From: Jason A. Donenfeld Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2021 08:24:45 +0000 (+0100) Subject: kernel-5.4: backport fd16931a2f51 for chacha neon X-Git-Url: http://git.lede-project.org./?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d54072587146dd0db9bb52b513234d944edabda3;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fynezz.git kernel-5.4: backport fd16931a2f51 for chacha neon Without this patch, the chacha block counter is not incremented on neon rounds, resulting in incorrect calculations and corrupt packets. This also switches to using `--no-numbered --zero-commit` so that future diffs are smaller. Reported-by: Hans Geiblinger Reviewed-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy Cc: David Bauer Cc: Petr Štetiar Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0001-crypto-lib-tidy-up-lib-crypto-Kconfig-and-Makefile.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0001-crypto-lib-tidy-up-lib-crypto-Kconfig-and-Makefile.patch index 9de7c9cb00..e32e18a357 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0001-crypto-lib-tidy-up-lib-crypto-Kconfig-and-Makefile.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0001-crypto-lib-tidy-up-lib-crypto-Kconfig-and-Makefile.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 7b5de278d022b3f31bc5b42cd160bea2e8bc4c74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:07 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 001/124] crypto: lib - tidy up lib/crypto Kconfig and Makefile +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: lib - tidy up lib/crypto Kconfig and Makefile commit 746b2e024c67aa605ac12d135cd7085a49cf9dc4 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0002-crypto-chacha-move-existing-library-code-into-lib-cr.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0002-crypto-chacha-move-existing-library-code-into-lib-cr.patch index a16ca08f56..177b5840d5 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0002-crypto-chacha-move-existing-library-code-into-lib-cr.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0002-crypto-chacha-move-existing-library-code-into-lib-cr.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 6f71439c260ddd0f9a21fee3e34449fe9c017ab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:08 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 002/124] crypto: chacha - move existing library code into - lib/crypto +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha - move existing library code into lib/crypto commit 5fb8ef25803ef33e2eb60b626435828b937bed75 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0003-crypto-x86-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library-i.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0003-crypto-x86-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library-i.patch index 60339381b5..b1f59cc38f 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0003-crypto-x86-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library-i.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0003-crypto-x86-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library-i.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 29c84baf5e125aa43265192a08cc4bd904db1d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:09 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 003/124] crypto: x86/chacha - depend on generic chacha library - instead of crypto driver +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/chacha - depend on generic chacha library instead + of crypto driver commit 28e8d89b1ce8d2e7badfb5f69971dd635acb8863 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0004-crypto-x86-chacha-expose-SIMD-ChaCha-routine-as-libr.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0004-crypto-x86-chacha-expose-SIMD-ChaCha-routine-as-libr.patch index 0e916c88cf..0e5462837b 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0004-crypto-x86-chacha-expose-SIMD-ChaCha-routine-as-libr.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0004-crypto-x86-chacha-expose-SIMD-ChaCha-routine-as-libr.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From e7f5b03590beee54da6d02aabe0e1392bc3251e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:10 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 004/124] crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as - library function +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as library + function commit 84e03fa39fbe95a5567d43bff458c6d3b3a23ad1 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0005-crypto-arm64-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0005-crypto-arm64-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library.patch index eca55ed037..10e49c192c 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0005-crypto-arm64-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0005-crypto-arm64-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 527b7f4f3e244c58e07fdb7d850acb45821e1c52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:11 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 005/124] crypto: arm64/chacha - depend on generic chacha - library instead of crypto driver +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm64/chacha - depend on generic chacha library + instead of crypto driver commit c77da4867cbb7841177275dbb250f5c09679fae4 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0006-crypto-arm64-chacha-expose-arm64-ChaCha-routine-as-l.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0006-crypto-arm64-chacha-expose-arm64-ChaCha-routine-as-l.patch index 69583ec838..71665e8bfd 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0006-crypto-arm64-chacha-expose-arm64-ChaCha-routine-as-l.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0006-crypto-arm64-chacha-expose-arm64-ChaCha-routine-as-l.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 8b3fda990212ced164ec776a3ba0acedae022614 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:12 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 006/124] crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as - library function +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library + function commit b3aad5bad26a01a4bd8c49a5c5f52aec665f3b7c upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0007-crypto-arm-chacha-import-Eric-Biggers-s-scalar-accel.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0007-crypto-arm-chacha-import-Eric-Biggers-s-scalar-accel.patch index bf3ce3edaf..978f2f55be 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0007-crypto-arm-chacha-import-Eric-Biggers-s-scalar-accel.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0007-crypto-arm-chacha-import-Eric-Biggers-s-scalar-accel.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 140ec1877054d2fe67538541b94b4967c0219ff4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:13 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 007/124] crypto: arm/chacha - import Eric Biggers's scalar - accelerated ChaCha code +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/chacha - import Eric Biggers's scalar accelerated + ChaCha code commit 29621d099f9c642b22a69dc8e7e20c108473a392 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0008-crypto-arm-chacha-remove-dependency-on-generic-ChaCh.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0008-crypto-arm-chacha-remove-dependency-on-generic-ChaCh.patch index 7f907f2364..88c9738dbc 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0008-crypto-arm-chacha-remove-dependency-on-generic-ChaCh.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0008-crypto-arm-chacha-remove-dependency-on-generic-ChaCh.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From a92bd97c758d32511f0deeef84f25c3a1d5e7879 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:14 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 008/124] crypto: arm/chacha - remove dependency on generic - ChaCha driver +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/chacha - remove dependency on generic ChaCha + driver commit b36d8c09e710c71f6a9690b6586fea2d1c9e1e27 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0009-crypto-arm-chacha-expose-ARM-ChaCha-routine-as-libra.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0009-crypto-arm-chacha-expose-ARM-ChaCha-routine-as-libra.patch index 072b50b498..4006dc63b2 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0009-crypto-arm-chacha-expose-ARM-ChaCha-routine-as-libra.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0009-crypto-arm-chacha-expose-ARM-ChaCha-routine-as-libra.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 360be1a8f326ec5c0d20a134e228fb96a2eb351d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:15 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 009/124] crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as - library function +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as library + function commit a44a3430d71bad4ee56788a59fff099b291ea54c upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0010-crypto-mips-chacha-import-32r2-ChaCha-code-from-Zinc.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0010-crypto-mips-chacha-import-32r2-ChaCha-code-from-Zinc.patch index e6fb4d9dc9..0a2b4c4523 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0010-crypto-mips-chacha-import-32r2-ChaCha-code-from-Zinc.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0010-crypto-mips-chacha-import-32r2-ChaCha-code-from-Zinc.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From f9b4c68865fdb7f3327f7d82fbc82c76c8773d53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:16 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 010/124] crypto: mips/chacha - import 32r2 ChaCha code from - Zinc +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: mips/chacha - import 32r2 ChaCha code from Zinc MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0011-crypto-mips-chacha-wire-up-accelerated-32r2-code-fro.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0011-crypto-mips-chacha-wire-up-accelerated-32r2-code-fro.patch index 1abfc29fc7..0d24ce29e5 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0011-crypto-mips-chacha-wire-up-accelerated-32r2-code-fro.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0011-crypto-mips-chacha-wire-up-accelerated-32r2-code-fro.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 01c1104f551dae77125bb3d0f461f4084f2a98df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:17 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 011/124] crypto: mips/chacha - wire up accelerated 32r2 code - from Zinc +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: mips/chacha - wire up accelerated 32r2 code from Zinc MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0012-crypto-chacha-unexport-chacha_generic-routines.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0012-crypto-chacha-unexport-chacha_generic-routines.patch index 23a1e41529..d06f47a100 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0012-crypto-chacha-unexport-chacha_generic-routines.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0012-crypto-chacha-unexport-chacha_generic-routines.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 53b97caa431974880c3ea592be870a62e9ef444a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 012/124] crypto: chacha - unexport chacha_generic routines +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha - unexport chacha_generic routines commit 22cf705360707ced15f9fe5423938f313c7df536 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0013-crypto-poly1305-move-core-routines-into-a-separate-l.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0013-crypto-poly1305-move-core-routines-into-a-separate-l.patch index a522704b4a..960300d2a5 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0013-crypto-poly1305-move-core-routines-into-a-separate-l.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0013-crypto-poly1305-move-core-routines-into-a-separate-l.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 905432633564215220707ee97f64ffb249a029f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:19 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 013/124] crypto: poly1305 - move core routines into a separate - library +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: poly1305 - move core routines into a separate library commit 48ea8c6ebc96bc0990e12ee1c43d0832c23576bb upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0014-crypto-x86-poly1305-unify-Poly1305-state-struct-with.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0014-crypto-x86-poly1305-unify-Poly1305-state-struct-with.patch index 5a879f0434..7d237549b0 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0014-crypto-x86-poly1305-unify-Poly1305-state-struct-with.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0014-crypto-x86-poly1305-unify-Poly1305-state-struct-with.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 1017a880df176730e7f8e32f28300eea2a6c27a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:20 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 014/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - unify Poly1305 state struct - with generic code +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - unify Poly1305 state struct with + generic code commit ad8f5b88383ea685f2b8df2a12ee3e08089a1287 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0015-crypto-poly1305-expose-init-update-final-library-int.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0015-crypto-poly1305-expose-init-update-final-library-int.patch index 66c276267c..bf8e90bf02 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0015-crypto-poly1305-expose-init-update-final-library-int.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0015-crypto-poly1305-expose-init-update-final-library-int.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From fd966ddf025b8b62aab20d2e4eb242fe51ad5137 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:21 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 015/124] crypto: poly1305 - expose init/update/final library - interface +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: poly1305 - expose init/update/final library interface commit a1d93064094cc5e24d64e35cf093e7191d0c9344 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0016-crypto-x86-poly1305-depend-on-generic-library-not-ge.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0016-crypto-x86-poly1305-depend-on-generic-library-not-ge.patch index a1fe77cd5a..8ea63f3b91 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0016-crypto-x86-poly1305-depend-on-generic-library-not-ge.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0016-crypto-x86-poly1305-depend-on-generic-library-not-ge.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 0e610172b19b8f7c1ce829247ce5f302b25ad100 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:22 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 016/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - depend on generic library not - generic shash +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - depend on generic library not generic + shash commit 1b2c6a5120489d41c8ea3b8dacd0b4586289b158 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0017-crypto-x86-poly1305-expose-existing-driver-as-poly13.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0017-crypto-x86-poly1305-expose-existing-driver-as-poly13.patch index 01037a6ee6..6514987b4d 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0017-crypto-x86-poly1305-expose-existing-driver-as-poly13.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0017-crypto-x86-poly1305-expose-existing-driver-as-poly13.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 2ceb2e26de65cce974875e0487dde20bc5f1826c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:23 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 017/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - expose existing driver as - poly1305 library +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - expose existing driver as poly1305 + library commit f0e89bcfbb894e5844cd1bbf6b3cf7c63cb0f5ac upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0018-crypto-arm64-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0018-crypto-arm64-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS.patch index 6596441950..464c6568f6 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0018-crypto-arm64-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0018-crypto-arm64-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 335ed336e74d7dcb152025ab65c2ffeceb15c690 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:24 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 018/124] crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate - OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON + implementation commit f569ca16475155013525686d0f73bc379c67e635 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0019-crypto-arm-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS-N.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0019-crypto-arm-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS-N.patch index d48235ca94..367b20fc3a 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0019-crypto-arm-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS-N.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0019-crypto-arm-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS-N.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 588765ccad76f9f65f09e1dcadc464d22441c889 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:25 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 019/124] crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS - NEON implementation +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON + implementation commit a6b803b3ddc793d6db0c16f12fc12d30d20fa9cc upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0020-crypto-mips-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0020-crypto-mips-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS-.patch index 68cac9cc57..272e1797da 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0020-crypto-mips-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS-.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0020-crypto-mips-poly1305-incorporate-OpenSSL-CRYPTOGAMS-.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From a338793df36990e97ab0b824fad6fbf6ef171f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:26 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 020/124] crypto: mips/poly1305 - incorporate - OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS optimized implementation +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: mips/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS + optimized implementation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0021-crypto-blake2s-generic-C-library-implementation-and-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0021-crypto-blake2s-generic-C-library-implementation-and-.patch index a78a9645be..97f73b983a 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0021-crypto-blake2s-generic-C-library-implementation-and-.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0021-crypto-blake2s-generic-C-library-implementation-and-.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 41138d5e49eedc77ff1c4985891b78baba02a874 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:28 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 021/124] crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation - and selftest +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and + selftest commit 66d7fb94e4ffe5acc589e0b2b4710aecc1f07a28 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0022-crypto-testmgr-add-test-cases-for-Blake2s.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0022-crypto-testmgr-add-test-cases-for-Blake2s.patch index 95ace4b295..9adc75eb98 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0022-crypto-testmgr-add-test-cases-for-Blake2s.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0022-crypto-testmgr-add-test-cases-for-Blake2s.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 4852555d88528a86fc20ac63da7aca29f9071193 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:29 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 022/124] crypto: testmgr - add test cases for Blake2s +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - add test cases for Blake2s commit 17e1df67023a5c9ccaeb5de8bf5b88f63127ecf7 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0023-crypto-blake2s-implement-generic-shash-driver.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0023-crypto-blake2s-implement-generic-shash-driver.patch index 4116973631..e25edf5dda 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0023-crypto-blake2s-implement-generic-shash-driver.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0023-crypto-blake2s-implement-generic-shash-driver.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From af5b936f5e17306da571f703bdef1f011a602b57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:30 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 023/124] crypto: blake2s - implement generic shash driver +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: blake2s - implement generic shash driver commit 7f9b0880925f1f9d7d59504ea0892d2ae9cfc233 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0024-crypto-blake2s-x86_64-SIMD-implementation.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0024-crypto-blake2s-x86_64-SIMD-implementation.patch index 80bf831f81..04405581d2 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0024-crypto-blake2s-x86_64-SIMD-implementation.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0024-crypto-blake2s-x86_64-SIMD-implementation.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 7960239adcaf7b56b081426ea3aa0ebf17398375 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:31 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 024/124] crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation commit ed0356eda153f6a95649e11feb7b07083caf9e20 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0025-crypto-curve25519-generic-C-library-implementations.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0025-crypto-curve25519-generic-C-library-implementations.patch index 87d4d41c96..e58dda9213 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0025-crypto-curve25519-generic-C-library-implementations.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0025-crypto-curve25519-generic-C-library-implementations.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From feadb4076186623fb4ca14d8f70759637c4df1f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:32 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 025/124] crypto: curve25519 - generic C library - implementations +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: curve25519 - generic C library implementations commit 0ed42a6f431e930b2e8fae21955406e09fe75d70 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0026-crypto-curve25519-add-kpp-selftest.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0026-crypto-curve25519-add-kpp-selftest.patch index 66c144e321..b2813aeb6a 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0026-crypto-curve25519-add-kpp-selftest.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0026-crypto-curve25519-add-kpp-selftest.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From c8ff08024112b37805ab5b1edbd7e451de35a17d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:33 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 026/124] crypto: curve25519 - add kpp selftest +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: curve25519 - add kpp selftest commit f613457a7af085728297bef71233c37faf3c01b1 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0027-crypto-curve25519-implement-generic-KPP-driver.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0027-crypto-curve25519-implement-generic-KPP-driver.patch index 2d6de581ee..d909561690 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0027-crypto-curve25519-implement-generic-KPP-driver.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0027-crypto-curve25519-implement-generic-KPP-driver.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 54bdc995d525de6ae20f74af36d079f8b79e52fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:34 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 027/124] crypto: curve25519 - implement generic KPP driver +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: curve25519 - implement generic KPP driver commit ee772cb641135739c1530647391d5a04c39db192 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0028-crypto-lib-curve25519-work-around-Clang-stack-spilli.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0028-crypto-lib-curve25519-work-around-Clang-stack-spilli.patch index b38f3f74f0..36b59c9aae 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0028-crypto-lib-curve25519-work-around-Clang-stack-spilli.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0028-crypto-lib-curve25519-work-around-Clang-stack-spilli.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 3c710fa0cdbf9362df4e3b36be338779662b30a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:35 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 028/124] crypto: lib/curve25519 - work around Clang stack - spilling issue +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: lib/curve25519 - work around Clang stack spilling + issue commit 660bb8e1f833ea63185fe80fde847e3e42f18e3b upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0029-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-library-and-KPP-implementat.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0029-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-library-and-KPP-implementat.patch index fd06cb1260..49fd970767 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0029-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-library-and-KPP-implementat.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0029-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-library-and-KPP-implementat.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 0195e7650ebe0fdb5e1d5891274c203cb6cee0b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:36 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 029/124] crypto: curve25519 - x86_64 library and KPP - implementations +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: curve25519 - x86_64 library and KPP implementations MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0030-crypto-arm-curve25519-import-Bernstein-and-Schwabe-s.