x86/entry/64: Merge SAVE_C_REGS and SAVE_EXTRA_REGS, remove unused extensions

All current code paths call SAVE_C_REGS and then immediately
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS. Therefore, merge these two macros and order the MOV
sequeneces properly.

While at it, remove the macros to save all except specific registers,
as these macros have been unused for a long time.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-2-linux@dominikbrodowski.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details

Harmonize all the Spectre messages so that a:

    dmesg | grep -i spectre

... gives us most Spectre related kernel boot messages.

Also fix a few other details:

 - clarify a comment about firmware speculation control

 - s/KPTI/PTI

 - remove various line-breaks that made the code uglier

Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

KVM/nVMX: Set the CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS if we have a valid L02 MSR bitmap

We either clear the CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS and end up intercepting all
MSR accesses or create a valid L02 MSR bitmap and use that. This decision
has to be made every time we evaluate whether we are going to generate the
L02 MSR bitmap.

Before commit:

  d28b387fb74d ("KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL")

... this was probably OK since the decision was always identical.

This is no longer the case now since the MSR bitmap might actually
change once we decide to not intercept SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD.

Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: jmattson@google.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: sironi@amazon.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518305967-31356-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

X86/nVMX: Properly set spec_ctrl and pred_cmd before merging MSRs

These two variables should check whether SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD are
supposed to be passed through to L2 guests or not. While
msr_write_intercepted_l01 would return 'true' if it is not passed through.

So just invert the result of msr_write_intercepted_l01 to implement the
correct semantics.

Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: sironi@amazon.de
Fixes: 086e7d4118cc ("KVM: VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518305967-31356-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

KVM/x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in slot_handle_level_range(), by always inlining iterator helper methods

With retpoline, tight loops of "call this function for every XXX" are
very much pessimised by taking a prediction miss *every* time. This one
is by far the biggest contributor to the guest launch time with retpoline.

By marking the iterator slot_handle_…() functions always_inline, we can
ensure that the indirect function call can be optimised away into a
direct call and it actually generates slightly smaller code because
some of the other conditionals can get optimised away too.

Performance is now pretty close to what we see with nospectre_v2 on
the command line.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: jmattson@google.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518305967-31356-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Revert "x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()"

This reverts commit 64e16720ea0879f8ab4547e3b9758936d483909b.

We cannot call C functions like that, without marking all the
call-clobbered registers as, well, clobbered. We might have got away
with it for now because the __ibp_barrier() function was *fairly*
unlikely to actually use any other registers. But no. Just no.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: jmattson@google.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
Cc: sironi@amazon.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518305967-31356-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again

Arjan points out that the Intel document only clears the 0xc2 microcode
on *some* parts with CPUID 506E3 (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP stepping 3).
For the Skylake H/S platform it's OK but for Skylake E3 which has the
same CPUID it isn't (yet) cleared.

So removing it from the blacklist was premature. Put it back for now.

Also, Arjan assures me that the 0x84 microcode for Kaby Lake which was
featured in one of the early revisions of the Intel document was never
released to the public, and won't be until/unless it is also validated
as safe. So those can change to 0x80 which is what all *other* versions
of the doc have identified.

Once the retrospective testing of existing public microcodes is done, we
should be back into a mode where new microcodes are only released in
batches and we shouldn't even need to update the blacklist for those
anyway, so this tweaking of the list isn't expected to be a thing which
keeps happening.

Requested-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518449255-2182-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist

Intel have retroactively blessed the 0xc2 microcode on Skylake mobile
and desktop parts, and the Gemini Lake 0x22 microcode is apparently fine
too. We blacklisted the latter purely because it was present with all
the other problematic ones in the 2018-01-08 release, but now it's
explicitly listed as OK.

We still list 0x84 for the various Kaby Lake / Coffee Lake parts, as
that appeared in one version of the blacklist and then reverted to
0x80 again. We can change it if 0x84 is actually announced to be safe.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: jmattson@google.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
Cc: sironi@amazon.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518305967-31356-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/mm/pti: Fix PTI comment in entry_SYSCALL_64()

The comment is confusing since the path is taken when
CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y is disabled (while the comment says it is not
taken).

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: nadav.amit@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180209170638.15161-1-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

MAINTAINERS: Add Peter Zijlstra as objtool co-maintainer

Since Josh keeps asking, add myself to MAINTAINERS.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

objtool: Fix switch-table detection

Linus reported that GCC-7.3 generated a switch-table construct that
confused objtool. It turns out that, in particular due to KASAN, it is
possible to have unrelated .rodata usage in between the .rodata setup
for the switch-table and the following indirect jump.

The simple linear reverse search from the indirect jump would hit upon
the KASAN .rodata usage first and fail to find a switch_table,
resulting in a spurious 'sibling call with modified stack frame'
warning.

Fix this by creating a 'jump-stack' which we can 'unwind' during
reversal, thereby skipping over much of the in-between code.

This is not fool proof by any means, but is sufficient to make the
known cases work. Future work would be to construct more comprehensive
flow analysis code.

Reported-and-tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180208130232.GF25235@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface

At entry userspace may have populated registers with values that could
otherwise be useful in a speculative execution attack. Clear them to
minimize the kernel's attack surface.

Originally-From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787989697.7847.4083702787288600552.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[ Made small improvements to the changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface

Clear the 'extra' registers on entering the 64-bit kernel for exceptions
and interrupts. The common registers are not cleared since they are
likely clobbered well before they can be exploited in a speculative
execution attack.

Originally-From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787989146.7847.15749181712358213254.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[ Made small improvements to the changelog and the code comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface

At entry userspace may have (maliciously) populated the extra registers
outside the syscall calling convention with arbitrary values that could
be useful in a speculative execution (Spectre style) attack.

