From 99c679acce5d07aa1be63d8afe94df27f0aecb50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcel Holtmann Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 17:31:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Filter list of supported commands/events for untrusted users When the user of the management interface is not trusted, then it only has access to a limited set of commands and events. When providing the list of supported commands and events take the trusted vs untrusted status of the user into account and return different lists. This way the untrusted user knows exactly which commands it can execute and which events it can receive. So no guesswork needed. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index eda52397a648..38b03bd14723 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -141,6 +141,27 @@ static const u16 mgmt_events[] = { MGMT_EV_ADVERTISING_REMOVED, }; +static const u16 mgmt_untrusted_commands[] = { + MGMT_OP_READ_INDEX_LIST, + MGMT_OP_READ_INFO, + MGMT_OP_READ_UNCONF_INDEX_LIST, + MGMT_OP_READ_CONFIG_INFO, + MGMT_OP_READ_EXT_INDEX_LIST, +}; + +static const u16 mgmt_untrusted_events[] = { + MGMT_EV_INDEX_ADDED, + MGMT_EV_INDEX_REMOVED, + MGMT_EV_NEW_SETTINGS, + MGMT_EV_CLASS_OF_DEV_CHANGED, + MGMT_EV_LOCAL_NAME_CHANGED, + MGMT_EV_UNCONF_INDEX_ADDED, + MGMT_EV_UNCONF_INDEX_REMOVED, + MGMT_EV_NEW_CONFIG_OPTIONS, + MGMT_EV_EXT_INDEX_ADDED, + MGMT_EV_EXT_INDEX_REMOVED, +}; + #define CACHE_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(2 * 1000) #define ZERO_KEY "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" \ @@ -265,14 +286,20 @@ static int read_commands(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, u16 data_len) { struct mgmt_rp_read_commands *rp; - const u16 num_commands = ARRAY_SIZE(mgmt_commands); - const u16 num_events = ARRAY_SIZE(mgmt_events); - __le16 *opcode; + u16 num_commands, num_events; size_t rp_size; int i, err; BT_DBG("sock %p", sk); + if (hci_sock_test_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED)) { + num_commands = ARRAY_SIZE(mgmt_commands); + num_events = ARRAY_SIZE(mgmt_events); + } else { + num_commands = ARRAY_SIZE(mgmt_untrusted_commands); + num_events = ARRAY_SIZE(mgmt_untrusted_events); + } + rp_size = sizeof(*rp) + ((num_commands + num_events) * sizeof(u16)); rp = kmalloc(rp_size, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -282,11 +309,23 @@ static int read_commands(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, rp->num_commands = cpu_to_le16(num_commands); rp->num_events = cpu_to_le16(num_events); - for (i = 0, opcode = rp->opcodes; i < num_commands; i++, opcode++) - put_unaligned_le16(mgmt_commands[i], opcode); + if (hci_sock_test_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED)) { + __le16 *opcode = rp->opcodes; + + for (i = 0; i < num_commands; i++, opcode++) + put_unaligned_le16(mgmt_commands[i], opcode); + + for (i = 0; i < num_events; i++, opcode++) + put_unaligned_le16(mgmt_events[i], opcode); + } else { + __le16 *opcode = rp->opcodes; + + for (i = 0; i < num_commands; i++, opcode++) + put_unaligned_le16(mgmt_untrusted_commands[i], opcode); - for (i = 0; i < num_events; i++, opcode++) - put_unaligned_le16(mgmt_events[i], opcode); + for (i = 0; i < num_events; i++, opcode++) + put_unaligned_le16(mgmt_untrusted_events[i], opcode); + } err = mgmt_cmd_complete(sk, MGMT_INDEX_NONE, MGMT_OP_READ_COMMANDS, 0, rp, rp_size); -- 2.30.2