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0030-crypto-arm-curve25519-import-Bernstein-and-Schwabe-s.patch index b15a32b5cb..8fda25d60a 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0030-crypto-arm-curve25519-import-Bernstein-and-Schwabe-s.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0030-crypto-arm-curve25519-import-Bernstein-and-Schwabe-s.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From bfc49f5ecdd60f2b37cd2f21a6f4de6ea91625e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:37 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 030/124] crypto: arm/curve25519 - import Bernstein and - Schwabe's Curve25519 ARM implementation +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/curve25519 - import Bernstein and Schwabe's + Curve25519 ARM implementation commit f0fb006b604f98e2309a30f34ef455ac734f7c1c upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0031-crypto-arm-curve25519-wire-up-NEON-implementation.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0031-crypto-arm-curve25519-wire-up-NEON-implementation.patch index 14a75e10eb..d84726b616 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0031-crypto-arm-curve25519-wire-up-NEON-implementation.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0031-crypto-arm-curve25519-wire-up-NEON-implementation.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From ec96c25c1ce09c78e44bd4627bc0a3e610b7f5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:38 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 031/124] crypto: arm/curve25519 - wire up NEON implementation +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/curve25519 - wire up NEON implementation commit d8f1308a025fc7e00414194ed742d5f05a21e13c upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0032-crypto-chacha20poly1305-import-construction-and-self.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0032-crypto-chacha20poly1305-import-construction-and-self.patch index dde774a68d..2d5601d7ac 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0032-crypto-chacha20poly1305-import-construction-and-self.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0032-crypto-chacha20poly1305-import-construction-and-self.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From d276ee98ad5275f3e1efb4f8a9f2e3fbece23a5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:39 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 032/124] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - import construction and - selftest from Zinc +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - import construction and selftest + from Zinc commit ed20078b7e3331e82828be357147af6a3282e4ce upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0033-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-reimplement-crypt_from_s.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0033-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-reimplement-crypt_from_s.patch index a7811eb26a..e4b2b58b82 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0033-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-reimplement-crypt_from_s.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0033-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-reimplement-crypt_from_s.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From b7af0c213ba3afe27da21845419756aec63b43b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:40 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 033/124] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement - crypt_from_sg() routine +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement crypt_from_sg() + routine commit d95312a3ccc0cd544d374be2fc45aeaa803e5fd9 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0034-crypto-chacha_generic-remove-unnecessary-setkey-func.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0034-crypto-chacha_generic-remove-unnecessary-setkey-func.patch index 493da3a097..709b1fbcf5 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0034-crypto-chacha_generic-remove-unnecessary-setkey-func.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0034-crypto-chacha_generic-remove-unnecessary-setkey-func.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From d59a7ffb8aa6735586929c5a2d90e142c6d6952d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 23:21:29 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 034/124] crypto: chacha_generic - remove unnecessary setkey() +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha_generic - remove unnecessary setkey() functions commit 2043323a799a660bc84bbee404cf7a2617ec6157 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0035-crypto-x86-chacha-only-unregister-algorithms-if-regi.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0035-crypto-x86-chacha-only-unregister-algorithms-if-regi.patch index f423acb90b..4554ea898b 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0035-crypto-x86-chacha-only-unregister-algorithms-if-regi.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0035-crypto-x86-chacha-only-unregister-algorithms-if-regi.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 4fa6b436d97e44deef404676d150ed4c13d63bba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 23:21:58 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 035/124] crypto: x86/chacha - only unregister algorithms if - registered +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/chacha - only unregister algorithms if registered commit b62755aed3a3f5ca9edd2718339ccea3b6bbbe57 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0036-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-use-chacha20_crypt.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0036-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-use-chacha20_crypt.patch index 1f6d22ee35..6ad20b999e 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0036-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-use-chacha20_crypt.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0036-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-use-chacha20_crypt.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 41d7b5227dcad70f5bd6471e9620fe3c8b3db300 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 23:22:16 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 036/124] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - use chacha20_crypt() +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - use chacha20_crypt() commit 413808b71e6204b0cc1eeaa77960f7c3cd381d33 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0037-crypto-arch-conditionalize-crypto-api-in-arch-glue-f.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0037-crypto-arch-conditionalize-crypto-api-in-arch-glue-f.patch index ab04cecf05..d510438f1d 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0037-crypto-arch-conditionalize-crypto-api-in-arch-glue-f.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0037-crypto-arch-conditionalize-crypto-api-in-arch-glue-f.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From f23fdc58a0a08afada84fe4910279ec3d8d085e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2019 11:31:12 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 037/124] crypto: arch - conditionalize crypto api in arch glue - for lib code +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arch - conditionalize crypto api in arch glue for lib + code commit 8394bfec51e0e565556101bcc4e2fe7551104cd8 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0038-crypto-chacha-fix-warning-message-in-header-file.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0038-crypto-chacha-fix-warning-message-in-header-file.patch index 6170e7b76e..ccd03e3525 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0038-crypto-chacha-fix-warning-message-in-header-file.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0038-crypto-chacha-fix-warning-message-in-header-file.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 61ad3d7b564718b9810b8112a6d2e9ad6405b167 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Valdis=20Kl=C4=93tnieks?= Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 20:58:36 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 038/124] crypto: chacha - fix warning message in header file +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha - fix warning message in header file commit 579d705cd64e44f3fcda1a6cfd5f37468a5ddf63 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0039-crypto-arm-curve25519-add-arch-specific-key-generati.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0039-crypto-arm-curve25519-add-arch-specific-key-generati.patch index 19d1338594..67de22deb6 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0039-crypto-arm-curve25519-add-arch-specific-key-generati.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0039-crypto-arm-curve25519-add-arch-specific-key-generati.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 610442255536492764547dddde0289d46a9566db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 10:26:39 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 039/124] crypto: arm/curve25519 - add arch-specific key - generation function +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/curve25519 - add arch-specific key generation + function commit 84faa307249b341f6ad8de3e1869d77a65e26669 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0040-crypto-lib-curve25519-re-add-selftests.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0040-crypto-lib-curve25519-re-add-selftests.patch index e4de170a56..e43d196a3b 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0040-crypto-lib-curve25519-re-add-selftests.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0040-crypto-lib-curve25519-re-add-selftests.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 63b5e3c85a71705225aa3eab04127b3449a4ab5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 19:53:26 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 040/124] crypto: lib/curve25519 - re-add selftests +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: lib/curve25519 - re-add selftests commit aa127963f1cab2b93c74c9b128a84610203fb674 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0041-crypto-poly1305-add-new-32-and-64-bit-generic-versio.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0041-crypto-poly1305-add-new-32-and-64-bit-generic-versio.patch index d843ea17ba..c41ef55b14 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0041-crypto-poly1305-add-new-32-and-64-bit-generic-versio.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0041-crypto-poly1305-add-new-32-and-64-bit-generic-versio.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From a9f240ba1206fb080c1b3f727dfba1512035a82b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2020 22:40:46 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 041/124] crypto: poly1305 - add new 32 and 64-bit generic - versions +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: poly1305 - add new 32 and 64-bit generic versions commit 1c08a104360f3e18f4ee6346c21cc3923efb952e upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0042-crypto-x86-poly1305-import-unmodified-cryptogams-imp.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0042-crypto-x86-poly1305-import-unmodified-cryptogams-imp.patch index 7c80309d2a..8e52383ae1 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0042-crypto-x86-poly1305-import-unmodified-cryptogams-imp.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0042-crypto-x86-poly1305-import-unmodified-cryptogams-imp.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 6dbd1094c7b9897a3264418cd6543fae1a0bcade Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2020 22:40:47 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 042/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - import unmodified cryptogams +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - import unmodified cryptogams implementation commit 0896ca2a0cb6127e8a129f1f2a680d49b6b0f65c upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0043-crypto-x86-poly1305-wire-up-faster-implementations-f.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0043-crypto-x86-poly1305-wire-up-faster-implementations-f.patch index 307c9b6ef3..0fc8348585 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0043-crypto-x86-poly1305-wire-up-faster-implementations-f.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0043-crypto-x86-poly1305-wire-up-faster-implementations-f.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From a81b2f8bd42fe51705d7102e9d9a2a40c2a9d624 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2020 22:40:48 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 043/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations - for kernel +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations for + kernel commit d7d7b853566254648df59f7ea27ea05952a6cfa8 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0044-crypto-arm-arm64-mips-poly1305-remove-redundant-non-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0044-crypto-arm-arm64-mips-poly1305-remove-redundant-non-.patch index e1c719fc01..b95b998880 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0044-crypto-arm-arm64-mips-poly1305-remove-redundant-non-.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0044-crypto-arm-arm64-mips-poly1305-remove-redundant-non-.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 3b1cffd5e47b394b8c0a92583e26acf599022364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2020 22:40:49 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 044/124] crypto: {arm,arm64,mips}/poly1305 - remove redundant +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: {arm,arm64,mips}/poly1305 - remove redundant non-reduction from emit MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0045-crypto-curve25519-Fix-selftest-build-error.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0045-crypto-curve25519-Fix-selftest-build-error.patch index 6247d99fea..fa8d8fd6a9 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0045-crypto-curve25519-Fix-selftest-build-error.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0045-crypto-curve25519-Fix-selftest-build-error.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From a7e800af9c95490f8b42934eccc88d02d0af6d2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2020 12:37:35 +0800 -Subject: [PATCH 045/124] crypto: curve25519 - Fix selftest build error +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: curve25519 - Fix selftest build error commit a8bdf2c42ee4d1ee42af1f3601f85de94e70a421 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0046-crypto-x86-poly1305-fix-.gitignore-typo.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0046-crypto-x86-poly1305-fix-.gitignore-typo.patch index f5a7c21e07..27f0417ac3 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0046-crypto-x86-poly1305-fix-.gitignore-typo.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0046-crypto-x86-poly1305-fix-.gitignore-typo.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From cd86f0664c2e42b6406cb56ac8d5182a65764e93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 18:23:55 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 046/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix .gitignore typo +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix .gitignore typo commit 1f6868995326cc82102049e349d8dbd116bdb656 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0047-crypto-chacha20poly1305-add-back-missing-test-vector.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0047-crypto-chacha20poly1305-add-back-missing-test-vector.patch index 9e10334873..eda969577a 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0047-crypto-chacha20poly1305-add-back-missing-test-vector.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0047-crypto-chacha20poly1305-add-back-missing-test-vector.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 956c2d9a4e69f7458c9b7cb81db98ec1be75ea49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 21:26:34 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 047/124] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - add back missing test - vectors and test chunking +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - add back missing test vectors and + test chunking commit 72c7943792c9e7788ddd182337bcf8f650cf56f5 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0048-crypto-x86-poly1305-emit-does-base-conversion-itself.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0048-crypto-x86-poly1305-emit-does-base-conversion-itself.patch index 68af53f52c..8209ca2898 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0048-crypto-x86-poly1305-emit-does-base-conversion-itself.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0048-crypto-x86-poly1305-emit-does-base-conversion-itself.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 722ccb5da4bab4e142e4dc1eea10406a08547c7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 11:42:22 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 048/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - emit does base conversion - itself +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - emit does base conversion itself commit f9e7fe32a792726186301423ff63a465d63386e1 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0049-crypto-arm-chacha-fix-build-failured-when-kernel-mod.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0049-crypto-arm-chacha-fix-build-failured-when-kernel-mod.patch index 392d52f205..354f584315 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0049-crypto-arm-chacha-fix-build-failured-when-kernel-mod.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0049-crypto-arm-chacha-fix-build-failured-when-kernel-mod.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 627e2c8313065e627fe5c8c9f82cebd765f5a65e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 17:43:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 049/124] crypto: arm/chacha - fix build failured when kernel - mode NEON is disabled +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/chacha - fix build failured when kernel mode NEON + is disabled commit 0bc81767c5bd9d005fae1099fb39eb3688370cb1 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0050-crypto-Kconfig-allow-tests-to-be-disabled-when-manag.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0050-crypto-Kconfig-allow-tests-to-be-disabled-when-manag.patch index 88ce1849c6..c52bf0a2a7 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0050-crypto-Kconfig-allow-tests-to-be-disabled-when-manag.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0050-crypto-Kconfig-allow-tests-to-be-disabled-when-manag.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 5e8381a3dc454813605aef01de31985f0f6bf130 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 12:01:36 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 050/124] crypto: Kconfig - allow tests to be disabled when - manager is disabled +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: Kconfig - allow tests to be disabled when manager is + disabled commit 2343d1529aff8b552589f622c23932035ed7a05d upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch index 300420f6fe..1ed49e5b6c 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From dceaaf068879fc228e85c482f65ebb707587f696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2020 12:42:01 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 051/124] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - prevent integer overflow - on large input +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - prevent integer overflow on large + input commit c9cc0517bba9f0213f1e55172feceb99e5512daf upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0052-crypto-x86-curve25519-support-assemblers-with-no-adx.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0052-crypto-x86-curve25519-support-assemblers-with-no-adx.patch index 9a380d377c..513025552d 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0052-crypto-x86-curve25519-support-assemblers-with-no-adx.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0052-crypto-x86-curve25519-support-assemblers-with-no-adx.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 50af997532492b0f55bd9928743ac1f99dc1cd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2020 22:52:35 +0800 -Subject: [PATCH 052/124] crypto: x86/curve25519 - support assemblers with no - adx support +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/curve25519 - support assemblers with no adx + support commit 1579f1bc3b753d17a44de3457d5c6f4a5b14c752 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0053-crypto-arm64-chacha-correctly-walk-through-blocks.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0053-crypto-arm64-chacha-correctly-walk-through-blocks.patch index 1c8d2df2e5..823a908373 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0053-crypto-arm64-chacha-correctly-walk-through-blocks.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0053-crypto-arm64-chacha-correctly-walk-through-blocks.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From ed61666f3b3fae43e872dc36a2c01794d7119165 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 20:27:32 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 053/124] crypto: arm64/chacha - correctly walk through blocks +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm64/chacha - correctly walk through blocks commit c8cfcb78c65877313cda7bcbace624d3dbd1f3b3 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0054-crypto-x86-curve25519-replace-with-formally-verified.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0054-crypto-x86-curve25519-replace-with-formally-verified.patch index 46ee2573dd..938d700da2 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0054-crypto-x86-curve25519-replace-with-formally-verified.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0054-crypto-x86-curve25519-replace-with-formally-verified.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From a35b4c8928691ab2aa671aa2ca38a02d4e3cc58d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 18:18:15 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 054/124] crypto: x86/curve25519 - replace with formally - verified implementation +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/curve25519 - replace with formally verified + implementation commit 07b586fe06625b0b610dc3d3a969c51913d143d4 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0055-crypto-x86-curve25519-leave-r12-as-spare-register.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0055-crypto-x86-curve25519-leave-r12-as-spare-register.patch index 74a6ef648b..d5b11e0d36 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0055-crypto-x86-curve25519-leave-r12-as-spare-register.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0055-crypto-x86-curve25519-leave-r12-as-spare-register.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 481c5ed9ac2acec32d93847636707bda02208ec8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2020 16:06:56 +0800 -Subject: [PATCH 055/124] crypto: x86/curve25519 - leave r12 as spare register +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/curve25519 - leave r12 as spare register commit dc7fc3a53ae158263196b1892b672aedf67796c5 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0056-crypto-arm-64-poly1305-add-artifact-to-.gitignore-fi.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0056-crypto-arm-64-poly1305-add-artifact-to-.gitignore-fi.patch index 528de4335e..655371630c 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0056-crypto-arm-64-poly1305-add-artifact-to-.gitignore-fi.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0056-crypto-arm-64-poly1305-add-artifact-to-.gitignore-fi.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 216f24cb4aba8385025c38da0f79c4aa8e637484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 11:56:17 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 056/124] crypto: arm[64]/poly1305 - add artifact to .gitignore - files +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm[64]/poly1305 - add artifact to .gitignore files commit 6e4e00d8b68ca7eb30d08afb740033e0d36abe55 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0057-crypto-arch-lib-limit-simd-usage-to-4k-chunks.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0057-crypto-arch-lib-limit-simd-usage-to-4k-chunks.patch index bb0f5802a9..f8828f243e 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0057-crypto-arch-lib-limit-simd-usage-to-4k-chunks.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0057-crypto-arch-lib-limit-simd-usage-to-4k-chunks.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From af386d2b1f9207290a12aa97ecec8b428f3bebb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 15:54:04 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 057/124] crypto: arch/lib - limit simd usage to 4k chunks +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arch/lib - limit simd usage to 4k chunks commit 706024a52c614b478b63f7728d202532ce6591a9 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0058-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-Add-missing-function-dec.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0058-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-Add-missing-function-dec.patch index 0653e3a8ba..736147f934 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0058-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-Add-missing-function-dec.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0058-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-Add-missing-function-dec.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 58c2229461f888087fc3175650bc2e6aa70fd862 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 12:41:13 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH 058/124] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - Add missing function +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - Add missing function declaration commit 06cc2afbbdf9a9e8df3e2f8db724997dd6e1b4ac upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0059-crypto-x86-chacha-sse3-use-unaligned-loads-for-state.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0059-crypto-x86-chacha-sse3-use-unaligned-loads-for-state.patch index 652439393b..52847877f6 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0059-crypto-x86-chacha-sse3-use-unaligned-loads-for-state.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0059-crypto-x86-chacha-sse3-use-unaligned-loads-for-state.