Clear these registers to minimize the kernel's attack surface.

Note, this only clears the extra registers and not the unused
registers for syscalls less than 6 arguments, since those registers are
likely to be clobbered well before their values could be put to use
under speculation.

Note, Linus found that the XOR instructions can be executed with
minimized cost if interleaved with the PUSH instructions, and Ingo's
analysis found that R10 and R11 should be included in the register
clearing beyond the typical 'extra' syscall calling convention
registers.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787988577.7847.16733592218894189003.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[ Made small improvements to the changelog and the code comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL

[ Based on a patch from Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> ]

... basically doing exactly what we do for VMX:

- Passthrough SPEC_CTRL to guests (if enabled in guest CPUID)
- Save and restore SPEC_CTRL around VMExit and VMEntry only if the guest
  actually used it.

Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517669783-20732-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de

KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL

[ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> ]

Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for
guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not
be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach.

To avoid the overhead of saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for
guests that do not actually use the MSR, only start saving and restoring
when a non-zero is written to it.

No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP
may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes
if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest.

[dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset]

Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-5-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de

KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES

Intel processors use MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to indicate RDCL_NO
(bit 0) and IBRS_ALL (bit 1). This is a read-only MSR. By default the
contents will come directly from the hardware, but user-space can still
override it.

[dwmw2: The bit in kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features can be unconditional]

Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-4-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de

KVM/x86: Add IBPB support

The Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch
control mechanism. It keeps earlier branches from influencing
later ones.

Unlike IBRS and STIBP, IBPB does not define a new mode of operation.
It's a command that ensures predicted branch targets aren't used after
the barrier. Although IBRS and IBPB are enumerated by the same CPUID
enumeration, IBPB is very different.

IBPB helps mitigate against three potential attacks:

* Mitigate guests from being attacked by other guests.
  - This is addressed by issing IBPB when we do a guest switch.

* Mitigate attacks from guest/ring3->host/ring3.
  These would require a IBPB during context switch in host, or after
  VMEXIT. The host process has two ways to mitigate
  - Either it can be compiled with retpoline
  - If its going through context switch, and has set !dumpable then
    there is a IBPB in that path.
    (Tim's patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10192871)
  - The case where after a VMEXIT you return back to Qemu might make
    Qemu attackable from guest when Qemu isn't compiled with retpoline.
  There are issues reported when doing IBPB on every VMEXIT that resulted
  in some tsc calibration woes in guest.

* Mitigate guest/ring0->host/ring0 attacks.
  When host kernel is using retpoline it is safe against these attacks.
  If host kernel isn't using retpoline we might need to do a IBPB flush on
  every VMEXIT.

Even when using retpoline for indirect calls, in certain conditions 'ret'
can use the BTB on Skylake-era CPUs. There are other mitigations
available like RSB stuffing/clearing.

* IBPB is issued only for SVM during svm_free_vcpu().
  VMX has a vmclear and SVM doesn't.  Follow discussion here:
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/15/146

Please refer to the following spec for more details on the enumeration
and control.

Refer here to get documentation about mitigations.

https://software.intel.com/en-us/side-channel-security-support

[peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite]
[karahmed: - rebase
           - vmx: expose PRED_CMD if guest has it in CPUID
           - svm: only pass through IBPB if guest has it in CPUID
           - vmx: support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()]
           - vmx: support nested]
[dwmw2: Expose CPUID bit too (AMD IBPB only for now as we lack IBRS)
        PRED_CMD is a write-only MSR]

Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515720739-43819-6-git-send-email-ashok.raj@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-3-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de

KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX

[dwmw2: Stop using KF() for bits in it, too]
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-2-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de

Merge branch 'msr-bitmaps' of git://git./virt/kvm/kvm into x86/pti

Pull the KVM prerequisites so the IBPB patches apply.

x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com

x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst

I'm seeing build failures from the two newly introduced arrays that
are marked 'const' and '__initdata', which are mutually exclusive:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:882:43: error: 'cpu_no_speculation' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init'
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:895:43: error: 'cpu_no_meltdown' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init'

The correct annotation is __initconst.

Fixes: fec9434a12f3 ("x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202213959.611210-1-arnd@arndb.de

x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing

[dwmw2: Use ARRAY_SIZE]

Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517484441-1420-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions

There's no point in building init code with retpolines, since it runs before
any potentially hostile userspace does. And before the retpoline is actually
ALTERNATIVEd into place, for much of it.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517484441-1420-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation

Commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup"
added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of
'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'.

The lfence can be avoided in this path by using the array_index_nospec()
helper designed for these types of fixes.

Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151744959670.6342.3001723920950249067.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU

Place the MSR bitmap in struct loaded_vmcs, and update it in place
every time the x2apic or APICv state can change.  This is rare and
the loop can handle 64 MSRs per iteration, in a similar fashion as
nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap.

This prepares for choosing, on a per-VM basis, whether to intercept
the SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD MSRs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option

The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the
original pv indirect calls in place.

That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify
paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines.

As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much
other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel
vulnerable to Spectre v2.  It was probably a debug option from the early
paravirt days.  So just remove it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble

x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch

Flush indirect branches when switching into a process that marked itself
non dumpable. This protects high value processes like gpg better,
without having too high performance overhead.

If done naïvely, we could switch to a kernel idle thread and then back
to the original process, such as:

    process A -> idle -> process A

In such scenario, we do not have to do IBPB here even though the process
is non-dumpable, as we are switching back to the same process after a
hiatus.

To avoid the redundant IBPB, which is expensive, we track the last mm
user context ID. The cost is to have an extra u64 mm context id to track
the last mm we were using before switching to the init_mm used by idle.
Avoiding the extra IBPB is probably worth the extra memory for this
common scenario.

