rewind(msg)); -+ body = b_ptr(chn->buf, -http_data_rewind(msg)); - - block1 = len; -- if (block1 > msg->chn->buf->data + msg->chn->buf->size - body) -- block1 = msg->chn->buf->data + msg->chn->buf->size - body; -+ if (block1 > chn->buf->data + chn->buf->size - body) -+ block1 = chn->buf->data + chn->buf->size - body; - - if (block1 == len) { - /* buffer is not wrapped (or empty) */ -@@ -11386,8 +11389,8 @@ smp_fetch_body_param(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, - /* buffer is wrapped, we need to defragment it */ - smp->ctx.a[0] = body; - smp->ctx.a[1] = body + block1; -- smp->ctx.a[2] = msg->chn->buf->data; -- smp->ctx.a[3] = msg->chn->buf->data + ( len - block1 ); -+ smp->ctx.a[2] = chn->buf->data; -+ smp->ctx.a[3] = chn->buf->data + ( len - block1 ); - } - } - return smp_fetch_param('&', name, name_len, args, smp, kw, private); -@@ -11422,17 +11425,18 @@ smp_fetch_url_param_val(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char * - static int - smp_fetch_url32(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) - { -+ struct channel *chn = SMP_REQ_CHN(smp); - struct http_txn *txn; - struct hdr_ctx ctx; - unsigned int hash = 0; - char *ptr, *beg, *end; - int len; - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(chn); - - txn = smp->strm->txn; - ctx.idx = 0; -- if (http_find_header2("Host", 4, txn->req.chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) { -+ if (http_find_header2("Host", 4, chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) { - /* OK we have the header value in ctx.line+ctx.val for ctx.vlen bytes */ - ptr = ctx.line + ctx.val; - len = ctx.vlen; -@@ -11441,7 +11445,7 @@ smp_fetch_url32(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - } - - /* now retrieve the path */ -- end = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; -+ end = chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l; - beg = http_get_path(txn); - if (!beg) - beg = end; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/042-BUG-MEDIUM-maps-only-try-to-parse-the-default-value-when-its-present.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/042-BUG-MEDIUM-maps-only-try-to-parse-the-default-value-when-its-present.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9ba38fe8c5..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/042-BUG-MEDIUM-maps-only-try-to-parse-the-default-value-when-its-present.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -commit 814ca94cbcba61a11485dedf80f6b35c34e4d74b -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Apr 19 11:35:22 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: maps: only try to parse the default value when it's present - - Maps returning an IP address (e.g. map_str_ip) support an optional - default value which must be parsed. Unfortunately the parsing code does - not check for this argument's existence and uncondtionally tries to - resolve the argument whenever the output is of type address, resulting - in segfaults at parsing time when no such argument is provided. This - patch adds the appropriate check. - - This fix may be backported as far as 1.6. - - (cherry picked from commit aa5801bcaade82ce58b9a70f320b7d0389e444b0) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit 0ad6d18945467f4d6defaad619ae49f939770ba2) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/map.c b/src/map.c -index da399088..211d1911 100644 ---- a/src/map.c -+++ b/src/map.c -@@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ int sample_load_map(struct arg *arg, struct sample_conv *conv, - 1, err, file, line)) - return 0; - -- /* the maps of type IP have a string as defaultvalue. This -- * string canbe anipv4 or an ipv6, we must convert it. -+ /* the maps of type IP support a string as default value. This -+ * string can be an ipv4 or an ipv6, we must convert it. - */ -- if (desc->conv->out_type == SMP_T_ADDR) { -+ if (arg[1].type != ARGT_STOP && desc->conv->out_type == SMP_T_ADDR) { - struct sample_data data; - if (!map_parse_ip(arg[1].data.str.str, &data)) { - memprintf(err, "map: cannot parse default ip <%s>.", arg[1].data.str.str); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/043-BUG-MINOR-acl-properly-detect-pattern-type-SMP_T_ADDR.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/043-BUG-MINOR-acl-properly-detect-pattern-type-SMP_T_ADDR.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1c03f87a0b..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/043-BUG-MINOR-acl-properly-detect-pattern-type-SMP_T_ADDR.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -commit 4aa6348c04bc854b1dc47227b6931d43e704968d -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Apr 19 11:45:20 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: acl: properly detect pattern type SMP_T_ADDR - - Since 1.6-dev4 with commit b2f8f087f ("MINOR: map: The map can return - IPv4 and IPv6"), maps can return both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, which - is represented as SMP_T_ADDR at the output of the map converter. But - the ACL parser only checks for either SMP_T_IPV4 or SMP_T_IPV6 and - requires to see an explicit matching method specified. Given that it - uses the same pattern parser for both address families, it implicitly - is also compatible with SMP_T_ADDR, which ought to have been added - there. - - This fix should be backported as far as 1.6. - - (cherry picked from commit 78c5eec9497e1e60565492bc69581aea439e54cc) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - (cherry picked from commit ce727199a5b1a7c58cce1b0cfe79b91c6c138935) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/acl.c b/src/acl.c -index f19b2d20..42339b43 100644 ---- a/src/acl.c -+++ b/src/acl.c -@@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ struct acl_expr *parse_acl_expr(const char **args, char **err, struct arg_list * - expr->pat.prune = pat_prune_fcts[PAT_MATCH_INT]; - expr->pat.expect_type = pat_match_types[PAT_MATCH_INT]; - break; -+ case SMP_T_ADDR: - case SMP_T_IPV4: - case SMP_T_IPV6: - expr->pat.parse = pat_parse_fcts[PAT_MATCH_IP]; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/044-BUG-MEDIUM-thread-http-Add-missing-locks-in-set-map-and-add-acl-HTTP-rules.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/044-BUG-MEDIUM-thread-http-Add-missing-locks-in-set-map-and-add-acl-HTTP-rules.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 55ccfa6c25..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/044-BUG-MEDIUM-thread-http-Add-missing-locks-in-set-map-and-add-acl-HTTP-rules.