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 833ca409e17c10f4affb5879e22a03fdf1933439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 12:11:18 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 059/124] crypto: x86/chacha-sse3 - use unaligned loads for - state array +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/chacha-sse3 - use unaligned loads for state array commit e79a31715193686e92dadb4caedfbb1f5de3659c upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0060-crypto-x86-curve25519-Remove-unused-carry-variables.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0060-crypto-x86-curve25519-Remove-unused-carry-variables.patch index 9c7c3c7bcc..5a2d20a982 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0060-crypto-x86-curve25519-Remove-unused-carry-variables.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0060-crypto-x86-curve25519-Remove-unused-carry-variables.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 9cfd2787b0b37940c656c6ea5fede6b3c360f0e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 17:50:48 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH 060/124] crypto: x86/curve25519 - Remove unused carry - variables +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/curve25519 - Remove unused carry variables commit 054a5540fb8f7268e2c79e9deab4242db15c8cba upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0061-crypto-arm-curve25519-include-linux-scatterlist.h.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0061-crypto-arm-curve25519-include-linux-scatterlist.h.patch index e1857f82b9..b58fd08fc9 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0061-crypto-arm-curve25519-include-linux-scatterlist.h.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0061-crypto-arm-curve25519-include-linux-scatterlist.h.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 6ae9f0d421af5145d457c51abe2b704ebb297a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabio Estevam Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 11:09:53 -0300 -Subject: [PATCH 061/124] crypto: arm/curve25519 - include - +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/curve25519 - include commit 6779d0e6b0fe193ab3010ea201782ca6f75a3862 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0062-crypto-arm-poly1305-Add-prototype-for-poly1305_block.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0062-crypto-arm-poly1305-Add-prototype-for-poly1305_block.patch index 7cdf0dbdaf..cf3724a499 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0062-crypto-arm-poly1305-Add-prototype-for-poly1305_block.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0062-crypto-arm-poly1305-Add-prototype-for-poly1305_block.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 55a3d2044f411ecf291777f31053b8d8ee81c051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 11:23:00 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH 062/124] crypto: arm/poly1305 - Add prototype for - poly1305_blocks_neon +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/poly1305 - Add prototype for poly1305_blocks_neon commit 51982ea02aef972132eb35c583d3e4c5b83166e5 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0063-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0063-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch index 9c2d666d01..dd76e2a1f2 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0063-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0063-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 4c4ab112443b42603d57b698111b55bfec278001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Uros Bizjak Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 19:30:58 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 063/124] crypto: curve25519-x86_64 - Use XORL r32,32 +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: curve25519-x86_64 - Use XORL r32,32 commit db719539fd3889836900bf912755aa30a5985e9a upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0064-crypto-poly1305-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0064-crypto-poly1305-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch index fa5c1882da..4fcaa1eb75 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0064-crypto-poly1305-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0064-crypto-poly1305-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From a2c7d387da3b3cdb8b7c16ef91cce45f92ebcf61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Uros Bizjak Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 19:38:31 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 064/124] crypto: poly1305-x86_64 - Use XORL r32,32 +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: poly1305-x86_64 - Use XORL r32,32 commit 7dfd1e01b3dfc13431b1b25720cf2692a7e111ef upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0065-crypto-x86-poly1305-Remove-assignments-with-no-effec.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0065-crypto-x86-poly1305-Remove-assignments-with-no-effec.patch index 0f8c836da9..ee64bfe1fc 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0065-crypto-x86-poly1305-Remove-assignments-with-no-effec.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0065-crypto-x86-poly1305-Remove-assignments-with-no-effec.patch @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -From 5502c4d51b8c27631ed1026ef172bd9ce58303d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 13:29:04 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH 065/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no - effect +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect commit 4a0c1de64bf9d9027a6f19adfba89fc27893db23 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0066-crypto-x86-poly1305-add-back-a-needed-assignment.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0066-crypto-x86-poly1305-add-back-a-needed-assignment.patch index aebedb0282..dce8bb912b 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0066-crypto-x86-poly1305-add-back-a-needed-assignment.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0066-crypto-x86-poly1305-add-back-a-needed-assignment.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 4849474f7e021d0d2e33a008abf93cacebf812f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 15:27:48 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 066/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - add back a needed assignment +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/poly1305 - add back a needed assignment commit c3a98c3ad5c0dc60a1ac66bf91147a3f39cac96b upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0067-crypto-Kconfig-CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS-requires-t.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0067-crypto-Kconfig-CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS-requires-t.patch index 430737e0c0..31c47df4b3 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0067-crypto-Kconfig-CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS-requires-t.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0067-crypto-Kconfig-CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS-requires-t.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 4517445d7df86d35d348f884a228e6979113d485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 14:48:15 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 067/124] crypto: Kconfig - CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS requires - the manager +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: Kconfig - CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS requires the + manager commit 6569e3097f1c4a490bdf2b23d326855e04942dfd upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0068-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0068-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch index 2ecdbec380..b31b8d9a0e 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0068-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0068-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From de69c3a866f93a10d86d25d04af54a722bebc420 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 17:28:09 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 068/124] crypto: arm/chacha-neon - optimize for non-block size +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/chacha-neon - optimize for non-block size multiples commit 86cd97ec4b943af35562a74688bc4e909b32c3d1 upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0069-crypto-arm64-chacha-simplify-tail-block-handling.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0069-crypto-arm64-chacha-simplify-tail-block-handling.patch index 55e16247d9..42e9048b99 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0069-crypto-arm64-chacha-simplify-tail-block-handling.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0069-crypto-arm64-chacha-simplify-tail-block-handling.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From af8c75e27b20e01464aa6ad43ca3095534c81a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2020 17:39:38 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 069/124] crypto: arm64/chacha - simplify tail block handling +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm64/chacha - simplify tail block handling commit c4fc6328d6c67690a7e6e03f43a5a976a13120ef upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0070-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-define-empty-module-exit.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0070-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-define-empty-module-exit.patch index e4ca8892ca..084ae74bfd 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0070-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-define-empty-module-exit.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0070-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-define-empty-module-exit.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 06c613a67ec604201f424e8e763f3361264d995e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 20:30:12 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 070/124] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - define empty module - exit function +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - define empty module exit + function commit ac88c322d0f2917d41d13553c69e9d7f043c8b6f upstream. diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0071-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-add-missing-counter-increment.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0071-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-add-missing-counter-increment.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea3cc802a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0071-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-add-missing-counter-increment.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2020 15:39:29 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: arm/chacha-neon - add missing counter increment + +commit fd16931a2f518a32753920ff20895e5cf04c8ff1 upstream. + +Commit 86cd97ec4b943af3 ("crypto: arm/chacha-neon - optimize for non-block +size multiples") refactored the chacha block handling in the glue code in +a way that may result in the counter increment to be omitted when calling +chacha_block_xor_neon() to process a full block. This violates the skcipher +API, which requires that the output IV is suitable for handling more input +as long as the preceding input has been presented in round multiples of the +block size. Also, the same code is exposed via the chacha library interface +whose callers may actually rely on this increment to occur even for final +blocks that are smaller than the chacha block size. + +So increment the counter after calling chacha_block_xor_neon(). + +Fixes: 86cd97ec4b943af3 ("crypto: arm/chacha-neon - optimize for non-block size multiples") +Reported-by: Eric Biggers +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c ++++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c +@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8 + chacha_block_xor_neon(state, d, s, nrounds); + if (d != dst) + memcpy(dst, buf, bytes); ++ state[12]++; + } + } + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0071-icmp-introduce-helper-for-nat-d-source-address-in-ne.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0071-icmp-introduce-helper-for-nat-d-source-address-in-ne.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f5ad6fe0fc..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0071-icmp-introduce-helper-for-nat-d-source-address-in-ne.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,148 +0,0 @@ -From 9793cc7357e8d70fed9cb350d2d39346328cc73b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 20:47:05 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 071/124] icmp: introduce helper for nat'd source address in - network device context - -commit 0b41713b606694257b90d61ba7e2712d8457648b upstream. - -This introduces a helper function to be called only by network drivers -that wraps calls to icmp[v6]_send in a conntrack transformation, in case -NAT has been used. We don't want to pollute the non-driver path, though, -so we introduce this as a helper to be called by places that actually -make use of this, as suggested by Florian. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Cc: Florian Westphal -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - include/linux/icmpv6.h | 10 ++++++++++ - include/net/icmp.h | 6 ++++++ - net/ipv4/icmp.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 83 insertions(+) - ---- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h -+++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h -@@ -22,12 +22,22 @@ extern int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender( - int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type, - unsigned int data_len); - -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) -+void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info); -+#else -+#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send -+#endif -+ - #else - - static inline void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, - u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) - { -+} - -+static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb, -+ u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) -+{ - } - #endif - ---- a/include/net/icmp.h -+++ b/include/net/icmp.h -@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_b - __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &IPCB(skb_in)->opt); - } - -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) -+void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info); -+#else -+#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send -+#endif -+ - int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb); - int icmp_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info); - int icmp_init(void); ---- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c -+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c -@@ -750,6 +750,39 @@ out:; - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send); - -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) -+#include -+void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info) -+{ -+ struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; -+ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; -+ struct nf_conn *ct; -+ __be32 orig_ip; -+ -+ ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); -+ if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) { -+ icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if (skb_shared(skb_in)) -+ skb_in = cloned_skb = skb_clone(skb_in, GFP_ATOMIC); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!skb_in || skb_network_header(skb_in) < skb_in->head || -+ (skb_network_header(skb_in) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) > -+ skb_tail_pointer(skb_in) || skb_ensure_writable(skb_in, -+ skb_network_offset(skb_in) + sizeof(struct iphdr)))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; -+ ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip; -+ icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info); -+ ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; -+out: -+ consume_skb(cloned_skb); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmp_ndo_send); -+#endif - - static void icmp_socket_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info) - { ---- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c -+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c -@@ -45,4 +45,38 @@ out: - rcu_read_unlock(); - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_send); -+ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) -+#include -+void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) -+{ -+ struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; -+ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; -+ struct in6_addr orig_ip; -+ struct nf_conn *ct; -+ -+ ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); -+ if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) { -+ icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if (skb_shared(skb_in)) -+ skb_in = cloned_skb = skb_clone(skb_in, GFP_ATOMIC); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!skb_in || skb_network_header(skb_in) < skb_in->head || -+ (skb_network_header(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) > -+ skb_tail_pointer(skb_in) || skb_ensure_writable(skb_in, -+ skb_network_offset(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; -+ ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6; -+ icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info); -+ ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; -+out: -+ consume_skb(cloned_skb); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_ndo_send); -+#endif - #endif diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0072-icmp-introduce-helper-for-nat-d-source-address-in-ne.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0072-icmp-introduce-helper-for-nat-d-source-address-in-ne.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b53cc6226 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0072-icmp-introduce-helper-for-nat-d-source-address-in-ne.patch @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 20:47:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] icmp: introduce helper for nat'd source address in network + device context + +commit 0b41713b606694257b90d61ba7e2712d8457648b upstream. + +This introduces a helper function to be called only by network drivers +that wraps calls to icmp[v6]_send in a conntrack transformation, in case +NAT has been used. We don't want to pollute the non-driver path, though, +so we introduce this as a helper to be called by places that actually +make use of this, as suggested by Florian. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Cc: Florian Westphal +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + include/linux/icmpv6.h | 10 ++++++++++ + include/net/icmp.h | 6 ++++++ + net/ipv4/icmp.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 83 insertions(+) + +--- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h ++++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h +@@ -22,12 +22,22 @@ extern int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender( + int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type, + unsigned int data_len); + ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) ++void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info); ++#else ++#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send ++#endif ++ + #else + + static inline void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, + u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) + { ++} + ++static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb, ++ u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) ++{ + } + #endif + +--- a/include/net/icmp.h ++++ b/include/net/icmp.h +@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_b + __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &IPCB(skb_in)->opt); + } + ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) ++void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info); ++#else ++#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send ++#endif ++ + int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb); + int icmp_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info); + int icmp_init(void); +--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c +@@ -750,6 +750,39 @@ out:; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send); + ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) ++#include ++void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info) ++{ ++ struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; ++ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; ++ struct nf_conn *ct; ++ __be32 orig_ip; ++ ++ ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); ++ if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) { ++ icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (skb_shared(skb_in)) ++ skb_in = cloned_skb = skb_clone(skb_in, GFP_ATOMIC); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!skb_in || skb_network_header(skb_in) < skb_in->head || ++ (skb_network_header(skb_in) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) > ++ skb_tail_pointer(skb_in) || skb_ensure_writable(skb_in, ++ skb_network_offset(skb_in) + sizeof(struct iphdr)))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; ++ ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip; ++ icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info); ++ ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; ++out: ++ consume_skb(cloned_skb); ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmp_ndo_send); ++#endif + + static void icmp_socket_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info) + { +--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c +@@ -45,4 +45,38 @@ out: + rcu_read_unlock(); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_send); ++ ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) ++#include ++void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) ++{ ++ struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; ++ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; ++ struct in6_addr orig_ip; ++ struct nf_conn *ct; ++ ++ ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); ++ if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) { ++ icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (skb_shared(skb_in)) ++ skb_in = cloned_skb = skb_clone(skb_in, GFP_ATOMIC); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!skb_in || skb_network_header(skb_in) < skb_in->head || ++ (skb_network_header(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) > ++ skb_tail_pointer(skb_in) || skb_ensure_writable(skb_in, ++ skb_network_offset(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; ++ ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6; ++ icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info); ++ ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; ++out: ++ consume_skb(cloned_skb); ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_ndo_send); ++#endif + #endif diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0072-net-icmp-pass-zeroed-opts-from-icmp-v6-_ndo_send-bef.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0072-net-icmp-pass-zeroed-opts-from-icmp-v6-_ndo_send-bef.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fcca169d2d..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0072-net-icmp-pass-zeroed-opts-from-icmp-v6-_ndo_send-bef.