For those cases where tlb_defer_switch_to_init_mm() returns true (non
PCID), lazy tlb will defer switch to init_mm, so we will not be changing
the mm for the process A -> idle -> process A switch. So IBPB will be
skipped for this case.

Thanks to the reviewers and Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion of
using ctx_id which got rid of the problem of mm pointer recycling.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux@dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517263487-3708-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel

Despite the fact that all the other code there seems to be doing it, just
using set_cpu_cap() in early_intel_init() doesn't actually work.

For CPUs with PKU support, setup_pku() calls get_cpu_cap() after
c->c_init() has set those feature bits. That resets those bits back to what
was queried from the hardware.

Turning the bits off for bad microcode is easy to fix. That can just use
setup_clear_cpu_cap() to force them off for all CPUs.

I was less keen on forcing the feature bits *on* that way, just in case
of inconsistencies. I appreciate that the kernel is going to get this
utterly wrong if CPU features are not consistent, because it has already
applied alternatives by the time secondary CPUs are brought up.

But at least if setup_force_cpu_cap() isn't being used, we might have a
chance of *detecting* the lack of the corresponding bit and either
panicking or refusing to bring the offending CPU online.

So ensure that the appropriate feature bits are set within get_cpu_cap()
regardless of how many extra times it's called.

Fixes: 2961298e ("x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517322623-15261-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"

Trivial fix to spelling mistake in pr_err error message text.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180130193218.9271-1-colin.king@canonical.com

x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1

Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params

Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac
is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx()
handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize
txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any
speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of
txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS).

Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to
read from the 'fdt->fd' array.  In order to avoid potential leaks of
kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from
__fcheck_files.

Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation

The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation.

While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it
does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory
relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache
behavior.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation

Quoting Linus:

    I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
    the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
    agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
    because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
    but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
    that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
    space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
    accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.

Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check
near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be
mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e.
array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by:

cmp %limit, %ptr
sbb %mask, %mask
and %mask, %ptr

With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit
or NULL.

Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec

Quoting Linus:

    I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
    the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
    agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
    because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
    but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
    that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
    space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
    accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.

__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the
limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases
a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}

In preparation for converting some __uaccess_begin() instances to
__uacess_begin_nospec(), make sure all 'from user' uaccess paths are
using the _begin(), _end() helpers rather than open-coded stac() and
clac().

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416438.33451.17309465232057176966.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec

For __get_user() paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value
of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for
Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP), a barrier_nospec() causes the
access_ok() result to resolve in the pipeline before the CPU might take any
speculative action on the pointer value. Given the cost of 'stac' the
speculation barrier is placed after 'stac' to hopefully overlap the cost of
disabling SMAP with the cost of flushing the instruction pipeline.

Since __get_user is a major kernel interface that deals with user
controlled pointers, the __uaccess_begin_nospec() mechanism will prevent
speculative execution past an access_ok() permission check. While
speculative execution past access_ok() is not enough to lead to a kernel
memory leak, it is a necessary precondition.

To be clear, __uaccess_begin_nospec() is addressing a class of potential
problems near __get_user() usages.

Note, that while the barrier_nospec() in __uaccess_begin_nospec() is used
to protect __get_user(), pointer masking similar to array_index_nospec()
will be used for get_user() since it incorporates a bounds check near the
usage.

uaccess_try_nospec provides the same mechanism for get_user_try.

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415922.33451.5796614273104346583.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

x86: Introduce barrier_nospec

Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from
rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec().

One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence
speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e.
force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline
to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially
operating on out-of-bounds data.

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415361.33451.9049453007262764675.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec

array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array
indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask
otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the
carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software.

The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is
handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the
control flow.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414808.33451.1873237130672785331.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references

array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate
against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary
checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec()
implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across
multiple architectures (ARM, x86).

Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove
speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to
introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation.

Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

Documentation: Document array_index_nospec

Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info

The TS_COMPAT bit is very hot and is accessed from code paths that mostly
also touch thread_info::flags.  Move it into struct thread_info to improve
cache locality.

The only reason it was in thread_struct is that there was a brief period
during which arch-specific fields were not allowed in struct thread_info.

Linus suggested further changing:

  ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED);

to:

  if (unlikely(ti->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)))
          ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED);

on the theory that frequently dirtying the cacheline even in pure 64-bit
code that never needs to modify status hurts performance.  That could be a
reasonable followup patch, but I suspect it matters less on top of this
patch.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/03148bcc1b217100e6e8ecf6a5468c45cf4304b6.1517164461.git.luto@kernel.org

x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away

With the fast path removed there is no point in splitting the push of the
normal and the extra register set. Just push the extra regs right away.

[ tglx: Split out from 'x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path' ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/462dff8d4d64dfbfc851fbf3130641809d980ecd.1517164461.git.luto@kernel.org

x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path

The SYCALLL64 fast path was a nice, if small, optimization back in the good
old days when syscalls were actually reasonably fast.  Now there is PTI to
slow everything down, and indirect branches are verboten, making everything
messier.  The retpoline code in the fast path is particularly nasty.

Just get rid of the fast path. The slow path is barely slower.

[ tglx: Split out the 'push all extra regs' part ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/462dff8d4d64dfbfc851fbf3130641809d980ecd.1517164461.git.luto@kernel.org

x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser

The spectre_v2 option 'auto' does not check whether CONFIG_RETPOLINE is
enabled. As a consequence it fails to emit the appropriate warning and sets
feature flags which have no effect at all.

Add the missing IS_ENABLED() check.

