From 417c3522b3202dacce4873cfb0190459fbce95c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Hutchings Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2013 17:04:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] net/compat: Fix minor information leak in siocdevprivate_ioctl() We don't need to check that ifr_data itself is a valid user pointer, but we should check &ifr_data is. Thankfully the copy of ifr_name is checked, so this can only leak a few bytes from immediately above the user address limit. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- net/socket.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index c226aceee65b..fbb6ec13b1f4 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -3015,19 +3015,16 @@ static int siocdevprivate_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, if (copy_from_user(&tmp_buf[0], &(u_ifreq32->ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name[0]), IFNAMSIZ)) return -EFAULT; - if (__get_user(data32, &u_ifreq32->ifr_ifru.ifru_data)) + if (get_user(data32, &u_ifreq32->ifr_ifru.ifru_data)) return -EFAULT; data64 = compat_ptr(data32); u_ifreq64 = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(*u_ifreq64)); - /* Don't check these user accesses, just let that get trapped - * in the ioctl handler instead. - */ if (copy_to_user(&u_ifreq64->ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name[0], &tmp_buf[0], IFNAMSIZ)) return -EFAULT; - if (__put_user(data64, &u_ifreq64->ifr_ifru.ifru_data)) + if (put_user(data64, &u_ifreq64->ifr_ifru.ifru_data)) return -EFAULT; return dev_ioctl(net, cmd, u_ifreq64); -- 2.30.2