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,299 +0,0 @@ -From 4a25324891a32d080589a6e3a4dec2be2d9e3d60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 14:18:58 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 072/124] net: icmp: pass zeroed opts from icmp{,v6}_ndo_send - before sending - -commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream. - -The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting -it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the -inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially -when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that -point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory -contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one -reported by a user: - - panic+0x108/0x2ea - __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20 - __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0 - icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160 - -In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read -from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can -induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen -in __ip_options_echo. For example: - - // sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes - sptr = skb_network_header(skb); - // dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send - dptr = dopt->__data; - // sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question - if (sopt->rr) { - optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data - soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data - // this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over - // flowing the stack: - memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen); - } - -In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only -IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is -worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does -a bit of bounds checking on the value. - -This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41, -sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by -good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've -avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN: - - BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0 - Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89 - CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5 - Call Trace: - dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc - print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160 - __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 - kasan_report+0x32/0x40 - check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0 - memcpy+0x39/0x60 - __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0 - __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700 - -Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for -the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the -gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the -shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send. - -This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to -the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was -already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function. -For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it -behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward. - -Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs") -Reported-by: SinYu -Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/ -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com -Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski -[Jason: the gtp part didn't apply because it doesn't use icmp_ndo_send on 5.4] -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - include/linux/icmpv6.h | 17 ++++++++++++++--- - include/linux/ipv6.h | 1 - - include/net/icmp.h | 6 +++++- - net/ipv4/icmp.c | 5 +++-- - net/ipv6/icmp.c | 16 ++++++++-------- - net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | 12 +++++++----- - 6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) - ---- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h -+++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h -@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ - #define _LINUX_ICMPV6_H - - #include -+#include - #include - - static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb) -@@ -13,10 +14,16 @@ static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr - #include - - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) --extern void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info); -+extern void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, -+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm); - -+static inline void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) -+{ -+ __icmpv6_send(skb, type, code, info, IP6CB(skb)); -+} - typedef void ip6_icmp_send_t(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, -- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr); -+ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr, -+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm); - extern int inet6_register_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn); - extern int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn); - int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type, -@@ -25,7 +32,11 @@ int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) - void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info); - #else --#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send -+static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) -+{ -+ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 }; -+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm); -+} - #endif - - #else ---- a/include/linux/ipv6.h -+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h -@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ struct ipv6_params { - __s32 autoconf; - }; - extern struct ipv6_params ipv6_defaults; --#include - #include - #include - ---- a/include/net/icmp.h -+++ b/include/net/icmp.h -@@ -46,7 +46,11 @@ static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_b - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) - void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info); - #else --#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send -+static inline void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info) -+{ -+ struct ip_options opts = { 0 }; -+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts); -+} - #endif - - int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb); ---- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c -+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c -@@ -755,13 +755,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send); - void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info) - { - struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; -+ struct ip_options opts = { 0 }; - enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; - struct nf_conn *ct; - __be32 orig_ip; - - ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); - if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) { -- icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info); -+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts); - return; - } - -@@ -776,7 +777,7 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_i - - orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; - ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip; -- icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info); -+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts); - ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; - out: - consume_skb(cloned_skb); ---- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c -+++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c -@@ -312,10 +312,9 @@ static int icmpv6_getfrag(void *from, ch - } - - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6) --static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb) -+static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt) - { - struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb); -- struct inet6_skb_parm *opt = IP6CB(skb); - struct ipv6_destopt_hao *hao; - struct in6_addr tmp; - int off; -@@ -332,7 +331,7 @@ static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buf - } - } - #else --static inline void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb) {} -+static inline void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt) {} - #endif - - static struct dst_entry *icmpv6_route_lookup(struct net *net, -@@ -427,7 +426,8 @@ static int icmp6_iif(const struct sk_buf - * Send an ICMP message in response to a packet in error - */ - static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, -- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr) -+ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr, -+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm) - { - struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL; - struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb); -@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *s - if (!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && !icmpv6_global_allow(net, type)) - goto out_bh_enable; - -- mip6_addr_swap(skb); -+ mip6_addr_swap(skb, parm); - - memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6)); - fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_ICMPV6; -@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ out_bh_enable: - */ - void icmpv6_param_prob(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 code, int pos) - { -- icmp6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PARAMPROB, code, pos, NULL); -+ icmp6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PARAMPROB, code, pos, NULL, IP6CB(skb)); - kfree_skb(skb); - } - -@@ -662,10 +662,10 @@ int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk - } - if (type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED) - icmp6_send(skb2, ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED, ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT, -- info, &temp_saddr); -+ info, &temp_saddr, IP6CB(skb2)); - else - icmp6_send(skb2, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, -- info, &temp_saddr); -+ info, &temp_saddr, IP6CB(skb2)); - if (rt) - ip6_rt_put(rt); - ---- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c -+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c -@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(ip6_icm - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_unregister_icmp_sender); - --void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) -+void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, -+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm) - { - ip6_icmp_send_t *send; - -@@ -40,16 +41,17 @@ void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 - - if (!send) - goto out; -- send(skb, type, code, info, NULL); -+ send(skb, type, code, info, NULL, parm); - out: - rcu_read_unlock(); - } --EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_send); -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmpv6_send); - - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) - #include - void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) - { -+ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 }; - struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; - enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; - struct in6_addr orig_ip; -@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb - - ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); - if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) { -- icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info); -+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm); - return; - } - -@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb - - orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; - ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6; -- icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info); -+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm); - ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; - out: - consume_skb(cloned_skb); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0073-net-WireGuard-secure-network-tunnel.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0073-net-WireGuard-secure-network-tunnel.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8651c73a5d..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0073-net-WireGuard-secure-network-tunnel.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8071 +0,0 @@ -From 3e5c0a5efec6e13aa22c59b7170837972e23df49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 00:27:34 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 073/124] net: WireGuard secure network tunnel - -commit e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd upstream. - -WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for -the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. -Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and -considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are -available at: - - * https://www.wireguard.com/ - * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf - -This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, -accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It -makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of -networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing -system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption -operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. -Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from -the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools -have already implemented the API. - -This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel -tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit -of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the -namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like -the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for -pictures and examples. - -The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything -into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, -making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as -follows: - - * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the - cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in - nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of - bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared - pieces of data, like keys and key lists. - - * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for - ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance - with particular WireGuard semantics. - - * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of - WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an - integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just - being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. - - * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for - rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and - wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. - - * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions - available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. - - * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and - the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving - ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky - socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. - - * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard - peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace - tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project - distributes the basic wg(8) tool. - - * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling - the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. - - * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on - multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via - workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie - messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. - - * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on - multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via - the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI - poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages - as part of the protocol, in parallel. - - * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular - event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry - point functions for callers. - - * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. - - * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security - sensitive functions. - - * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing - script using network namespaces. - -This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing -WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or -coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future -optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and -vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally -standalone. - -We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a -verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Cc: David Miller -Cc: Greg KH -Cc: Linus Torvalds -Cc: Herbert Xu -Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org -Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org -Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -[Jason: ported to 5.4 by doing the following: - - wg_get_device_start uses genl_family_attrbuf - - trival skb_redirect_reset change from 2c64605b590e is folded in - - skb_list_walk_safe was already backported prior] -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - MAINTAINERS | 8 + - drivers/net/Kconfig | 41 + - drivers/net/Makefile | 1 + - drivers/net/wireguard/Makefile | 18 + - drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 381 +++++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.h | 59 ++ - drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c | 236 ++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.h | 59 ++ - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 458 ++++++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | 65 ++ - drivers/net/wireguard/main.c | 64 ++ - drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h | 128 +++ - drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 648 +++++++++++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.h | 12 + - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 828 +++++++++++++++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h | 137 +++ - drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 240 ++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h | 83 ++ - drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c | 221 +++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.h | 64 ++ - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c | 53 ++ - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 197 +++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.c | 223 +++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.h | 19 + - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 595 +++++++++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/allowedips.c | 683 +++++++++++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c | 104 +++ - drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c | 226 +++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 413 +++++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 437 ++++++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/socket.h | 44 + - drivers/net/wireguard/timers.c | 243 ++++++ - drivers/net/wireguard/timers.h | 31 + - drivers/net/wireguard/version.h | 1 + - include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h | 196 +++++ - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 537 ++++++++++++ - 36 files changed, 7753 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/Makefile - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/device.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/main.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/allowedips.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/timers.c - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/timers.h - create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/version.h - create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h - create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh - ---- a/MAINTAINERS -+++ b/MAINTAINERS -@@ -17584,6 +17584,14 @@ L: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org - S: Maintained - F: drivers/gpio/gpio-ws16c48.c - -+WIREGUARD SECURE NETWORK TUNNEL -+M: Jason A. Donenfeld -+S: Maintained -+F: drivers/net/wireguard/ -+F: tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/ -+L: wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com -+L: netdev@vger.kernel.org -+ - WISTRON LAPTOP BUTTON DRIVER - M: Miloslav Trmac - S: Maintained ---- a/drivers/net/Kconfig -+++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig -@@ -71,6 +71,47 @@ config DUMMY - To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module - will be called dummy. - -+config WIREGUARD -+ tristate "WireGuard secure network tunnel" -+ depends on NET && INET -+ depends on IPV6 || !IPV6 -+ select NET_UDP_TUNNEL -+ select DST_CACHE -+ select CRYPTO -+ select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519 -+ select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305 -+ select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S -+ select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT -+ select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT -+ select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT -+ select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86 if X86 && 64BIT -+ select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if (ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON -+ select CRYPTO_POLY1305_NEON if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON -+ select CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM if ARM -+ select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_NEON if ARM && KERNEL_MODE_NEON -+ select CRYPTO_CHACHA_MIPS if CPU_MIPS32_R2 -+ select CRYPTO_POLY1305_MIPS if CPU_MIPS32 || (CPU_MIPS64 && 64BIT) -+ help -+ WireGuard is a secure, fast, and easy to use replacement for IPSec -+ that uses modern cryptography and clever networking tricks. It's -+ designed to be fairly general purpose and abstract enough to fit most -+ use cases, while at the same time remaining extremely simple to -+ configure. See www.wireguard.com for more info. -+ -+ It's safe to say Y or M here, as the driver is very lightweight and -+ is only in use when an administrator chooses to add an interface. -+ -+config WIREGUARD_DEBUG -+ bool "Debugging checks and verbose messages" -+ depends on WIREGUARD -+ help -+ This will write log messages for handshake and other events -+ that occur for a WireGuard interface. It will also perform some -+ extra validation checks and unit tests at various points. This is -+ only useful for debugging. -+ -+ Say N here unless you know what you're doing. -+ - config EQUALIZER - tristate "EQL (serial line load balancing) support" - ---help--- ---- a/drivers/net/Makefile -+++ b/drivers/net/Makefile -@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BONDING) += bonding/ - obj-$(CONFIG_IPVLAN) += ipvlan/ - obj-$(CONFIG_IPVTAP) += ipvlan/ - obj-$(CONFIG_DUMMY) += dummy.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_WIREGUARD) += wireguard/ - obj-$(CONFIG_EQUALIZER) += eql.o - obj-$(CONFIG_IFB) += ifb.o - obj-$(CONFIG_MACSEC) += macsec.o ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/Makefile -@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ -+ccflags-y := -O3 -+ccflags-y += -D'pr_fmt(fmt)=KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt' -+ccflags-$(CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG) += -DDEBUG -+wireguard-y := main.o -+wireguard-y += noise.o -+wireguard-y += device.o -+wireguard-y += peer.o -+wireguard-y += timers.o -+wireguard-y += queueing.o -+wireguard-y += send.o -+wireguard-y += receive.o -+wireguard-y += socket.o -+wireguard-y += peerlookup.o -+wireguard-y += allowedips.o -+wireguard-y += ratelimiter.o -+wireguard-y += cookie.o -+wireguard-y += netlink.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_WIREGUARD) := wireguard.o ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c -@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "allowedips.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+ -+static void swap_endian(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, u8 bits) -+{ -+ if (bits == 32) { -+ *(u32 *)dst = be32_to_cpu(*(const __be32 *)src); -+ } else if (bits == 128) { -+ ((u64 *)dst)[0] = be64_to_cpu(((const __be64 *)src)[0]); -+ ((u64 *)dst)[1] = be64_to_cpu(((const __be64 *)src)[1]); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void copy_and_assign_cidr(struct allowedips_node *node, const u8 *src, -+ u8 cidr, u8 bits) -+{ -+ node->cidr = cidr; -+ node->bit_at_a = cidr / 8U; -+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN -+ node->bit_at_a ^= (bits / 8U - 1U) % 8U; -+#endif -+ node->bit_at_b = 7U - (cidr % 8U); -+ node->bitlen = bits; -+ memcpy(node->bits, src, bits / 8U); -+} -+#define CHOOSE_NODE(parent, key) \ -+ parent->bit[(key[parent->bit_at_a] >> parent->bit_at_b) & 1] -+ -+static void node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) -+{ -+ kfree(container_of(rcu, struct allowedips_node, rcu)); -+} -+ -+static void push_rcu(struct allowedips_node **stack, -+ struct allowedips_node __rcu *p, unsigned int *len) -+{ -+ if (rcu_access_pointer(p)) { -+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && *len >= 128); -+ stack[(*len)++] = rcu_dereference_raw(p); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void root_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) -+{ -+ struct allowedips_node *node, *stack[128] = { -+ container_of(rcu, struct allowedips_node, rcu) }; -+ unsigned int len = 1; -+ -+ while (len > 0 && (node = stack[--len])) { -+ push_rcu(stack, node->bit[0], &len); -+ push_rcu(stack, node->bit[1], &len); -+ kfree(node); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void root_remove_peer_lists(struct allowedips_node *root) -+{ -+ struct allowedips_node *node, *stack[128] = { root }; -+ unsigned int len = 1; -+ -+ while (len > 0 && (node = stack[--len])) { -+ push_rcu(stack, node->bit[0], &len); -+ push_rcu(stack, node->bit[1], &len); -+ if (rcu_access_pointer(node->peer)) -+ list_del(&node->peer_list); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void walk_remove_by_peer(struct allowedips_node __rcu **top, -+ struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) -+{ -+#define REF(p) rcu_access_pointer(p) -+#define DEREF(p) rcu_dereference_protected(*(p), lockdep_is_held(lock)) -+#define PUSH(p) ({ \ -+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && len >= 128); \ -+ stack[len++] = p; \ -+ }) -+ -+ struct allowedips_node __rcu **stack[128], **nptr; -+ struct allowedips_node *node, *prev; -+ unsigned int len; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!peer || !REF(*top))) -+ return; -+ -+ for (prev = NULL, len = 0, PUSH(top); len > 0; prev = node) { -+ nptr = stack[len - 1]; -+ node = DEREF(nptr); -+ if (!node) { -+ --len; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (!prev || REF(prev->bit[0]) == node || -+ REF(prev->bit[1]) == node) { -+ if (REF(node->bit[0])) -+ PUSH(&node->bit[0]); -+ else if (REF(node->bit[1])) -+ PUSH(&node->bit[1]); -+ } else if (REF(node->bit[0]) == prev) { -+ if (REF(node->bit[1])) -+ PUSH(&node->bit[1]); -+ } else { -+ if (rcu_dereference_protected(node->peer, -+ lockdep_is_held(lock)) == peer) { -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(node->peer, NULL); -+ list_del_init(&node->peer_list); -+ if (!node->bit[0] || !node->bit[1]) { -+ rcu_assign_pointer(*nptr, DEREF( -+ &node->bit[!REF(node->bit[0])])); -+ call_rcu(&node->rcu, node_free_rcu); -+ node = DEREF(nptr); -+ } -+ } -+ --len; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#undef REF -+#undef DEREF -+#undef PUSH -+} -+ -+static unsigned int fls128(u64 a, u64 b) -+{ -+ return a ? fls64(a) + 64U : fls64(b); -+} -+ -+static u8 common_bits(const struct allowedips_node *node, const u8 *key, -+ u8 bits) -+{ -+ if (bits == 32) -+ return 32U - fls(*(const u32 *)node->bits ^ *(const u32 *)key); -+ else if (bits == 128) -+ return 128U - fls128( -+ *(const u64 *)&node->bits[0] ^ *(const u64 *)&key[0], -+ *(const u64 *)&node->bits[8] ^ *(const u64 *)&key[8]); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static bool prefix_matches(const struct allowedips_node *node, const u8 *key, -+ u8 bits) -+{ -+ /* This could be much faster if it actually just compared the common -+ * bits properly, by precomputing a mask bswap(~0 << (32 - cidr)), and -+ * the rest, but it turns out that common_bits is already super fast on -+ * modern processors, even taking into account the unfortunate bswap. -+ * So, we just inline it like this instead. -+ */ -+ return common_bits(node, key, bits) >= node->cidr; -+} -+ -+static struct allowedips_node *find_node(struct allowedips_node *trie, u8 bits, -+ const u8 *key) -+{ -+ struct allowedips_node *node = trie, *found = NULL; -+ -+ while (node && prefix_matches(node, key, bits)) { -+ if (rcu_access_pointer(node->peer)) -+ found = node; -+ if (node->cidr == bits) -+ break; -+ node = rcu_dereference_bh(CHOOSE_NODE(node, key)); -+ } -+ return found; -+} -+ -+/* Returns a strong reference to a