Fixes: da285121560e ("x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: Tomohiro" <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f5892721-7528-3647-08fb-f8d10e65ad87@cn.fujitsu.com

x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP

Since commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the
fixmap"), i386's CPU_ENTRY_AREA has been mapped to the memory area just
below FIXADDR_START. But already immediately before FIXADDR_START is the
FIX_BTMAP area, which means that early_ioremap can collide with the entry
area.

It's especially bad on PAE where FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN gets aligned to exactly
match CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE, so the first early_ioremap slot clobbers the
IDT and causes interrupts during early boot to reset the system.

The overlap wasn't a problem before the CPU entry area was introduced,
as the fixmap has classically been preceded by the pkmap or vmalloc
areas, neither of which is used until early_ioremap is out of the
picture.

Relocate CPU_ENTRY_AREA to below FIX_BTMAP, not just below the permanent
fixmap area.

Fixes: commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
Signed-off-by: William Grant <william.grant@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7041d181-a019-e8b9-4e4e-48215f841e2c@canonical.com

objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol

With the following fix:

  2a0098d70640 ("objtool: Fix seg fault with gold linker")

... a seg fault was avoided, but the original seg fault condition in
objtool wasn't fixed.  Replace the seg fault with an error message.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dc4585a70d6b975c99fc51d1957ccdde7bd52f3a.1517284349.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section

Now that the previous patch gave objtool the ability to read retpoline
alternatives, it shows a new warning:

  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o: warning: objtool: .entry_trampoline: don't know how to handle alternatives at end of section

This is due to the JMP_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline().

Previously, objtool ignored this situation because it wasn't needed, and
it would have required a bit of extra code.  Now that this case exists,
add proper support for it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2a30a3c2158af47d891a76e69bb1ef347e0443fd.1517284349.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling

Currently objtool requires all retpolines to be:

  a) patched in with alternatives; and

  b) annotated with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE.

If you forget to do both of the above, objtool segfaults trying to
dereference a NULL 'insn->call_dest' pointer.

Avoid that situation and print a more helpful error message:

  quirks.o: warning: objtool: efi_delete_dummy_variable()+0x99: unsupported intra-function call
  quirks.o: warning: objtool: If this is a retpoline, please patch it in with alternatives and annotate it with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE.

Future improvements can be made to make objtool smarter with respect to
retpolines, but this is a good incremental improvement for now.

Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/819e50b6d9c2e1a22e34c1a636c0b2057cc8c6e5.1517284349.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Merge tag 'v4.15' into x86/pti, to be able to merge dependent changes

Time has come to switch PTI development over to a v4.15 base - we'll still
try to make sure that all PTI fixes backport cleanly to v4.14 and earlier.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Linux 4.15

Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 retpoline fixlet from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Remove the ESP/RSP thunks for retpoline as they cannot ever work.

  Get rid of them before they show up in a release"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk

Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A set of small fixes for 4.15:

   - Fix vmapped stack synchronization on systems with 4-level paging
     and a large amount of memory caused by a missing 5-level folding
     which made the pgd synchronization logic to fail and causing double
     faults.

   - Add a missing sanity check in the vmalloc_fault() logic on 5-level
     paging systems.

   - Bring back protection against accessing a freed initrd in the
     microcode loader which was lost by a wrong merge conflict
     resolution.

   - Extend the Broadwell micro code loading sanity check.

   - Add a missing ENDPROC annotation in ftrace assembly code which
     makes ORC unhappy.

   - Prevent loading the AMD power module on !AMD platforms. The load
     itself is uncritical, but an unload attempt results in a kernel
     crash.

   - Update Peter Anvins role in the MAINTAINERS file"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/ftrace: Add one more ENDPROC annotation
  x86: Mark hpa as a "Designated Reviewer" for the time being
  x86/mm/64: Tighten up vmalloc_fault() sanity checks on 5-level kernels
  x86/mm/64: Fix vmapped stack syncing on very-large-memory 4-level systems
  x86/microcode: Fix again accessing initrd after having been freed
  x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading further with LLC size check
  perf/x86/amd/power: Do not load AMD power module on !AMD platforms

Merge branch 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull timer fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single fix for a ~10 years old problem which causes high resolution
  timers to stop after a CPU unplug/plug cycle due to a stale flag in
  the per CPU hrtimer base struct.

  Paul McKenney was hunting this for about a year, but the heisenbug
  nature made it resistant against debug attempts for quite some time"

* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  hrtimer: Reset hrtimer cpu base proper on CPU hotplug

Merge branch 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull scheduler fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single bug fix to prevent a subtle deadlock in the scheduler core
  code vs cpu hotplug"

* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  sched/core: Fix cpu.max vs. cpuhotplug deadlock

Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull perf fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Four patches which all address lock inversions and deadlocks in the
  perf core code and the Intel debug store"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf/x86: Fix perf,x86,cpuhp deadlock
  perf/core: Fix ctx::mutex deadlock
  perf/core: Fix another perf,trace,cpuhp lock inversion
  perf/core: Fix lock inversion between perf,trace,cpuhp

Merge branch 'locking-urgent-for-linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull locking fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Two final locking fixes for 4.15:

   - Repair the OWNER_DIED logic in the futex code which got wreckaged
     with the recent fix for a subtle race condition.

   - Prevent the hard lockup detector from triggering when dumping all
     held locks in the system"

* 'locking-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  locking/lockdep: Avoid triggering hardlockup from debug_show_all_locks()
  futex: Fix OWNER_DEAD fixup

x86/ftrace: Add one more ENDPROC annotation

When ORC support was added for the ftrace_64.S code, an ENDPROC
for function_hook() was missed. This results in the following warning:

  arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.o: warning: objtool: .entry.text+0x0: unreachable instruction

Fixes: e2ac83d74a4d ("x86/ftrace: Fix ORC unwinding from ftrace handlers")
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180128022150.dqierscqmt3uwwsr@treble

x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()

Make it all a function which does the WRMSR instead of having a hairy
inline asm.

