From 42f91093b043332ad75cea7aeafecda6fe81814c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 17:22:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Ignore spurious translation faults taken from the kernel Thanks to address translation being performed out of order with respect to loads and stores, it is possible for a CPU to take a translation fault when accessing a page that was mapped by a different CPU. For example, in the case that one CPU maps a page and then sets a flag to tell another CPU: CPU 0 ----- MOV X0, STR X0, [Xptep] // Store new PTE to page table DSB ISHST ISB MOV X1, #1 STR X1, [Xflag] // Set the flag CPU 1 ----- loop: LDAR X0, [Xflag] // Poll flag with Acquire semantics CBZ X0, loop LDR X1, [X2] // Translates using the new PTE then the final load on CPU 1 can raise a translation fault because the translation can be performed speculatively before the read of the flag and marked as "faulting" by the CPU. This isn't quite as bad as it sounds since, in reality, code such as: CPU 0 CPU 1 ----- ----- spin_lock(&lock); spin_lock(&lock); *ptr = vmalloc(size); if (*ptr) spin_unlock(&lock); foo = **ptr; spin_unlock(&lock); will not trigger the fault because there is an address dependency on CPU 1 which prevents the speculative translation. However, more exotic code where the virtual address is known ahead of time, such as: CPU 0 CPU 1 ----- ----- spin_lock(&lock); spin_lock(&lock); set_fixmap(0, paddr, prot); if (mapped) mapped = true; foo = *fix_to_virt(0); spin_unlock(&lock); spin_unlock(&lock); could fault. This can be avoided by any of: * Introducing broadcast TLB maintenance on the map path * Adding a DSB;ISB sequence after checking a flag which indicates that a virtual address is now mapped * Handling the spurious fault Given that we have never observed a problem due to this under Linux and future revisions of the architecture are being tightened so that translation table walks are effectively ordered in the same way as explicit memory accesses, we no longer treat spurious kernel faults as fatal if an AT instruction indicates that the access does not trigger a translation fault. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Will Deacon --- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index cfd65b63f36f..9808da29a653 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -242,6 +243,34 @@ static inline bool is_el1_permission_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, return false; } +static bool __kprobes is_spurious_el1_translation_fault(unsigned long addr, + unsigned int esr, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + unsigned long flags; + u64 par, dfsc; + + if (ESR_ELx_EC(esr) != ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR || + (esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE) != ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT) + return false; + + local_irq_save(flags); + asm volatile("at s1e1r, %0" :: "r" (addr)); + isb(); + par = read_sysreg(par_el1); + local_irq_restore(flags); + + if (!(par & SYS_PAR_EL1_F)) + return false; + + /* + * If we got a different type of fault from the AT instruction, + * treat the translation fault as spurious. + */ + dfsc = FIELD_PREP(SYS_PAR_EL1_FST, par); + return (dfsc & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE) != ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT; +} + static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) { @@ -270,6 +299,10 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, if (!is_el1_instruction_abort(esr) && fixup_exception(regs)) return; + if (WARN_RATELIMIT(is_spurious_el1_translation_fault(addr, esr, regs), + "Ignoring spurious kernel translation fault at virtual address %016lx\n", addr)) + return; + if (is_el1_permission_fault(addr, esr, regs)) { if (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) msg = "write to read-only memory"; -- 2.30.2