peer */ -+static struct wg_peer *lookup(struct allowedips_node __rcu *root, u8 bits, -+ const void *be_ip) -+{ -+ /* Aligned so it can be passed to fls/fls64 */ -+ u8 ip[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); -+ struct allowedips_node *node; -+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; -+ -+ swap_endian(ip, be_ip, bits); -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+retry: -+ node = find_node(rcu_dereference_bh(root), bits, ip); -+ if (node) { -+ peer = wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(rcu_dereference_bh(node->peer)); -+ if (!peer) -+ goto retry; -+ } -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ return peer; -+} -+ -+static bool node_placement(struct allowedips_node __rcu *trie, const u8 *key, -+ u8 cidr, u8 bits, struct allowedips_node **rnode, -+ struct mutex *lock) -+{ -+ struct allowedips_node *node = rcu_dereference_protected(trie, -+ lockdep_is_held(lock)); -+ struct allowedips_node *parent = NULL; -+ bool exact = false; -+ -+ while (node && node->cidr <= cidr && prefix_matches(node, key, bits)) { -+ parent = node; -+ if (parent->cidr == cidr) { -+ exact = true; -+ break; -+ } -+ node = rcu_dereference_protected(CHOOSE_NODE(parent, key), -+ lockdep_is_held(lock)); -+ } -+ *rnode = parent; -+ return exact; -+} -+ -+static int add(struct allowedips_node __rcu **trie, u8 bits, const u8 *key, -+ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) -+{ -+ struct allowedips_node *node, *parent, *down, *newnode; -+ -+ if (unlikely(cidr > bits || !peer)) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ -+ if (!rcu_access_pointer(*trie)) { -+ node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!node)) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(node->peer, peer); -+ list_add_tail(&node->peer_list, &peer->allowedips_list); -+ copy_and_assign_cidr(node, key, cidr, bits); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(*trie, node); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ if (node_placement(*trie, key, cidr, bits, &node, lock)) { -+ rcu_assign_pointer(node->peer, peer); -+ list_move_tail(&node->peer_list, &peer->allowedips_list); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ newnode = kzalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!newnode)) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnode->peer, peer); -+ list_add_tail(&newnode->peer_list, &peer->allowedips_list); -+ copy_and_assign_cidr(newnode, key, cidr, bits); -+ -+ if (!node) { -+ down = rcu_dereference_protected(*trie, lockdep_is_held(lock)); -+ } else { -+ down = rcu_dereference_protected(CHOOSE_NODE(node, key), -+ lockdep_is_held(lock)); -+ if (!down) { -+ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(node, key), newnode); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ } -+ cidr = min(cidr, common_bits(down, key, bits)); -+ parent = node; -+ -+ if (newnode->cidr == cidr) { -+ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(newnode, down->bits), down); -+ if (!parent) -+ rcu_assign_pointer(*trie, newnode); -+ else -+ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(parent, newnode->bits), -+ newnode); -+ } else { -+ node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!node)) { -+ kfree(newnode); -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ } -+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->peer_list); -+ copy_and_assign_cidr(node, newnode->bits, cidr, bits); -+ -+ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(node, down->bits), down); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(node, newnode->bits), newnode); -+ if (!parent) -+ rcu_assign_pointer(*trie, node); -+ else -+ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(parent, node->bits), -+ node); -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+void wg_allowedips_init(struct allowedips *table) -+{ -+ table->root4 = table->root6 = NULL; -+ table->seq = 1; -+} -+ -+void wg_allowedips_free(struct allowedips *table, struct mutex *lock) -+{ -+ struct allowedips_node __rcu *old4 = table->root4, *old6 = table->root6; -+ -+ ++table->seq; -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(table->root4, NULL); -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(table->root6, NULL); -+ if (rcu_access_pointer(old4)) { -+ struct allowedips_node *node = rcu_dereference_protected(old4, -+ lockdep_is_held(lock)); -+ -+ root_remove_peer_lists(node); -+ call_rcu(&node->rcu, root_free_rcu); -+ } -+ if (rcu_access_pointer(old6)) { -+ struct allowedips_node *node = rcu_dereference_protected(old6, -+ lockdep_is_held(lock)); -+ -+ root_remove_peer_lists(node); -+ call_rcu(&node->rcu, root_free_rcu); -+ } -+} -+ -+int wg_allowedips_insert_v4(struct allowedips *table, const struct in_addr *ip, -+ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) -+{ -+ /* Aligned so it can be passed to fls */ -+ u8 key[4] __aligned(__alignof(u32)); -+ -+ ++table->seq; -+ swap_endian(key, (const u8 *)ip, 32); -+ return add(&table->root4, 32, key, cidr, peer, lock); -+} -+ -+int wg_allowedips_insert_v6(struct allowedips *table, const struct in6_addr *ip, -+ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) -+{ -+ /* Aligned so it can be passed to fls64 */ -+ u8 key[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); -+ -+ ++table->seq; -+ swap_endian(key, (const u8 *)ip, 128); -+ return add(&table->root6, 128, key, cidr, peer, lock); -+} -+ -+void wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(struct allowedips *table, -+ struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) -+{ -+ ++table->seq; -+ walk_remove_by_peer(&table->root4, peer, lock); -+ walk_remove_by_peer(&table->root6, peer, lock); -+} -+ -+int wg_allowedips_read_node(struct allowedips_node *node, u8 ip[16], u8 *cidr) -+{ -+ const unsigned int cidr_bytes = DIV_ROUND_UP(node->cidr, 8U); -+ swap_endian(ip, node->bits, node->bitlen); -+ memset(ip + cidr_bytes, 0, node->bitlen / 8U - cidr_bytes); -+ if (node->cidr) -+ ip[cidr_bytes - 1U] &= ~0U << (-node->cidr % 8U); -+ -+ *cidr = node->cidr; -+ return node->bitlen == 32 ? AF_INET : AF_INET6; -+} -+ -+/* Returns a strong reference to a peer */ -+struct wg_peer *wg_allowedips_lookup_dst(struct allowedips *table, -+ struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) -+ return lookup(table->root4, 32, &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); -+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) -+ return lookup(table->root6, 128, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+/* Returns a strong reference to a peer */ -+struct wg_peer *wg_allowedips_lookup_src(struct allowedips *table, -+ struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) -+ return lookup(table->root4, 32, &ip_hdr(skb)->saddr); -+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) -+ return lookup(table->root6, 128, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr); -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+#include "selftest/allowedips.c" ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.h -@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_ALLOWEDIPS_H -+#define _WG_ALLOWEDIPS_H -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+struct wg_peer; -+ -+struct allowedips_node { -+ struct wg_peer __rcu *peer; -+ struct allowedips_node __rcu *bit[2]; -+ /* While it may seem scandalous that we waste space for v4, -+ * we're alloc'ing to the nearest power of 2 anyway, so this -+ * doesn't actually make a difference. -+ */ -+ u8 bits[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); -+ u8 cidr, bit_at_a, bit_at_b, bitlen; -+ -+ /* Keep rarely used list at bottom to be beyond cache line. */ -+ union { -+ struct list_head peer_list; -+ struct rcu_head rcu; -+ }; -+}; -+ -+struct allowedips { -+ struct allowedips_node __rcu *root4; -+ struct allowedips_node __rcu *root6; -+ u64 seq; -+}; -+ -+void wg_allowedips_init(struct allowedips *table); -+void wg_allowedips_free(struct allowedips *table, struct mutex *mutex); -+int wg_allowedips_insert_v4(struct allowedips *table, const struct in_addr *ip, -+ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock); -+int wg_allowedips_insert_v6(struct allowedips *table, const struct in6_addr *ip, -+ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock); -+void wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(struct allowedips *table, -+ struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock); -+/* The ip input pointer should be __aligned(__alignof(u64))) */ -+int wg_allowedips_read_node(struct allowedips_node *node, u8 ip[16], u8 *cidr); -+ -+/* These return a strong reference to a peer: */ -+struct wg_peer *wg_allowedips_lookup_dst(struct allowedips *table, -+ struct sk_buff *skb); -+struct wg_peer *wg_allowedips_lookup_src(struct allowedips *table, -+ struct sk_buff *skb); -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+bool wg_allowedips_selftest(void); -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _WG_ALLOWEDIPS_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c -@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "cookie.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "messages.h" -+#include "ratelimiter.h" -+#include "timers.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+void wg_cookie_checker_init(struct cookie_checker *checker, -+ struct wg_device *wg) -+{ -+ init_rwsem(&checker->secret_lock); -+ checker->secret_birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ get_random_bytes(checker->secret, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ checker->device = wg; -+} -+ -+enum { COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN = 8 }; -+static const u8 mac1_key_label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN] = "mac1----"; -+static const u8 cookie_key_label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN] = "cookie--"; -+ -+static void precompute_key(u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN]) -+{ -+ struct blake2s_state blake; -+ -+ blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ blake2s_update(&blake, label, COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN); -+ blake2s_update(&blake, pubkey, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ blake2s_final(&blake, key); -+} -+ -+/* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */ -+void wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(struct cookie_checker *checker) -+{ -+ if (likely(checker->device->static_identity.has_identity)) { -+ precompute_key(checker->cookie_encryption_key, -+ checker->device->static_identity.static_public, -+ cookie_key_label); -+ precompute_key(checker->message_mac1_key, -+ checker->device->static_identity.static_public, -+ mac1_key_label); -+ } else { -+ memset(checker->cookie_encryption_key, 0, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memset(checker->message_mac1_key, 0, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ } -+} -+ -+void wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ precompute_key(peer->latest_cookie.cookie_decryption_key, -+ peer->handshake.remote_static, cookie_key_label); -+ precompute_key(peer->latest_cookie.message_mac1_key, -+ peer->handshake.remote_static, mac1_key_label); -+} -+ -+void wg_cookie_init(struct cookie *cookie) -+{ -+ memset(cookie, 0, sizeof(*cookie)); -+ init_rwsem(&cookie->lock); -+} -+ -+static void compute_mac1(u8 mac1[COOKIE_LEN], const void *message, size_t len, -+ const u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ len = len - sizeof(struct message_macs) + -+ offsetof(struct message_macs, mac1); -+ blake2s(mac1, message, key, COOKIE_LEN, len, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+} -+ -+static void compute_mac2(u8 mac2[COOKIE_LEN], const void *message, size_t len, -+ const u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]) -+{ -+ len = len - sizeof(struct message_macs) + -+ offsetof(struct message_macs, mac2); -+ blake2s(mac2, message, cookie, COOKIE_LEN, len, COOKIE_LEN); -+} -+ -+static void make_cookie(u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN], struct sk_buff *skb, -+ struct cookie_checker *checker) -+{ -+ struct blake2s_state state; -+ -+ if (wg_birthdate_has_expired(checker->secret_birthdate, -+ COOKIE_SECRET_MAX_AGE)) { -+ down_write(&checker->secret_lock); -+ checker->secret_birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ get_random_bytes(checker->secret, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ up_write(&checker->secret_lock); -+ } -+ -+ down_read(&checker->secret_lock); -+ -+ blake2s_init_key(&state, COOKIE_LEN, checker->secret, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) -+ blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, -+ sizeof(struct in_addr)); -+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) -+ blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, -+ sizeof(struct in6_addr)); -+ blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&udp_hdr(skb)->source, sizeof(__be16)); -+ blake2s_final(&state, cookie); -+ -+ up_read(&checker->secret_lock); -+} -+ -+enum cookie_mac_state wg_cookie_validate_packet(struct cookie_checker *checker, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, -+ bool check_cookie) -+{ -+ struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *) -+ (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*macs)); -+ enum cookie_mac_state ret; -+ u8 computed_mac[COOKIE_LEN]; -+ u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]; -+ -+ ret = INVALID_MAC; -+ compute_mac1(computed_mac, skb->data, skb->len, -+ checker->message_mac1_key); -+ if (crypto_memneq(computed_mac, macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ ret = VALID_MAC_BUT_NO_COOKIE; -+ -+ if (!check_cookie) -+ goto out; -+ -+ make_cookie(cookie, skb, checker); -+ -+ compute_mac2(computed_mac, skb->data, skb->len, cookie); -+ if (crypto_memneq(computed_mac, macs->mac2, COOKIE_LEN)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ ret = VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE_BUT_RATELIMITED; -+ if (!wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb, dev_net(checker->device->dev))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ ret = VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE; -+ -+out: -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+void wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(void *message, size_t len, -+ struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *) -+ ((u8 *)message + len - sizeof(*macs)); -+ -+ down_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+ compute_mac1(macs->mac1, message, len, -+ peer->latest_cookie.message_mac1_key); -+ memcpy(peer->latest_cookie.last_mac1_sent, macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN); -+ peer->latest_cookie.have_sent_mac1 = true; -+ up_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+ -+ down_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+ if (peer->latest_cookie.is_valid && -+ !wg_birthdate_has_expired(peer->latest_cookie.birthdate, -+ COOKIE_SECRET_MAX_AGE - COOKIE_SECRET_LATENCY)) -+ compute_mac2(macs->mac2, message, len, -+ peer->latest_cookie.cookie); -+ else -+ memset(macs->mac2, 0, COOKIE_LEN); -+ up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+} -+ -+void wg_cookie_message_create(struct message_handshake_cookie *dst, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 index, -+ struct cookie_checker *checker) -+{ -+ struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *) -+ ((u8 *)skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*macs)); -+ u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]; -+ -+ dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE); -+ dst->receiver_index = index; -+ get_random_bytes_wait(dst->nonce, COOKIE_NONCE_LEN); -+ -+ make_cookie(cookie, skb, checker); -+ xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst->encrypted_cookie, cookie, COOKIE_LEN, -+ macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN, dst->nonce, -+ checker->cookie_encryption_key); -+} -+ -+void wg_cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, -+ struct wg_device *wg) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; -+ u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]; -+ bool ret; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!wg_index_hashtable_lookup(wg->index_hashtable, -+ INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE | -+ INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR, -+ src->receiver_index, &peer))) -+ return; -+ -+ down_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+ if (unlikely(!peer->latest_cookie.have_sent_mac1)) { -+ up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ ret = xchacha20poly1305_decrypt( -+ cookie, src->encrypted_cookie, sizeof(src->encrypted_cookie), -+ peer->latest_cookie.last_mac1_sent, COOKIE_LEN, src->nonce, -+ peer->latest_cookie.cookie_decryption_key); -+ up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+ -+ if (ret) { -+ down_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+ memcpy(peer->latest_cookie.cookie, cookie, COOKIE_LEN); -+ peer->latest_cookie.birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ peer->latest_cookie.is_valid = true; -+ peer->latest_cookie.have_sent_mac1 = false; -+ up_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); -+ } else { -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Could not decrypt invalid cookie response\n", -+ wg->dev->name); -+ } -+ -+out: -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.h -@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_COOKIE_H -+#define _WG_COOKIE_H -+ -+#include "messages.h" -+#include -+ -+struct wg_peer; -+ -+struct cookie_checker { -+ u8 secret[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; -+ u8 cookie_encryption_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 message_mac1_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u64 secret_birthdate; -+ struct rw_semaphore secret_lock; -+ struct wg_device *device; -+}; -+ -+struct cookie { -+ u64 birthdate; -+ bool is_valid; -+ u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]; -+ bool have_sent_mac1; -+ u8 last_mac1_sent[COOKIE_LEN]; -+ u8 cookie_decryption_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 message_mac1_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ struct rw_semaphore lock; -+}; -+ -+enum cookie_mac_state { -+ INVALID_MAC, -+ VALID_MAC_BUT_NO_COOKIE, -+ VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE_BUT_RATELIMITED, -+ VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE -+}; -+ -+void wg_cookie_checker_init(struct cookie_checker *checker, -+ struct wg_device *wg); -+void wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(struct cookie_checker *checker); -+void wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_cookie_init(struct cookie *cookie); -+ -+enum cookie_mac_state wg_cookie_validate_packet(struct cookie_checker *checker, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, -+ bool check_cookie); -+void wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(void *message, size_t len, -+ struct wg_peer *peer); -+ -+void wg_cookie_message_create(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 index, -+ struct cookie_checker *checker); -+void wg_cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, -+ struct wg_device *wg); -+ -+#endif /* _WG_COOKIE_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "socket.h" -+#include "timers.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "ratelimiter.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "messages.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+static LIST_HEAD(device_list); -+ -+static int wg_open(struct net_device *dev) -+{ -+ struct in_device *dev_v4 = __in_dev_get_rtnl(dev); -+ struct inet6_dev *dev_v6 = __in6_dev_get(dev); -+ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ int ret; -+ -+ if (dev_v4) { -+ /* At some point we might put this check near the ip_rt_send_ -+ * redirect call of ip_forward in net/ipv4/ip_forward.c, similar -+ * to the current secpath check. -+ */ -+ IN_DEV_CONF_SET(dev_v4, SEND_REDIRECTS, false); -+ IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(dev_net(dev), SEND_REDIRECTS) = false; -+ } -+ if (dev_v6) -+ dev_v6->cnf.addr_gen_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE; -+ -+ ret = wg_socket_init(wg, wg->incoming_port); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { -+ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); -+ if (peer->persistent_keepalive_interval) -+ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); -+ } -+ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP -+static int wg_pm_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, -+ void *data) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg; -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ -+ /* If the machine is constantly suspending and resuming, as part of -+ * its normal operation rather than as a somewhat rare event, then we -+ * don't actually want to clear keys. -+ */ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ANDROID)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (action != PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE && action != PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE) -+ return 0; -+ -+ rtnl_lock(); -+ list_for_each_entry(wg, &device_list, device_list) { -+ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { -+ del_timer(&peer->timer_zero_key_material); -+ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake); -+ wg_noise_keypairs_clear(&peer->keypairs); -+ } -+ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ } -+ rtnl_unlock(); -+ rcu_barrier(); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static struct notifier_block pm_notifier = { .notifier_call = wg_pm_notification }; -+#endif -+ -+static int wg_stop(struct net_device *dev) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ -+ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { -+ wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(peer); -+ wg_timers_stop(peer); -+ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake); -+ wg_noise_keypairs_clear(&peer->keypairs); -+ wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(&peer->last_sent_handshake); -+ } -+ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ skb_queue_purge(&wg->incoming_handshakes); -+ wg_socket_reinit(wg, NULL, NULL); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); -+ struct sk_buff_head packets; -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ struct sk_buff *next; -+ sa_family_t family; -+ u32 mtu; -+ int ret; -+ -+ if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol)) { -+ ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Invalid IP packet\n", dev->name); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ peer = wg_allowedips_lookup_dst(&wg->peer_allowedips, skb); -+ if (unlikely(!peer)) { -+ ret = -ENOKEY; -+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No peer has allowed IPs matching %pI4\n", -+ dev->name, &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); -+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No peer has allowed IPs matching %pI6\n", -+ dev->name, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ family = READ_ONCE(peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family); -+ if (unlikely(family != AF_INET && family != AF_INET6)) { -+ ret = -EDESTADDRREQ; -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No valid endpoint has been configured or discovered for peer %llu\n", -+ dev->name, peer->internal_id); -+ goto err_peer; -+ } -+ -+ mtu = skb_dst(skb) ? dst_mtu(skb_dst(skb)) : dev->mtu; -+ -+ __skb_queue_head_init(&packets); -+ if (!skb_is_gso(skb)) { -+ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); -+ } else { -+ struct sk_buff *segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, 0); -+ -+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(segs))) { -+ ret = PTR_ERR(segs); -+ goto err_peer; -+ } -+ dev_kfree_skb(skb); -+ skb = segs; -+ } -+ -+ skb_list_walk_safe(skb, skb, next) { -+ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); -+ -+ skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); -+ if (unlikely(!skb)) -+ continue; -+ -+ /* We only need to keep the original dst around for icmp, -+ * so at this point we're in a position to drop it. -+ */ -+ skb_dst_drop(skb); -+ -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu = mtu; -+ -+ __skb_queue_tail(&packets, skb); -+ } -+ -+ spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); -+ /* If the queue is getting too big, we start removing the oldest packets -+ * until it's small again. We do this before adding the new packet, so -+ * we don't remove GSO segments that are in excess. -+ */ -+ while (skb_queue_len(&peer->staged_packet_queue) > MAX_STAGED_PACKETS) { -+ dev_kfree_skb(__skb_dequeue(&peer->staged_packet_queue)); -+ ++dev->stats.tx_dropped; -+ } -+ skb_queue_splice_tail(&packets, &peer->staged_packet_queue); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); -+ -+ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); -+ -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ return NETDEV_TX_OK; -+ -+err_peer: -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+err: -+ ++dev->stats.tx_errors; -+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) -+ icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0); -+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) -+ icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0); -+ kfree_skb(skb); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static const struct net_device_ops netdev_ops = { -+ .ndo_open = wg_open, -+ .ndo_stop = wg_stop, -+ .ndo_start_xmit = wg_xmit, -+ .ndo_get_stats64 = ip_tunnel_get_stats64 -+}; -+ -+static void wg_destruct(struct net_device *dev) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); -+ -+ rtnl_lock(); -+ list_del(&wg->device_list); -+ rtnl_unlock(); -+ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ wg->incoming_port = 0; -+ wg_socket_reinit(wg, NULL, NULL); -+ /* The final references are cleared in the below calls to destroy_workqueue. */ -+ wg_peer_remove_all(wg); -+ destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_receive_wq); -+ destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_send_wq); -+ destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq); -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true); -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true); -+ rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for all the peers to be actually freed. */ -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+ memzero_explicit(&wg->static_identity, sizeof(wg->static_identity)); -+ skb_queue_purge(&wg->incoming_handshakes); -+ free_percpu(dev->tstats); -+ free_percpu(wg->incoming_handshakes_worker); -+ if (wg->have_creating_net_ref) -+ put_net(wg->creating_net); -+ kvfree(wg->index_hashtable); -+ kvfree(wg->peer_hashtable); -+ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ -+ pr_debug("%s: Interface deleted\n", dev->name); -+ free_netdev(dev); -+} -+ -+static const struct device_type device_type = { .name = KBUILD_MODNAME }; -+ -+static void wg_setup(struct net_device *dev) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); -+ enum { WG_NETDEV_FEATURES = NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM | -+ NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_GSO | -+ NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE | NETIF_F_HIGHDMA }; -+ -+ dev->netdev_ops = &netdev_ops; -+ dev->hard_header_len = 0; -+ dev->addr_len = 0; -+ dev->needed_headroom = DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM; -+ dev->needed_tailroom = noise_encrypted_len(MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE); -+ dev->type = ARPHRD_NONE; -+ dev->flags = IFF_POINTOPOINT | IFF_NOARP; -+ dev->priv_flags |= IFF_NO_QUEUE; -+ dev->features |= NETIF_F_LLTX; -+ dev->features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; -+ dev->hw_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; -+ dev->hw_enc_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; -+ dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH - -+ sizeof(struct udphdr) - -+ max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr)); -+ -+ SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &device_type); -+ -+ /* We need to keep the dst around in case of icmp replies. */ -+ netif_keep_dst(dev); -+ -+ memset(wg, 0, sizeof(*wg)); -+ wg->dev = dev; -+} -+ -+static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev, -+ struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[], -+ struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); -+ int ret = -ENOMEM; -+ -+ wg->creating_net = src_net; -+ init_rwsem(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ mutex_init(&wg->socket_update_lock); -+ mutex_init(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ skb_queue_head_init(&wg->incoming_handshakes); -+ wg_allowedips_init(&wg->peer_allowedips); -+ wg_cookie_checker_init(&wg->cookie_checker, wg); -+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&wg->peer_list); -+ wg->device_update_gen = 1; -+ -+ wg->peer_hashtable = wg_pubkey_hashtable_alloc(); -+ if (!wg->peer_hashtable) -+ return ret; -+ -+ wg->index_hashtable = wg_index_hashtable_alloc(); -+ if (!wg->index_hashtable) -+ goto err_free_peer_hashtable; -+ -+ dev->tstats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct pcpu_sw_netstats); -+ if (!dev->tstats) -+ goto err_free_index_hashtable; -+ -+ wg->incoming_handshakes_worker = -+ wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( -+ wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker, wg); -+ if (!wg->incoming_handshakes_worker) -+ goto err_free_tstats; -+ -+ wg->handshake_receive_wq = alloc_workqueue("wg-kex-%s", -+ WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_FREEZABLE, 0, dev->name); -+ if (!wg->handshake_receive_wq) -+ goto err_free_incoming_handshakes; -+ -+ wg->handshake_send_wq = alloc_workqueue("wg-kex-%s", -+ WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_FREEZABLE, 0, dev->name); -+ if (!wg->handshake_send_wq) -+ goto err_destroy_handshake_receive; -+ -+ wg->packet_crypt_wq = alloc_workqueue("wg-crypt-%s", -+ WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0, dev->name); -+ if (!wg->packet_crypt_wq) -+ goto err_destroy_handshake_send; -+ -+ ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->encrypt_queue, wg_packet_encrypt_worker, -+ true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto err_destroy_packet_crypt; -+ -+ ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->decrypt_queue, wg_packet_decrypt_worker, -+ true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto err_free_encrypt_queue; -+ -+ ret = wg_ratelimiter_init(); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto err_free_decrypt_queue; -+ -+ ret = register_netdevice(dev); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto err_uninit_ratelimiter; -+ -+ list_add(&wg->device_list, &device_list); -+ -+ /* We wait until the end to assign priv_destructor, so that -+ * register_netdevice doesn't call it for us if it fails. -+ */ -+ dev->priv_destructor = wg_destruct; -+ -+ pr_debug("%s: Interface created\n", dev->name); -+ return ret; -+ -+err_uninit_ratelimiter: -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+err_free_decrypt_queue: -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true); -+err_free_encrypt_queue: -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true); -+err_destroy_packet_crypt: -+ destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq); -+err_destroy_handshake_send: -+ destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_send_wq); -+err_destroy_handshake_receive: -+ destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_receive_wq); -+err_free_incoming_handshakes: -+ free_percpu(wg->incoming_handshakes_worker); -+err_free_tstats: -+ free_percpu(dev->tstats); -+err_free_index_hashtable: -+ kvfree(wg->index_hashtable); -+err_free_peer_hashtable: -+ kvfree(wg->peer_hashtable); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static struct rtnl_link_ops link_ops __read_mostly = { -+ .kind = KBUILD_MODNAME, -+ .priv_size = sizeof(struct wg_device), -+ .setup = wg_setup, -+ .newlink = wg_newlink, -+}; -+ -+static int wg_netdevice_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, -+ unsigned long action, void *data) -+{ -+ struct net_device *dev = ((struct netdev_notifier_info *)data)->dev; -+ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); -+ -+ ASSERT_RTNL(); -+ -+ if (action != NETDEV_REGISTER || dev->netdev_ops != &netdev_ops) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (dev_net(dev) == wg->creating_net && wg->have_creating_net_ref) { -+ put_net(wg->creating_net); -+ wg->have_creating_net_ref = false; -+ } else if (dev_net(dev) != wg->creating_net && -+ !wg->have_creating_net_ref) { -+ wg->have_creating_net_ref = true; -+ get_net(wg->creating_net); -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static struct notifier_block netdevice_notifier = { -+ .notifier_call = wg_netdevice_notification -+}; -+ -+int __init wg_device_init(void) -+{ -+ int ret; -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP -+ ret = register_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); -+ if (ret) -+ return ret; -+#endif -+ -+ ret = register_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); -+ if (ret) -+ goto error_pm; -+ -+ ret = rtnl_link_register(&link_ops); -+ if (ret) -+ goto error_netdevice; -+ -+ return 0; -+ -+error_netdevice: -+ unregister_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); -+error_pm: -+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP -+ unregister_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); -+#endif -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+void wg_device_uninit(void) -+{ -+ rtnl_link_unregister(&link_ops); -+ unregister_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); -+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP -+ unregister_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); -+#endif -+ rcu_barrier(); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h -@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_DEVICE_H -+#define _WG_DEVICE_H -+ -+#include "noise.h" -+#include "allowedips.h" -+#include "peerlookup.h" -+#include "cookie.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+struct wg_device; -+ -+struct multicore_worker { -+ void *ptr; -+ struct work_struct work; -+}; -+ -+struct crypt_queue { -+ struct ptr_ring ring; -+ union { -+ struct { -+ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker; -+ int last_cpu; -+ }; -+ struct work_struct work; -+ }; -+}; -+ -+struct wg_device { -+ struct net_device *dev; -+ struct crypt_queue encrypt_queue, decrypt_queue; -+ struct sock __rcu *sock4, *sock6; -+ struct net *creating_net; -+ struct noise_static_identity static_identity; -+ struct workqueue_struct *handshake_receive_wq, *handshake_send_wq; -+ struct workqueue_struct *packet_crypt_wq; -+ struct sk_buff_head incoming_handshakes; -+ int incoming_handshake_cpu; -+ struct multicore_worker __percpu *incoming_handshakes_worker; -+ struct cookie_checker cookie_checker; -+ struct pubkey_hashtable *peer_hashtable; -+ struct index_hashtable *index_hashtable; -+ struct allowedips peer_allowedips; -+ struct mutex device_update_lock, socket_update_lock; -+ struct list_head device_list, peer_list; -+ unsigned int num_peers, device_update_gen; -+ u32 fwmark; -+ u16 incoming_port; -+ bool have_creating_net_ref; -+}; -+ -+int wg_device_init(void); -+void wg_device_uninit(void); -+ -+#endif /* _WG_DEVICE_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/main.c -@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "version.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "noise.h" -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "ratelimiter.h" -+#include "netlink.h" -+ -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+static int __init mod_init(void) -+{ -+ int ret; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+ if (!wg_allowedips_selftest() || !wg_packet_counter_selftest() || -+ !wg_ratelimiter_selftest()) -+ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; -+#endif -+ wg_noise_init(); -+ -+ ret = wg_device_init(); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto err_device; -+ -+ ret = wg_genetlink_init(); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto err_netlink; -+ -+ pr_info("WireGuard " WIREGUARD_VERSION " loaded. See www.wireguard.com for information.\n"); -+ pr_info("Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved.\n"); -+ -+ return 0; -+ -+err_netlink: -+ wg_device_uninit(); -+err_device: -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static void __exit mod_exit(void) -+{ -+ wg_genetlink_uninit(); -+ wg_device_uninit(); -+} -+ -+module_init(mod_init); -+module_exit(mod_exit); -+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); -+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("WireGuard secure network tunnel"); -+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld "); -+MODULE_VERSION(WIREGUARD_VERSION); -+MODULE_ALIAS_RTNL_LINK(KBUILD_MODNAME); -+MODULE_ALIAS_GENL_FAMILY(WG_GENL_NAME); ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h -@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_MESSAGES_H -+#define _WG_MESSAGES_H -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+enum noise_lengths { -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN = CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN = CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE, -+ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN = sizeof(u64) + sizeof(u32), -+ NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN = CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE, -+ NOISE_HASH_LEN = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE -+}; -+ -+#define noise_encrypted_len(plain_len) ((plain_len) + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN) -+ -+enum cookie_values { -+ COOKIE_SECRET_MAX_AGE = 2 * 60, -+ COOKIE_SECRET_LATENCY = 5, -+ COOKIE_NONCE_LEN = XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE, -+ COOKIE_LEN = 16 -+}; -+ -+enum counter_values { -+ COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL = 2048, -+ COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS = BITS_PER_LONG, -+ COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE = COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL - COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS -+}; -+ -+enum limits { -+ REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES = 1ULL << 60, -+ REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES = U64_MAX - COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE - 1, -+ REKEY_TIMEOUT = 5, -+ REKEY_TIMEOUT_JITTER_MAX_JIFFIES = HZ / 3, -+ REKEY_AFTER_TIME = 120, -+ REJECT_AFTER_TIME = 180, -+ INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND = 50, -+ MAX_PEERS_PER_DEVICE = 1U << 20, -+ KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT = 10, -+ MAX_TIMER_HANDSHAKES = 90 / REKEY_TIMEOUT, -+ MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES = 4096, /* TODO: replace this with DQL */ -+ MAX_STAGED_PACKETS = 128, -+ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS = 1024 /* TODO: replace this with DQL */ -+}; -+ -+enum message_type { -+ MESSAGE_INVALID = 0, -+ MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION = 1, -+ MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE = 2, -+ MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE = 3, -+ MESSAGE_DATA = 4 -+}; -+ -+struct message_header { -+ /* The actual layout of this that we want is: -+ * u8 type -+ * u8 reserved_zero[3] -+ * -+ * But it turns out that by encoding this as little endian, -+ * we achieve the same thing, and it makes checking faster. -+ */ -+ __le32 type; -+}; -+ -+struct message_macs { -+ u8 mac1[COOKIE_LEN]; -+ u8 mac2[COOKIE_LEN]; -+}; -+ -+struct message_handshake_initiation { -+ struct message_header header; -+ __le32 sender_index; -+ u8 unencrypted_ephemeral[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 encrypted_static[noise_encrypted_len(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)]; -+ u8 encrypted_timestamp[noise_encrypted_len(NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN)]; -+ struct message_macs macs; -+}; -+ -+struct message_handshake_response { -+ struct message_header header; -+ __le32 sender_index; -+ __le32 receiver_index; -+ u8 unencrypted_ephemeral[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 encrypted_nothing[noise_encrypted_len(0)]; -+ struct message_macs macs; -+}; -+ -+struct message_handshake_cookie { -+ struct message_header header; -+ __le32 receiver_index; -+ u8 nonce[COOKIE_NONCE_LEN]; -+ u8 encrypted_cookie[noise_encrypted_len(COOKIE_LEN)]; -+}; -+ -+struct message_data { -+ struct message_header header; -+ __le32 key_idx; -+ __le64 counter; -+ u8 encrypted_data[]; -+}; -+ -+#define message_data_len(plain_len) \ -+ (noise_encrypted_len(plain_len) + sizeof(struct message_data)) -+ -+enum message_alignments { -+ MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE = 16, -+ MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH = message_data_len(0) -+}; -+ -+#define SKB_HEADER_LEN \ -+ (max(sizeof(struct iphdr), sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) + \ -+ sizeof(struct udphdr) + NET_SKB_PAD) -+#define DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM \ -+ ALIGN(sizeof(struct message_data) + SKB_HEADER_LEN, 4) -+ -+enum { HANDSHAKE_DSCP = 0x88 /* AF41, plus 00 ECN */ }; -+ -+#endif /* _WG_MESSAGES_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "netlink.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "socket.h" -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "messages.h" -+ -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+static struct genl_family genl_family; -+ -+static const struct nla_policy device_policy[WGDEVICE_A_MAX + 1] = { -+ [WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, -+ [WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING, .len = IFNAMSIZ - 1 }, -+ [WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, -+ [WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, -+ [WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, -+ [WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, -+ [WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, -+ [WGDEVICE_A_PEERS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED } -+}; -+ -+static const struct nla_policy peer_policy[WGPEER_A_MAX + 1] = { -+ [WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, -+ [WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN }, -+ [WGPEER_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, -+ [WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct sockaddr) }, -+ [WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, -+ [WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct __kernel_timespec) }, -+ [WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, -+ [WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, -+ [WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, -+ [WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION] = { .type = NLA_U32 } -+}; -+ -+static const struct nla_policy allowedip_policy[WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX + 1] = { -+ [WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, -+ [WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) }, -+ [WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U8 } -+}; -+ -+static struct wg_device *lookup_interface(struct nlattr **attrs, -+ struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ struct net_device *dev = NULL; -+ -+ if (!attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX] == !attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME]) -+ return ERR_PTR(-EBADR); -+ if (attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX]) -+ dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(skb->sk), -+ nla_get_u32(attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX])); -+ else if (attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME]) -+ dev = dev_get_by_name(sock_net(skb->sk), -+ nla_data(attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME])); -+ if (!dev) -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); -+ if (!dev->rtnl_link_ops || !dev->rtnl_link_ops->kind || -+ strcmp(dev->rtnl_link_ops->kind, KBUILD_MODNAME)) { -+ dev_put(dev); -+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); -+ } -+ return netdev_priv(dev); -+} -+ -+static int get_allowedips(struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *ip, u8 cidr, -+ int family) -+{ -+ struct nlattr *allowedip_nest; -+ -+ allowedip_nest = nla_nest_start(skb, 0); -+ if (!allowedip_nest) -+ return -EMSGSIZE; -+ -+ if (nla_put_u8(skb, WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK, cidr) || -+ nla_put_u16(skb, WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY, family) || -+ nla_put(skb, WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR, family == AF_INET6 ? -+ sizeof(struct in6_addr) : sizeof(struct in_addr), ip)) { -+ nla_nest_cancel(skb, allowedip_nest); -+ return -EMSGSIZE; -+ } -+ -+ nla_nest_end(skb, allowedip_nest); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+struct dump_ctx { -+ struct wg_device *wg; -+ struct wg_peer *next_peer; -+ u64 allowedips_seq; -+ struct allowedips_node *next_allowedip; -+}; -+ -+#define DUMP_CTX(cb) ((struct dump_ctx *)(cb)->args) -+ -+static int -+get_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb, struct dump_ctx *ctx) -+{ -+ -+ struct nlattr *allowedips_nest, *peer_nest = nla_nest_start(skb, 0); -+ struct allowedips_node *allowedips_node = ctx->next_allowedip; -+ bool fail; -+ -+ if (!peer_nest) -+ return -EMSGSIZE; -+ -+ down_read(&peer->handshake.lock); -+ fail = nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, -+ peer->handshake.remote_static); -+ up_read(&peer->handshake.lock); -+ if (fail) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (!allowedips_node) { -+ const struct __kernel_timespec last_handshake = { -+ .tv_sec = peer->walltime_last_handshake.tv_sec, -+ .tv_nsec = peer->walltime_last_handshake.tv_nsec -+ }; -+ -+ down_read(&peer->handshake.lock); -+ fail = nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, -+ peer->handshake.preshared_key); -+ up_read(&peer->handshake.lock); -+ if (fail) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME, -+ sizeof(last_handshake), &last_handshake) || -+ nla_put_u16(skb, WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL, -+ peer->persistent_keepalive_interval) || -+ nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES, peer->tx_bytes, -+ WGPEER_A_UNSPEC) || -+ nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES, peer->rx_bytes, -+ WGPEER_A_UNSPEC) || -+ nla_put_u32(skb, WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1)) -+ goto err; -+ -+ read_lock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+ if (peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET) -+ fail = nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT, -+ sizeof(peer->endpoint.addr4), -+ &peer->endpoint.addr4); -+ else if (peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) -+ fail = nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT, -+ sizeof(peer->endpoint.addr6), -+ &peer->endpoint.addr6); -+ read_unlock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+ if (fail) -+ goto err; -+ allowedips_node = -+ list_first_entry_or_null(&peer->allowedips_list, -+ struct allowedips_node, peer_list); -+ } -+ if (!allowedips_node) -+ goto no_allowedips; -+ if (!ctx->allowedips_seq) -+ ctx->allowedips_seq = peer->device->peer_allowedips.seq; -+ else if (ctx->allowedips_seq != peer->device->peer_allowedips.seq) -+ goto no_allowedips; -+ -+ allowedips_nest = nla_nest_start(skb, WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS); -+ if (!allowedips_nest) -+ goto err; -+ -+ list_for_each_entry_from(allowedips_node, &peer->allowedips_list, -+ peer_list) { -+ u8 cidr, ip[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); -+ int family; -+ -+ family = wg_allowedips_read_node(allowedips_node, ip, &cidr); -+ if (get_allowedips(skb, ip, cidr, family)) { -+ nla_nest_end(skb, allowedips_nest); -+ nla_nest_end(skb, peer_nest); -+ ctx->next_allowedip = allowedips_node; -+ return -EMSGSIZE; -+ } -+ } -+ nla_nest_end(skb, allowedips_nest); -+no_allowedips: -+ nla_nest_end(skb, peer_nest); -+ ctx->next_allowedip = NULL; -+ ctx->allowedips_seq = 0; -+ return 0; -+err: -+ nla_nest_cancel(skb, peer_nest); -+ return -EMSGSIZE; -+} -+ -+static int wg_get_device_start(struct netlink_callback *cb) -+{ -+ struct nlattr **attrs = genl_family_attrbuf(&genl_family); -+ struct wg_device *wg; -+ int ret; -+ -+ ret = nlmsg_parse(cb->nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + genl_family.hdrsize, attrs, -+ genl_family.maxattr, device_policy, NULL); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ wg = lookup_interface(attrs, cb->skb); -+ if (IS_ERR(wg)) -+ return PTR_ERR(wg); -+ DUMP_CTX(cb)->wg = wg; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int wg_get_device_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer, *next_peer_cursor; -+ struct dump_ctx *ctx = DUMP_CTX(cb); -+ struct wg_device *wg = ctx->wg; -+ struct nlattr *peers_nest; -+ int ret = -EMSGSIZE; -+ bool done = true; -+ void *hdr; -+ -+ rtnl_lock(); -+ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ cb->seq = wg->device_update_gen; -+ next_peer_cursor = ctx->next_peer; -+ -+ hdr = genlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, -+ &genl_family, NLM_F_MULTI, WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE); -+ if (!hdr) -+ goto out; -+ genl_dump_check_consistent(cb, hdr); -+ -+ if (!ctx->next_peer) { -+ if (nla_put_u16(skb, WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT, -+ wg->incoming_port) || -+ nla_put_u32(skb, WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK, wg->fwmark) || -+ nla_put_u32(skb, WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX, wg->dev->ifindex) || -+ nla_put_string(skb, WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME, wg->dev->name)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ if (wg->static_identity.has_identity) { -+ if (nla_put(skb, WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, -+ wg->static_identity.static_private) || -+ nla_put(skb, WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, -+ wg->static_identity.static_public)) { -+ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ } -+ -+ peers_nest = nla_nest_start(skb, WGDEVICE_A_PEERS); -+ if (!peers_nest) -+ goto out; -+ ret = 0; -+ /* If the last cursor was removed via list_del_init in peer_remove, then -+ * we just treat this the same as there being no more peers left. The -+ * reason is that seq_nr should indicate to userspace that this isn't a -+ * coherent dump anyway, so they'll try again. -+ */ -+ if (list_empty(&wg->peer_list) || -+ (ctx->next_peer && list_empty(&ctx->next_peer->peer_list))) { -+ nla_nest_cancel(skb, peers_nest); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ lockdep_assert_held(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ peer = list_prepare_entry(ctx->next_peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list); -+ list_for_each_entry_continue(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { -+ if (get_peer(peer, skb, ctx)) { -+ done = false; -+ break; -+ } -+ next_peer_cursor = peer; -+ } -+ nla_nest_end(skb, peers_nest); -+ -+out: -+ if (!ret && !done && next_peer_cursor) -+ wg_peer_get(next_peer_cursor); -+ wg_peer_put(ctx->next_peer); -+ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ rtnl_unlock(); -+ -+ if (ret) { -+ genlmsg_cancel(skb, hdr); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ genlmsg_end(skb, hdr); -+ if (done) { -+ ctx->next_peer = NULL; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ ctx->next_peer = next_peer_cursor; -+ return skb->len; -+ -+ /* At this point, we can't really deal ourselves with safely zeroing out -+ * the private key material after usage. This will need an additional API -+ * in the kernel for marking skbs as zero_on_free. -+ */ -+} -+ -+static int wg_get_device_done(struct netlink_callback *cb) -+{ -+ struct dump_ctx *ctx = DUMP_CTX(cb); -+ -+ if (ctx->wg) -+ dev_put(ctx->wg->dev); -+ wg_peer_put(ctx->next_peer); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int set_port(struct wg_device *wg, u16 port) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ -+ if (wg->incoming_port == port) -+ return 0; -+ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) -+ wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(peer); -+ if (!netif_running(wg->dev)) { -+ wg->incoming_port = port; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ return wg_socket_init(wg, port); -+} -+ -+static int set_allowedip(struct wg_peer *peer, struct nlattr **attrs) -+{ -+ int ret = -EINVAL; -+ u16 family; -+ u8 cidr; -+ -+ if (!attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY] || !attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR] || -+ !attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK]) -+ return ret; -+ family = nla_get_u16(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY]); -+ cidr = nla_get_u8(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK]); -+ -+ if (family == AF_INET && cidr <= 32 && -+ nla_len(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR]) == sizeof(struct in_addr)) -+ ret = wg_allowedips_insert_v4( -+ &peer->device->peer_allowedips, -+ nla_data(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR]), cidr, peer, -+ &peer->device->device_update_lock); -+ else if (family == AF_INET6 && cidr <= 128 && -+ nla_len(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR]) == sizeof(struct in6_addr)) -+ ret = wg_allowedips_insert_v6( -+ &peer->device->peer_allowedips, -+ nla_data(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR]), cidr, peer, -+ &peer->device->device_update_lock); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static int set_peer(struct wg_device *wg, struct nlattr **attrs) -+{ -+ u8 *public_key = NULL, *preshared_key = NULL; -+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; -+ u32 flags = 0; -+ int ret; -+ -+ ret = -EINVAL; -+ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] && -+ nla_len(attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY]) == NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) -+ public_key = nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY]); -+ else -+ goto out; -+ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] && -+ nla_len(attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY]) == NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN) -+ preshared_key = nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY]); -+ -+ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_FLAGS]) -+ flags = nla_get_u32(attrs[WGPEER_A_FLAGS]); -+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; -+ if (flags & ~__WGPEER_F_ALL) -+ goto out; -+ -+ ret = -EPFNOSUPPORT; -+ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION]) { -+ if (nla_get_u32(attrs[WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION]) != 1) -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ peer = wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(wg->peer_hashtable, -+ nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY])); -+ ret = 0; -+ if (!peer) { /* Peer doesn't exist yet. Add a new one. */ -+ if (flags & (WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME | WGPEER_F_UPDATE_ONLY)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* The peer is new, so there aren't allowed IPs to remove. */ -+ flags &= ~WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS; -+ -+ down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ if (wg->static_identity.has_identity && -+ !memcmp(nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY]), -+ wg->static_identity.static_public, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)) { -+ /* We silently ignore peers that have the same public -+ * key as the device. The reason we do it silently is -+ * that we'd like for people to be able to reuse the -+ * same set of API calls across peers. -+ */ -+ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ ret = 0; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ -+ peer = wg_peer_create(wg, public_key, preshared_key); -+ if (IS_ERR(peer)) { -+ /* Similar to the above, if the key is invalid, we skip -+ * it without fanfare, so that services don't need to -+ * worry about doing key validation themselves. -+ */ -+ ret = PTR_ERR(peer) == -EKEYREJECTED ? 