[dwmw2: export it, fix CONFIG_RETPOLINE issues]

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()

Simplify it to call an asm-function instead of pasting 41 insn bytes at
every call site. Also, add alignment to the macro as suggested here:

  https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886

[dwmw2: Clean up comments, let it clobber %ebx and just tell the compiler]

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags

We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs",
"ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD has separate CPUID bits for those, use them
as the user-visible bits.

When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB
capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP
bit is set, set the AMD STIBP that's used for the generic hardware
capability.

Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including
RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are
patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by
non-root, and the same should apply to all information about which
mitigations are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo.

The feature bit for whether IBPB is actually used, which is needed for
ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB.

Originally-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional

If sysfs is disabled and RETPOLINE not defined:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:97:13: warning: ‘spectre_v2_bad_module’ defined but not used
[-Wunused-variable]
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;

Hide it.

Fixes: caf7501a1b4e ("module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module")
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

hrtimer: Reset hrtimer cpu base proper on CPU hotplug

The hrtimer interrupt code contains a hang detection and mitigation
mechanism, which prevents that a long delayed hrtimer interrupt causes a
continous retriggering of interrupts which prevent the system from making
progress. If a hang is detected then the timer hardware is programmed with
a certain delay into the future and a flag is set in the hrtimer cpu base
which prevents newly enqueued timers from reprogramming the timer hardware
prior to the chosen delay. The subsequent hrtimer interrupt after the delay
clears the flag and resumes normal operation.

If such a hang happens in the last hrtimer interrupt before a CPU is
unplugged then the hang_detected flag is set and stays that way when the
CPU is plugged in again. At that point the timer hardware is not armed and
it cannot be armed because the hang_detected flag is still active, so
nothing clears that flag. As a consequence the CPU does not receive hrtimer
interrupts and no timers expire on that CPU which results in RCU stalls and
other malfunctions.

Clear the flag along with some other less critical members of the hrtimer
cpu base to ensure starting from a clean state when a CPU is plugged in.

Thanks to Paul, Sebastian and Anna-Maria for their help to get down to the
root cause of that hard to reproduce heisenbug. Once understood it's
trivial and certainly justifies a brown paperbag.

Fixes: 41d2e4949377 ("hrtimer: Tune hrtimer_interrupt hang logic")
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801261447590.2067@nanos

x86: Mark hpa as a "Designated Reviewer" for the time being

Due to some unfortunate events, I have not been directly involved in
the x86 kernel patch flow for a while now.  I have also not been able
to ramp back up by now like I had hoped to, and after reviewing what I
will need to work on both internally at Intel and elsewhere in the near
term, it is clear that I am not going to be able to ramp back up until
late 2018 at the very earliest.

It is not acceptable to not recognize that this load is currently
taken by Ingo and Thomas without my direct participation, so I mark
myself as R: (designated reviewer) rather than M: (maintainer) until
further notice.  This is in fact recognizing the de facto situation
for the past few years.

I have obviously no intention of going away, and I will do everything
within my power to improve Linux on x86 and x86 for Linux.  This,
however, puts credit where it is due and reflects a change of focus.

This patch also removes stale entries for portions of the x86
architecture which have not been maintained separately from arch/x86
for a long time.  If there is a reason to re-introduce them then that
can happen later.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <h.peter.anvin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Bruce Schlobohm <bruce.schlobohm@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125195934.5253-1-hpa@zytor.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs

Group together the calls to alloc_vmcs and loaded_vmcs_init.  Soon we'll also
allocate an MSR bitmap there.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool

The potential performance advantages of a vmcs02 pool have never been
realized. To simplify the code, eliminate the pool. Instead, a single
vmcs02 is allocated per VCPU when the VCPU enters VMX operation.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ameya More <ameya.more@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-4.15-maintainers' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/palmer/riscv-linux

Pull RISC-V update from Palmer Dabbelt:
 "RISC-V: We have a new mailing list and git repo!

  Sorry to send something essentially as late as possible (Friday after
  an rc9), but we managed to get a mailing list for the RISC-V Linux
  port. We've been using patches@groups.riscv.org for a while, but that
  list has some problems (it's Google Groups and it's shared over all
  RISC-V software projects). The new infaread.org list is much better.
  We just got it on Wednesday but I used it a bit on Thursday to shake
  out all the configuration problems and it appears to be in working
  order.

  When I updated the mailing list I noticed that the MAINTAINERS file
  was pointing to our github repo, but now that we have a kernel.org
  repo I'd like to point to that instead so I changed that as well.
  We'll be centralizing all RISC-V Linux related development here as
  that seems to be the saner way to go about it.

  I can understand if it's too late to get this into 4.15, but given
  that it's not a code change I was hoping it'd still be OK. It would be
  nice to have the new mailing list and git repo in the release tarballs
  so when people start to find bugs they'll get to the right place"

* tag 'riscv-for-linus-4.15-maintainers' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/palmer/riscv-linux:
  Update the RISC-V MAINTAINERS file

Merge git://git./linux/kernel/git/davem/net

Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) The per-network-namespace loopback device, and thus its namespace,
    can have its teardown deferred for a long time if a kernel created
    TCP socket closes and the namespace is exiting meanwhile. The kernel
    keeps trying to finish the close sequence until it times out (which
    takes quite some time).

    Fix this by forcing the socket closed in this situation, from Dan
    Streetman.

 2) Fix regression where we're trying to invoke the update_pmtu method
    on route types (in this case metadata tunnel routes) that don't
    implement the dst_ops method. Fix from Nicolas Dichtel.

