From b2d5e254ebfe9e4a926265c23bc5943f212fd1ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 14:34:55 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix trying LTK re-encryption when we don't have an LTK In the case that the key distribution bits cause us not to generate a local LTK we should not try to re-encrypt if we're currently encrypted with an STK. This patch fixes the check for this in the smp_sufficient_security function. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index bf3568c46847..8339d6b0f2b8 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -876,9 +876,12 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level) /* If we're encrypted with an STK always claim insufficient * security. This way we allow the connection to be re-encrypted * with an LTK, even if the LTK provides the same level of - * security. + * security. Only exception is if we don't have an LTK (e.g. + * because of key distribution bits). */ - if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && + hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, + hcon->out)) return false; if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) -- 2.30.2