0 : PTR_ERR(peer); -+ peer = NULL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ /* Take additional reference, as though we've just been -+ * looked up. -+ */ -+ wg_peer_get(peer); -+ } -+ -+ if (flags & WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME) { -+ wg_peer_remove(peer); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (preshared_key) { -+ down_write(&peer->handshake.lock); -+ memcpy(&peer->handshake.preshared_key, preshared_key, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ up_write(&peer->handshake.lock); -+ } -+ -+ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT]) { -+ struct sockaddr *addr = nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT]); -+ size_t len = nla_len(attrs[WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT]); -+ -+ if ((len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) && -+ addr->sa_family == AF_INET) || -+ (len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) && -+ addr->sa_family == AF_INET6)) { -+ struct endpoint endpoint = { { { 0 } } }; -+ -+ memcpy(&endpoint.addr, addr, len); -+ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(peer, &endpoint); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (flags & WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS) -+ wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(&wg->peer_allowedips, peer, -+ &wg->device_update_lock); -+ -+ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS]) { -+ struct nlattr *attr, *allowedip[WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX + 1]; -+ int rem; -+ -+ nla_for_each_nested(attr, attrs[WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS], rem) { -+ ret = nla_parse_nested(allowedip, WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX, -+ attr, allowedip_policy, NULL); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto out; -+ ret = set_allowedip(peer, allowedip); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL]) { -+ const u16 persistent_keepalive_interval = nla_get_u16( -+ attrs[WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL]); -+ const bool send_keepalive = -+ !peer->persistent_keepalive_interval && -+ persistent_keepalive_interval && -+ netif_running(wg->dev); -+ -+ peer->persistent_keepalive_interval = persistent_keepalive_interval; -+ if (send_keepalive) -+ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); -+ } -+ -+ if (netif_running(wg->dev)) -+ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); -+ -+out: -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY]) -+ memzero_explicit(nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY]), -+ nla_len(attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY])); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg = lookup_interface(info->attrs, skb); -+ u32 flags = 0; -+ int ret; -+ -+ if (IS_ERR(wg)) { -+ ret = PTR_ERR(wg); -+ goto out_nodev; -+ } -+ -+ rtnl_lock(); -+ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ -+ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS]) -+ flags = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS]); -+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; -+ if (flags & ~__WGDEVICE_F_ALL) -+ goto out; -+ -+ ret = -EPERM; -+ if ((info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] || -+ info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]) && -+ !ns_capable(wg->creating_net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ ++wg->device_update_gen; -+ -+ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]) { -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ -+ wg->fwmark = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]); -+ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) -+ wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(peer); -+ } -+ -+ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT]) { -+ ret = set_port(wg, -+ nla_get_u16(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT])); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (flags & WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS) -+ wg_peer_remove_all(wg); -+ -+ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY] && -+ nla_len(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY]) == -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) { -+ u8 *private_key = nla_data(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY]); -+ u8 public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ struct wg_peer *peer, *temp; -+ -+ if (!crypto_memneq(wg->static_identity.static_private, -+ private_key, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)) -+ goto skip_set_private_key; -+ -+ /* We remove before setting, to prevent race, which means doing -+ * two 25519-genpub ops. -+ */ -+ if (curve25519_generate_public(public_key, private_key)) { -+ peer = wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(wg->peer_hashtable, -+ public_key); -+ if (peer) { -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ wg_peer_remove(peer); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ down_write(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(&wg->static_identity, -+ private_key); -+ list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list, -+ peer_list) { -+ if (wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer)) -+ wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer); -+ else -+ wg_peer_remove(peer); -+ } -+ wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(&wg->cookie_checker); -+ up_write(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ } -+skip_set_private_key: -+ -+ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PEERS]) { -+ struct nlattr *attr, *peer[WGPEER_A_MAX + 1]; -+ int rem; -+ -+ nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PEERS], rem) { -+ ret = nla_parse_nested(peer, WGPEER_A_MAX, attr, -+ peer_policy, NULL); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto out; -+ ret = set_peer(wg, peer); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ ret = 0; -+ -+out: -+ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ rtnl_unlock(); -+ dev_put(wg->dev); -+out_nodev: -+ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY]) -+ memzero_explicit(nla_data(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY]), -+ nla_len(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY])); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static const struct genl_ops genl_ops[] = { -+ { -+ .cmd = WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE, -+ .start = wg_get_device_start, -+ .dumpit = wg_get_device_dump, -+ .done = wg_get_device_done, -+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM -+ }, { -+ .cmd = WG_CMD_SET_DEVICE, -+ .doit = wg_set_device, -+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM -+ } -+}; -+ -+static struct genl_family genl_family __ro_after_init = { -+ .ops = genl_ops, -+ .n_ops = ARRAY_SIZE(genl_ops), -+ .name = WG_GENL_NAME, -+ .version = WG_GENL_VERSION, -+ .maxattr = WGDEVICE_A_MAX, -+ .module = THIS_MODULE, -+ .policy = device_policy, -+ .netnsok = true -+}; -+ -+int __init wg_genetlink_init(void) -+{ -+ return genl_register_family(&genl_family); -+} -+ -+void __exit wg_genetlink_uninit(void) -+{ -+ genl_unregister_family(&genl_family); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.h -@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_NETLINK_H -+#define _WG_NETLINK_H -+ -+int wg_genetlink_init(void); -+void wg_genetlink_uninit(void); -+ -+#endif /* _WG_NETLINK_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -@@ -0,0 +1,828 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "noise.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "messages.h" -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "peerlookup.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+/* This implements Noise_IKpsk2: -+ * -+ * <- s -+ * ****** -+ * -> e, es, s, ss, {t} -+ * <- e, ee, se, psk, {} -+ */ -+ -+static const u8 handshake_name[37] = "Noise_IKpsk2_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s"; -+static const u8 identifier_name[34] = "WireGuard v1 zx2c4 Jason@zx2c4.com"; -+static u8 handshake_init_hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN] __ro_after_init; -+static u8 handshake_init_chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN] __ro_after_init; -+static atomic64_t keypair_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0); -+ -+void __init wg_noise_init(void) -+{ -+ struct blake2s_state blake; -+ -+ blake2s(handshake_init_chaining_key, handshake_name, NULL, -+ NOISE_HASH_LEN, sizeof(handshake_name), 0); -+ blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ blake2s_update(&blake, handshake_init_chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ blake2s_update(&blake, identifier_name, sizeof(identifier_name)); -+ blake2s_final(&blake, handshake_init_hash); -+} -+ -+/* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */ -+bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ bool ret = true; -+ -+ down_write(&peer->handshake.lock); -+ if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) -+ ret = curve25519( -+ peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, -+ peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private, -+ peer->handshake.remote_static); -+ else -+ memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ up_write(&peer->handshake.lock); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, -+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, -+ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(*handshake)); -+ init_rwsem(&handshake->lock); -+ handshake->entry.type = INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE; -+ handshake->entry.peer = peer; -+ memcpy(handshake->remote_static, peer_public_key, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ if (peer_preshared_key) -+ memcpy(handshake->preshared_key, peer_preshared_key, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ handshake->static_identity = static_identity; -+ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED; -+ return wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer); -+} -+ -+static void handshake_zero(struct noise_handshake *handshake) -+{ -+ memset(&handshake->ephemeral_private, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memset(&handshake->remote_ephemeral, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memset(&handshake->hash, 0, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memset(&handshake->chaining_key, 0, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ handshake->remote_index = 0; -+ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED; -+} -+ -+void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake) -+{ -+ wg_index_hashtable_remove( -+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, -+ &handshake->entry); -+ down_write(&handshake->lock); -+ handshake_zero(handshake); -+ up_write(&handshake->lock); -+ wg_index_hashtable_remove( -+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, -+ &handshake->entry); -+} -+ -+static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair = kzalloc(sizeof(*keypair), GFP_KERNEL); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!keypair)) -+ return NULL; -+ keypair->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&keypair_counter); -+ keypair->entry.type = INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR; -+ keypair->entry.peer = peer; -+ kref_init(&keypair->refcount); -+ return keypair; -+} -+ -+static void keypair_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) -+{ -+ kzfree(container_of(rcu, struct noise_keypair, rcu)); -+} -+ -+static void keypair_free_kref(struct kref *kref) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair = -+ container_of(kref, struct noise_keypair, refcount); -+ -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu destroyed for peer %llu\n", -+ keypair->entry.peer->device->dev->name, -+ keypair->internal_id, -+ keypair->entry.peer->internal_id); -+ wg_index_hashtable_remove(keypair->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, -+ &keypair->entry); -+ call_rcu(&keypair->rcu, keypair_free_rcu); -+} -+ -+void wg_noise_keypair_put(struct noise_keypair *keypair, bool unreference_now) -+{ -+ if (unlikely(!keypair)) -+ return; -+ if (unlikely(unreference_now)) -+ wg_index_hashtable_remove( -+ keypair->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, -+ &keypair->entry); -+ kref_put(&keypair->refcount, keypair_free_kref); -+} -+ -+struct noise_keypair *wg_noise_keypair_get(struct noise_keypair *keypair) -+{ -+ RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_bh_held(), -+ "Taking noise keypair reference without holding the RCU BH read lock"); -+ if (unlikely(!keypair || !kref_get_unless_zero(&keypair->refcount))) -+ return NULL; -+ return keypair; -+} -+ -+void wg_noise_keypairs_clear(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *old; -+ -+ spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); -+ -+ /* We zero the next_keypair before zeroing the others, so that -+ * wg_noise_received_with_keypair returns early before subsequent ones -+ * are zeroed. -+ */ -+ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL); -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true); -+ -+ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->previous_keypair, NULL); -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true); -+ -+ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->current_keypair, NULL); -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true); -+ -+ spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); -+} -+ -+void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair; -+ -+ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake); -+ wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(&peer->last_sent_handshake); -+ -+ spin_lock_bh(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock); -+ keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(peer->keypairs.next_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock)); -+ if (keypair) -+ keypair->sending.is_valid = false; -+ keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(peer->keypairs.current_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock)); -+ if (keypair) -+ keypair->sending.is_valid = false; -+ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock); -+} -+ -+static void add_new_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, -+ struct noise_keypair *new_keypair) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *previous_keypair, *next_keypair, *current_keypair; -+ -+ spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); -+ previous_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); -+ next_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); -+ current_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); -+ if (new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator) { -+ /* If we're the initiator, it means we've sent a handshake, and -+ * received a confirmation response, which means this new -+ * keypair can now be used. -+ */ -+ if (next_keypair) { -+ /* If there already was a next keypair pending, we -+ * demote it to be the previous keypair, and free the -+ * existing current. Note that this means KCI can result -+ * in this transition. It would perhaps be more sound to -+ * always just get rid of the unused next keypair -+ * instead of putting it in the previous slot, but this -+ * might be a bit less robust. Something to think about -+ * for the future. -+ */ -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, -+ next_keypair); -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(current_keypair, true); -+ } else /* If there wasn't an existing next keypair, we replace -+ * the previous with the current one. -+ */ -+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, -+ current_keypair); -+ /* At this point we can get rid of the old previous keypair, and -+ * set up the new keypair. -+ */ -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair, true); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->current_keypair, new_keypair); -+ } else { -+ /* If we're the responder, it means we can't use the new keypair -+ * until we receive confirmation via the first data packet, so -+ * we get rid of the existing previous one, the possibly -+ * existing next one, and slide in the new next one. -+ */ -+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair, new_keypair); -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(next_keypair, true); -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->previous_keypair, NULL); -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair, true); -+ } -+ spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); -+} -+ -+bool wg_noise_received_with_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, -+ struct noise_keypair *received_keypair) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *old_keypair; -+ bool key_is_new; -+ -+ /* We first check without taking the spinlock. */ -+ key_is_new = received_keypair == -+ rcu_access_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair); -+ if (likely(!key_is_new)) -+ return false; -+ -+ spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); -+ /* After locking, we double check that things didn't change from -+ * beneath us. -+ */ -+ if (unlikely(received_keypair != -+ rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)))) { -+ spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); -+ return false; -+ } -+ -+ /* When we've finally received the confirmation, we slide the next -+ * into the current, the current into the previous, and get rid of -+ * the old previous. -+ */ -+ old_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, -+ rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, -+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock))); -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(old_keypair, true); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->current_keypair, received_keypair); -+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL); -+ -+ spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); -+ return true; -+} -+ -+/* Must hold static_identity->lock */ -+void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key( -+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, -+ const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ memcpy(static_identity->static_private, private_key, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ curve25519_clamp_secret(static_identity->static_private); -+ static_identity->has_identity = curve25519_generate_public( -+ static_identity->static_public, private_key); -+} -+ -+/* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF: -+ * - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf -+ * - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869 -+ */ -+static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data, -+ size_t first_len, size_t second_len, size_t third_len, -+ size_t data_len, const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) -+{ -+ u8 output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1]; -+ u8 secret[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; -+ -+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && -+ (first_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || -+ second_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || -+ third_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || -+ ((second_len || second_dst || third_len || third_dst) && -+ (!first_len || !first_dst)) || -+ ((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst)))); -+ -+ /* Extract entropy from data into secret */ -+ blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ -+ if (!first_dst || !first_len) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */ -+ output[0] = 1; -+ blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); -+ memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len); -+ -+ if (!second_dst || !second_len) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */ -+ output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2; -+ blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, -+ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); -+ memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len); -+ -+ if (!third_dst || !third_len) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */ -+ output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3; -+ blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, -+ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); -+ memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len); -+ -+out: -+ /* Clear sensitive data from stack */ -+ memzero_explicit(secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); -+ memzero_explicit(output, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1); -+} -+ -+static void symmetric_key_init(struct noise_symmetric_key *key) -+{ -+ spin_lock_init(&key->counter.receive.lock); -+ atomic64_set(&key->counter.counter, 0); -+ memset(key->counter.receive.backtrack, 0, -+ sizeof(key->counter.receive.backtrack)); -+ key->birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ key->is_valid = true; -+} -+ -+static void derive_keys(struct noise_symmetric_key *first_dst, -+ struct noise_symmetric_key *second_dst, -+ const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) -+{ -+ kdf(first_dst->key, second_dst->key, NULL, NULL, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0, -+ chaining_key); -+ symmetric_key_init(first_dst); -+ symmetric_key_init(second_dst); -+} -+ -+static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], -+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ u8 dh_calculation[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!curve25519(dh_calculation, private, public))) -+ return false; -+ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, dh_calculation, NOISE_HASH_LEN, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key); -+ memzero_explicit(dh_calculation, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ return true; -+} -+ -+static void mix_hash(u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const u8 *src, size_t src_len) -+{ -+ struct blake2s_state blake; -+ -+ blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ blake2s_update(&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ blake2s_update(&blake, src, src_len); -+ blake2s_final(&blake, hash); -+} -+ -+static void mix_psk(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], -+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ u8 temp_hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; -+ -+ kdf(chaining_key, temp_hash, key, psk, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_HASH_LEN, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key); -+ mix_hash(hash, temp_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memzero_explicit(temp_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+} -+ -+static void handshake_init(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], -+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], -+ const u8 