 3) Fix long standing memory corruption issues in r8169 driver by
    performing the chip statistics DMA programming more correctly. From
    Francois Romieu.

 4) Handle local broadcast sends over VRF routes properly, from David
    Ahern.

 5) Don't refire the DCCP CCID2 timer endlessly, otherwise the socket
    can never be released. From Alexey Kodanev.

 6) Set poll flags properly in VSOCK protocol layer, from Stefan
    Hajnoczi.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net:
  VSOCK: set POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM for TCP_CLOSING
  dccp: don't restart ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() if sk in closed state
  net: vrf: Add support for sends to local broadcast address
  r8169: fix memory corruption on retrieval of hardware statistics.
  net: don't call update_pmtu unconditionally
  net: tcp: close sock if net namespace is exiting

Merge tag 'drm-fixes-for-v4.15-rc10-2' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux

Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
 "A fairly urgent nouveau regression fix for broken irqs across
  suspend/resume came in. This was broken before but a patch in 4.15 has
  made it much more obviously broken and now s/r fails a lot more often.

  The fix removes freeing the irq across s/r which never should have
  been done anyways.

  Also two vc4 fixes for a NULL deference and some misrendering /
  flickering on screen"

* tag 'drm-fixes-for-v4.15-rc10-2' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux:
  drm/nouveau: Move irq setup/teardown to pci ctor/dtor
  drm/vc4: Fix NULL pointer dereference in vc4_save_hang_state()
  drm/vc4: Flush the caches before the bin jobs, as well.

VSOCK: set POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM for TCP_CLOSING

select(2) with wfds but no rfds must return when the socket is shut down
by the peer.  This way userspace notices socket activity and gets -EPIPE
from the next write(2).

Currently select(2) does not return for virtio-vsock when a SEND+RCV
shutdown packet is received.  This is because vsock_poll() only sets
POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM for TCP_CLOSE, not the TCP_CLOSING state that the
socket is in when the shutdown is received.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

dccp: don't restart ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() if sk in closed state

ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() timer callback always restarts the timer
again and can run indefinitely (unless it is stopped outside), and after
commit 120e9dabaf55 ("dccp: defer ccid_hc_tx_delete() at dismantle time"),
which moved ccid_hc_tx_delete() (also includes sk_stop_timer()) from
dccp_destroy_sock() to sk_destruct(), this started to happen quite often.
The timer prevents releasing the socket, as a result, sk_destruct() won't
be called.

Found with LTP/dccp_ipsec tests running on the bonding device,
which later couldn't be unloaded after the tests were completed:

  unregister_netdevice: waiting for bond0 to become free. Usage count = 148

Fixes: 2a91aa396739 ("[DCCP] CCID2: Initial CCID2 (TCP-Like) implementation")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Update the RISC-V MAINTAINERS file

Now that we're upstream in Linux we've been able to make some
infrastructure changes so our port works a bit more like other ports.
Specifically:

* We now have a mailing list specific to the RISC-V Linux port, hosted
  at lists.infreadead.org.
* We now have a kernel.org git tree where work on our port is
  coordinated.

This patch changes the RISC-V maintainers entry to reflect these new
bits of infrastructure.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>

x86/mm/64: Tighten up vmalloc_fault() sanity checks on 5-level kernels

On a 5-level kernel, if a non-init mm has a top-level entry, it needs to
match init_mm's, but the vmalloc_fault() code skipped over the BUG_ON()
that would have checked it.

While we're at it, get rid of the rather confusing 4-level folded "pgd"
logic.

Cleans-up: b50858ce3e2a ("x86/mm/vmalloc: Add 5-level paging support")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Neil Berrington <neil.berrington@datacore.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2ae598f8c279b0a29baf75df207e6f2fdddc0a1b.1516914529.git.luto@kernel.org

x86/mm/64: Fix vmapped stack syncing on very-large-memory 4-level systems

Neil Berrington reported a double-fault on a VM with 768GB of RAM that uses
large amounts of vmalloc space with PTI enabled.

The cause is that load_new_mm_cr3() was never fixed to take the 5-level pgd
folding code into account, so, on a 4-level kernel, the pgd synchronization
logic compiles away to exactly nothing.

Interestingly, the problem doesn't trigger with nopti.  I assume this is
because the kernel is mapped with global pages if we boot with nopti.  The
sequence of operations when we create a new task is that we first load its
mm while still running on the old stack (which crashes if the old stack is
unmapped in the new mm unless the TLB saves us), then we call
prepare_switch_to(), and then we switch to the new stack.
prepare_switch_to() pokes the new stack directly, which will populate the
mapping through vmalloc_fault().  I assume that we're getting lucky on
non-PTI systems -- the old stack's TLB entry stays alive long enough to
make it all the way through prepare_switch_to() and switch_to() so that we
make it to a valid stack.

Fixes: b50858ce3e2a ("x86/mm/vmalloc: Add 5-level paging support")
Reported-and-tested-by: Neil Berrington <neil.berrington@datacore.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/346541c56caed61abbe693d7d2742b4a380c5001.1516914529.git.luto@kernel.org

x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg

Make

[    0.031118] Spectre V2 mitigation: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline

into

[    0.031118] Spectre V2: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline

to reduce the mitigation mitigations strings.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: riel@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: jikos@kernel.org
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: pjt@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-5-bp@alien8.de

x86/nospec: Fix header guards names

... to adhere to the _ASM_X86_ naming scheme.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: riel@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: jikos@kernel.org
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Cc: pjt@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-3-bp@alien8.de

x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers

After commit ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
pointers are being hashed when printed. However, this makes the alternative
debug output completely useless. Switch to %px in order to see the
unadorned kernel pointers.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: riel@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: jikos@kernel.org
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Cc: pjt@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-2-bp@alien8.de

x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support

Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches.