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -commit 8276ea30400887cb25186571ac62252da97b91df -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Fri Apr 19 14:50:55 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: thread/http: Add missing locks in set-map and add-acl HTTP rules - - Locks are missing in the rules "http-request set-map" and "http-response - add-acl" when an acl or map update is performed. Pattern elements must be - locked. - - This patch must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. For the 1.8, the HTX part must be - ignored. - - (cherry picked from commit e84289e5854aa3b00cd19032387f435ca6748491) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit 82dedc4add923bd1ff1b47a559a23e83886521a8) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c -index 9beaa137..ccacd6a4 100644 ---- a/src/proto_http.c -+++ b/src/proto_http.c -@@ -2717,12 +2717,14 @@ resume_execution: - value->str[value->len] = '\0'; - - /* perform update */ -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(PATREF_LOCK, &ref->lock); - if (pat_ref_find_elt(ref, key->str) != NULL) - /* update entry if it exists */ - pat_ref_set(ref, key->str, value->str, NULL); - else - /* insert a new entry */ - pat_ref_add(ref, key->str, value->str, NULL); -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(PATREF_LOCK, &ref->lock); - - free_trash_chunk(key); - free_trash_chunk(value); -@@ -2978,8 +2980,10 @@ resume_execution: - - /* perform update */ - /* check if the entry already exists */ -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(PATREF_LOCK, &ref->lock); - if (pat_ref_find_elt(ref, key->str) == NULL) - pat_ref_add(ref, key->str, NULL, NULL); -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(PATREF_LOCK, &ref->lock); - - free_trash_chunk(key); - break; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/045-BUG-MINOR-51d-Get-the-request-channel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/045-BUG-MINOR-51d-Get-the-request-channel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 85d55548c4..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/045-BUG-MINOR-51d-Get-the-request-channel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -commit 02fd3cd55a2232703494ad5c317907aba21783fe -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Fri Apr 19 15:22:29 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: 51d: Get the request channel to call CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST() - - Since the commit 89dc49935 ("BUG/MAJOR: http_fetch: Get the channel depending on - the keyword used"), the right channel must be passed as argument when the macro - CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST is called. - - This patch must be backported to 1.9. - - (cherry picked from commit 2db9dac4c81bbb97b45c9f0ff73ed9fe24a2ba83) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit 4fc4c6a9d5effccab3f63909cc86bca452f1be1e) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/51d.c b/src/51d.c -index 03101136..a0b683b1 100644 ---- a/src/51d.c -+++ b/src/51d.c -@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int _51d_fetch(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw - * Data type has to be reset to ensure the string output is processed - * correctly. - */ -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST((smp->strm ? &smp->strm->req : NULL)); - smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; - - /* Flags the sample to show it uses constant memory*/ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/046-BUG-MINOR-da-Get-the-request-channel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/046-BUG-MINOR-da-Get-the-request-channel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a245ed0036..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/046-BUG-MINOR-da-Get-the-request-channel-to-call-CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -commit 01d9157013729859fdb7470887d78d67a3cdf6b9 -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Fri Apr 19 15:26:01 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: da: Get the request channel to call CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST() - - Since the commit 89dc49935 ("BUG/MAJOR: http_fetch: Get the channel depending on - the keyword used"), the right channel must be passed as argument when the macro - CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST is called. - - This patch must be backported to 1.9. - - (cherry picked from commit f48552f2c10a2f956d7bd1eb02a6d694d2b5c5d3) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit 2a38fa09b588d8b30fabc77282e66ef613336ee7) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/da.c b/src/da.c -index 685a79d1..cd4050bf 100644 ---- a/src/da.c -+++ b/src/da.c -@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int da_haproxy_fetch(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const ch - return 1; - } - -- CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST(); -+ CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST((smp->strm ? &smp->strm->req : NULL)); - smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; - - /** diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/047-BUG-MINOR-spoe-Dont-systematically-wakeup-SPOE-stream-in-the-applet-handler.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/047-BUG-MINOR-spoe-Dont-systematically-wakeup-SPOE-stream-in-the-applet-handler.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3165d8a7e4..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/047-BUG-MINOR-spoe-Dont-systematically-wakeup-SPOE-stream-in-the-applet-handler.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -commit 1526ce4e6f5fb241ca236bd2ac870cdb30e054fd -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:39:32 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: spoe: Don't systematically wakeup SPOE stream in the applet handler - - This can lead to wakeups in loop between the SPOE stream and the SPOE applets - waiting to receive agent messages (mainly AGENT-HELLO and AGENT-DISCONNECT). - - This patch must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 371723b0c2a2e38ae14e1e6f6a7581ef3e2491cf) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - (cherry picked from commit fe0ccea6bb93406ca0a7339cdf17357b1a283e59) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/flt_spoe.c b/src/flt_spoe.c -index 95f30898..f6109778 100644 ---- a/src/flt_spoe.c -+++ b/src/flt_spoe.c -@@ -1929,8 +1929,6 @@ spoe_handle_appctx(struct appctx *appctx) - - if (SPOE_APPCTX(appctx)->task->expire != TICK_ETERNITY) - task_queue(SPOE_APPCTX(appctx)->task); -- si_oc(si)->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; -- task_wakeup(si_strm(si)->task, TASK_WOKEN_IO); - } - - struct applet spoe_applet = { -- 2.30.2