From 94c4c1304a58ed7416e5570cbdda2a6add7dc7ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Pavlinec Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 15:13:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] libarchive: update to version 3.4.0 Changes: remove backported patches add bsdtar libopenssl variant switch to github codeload polish tab/spaces Signed-off-by: Jan Pavlinec (cherry-picked from commit 8f3378e86dcd5b57464c36daf9df51d631742b53) --- libs/libarchive/Makefile | 57 +++++++++------ .../patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch | 37 ---------- .../patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch | 43 ----------- .../patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch | 72 ------------------- .../patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch | 31 -------- .../patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch | 55 -------------- .../patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch | 55 -------------- 7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 315 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch delete mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch delete mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch delete mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch delete mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch delete mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch diff --git a/libs/libarchive/Makefile b/libs/libarchive/Makefile index 6d579644bc..b2e6fcf100 100644 --- a/libs/libarchive/Makefile +++ b/libs/libarchive/Makefile @@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=libarchive -PKG_VERSION:=3.3.3 -PKG_RELEASE:=3 +PKG_VERSION:=3.4.0 +PKG_RELEASE:=1 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz -PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.libarchive.org/downloads -PKG_HASH:=ba7eb1781c9fbbae178c4c6bad1c6eb08edab9a1496c64833d1715d022b30e2e +PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://codeload.github.com/libarchive/libarchive/tar.gz/v$(PKG_VERSION)? +PKG_HASH:=c160d3c45010a51a924208f13f6b7b956dabdf8c5c60195df188a599028caa7c PKG_MAINTAINER:=Johannes Morgenroth PKG_LICENSE:=BSD-2-Clause @@ -27,38 +27,49 @@ PKG_FIXUP:=autoreconf include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk define Package/libarchive/Default - SECTION:=libs - CATEGORY:=Libraries - DEPENDS:=+zlib +liblzma +libbz2 +libexpat - TITLE:=Multi-format archive and compression library - URL:=https://www.libarchive.org/ + SECTION:=libs + CATEGORY:=Libraries + DEPENDS:=+zlib +liblzma +libbz2 +libexpat + TITLE:=Multi-format archive and compression library + URL:=https://www.libarchive.org/ endef define Package/libarchive $(call Package/libarchive/Default) - DEPENDS += +libopenssl + DEPENDS += +libopenssl endef define Package/libarchive-noopenssl $(call Package/libarchive/Default) - TITLE += (without OpenSSL dependency) - VARIANT:=noopenssl + TITLE += (without OpenSSL dependency) + VARIANT:=noopenssl +endef + +define Package/bsdtar/Default + SECTION:=utils + CATEGORY:=Utilities + SUBMENU:=Compression + TITLE:=tar BSD variant + URL:=https://www.libarchive.org/ endef define Package/bsdtar - SECTION:=utils - CATEGORY:=Utilities - SUBMENU:=Compression - DEPENDS:=+libarchive-noopenssl - TITLE:=BSD variant that supports various file compression formats - URL:=http://www.libarchive.org/ + $(call Package/bsdtar/Default) + DEPENDS:= +libarchive +endef + +define Package/bsdtar-noopenssl + $(call Package/bsdtar/Default) + TITLE += (without OpenSSL dependency) + DEPENDS:= +libarchive-noopenssl + VARIANT:=noopenssl endef define Package/bsdtar/description - Reads a variety of formats including tar, pax, zip, xar, lha, ar, - cab, mtree, rar, warc, 7z and ISO images. Writes tar, pax, zip, - xar, ar, ISO, mtree and shar archives. Automatically handles - archives compressed with gzip, bzip2, lzip, xz, lzma or compress. + Reads a variety of formats including tar, pax, zip, xar, lha, ar, + cab, mtree, rar, warc, 7z and ISO images. Writes tar, pax, zip, + xar, ar, ISO, mtree and shar archives. Automatically handles + archives compressed with gzip, bzip2, lzip, xz, lzma or compress. endef CONFIGURE_ARGS += \ @@ -99,7 +110,9 @@ define Package/bsdtar/install endef Package/libarchive-noopenssl/install = $(Package/libarchive/install) +Package/bsdtar-noopenssl/install = $(Package/bsdtar/install) $(eval $(call BuildPackage,libarchive)) $(eval $(call BuildPackage,libarchive-noopenssl)) $(eval $(call BuildPackage,bsdtar)) +$(eval $(call BuildPackage,bsdtar-noopenssl)) diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0d9566ff99..0000000000 --- a/libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -From 9c84b7426660c09c18cc349f6d70b5f8168b5680 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Axtens -Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 16:33:42 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] warc: consume data once read - -The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume -data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify -an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over -and over and over again until it hits the desired length. - -This means that a WARC resource with e.g. -Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665 -but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop. - -Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read. - -Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup. ---- - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | 5 +++++ - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c -index e8753853f..e8fc8428b 100644 ---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c -+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c -@@ -386,6 +386,11 @@ _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off) - return (ARCHIVE_EOF); - } - -+ if (w->unconsumed) { -+ __archive_read_consume(a, w->unconsumed); -+ w->unconsumed = 0U; -+ } -+ - rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd); - if (nrd < 0) { - *bsz = 0U; diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ecd4da5377..0000000000 --- a/libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From 15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Axtens -Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 14:29:42 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] Skip 0-length ACL fields - -Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar -with a malformed ACL: - -Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. -archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=, sc=) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726 -1726 switch (*s) { -(gdb) p n -$1 = 1 -(gdb) p field[n] -$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0} - -Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning -the switch statement. - -I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1], -and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup. - -[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun ---- - libarchive/archive_acl.c | 5 +++++ - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/libarchive/archive_acl.c b/libarchive/archive_acl.c -index 512beee1f..7beeee86e 100644 ---- a/libarchive/archive_acl.c -+++ b/libarchive/archive_acl.c -@@ -1723,6 +1723,11 @@ archive_acl_from_text_l(struct archive_acl *acl, const char *text, - st = field[n].start + 1; - len = field[n].end - field[n].start; - -+ if (len == 0) { -+ ret = ARCHIVE_WARN; -+ continue; -+ } -+ - switch (*s) { - case 'u': - if (len == 1 || (len == 4 diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch deleted file mode 100644 index df48969243..0000000000 --- a/libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -From bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Axtens -Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 00:55:22 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match - -Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a -single file archive reported that it was split across multiple -volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling -rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some -situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would -check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't -match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new -one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the -buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and -writes to the freed region can be observed. - -This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is -too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume -success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there -good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we -can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by -checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up -there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that -assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go -down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7 -decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data. - -Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym. ---- - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++ - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c -index 6f419c270..a8cc5c94d 100644 ---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c -+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c -@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct rar - struct data_block_offsets *dbo; - unsigned int cursor; - unsigned int nodes; -+ char filename_must_match; - - /* LZSS members */ - struct huffman_code maincode; -@@ -1560,6 +1561,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry, - } - return ret; - } -+ else if (rar->filename_must_match) -+ { -+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, -+ "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive"); -+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); -+ } - - rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save, - filename_size + 1); -@@ -2933,12 +2940,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail) - else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME && - rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER) - { -+ rar->filename_must_match = 1; - ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); - if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF)) - { - rar->has_endarc_header = 1; - ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); - } -+ rar->filename_must_match = 0; - if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK)) - return NULL; - return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail); diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7998b5583a..0000000000 --- a/libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -From 021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Axtens -Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 17:56:29 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified - -new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive. - -realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would -be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function. - -Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym. ---- - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++ - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c -index 234522229..6f419c270 100644 ---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c -+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c -@@ -2300,6 +2300,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a) - new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE; - else - new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1; -+ if (new_size == 0) { -+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, -+ "Zero window size is invalid."); -+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); -+ } - new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size); - if (new_window == NULL) { - archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a7df5a2c05..0000000000 --- a/libs/libarchive/patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -From 65a23f5dbee4497064e9bb467f81138a62b0dae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Axtens -Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 16:01:40 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives - -Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data() -would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause -the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory. - -A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash. - -An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented -binary will also crash. - -==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0) -==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. - #0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c) - #1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb) - #2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156) - #3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134) - #4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690) - #5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7) - #6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63) - #7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd) - #8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f) - #9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be) - #10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb) - #11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 - #12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09) - -This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries -may have been generated by qsym. ---- - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | 8 +------- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c -index bccbf8966..b6d1505d3 100644 ---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c -+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c -@@ -2964,13 +2964,7 @@ get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size, - if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) { - /* Copy mode. */ - -- /* -- * Note: '1' here is a performance optimization. -- * Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of -- * available bytes; asking for more than that forces the -- * decompressor to combine reads by copying data. -- */ -- *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail); -+ *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, minimum, &bytes_avail); - if (bytes_avail <= 0) { - archive_set_error(&a->archive, - ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 86bbd9d138..0000000000 --- a/libs/libarchive/patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -From 8312eaa576014cd9b965012af51bc1f967b12423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Axtens -Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 17:10:49 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] iso9660: Fail when expected Rockridge extensions is missing - -A corrupted or malicious ISO9660 image can cause read_CE() to loop -forever. - -read_CE() calls parse_rockridge(), expecting a Rockridge extension -to be read. However, parse_rockridge() is structured as a while -loop starting with a sanity check, and if the sanity check fails -before the loop has run, the function returns ARCHIVE_OK without -advancing the position in the file. This causes read_CE() to retry -indefinitely. - -Make parse_rockridge() return ARCHIVE_WARN if it didn't read an -extension. As someone with no real knowledge of the format, this -seems more apt than ARCHIVE_FATAL, but both the call-sites escalate -it to a fatal error immediately anyway. - -Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb (FairFuzz) and qsym. ---- - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 11 ++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c -index 28acfefbb..bad8f1dfe 100644 ---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c -+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c -@@ -2102,6 +2102,7 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file, - const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end) - { - struct iso9660 *iso9660; -+ int entry_seen = 0; - - iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data); - -@@ -2257,8 +2258,16 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file, - } - - p += p[2]; -+ entry_seen = 1; -+ } -+ -+ if (entry_seen) -+ return (ARCHIVE_OK); -+ else { -+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, -+ "Tried to parse Rockridge extensions, but none found"); -+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN); - } -- return (ARCHIVE_OK); - } - - static int -- 2.30.2