[ tglx: Add IBPB status to spectre_v2 sysfs file ]

Co-developed-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes

This doesn't refuse to load the affected microcodes; it just refuses to
use the Spectre v2 mitigation features if they're detected, by clearing
the appropriate feature bits.

The AMD CPUID bits are handled here too, because hypervisors *may* have
been exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control
of what's available.

It is non-trivial to use x86_match_cpu() for this table because that
doesn't handle steppings. And the approach taken in commit bd9240a18
almost made me lose my lunch.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown

Also, for CPUs which don't speculate at all, don't report that they're
vulnerable to the Spectre variants either.

Leave the cpu_no_meltdown[] match table with just X86_VENDOR_AMD in it
for now, even though that could be done with a simple comparison, on the
assumption that we'll have more to add.

Based on suggestions from Dave Hansen and Alan Cox.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs

Add MSR and bit definitions for SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD and ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

See Intel's 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control

AMD exposes the PRED_CMD/SPEC_CTRL MSRs slightly differently to Intel.
See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b3e25cc-286d-8bd0-aeaf-9ac4aae39de8@amd.com

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control

Add three feature bits exposed by new microcode on Intel CPUs for
speculation control.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf

This is a pure feature bits leaf. There are two AVX512 feature bits in it
already which were handled as scattered bits, and three more from this leaf
are going to be added for speculation control features.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module

There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes
vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the
right compiler or the right option.

To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info
string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with
retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source
or prebuilt object files are not checked.

If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at
load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: jeyu@kernel.org
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org

Merge branch 'linux-4.15' of git://github.com/skeggsb/linux into drm-fixes

Single irq regression fix
* 'linux-4.15' of git://github.com/skeggsb/linux:
  drm/nouveau: Move irq setup/teardown to pci ctor/dtor

net: vrf: Add support for sends to local broadcast address

Sukumar reported that sends to the local broadcast address
(255.255.255.255) are broken. Check for the address in vrf driver
and do not redirect to the VRF device - similar to multicast
packets.

With this change sockets can use SO_BINDTODEVICE to specify an
egress interface and receive responses. Note: the egress interface
can not be a VRF device but needs to be the enslaved device.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198521

Reported-by: Sukumar Gopalakrishnan <sukumarg1973@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

r8169: fix memory corruption on retrieval of hardware statistics.

Hardware statistics retrieval hurts in tight invocation loops.

Avoid extraneous write and enforce strict ordering of writes targeted to
the tally counters dump area address registers.

Signed-off-by: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>
Tested-by: Oliver Freyermuth <o.freyermuth@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/dtor/input

Pull input fixes from Dmitry Torokhov:
 "The main item is that we try to better handle the newer trackpoints on
  Lenovo devices that are now being produced by Elan/ALPS/NXP and only
  implement a small subset of the original IBM trackpoint controls"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input:
  Revert "Input: synaptics_rmi4 - use devm_device_add_group() for attributes in F01"
  Input: trackpoint - only expose supported controls for Elan, ALPS and NXP
  Input: trackpoint - force 3 buttons if 0 button is reported
  Input: xpad - add support for PDP Xbox One controllers
  Input: stmfts,s6sy671 - add SPDX identifier

orangefs: fix deadlock; do not write i_size in read_iter

After do_readv_writev, the inode cache is invalidated anyway, so i_size
will never be read.  It will be fetched from the server which will also
know about updates from other machines.

Fixes deadlock on 32-bit SMP.

See https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=151268557427760&w=2

Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

drm/nouveau: Move irq setup/teardown to pci ctor/dtor

For a while we've been having issues with seemingly random interrupts
coming from nvidia cards when resuming them. Originally the fix for this
was thought to be just re-arming the MSI interrupt registers right after
re-allocating our IRQs, however it seems a lot of what we do is both
wrong and not even nessecary.

This was made apparent by what appeared to be a regression in the
mainline kernel that started introducing suspend/resume issues for
nouveau:

        a0c9259dc4e1 (irq/matrix: Spread interrupts on allocation)

After this commit was introduced, we started getting interrupts from the
GPU before we actually re-allocated our own IRQ (see references below)
and assigned the IRQ handler. Investigating this turned out that the
problem was not with the commit, but the fact that nouveau even
free/allocates it's irqs before and after suspend/resume.

For starters: drivers in the linux kernel haven't had to handle
freeing/re-allocating their IRQs during suspend/resume cycles for quite
a while now. Nouveau seems to be one of the few drivers left that still
does this, despite the fact there's no reason we actually need to since
disabling interrupts from the device side should be enough, as the
kernel is already smart enough to know to disable host-side interrupts
for us before going into suspend. Since we were tearing down our IRQs by
hand however, that means there was a short period during resume where
interrupts could be received before we re-allocated our IRQ which would
lead to us getting an unhandled IRQ. Since we never handle said IRQ and
re-arm the interrupt registers, this would cause us to miss all of the
interrupts from the GPU and cause our init process to start timing out
on anything requiring interrupts.

So, since this whole setup/teardown every suspend/resume cycle is
useless anyway, move irq setup/teardown into the pci subdev's ctor/dtor
functions instead so they're only called at driver load and driver
unload. This should fix most of the issues with pending interrupts on
resume, along with getting suspend/resume for nouveau to work again.

As well, this probably means we can also just remove the msi rearm call
inside nvkm_pci_init(). But since our main focus here is to fix
suspend/resume before 4.15, we'll save that for a later patch.

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>

net: don't call update_pmtu unconditionally

Some dst_ops (e.g. md_dst_ops)) doesn't set this handler. It may result to:
"BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)"

Let's add a helper to check if update_pmtu is available before calling it.

Fixes: 52a589d51f10 ("geneve: update skb dst pmtu on tx path")
Fixes: a93bf0ff4490 ("vxlan: update skb dst pmtu on tx path")
CC: Roman Kapl <code@rkapl.cz>
CC: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git./virt/kvm/kvm

Pull KVM fixes from Radim Krčmář:
 "Fix races and a potential use after free in the s390 cmma migration
  code"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  KVM: s390: add proper locking for CMMA migration bitmap

Merge tag 'for-4.15-tag' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux

Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba:
 "It's been reported recently that readdir can list stale entries under
  some conditions. Fix it."

* tag 'for-4.15-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  Btrfs: fix stale entries in readdir

net: tcp: close sock if net namespace is exiting

When a tcp socket is closed, if it detects that its net namespace is
exiting, close immediately and do not wait for FIN sequence.

For normal sockets, a reference is taken to their net namespace, so it will
never exit while the socket is open.  However, kernel sockets do not take a
reference to their net namespace, so it may begin exiting while the kernel
socket is still open.  In this case if the kernel socket is a tcp socket,
it will stay open trying to complete its close sequence.  The sock's dst(s)
hold a reference to their interface, which are all transferred to the
namespace's loopback interface when the real interfaces are taken down.
When the namespace tries to take down its loopback interface, it hangs
waiting for all references to the loopback interface to release, which
results in messages like:

unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1

These messages continue until the socket finally times out and closes.
Since the net namespace cleanup holds the net_mutex while calling its
registered pernet callbacks, any new net namespace initialization is
blocked until the current net namespace finishes exiting.

After this change, the tcp socket notices the exiting net namespace, and
closes immediately, releasing its dst(s) and their reference to the
loopback interface, which lets the net namespace continue exiting.

Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1711407
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=97811
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

perf/x86: Fix perf,x86,cpuhp deadlock

More lockdep gifts, a 5-way lockup race:

perf_event_create_kernel_counter()
  perf_event_alloc()
    perf_try_init_event()
      x86_pmu_event_init()
__x86_pmu_event_init()
  x86_reserve_hardware()
 #0     mutex_lock(&pmc_reserve_mutex);
    reserve_ds_buffer()
 #1       get_online_cpus()

perf_event_release_kernel()
  _free_event()
    hw_perf_event_destroy()
      x86_release_hardware()
 #0 mutex_lock(&pmc_reserve_mutex)
release_ds_buffer()
 #1   get_online_cpus()

 #1 do_cpu_up()
  perf_event_init_cpu()
 #2     mutex_lock(&pmus_lock)
 #3     mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)

sys_perf_event_open()
  mutex_lock_double()
 #3     mutex_lock(ctx->mutex)
 #4     mutex_lock_nested(ctx->mutex, 1);

perf_try_init_event()
 #4   mutex_lock_nested(ctx->mutex, 1)
  x86_pmu_event_init()
    intel_pmu_hw_config()
      x86_add_exclusive()
 #0 mutex_lock(&pmc_reserve_mutex)

Fix it by using ordering constructs instead of locking.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

perf/core: Fix ctx::mutex deadlock

Lockdep noticed the following 3-way lockup scenario:

sys_perf_event_open()
  perf_event_alloc()
    perf_try_init_event()
 #0       ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock_nested(1)
      perf_swevent_init()
swevent_hlist_get()
 #1   mutex_lock(&pmus_lock)

perf_event_init_cpu()
 #1   mutex_lock(&pmus_lock)
 #2   mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)

sys_perf_event_open()
  mutex_lock_double()
 #2    mutex_lock()
 #0    mutex_lock_nested()

And while we need that perf_event_ctx_lock_nested() for HW PMUs such
that they can iterate the sibling list, trying to match it to the
available counters, the software PMUs need do no such thing. Exclude
them.

In particular the swevent triggers the above invertion, while the
tpevent PMU triggers a more elaborate one through their event_mutex.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

perf/core: Fix another perf,trace,cpuhp lock inversion

Lockdep noticed the following 3-way lockup race:

        perf_trace_init()
 #0       mutex_lock(&event_mutex)
          perf_trace_event_init()
            perf_trace_event_reg()
              tp_event->class->reg() := tracepoint_probe_register
 #1              mutex_lock(&tracepoints_mutex)
                  trace_point_add_func()
 #2                  static_key_enable()

 #2 do_cpu_up()
  perf_event_init_cpu()
 #3     mutex_lock(&pmus_lock)
 #4     mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)

perf_ioctl()
 #4   ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock()
  _perf_iotcl()
    ftrace_profile_set_filter()
 #0       mutex_lock(&event_mutex)

Fudge it for now by noting that the tracepoint state does not depend
on the event <-> context relation. Ugly though :/

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

perf/core: Fix lock inversion between perf,trace,cpuhp

Lockdep gifted us with noticing the following 4-way lockup scenario:

        perf_trace_init()
 #0       mutex_lock(&event_mutex)
          perf_trace_event_init()
            perf_trace_event_reg()
              tp_event->class->reg() := tracepoint_probe_register
 #1             mutex_lock(&tracepoints_mutex)
                  trace_point_add_func()
 #2                 static_key_enable()

 #2     do_cpu_up()
          perf_event_init_cpu()
 #3         mutex_lock(&pmus_lock)
 #4         mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)

        perf_event_task_disable()
          mutex_lock(&current->perf_event_mutex)
 #4       ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock()
 #5       perf_event_for_each_child()

        do_exit()
          task_work_run()
            __fput()
              perf_release()
                perf_event_release_kernel()
 #4               mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)
 #5               mutex_lock(&event->child_mutex)
                  free_event()
                    _free_event()
                      event->destroy() := perf_trace_destroy
 #0                     mutex_lock(&event_mutex);

Fix that by moving the free_event() out from under the locks.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>