remote_static[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ memcpy(hash, handshake_init_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memcpy(chaining_key, handshake_init_chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ mix_hash(hash, remote_static, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+} -+ -+static void message_encrypt(u8 *dst_ciphertext, const u8 *src_plaintext, -+ size_t src_len, u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) -+{ -+ chacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst_ciphertext, src_plaintext, src_len, hash, -+ NOISE_HASH_LEN, -+ 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key); -+ mix_hash(hash, dst_ciphertext, noise_encrypted_len(src_len)); -+} -+ -+static bool message_decrypt(u8 *dst_plaintext, const u8 *src_ciphertext, -+ size_t src_len, u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) -+{ -+ if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst_plaintext, src_ciphertext, src_len, -+ hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN, -+ 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key)) -+ return false; -+ mix_hash(hash, src_ciphertext, src_len); -+ return true; -+} -+ -+static void message_ephemeral(u8 ephemeral_dst[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 ephemeral_src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], -+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) -+{ -+ if (ephemeral_dst != ephemeral_src) -+ memcpy(ephemeral_dst, ephemeral_src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ mix_hash(hash, ephemeral_src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ kdf(chaining_key, NULL, NULL, ephemeral_src, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0, 0, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key); -+} -+ -+static void tai64n_now(u8 output[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]) -+{ -+ struct timespec64 now; -+ -+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&now); -+ -+ /* In order to prevent some sort of infoleak from precise timers, we -+ * round down the nanoseconds part to the closest rounded-down power of -+ * two to the maximum initiations per second allowed anyway by the -+ * implementation. -+ */ -+ now.tv_nsec = ALIGN_DOWN(now.tv_nsec, -+ rounddown_pow_of_two(NSEC_PER_SEC / INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND)); -+ -+ /* https://cr.yp.to/libtai/tai64.html */ -+ *(__be64 *)output = cpu_to_be64(0x400000000000000aULL + now.tv_sec); -+ *(__be32 *)(output + sizeof(__be64)) = cpu_to_be32(now.tv_nsec); -+} -+ -+bool -+wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst, -+ struct noise_handshake *handshake) -+{ -+ u8 timestamp[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]; -+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ bool ret = false; -+ -+ /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since -+ * curve25519_generate_secret uses get_random_bytes_wait. -+ */ -+ wait_for_random_bytes(); -+ -+ down_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock); -+ down_write(&handshake->lock); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!handshake->static_identity->has_identity)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION); -+ -+ handshake_init(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash, -+ handshake->remote_static); -+ -+ /* e */ -+ curve25519_generate_secret(handshake->ephemeral_private); -+ if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, -+ handshake->ephemeral_private)) -+ goto out; -+ message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, -+ dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key, -+ handshake->hash); -+ -+ /* es */ -+ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key, handshake->ephemeral_private, -+ handshake->remote_static)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* s */ -+ message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_static, -+ handshake->static_identity->static_public, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key, handshake->hash); -+ -+ /* ss */ -+ kdf(handshake->chaining_key, key, NULL, -+ handshake->precomputed_static_static, NOISE_HASH_LEN, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, -+ handshake->chaining_key); -+ -+ /* {t} */ -+ tai64n_now(timestamp); -+ message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_timestamp, timestamp, -+ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN, key, handshake->hash); -+ -+ dst->sender_index = wg_index_hashtable_insert( -+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, -+ &handshake->entry); -+ -+ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION; -+ ret = true; -+ -+out: -+ up_write(&handshake->lock); -+ up_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock); -+ memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+struct wg_peer * -+wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *src, -+ struct wg_device *wg) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL, *ret_peer = NULL; -+ struct noise_handshake *handshake; -+ bool replay_attack, flood_attack; -+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; -+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; -+ u8 s[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 t[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]; -+ u64 initiation_consumption; -+ -+ down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ if (unlikely(!wg->static_identity.has_identity)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ handshake_init(chaining_key, hash, wg->static_identity.static_public); -+ -+ /* e */ -+ message_ephemeral(e, src->unencrypted_ephemeral, chaining_key, hash); -+ -+ /* es */ -+ if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, key, wg->static_identity.static_private, e)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* s */ -+ if (!message_decrypt(s, src->encrypted_static, -+ sizeof(src->encrypted_static), key, hash)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Lookup which peer we're actually talking to */ -+ peer = wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(wg->peer_hashtable, s); -+ if (!peer) -+ goto out; -+ handshake = &peer->handshake; -+ -+ /* ss */ -+ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, handshake->precomputed_static_static, -+ NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, -+ chaining_key); -+ -+ /* {t} */ -+ if (!message_decrypt(t, src->encrypted_timestamp, -+ sizeof(src->encrypted_timestamp), key, hash)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ down_read(&handshake->lock); -+ replay_attack = memcmp(t, handshake->latest_timestamp, -+ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) <= 0; -+ flood_attack = (s64)handshake->last_initiation_consumption + -+ NSEC_PER_SEC / INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND > -+ (s64)ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ up_read(&handshake->lock); -+ if (replay_attack || flood_attack) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Success! Copy everything to peer */ -+ down_write(&handshake->lock); -+ memcpy(handshake->remote_ephemeral, e, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ if (memcmp(t, handshake->latest_timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) > 0) -+ memcpy(handshake->latest_timestamp, t, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN); -+ memcpy(handshake->hash, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memcpy(handshake->chaining_key, chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index; -+ if ((s64)(handshake->last_initiation_consumption - -+ (initiation_consumption = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns())) < 0) -+ handshake->last_initiation_consumption = initiation_consumption; -+ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION; -+ up_write(&handshake->lock); -+ ret_peer = peer; -+ -+out: -+ memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memzero_explicit(hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memzero_explicit(chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ if (!ret_peer) -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ return ret_peer; -+} -+ -+bool wg_noise_handshake_create_response(struct message_handshake_response *dst, -+ struct noise_handshake *handshake) -+{ -+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ bool ret = false; -+ -+ /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since -+ * curve25519_generate_secret uses get_random_bytes_wait. -+ */ -+ wait_for_random_bytes(); -+ -+ down_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock); -+ down_write(&handshake->lock); -+ -+ if (handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION) -+ goto out; -+ -+ dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE); -+ dst->receiver_index = handshake->remote_index; -+ -+ /* e */ -+ curve25519_generate_secret(handshake->ephemeral_private); -+ if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, -+ handshake->ephemeral_private)) -+ goto out; -+ message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, -+ dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key, -+ handshake->hash); -+ -+ /* ee */ -+ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, NULL, handshake->ephemeral_private, -+ handshake->remote_ephemeral)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* se */ -+ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, NULL, handshake->ephemeral_private, -+ handshake->remote_static)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* psk */ -+ mix_psk(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash, key, -+ handshake->preshared_key); -+ -+ /* {} */ -+ message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_nothing, NULL, 0, key, handshake->hash); -+ -+ dst->sender_index = wg_index_hashtable_insert( -+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, -+ &handshake->entry); -+ -+ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE; -+ ret = true; -+ -+out: -+ up_write(&handshake->lock); -+ up_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock); -+ memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+struct wg_peer * -+wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src, -+ struct wg_device *wg) -+{ -+ enum noise_handshake_state state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED; -+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL, *ret_peer = NULL; -+ struct noise_handshake *handshake; -+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; -+ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; -+ u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 ephemeral_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 static_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ -+ down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!wg->static_identity.has_identity)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ handshake = (struct noise_handshake *)wg_index_hashtable_lookup( -+ wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE, -+ src->receiver_index, &peer); -+ if (unlikely(!handshake)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ down_read(&handshake->lock); -+ state = handshake->state; -+ memcpy(hash, handshake->hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memcpy(chaining_key, handshake->chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memcpy(ephemeral_private, handshake->ephemeral_private, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ up_read(&handshake->lock); -+ -+ if (state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION) -+ goto fail; -+ -+ /* e */ -+ message_ephemeral(e, src->unencrypted_ephemeral, chaining_key, hash); -+ -+ /* ee */ -+ if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, NULL, ephemeral_private, e)) -+ goto fail; -+ -+ /* se */ -+ if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, NULL, wg->static_identity.static_private, e)) -+ goto fail; -+ -+ /* psk */ -+ mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, handshake->preshared_key); -+ -+ /* {} */ -+ if (!message_decrypt(NULL, src->encrypted_nothing, -+ sizeof(src->encrypted_nothing), key, hash)) -+ goto fail; -+ -+ /* Success! Copy everything to peer */ -+ down_write(&handshake->lock); -+ /* It's important to check that the state is still the same, while we -+ * have an exclusive lock. -+ */ -+ if (handshake->state != state) { -+ up_write(&handshake->lock); -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ memcpy(handshake->remote_ephemeral, e, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memcpy(handshake->hash, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memcpy(handshake->chaining_key, chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index; -+ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE; -+ up_write(&handshake->lock); -+ ret_peer = peer; -+ goto out; -+ -+fail: -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+out: -+ memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memzero_explicit(hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memzero_explicit(chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); -+ memzero_explicit(ephemeral_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memzero_explicit(static_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); -+ return ret_peer; -+} -+ -+bool wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake *handshake, -+ struct noise_keypairs *keypairs) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *new_keypair; -+ bool ret = false; -+ -+ down_write(&handshake->lock); -+ if (handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE && -+ handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE) -+ goto out; -+ -+ new_keypair = keypair_create(handshake->entry.peer); -+ if (!new_keypair) -+ goto out; -+ new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator = handshake->state == -+ HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE; -+ new_keypair->remote_index = handshake->remote_index; -+ -+ if (new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator) -+ derive_keys(&new_keypair->sending, &new_keypair->receiving, -+ handshake->chaining_key); -+ else -+ derive_keys(&new_keypair->receiving, &new_keypair->sending, -+ handshake->chaining_key); -+ -+ handshake_zero(handshake); -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ if (likely(!READ_ONCE(container_of(handshake, struct wg_peer, -+ handshake)->is_dead))) { -+ add_new_keypair(keypairs, new_keypair); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu created for peer %llu\n", -+ handshake->entry.peer->device->dev->name, -+ new_keypair->internal_id, -+ handshake->entry.peer->internal_id); -+ ret = wg_index_hashtable_replace( -+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, -+ &handshake->entry, &new_keypair->entry); -+ } else { -+ kzfree(new_keypair); -+ } -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ -+out: -+ up_write(&handshake->lock); -+ return ret; -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h -@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+#ifndef _WG_NOISE_H -+#define _WG_NOISE_H -+ -+#include "messages.h" -+#include "peerlookup.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+union noise_counter { -+ struct { -+ u64 counter; -+ unsigned long backtrack[COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG]; -+ spinlock_t lock; -+ } receive; -+ atomic64_t counter; -+}; -+ -+struct noise_symmetric_key { -+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ union noise_counter counter; -+ u64 birthdate; -+ bool is_valid; -+}; -+ -+struct noise_keypair { -+ struct index_hashtable_entry entry; -+ struct noise_symmetric_key sending; -+ struct noise_symmetric_key receiving; -+ __le32 remote_index; -+ bool i_am_the_initiator; -+ struct kref refcount; -+ struct rcu_head rcu; -+ u64 internal_id; -+}; -+ -+struct noise_keypairs { -+ struct noise_keypair __rcu *current_keypair; -+ struct noise_keypair __rcu *previous_keypair; -+ struct noise_keypair __rcu *next_keypair; -+ spinlock_t keypair_update_lock; -+}; -+ -+struct noise_static_identity { -+ u8 static_public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 static_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ struct rw_semaphore lock; -+ bool has_identity; -+}; -+ -+enum noise_handshake_state { -+ HANDSHAKE_ZEROED, -+ HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION, -+ HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION, -+ HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE, -+ HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE -+}; -+ -+struct noise_handshake { -+ struct index_hashtable_entry entry; -+ -+ enum noise_handshake_state state; -+ u64 last_initiation_consumption; -+ -+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity; -+ -+ u8 ephemeral_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 remote_static[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 remote_ephemeral[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 precomputed_static_static[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ -+ u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ -+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; -+ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; -+ -+ u8 latest_timestamp[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]; -+ __le32 remote_index; -+ -+ /* Protects all members except the immutable (after noise_handshake_ -+ * init): remote_static, precomputed_static_static, static_identity. -+ */ -+ struct rw_semaphore lock; -+}; -+ -+struct wg_device; -+ -+void wg_noise_init(void); -+bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, -+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, -+ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake); -+static inline void wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(atomic64_t *handshake_ns) -+{ -+ atomic64_set(handshake_ns, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns() - -+ (u64)(REKEY_TIMEOUT + 1) * NSEC_PER_SEC); -+} -+ -+void wg_noise_keypair_put(struct noise_keypair *keypair, bool unreference_now); -+struct noise_keypair *wg_noise_keypair_get(struct noise_keypair *keypair); -+void wg_noise_keypairs_clear(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs); -+bool wg_noise_received_with_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, -+ struct noise_keypair *received_keypair); -+void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(struct wg_peer *peer); -+ -+void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key( -+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, -+ const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]); -+bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer); -+ -+bool -+wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst, -+ struct noise_handshake *handshake); -+struct wg_peer * -+wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *src, -+ struct wg_device *wg); -+ -+bool wg_noise_handshake_create_response(struct message_handshake_response *dst, -+ struct noise_handshake *handshake); -+struct wg_peer * -+wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src, -+ struct wg_device *wg); -+ -+bool wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake *handshake, -+ struct noise_keypairs *keypairs); -+ -+#endif /* _WG_NOISE_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c -@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "timers.h" -+#include "peerlookup.h" -+#include "noise.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+static atomic64_t peer_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0); -+ -+struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg_device *wg, -+ const u8 public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ int ret = -ENOMEM; -+ -+ lockdep_assert_held(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ -+ if (wg->num_peers >= MAX_PEERS_PER_DEVICE) -+ return ERR_PTR(ret); -+ -+ peer = kzalloc(sizeof(*peer), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!peer)) -+ return ERR_PTR(ret); -+ peer->device = wg; -+ -+ if (!wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, -+ public_key, preshared_key, peer)) { -+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED; -+ goto err_1; -+ } -+ if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL)) -+ goto err_1; -+ if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue, wg_packet_tx_worker, false, -+ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) -+ goto err_2; -+ if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->rx_queue, NULL, false, -+ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) -+ goto err_3; -+ -+ peer->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&peer_counter); -+ peer->serial_work_cpu = nr_cpumask_bits; -+ wg_cookie_init(&peer->latest_cookie); -+ wg_timers_init(peer); -+ wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(peer); -+ spin_lock_init(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock); -+ INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_handshake_work, -+ wg_packet_handshake_send_worker); -+ rwlock_init(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+ kref_init(&peer->refcount); -+ skb_queue_head_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue); -+ wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(&peer->last_sent_handshake); -+ set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NO_BUSY_POLL, &peer->napi.state); -+ netif_napi_add(wg->dev, &peer->napi, wg_packet_rx_poll, -+ NAPI_POLL_WEIGHT); -+ napi_enable(&peer->napi); -+ list_add_tail(&peer->peer_list, &wg->peer_list); -+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&peer->allowedips_list); -+ wg_pubkey_hashtable_add(wg->peer_hashtable, peer); -+ ++wg->num_peers; -+ pr_debug("%s: Peer %llu created\n", wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id); -+ return peer; -+ -+err_3: -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false); -+err_2: -+ dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache); -+err_1: -+ kfree(peer); -+ return ERR_PTR(ret); -+} -+ -+struct wg_peer *wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_bh_held(), -+ "Taking peer reference without holding the RCU read lock"); -+ if (unlikely(!peer || !kref_get_unless_zero(&peer->refcount))) -+ return NULL; -+ return peer; -+} -+ -+static void peer_make_dead(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ /* Remove from configuration-time lookup structures. */ -+ list_del_init(&peer->peer_list); -+ wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(&peer->device->peer_allowedips, peer, -+ &peer->device->device_update_lock); -+ wg_pubkey_hashtable_remove(peer->device->peer_hashtable, peer); -+ -+ /* Mark as dead, so that we don't allow jumping contexts after. */ -+ WRITE_ONCE(peer->is_dead, true); -+ -+ /* The caller must now synchronize_rcu() for this to take effect. */ -+} -+ -+static void peer_remove_after_dead(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ WARN_ON(!peer->is_dead); -+ -+ /* No more keypairs can be created for this peer, since is_dead protects -+ * add_new_keypair, so we can now destroy existing ones. -+ */ -+ wg_noise_keypairs_clear(&peer->keypairs); -+ -+ /* Destroy all ongoing timers that were in-flight at the beginning of -+ * this function. -+ */ -+ wg_timers_stop(peer); -+ -+ /* The transition between packet encryption/decryption queues isn't -+ * guarded by is_dead, but each reference's life is strictly bounded by -+ * two generations: once for parallel crypto and once for serial -+ * ingestion, so we can simply flush twice, and be sure that we no -+ * longer have references inside these queues. -+ */ -+ -+ /* a) For encrypt/decrypt. */ -+ flush_workqueue(peer->device->packet_crypt_wq); -+ /* b.1) For send (but not receive, since that's napi). */ -+ flush_workqueue(peer->device->packet_crypt_wq); -+ /* b.2.1) For receive (but not send, since that's wq). */ -+ napi_disable(&peer->napi); -+ /* b.2.1) It's now safe to remove the napi struct, which must be done -+ * here from process context. -+ */ -+ netif_napi_del(&peer->napi); -+ -+ /* Ensure any workstructs we own (like transmit_handshake_work or -+ * clear_peer_work) no longer are in use. -+ */ -+ flush_workqueue(peer->device->handshake_send_wq); -+ -+ /* After the above flushes, a peer might still be active in a few -+ * different contexts: 1) from xmit(), before hitting is_dead and -+ * returning, 2) from wg_packet_consume_data(), before hitting is_dead -+ * and returning, 3) from wg_receive_handshake_packet() after a point -+ * where it has processed an incoming handshake packet, but where -+ * all calls to pass it off to timers fails because of is_dead. We won't -+ * have new references in (1) eventually, because we're removed from -+ * allowedips; we won't have new references in (2) eventually, because -+ * wg_index_hashtable_lookup will always return NULL, since we removed -+ * all existing keypairs and no more can be created; we won't have new -+ * references in (3) eventually, because we're removed from the pubkey -+ * hash table, which allows for a maximum of one handshake response, -+ * via the still-uncleared index hashtable entry, but not more than one, -+ * and in wg_cookie_message_consume, the lookup eventually gets a peer -+ * with a refcount of zero, so no new reference is taken. -+ */ -+ -+ --peer->device->num_peers; -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+} -+ -+/* We have a separate "remove" function make sure that all active places where -+ * a peer is currently operating will eventually come to an end and not pass -+ * their reference onto another context. -+ */ -+void wg_peer_remove(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ if (unlikely(!peer)) -+ return; -+ lockdep_assert_held(&peer->device->device_update_lock); -+ -+ peer_make_dead(peer); -+ synchronize_rcu(); -+ peer_remove_after_dead(peer); -+} -+ -+void wg_peer_remove_all(struct wg_device *wg) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer, *temp; -+ LIST_HEAD(dead_peers); -+ -+ lockdep_assert_held(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ -+ /* Avoid having to traverse individually for each one. */ -+ wg_allowedips_free(&wg->peer_allowedips, &wg->device_update_lock); -+ -+ list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { -+ peer_make_dead(peer); -+ list_add_tail(&peer->peer_list, &dead_peers); -+ } -+ synchronize_rcu(); -+ list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &dead_peers, peer_list) -+ peer_remove_after_dead(peer); -+} -+ -+static void rcu_release(struct rcu_head *rcu) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(rcu, struct wg_peer, rcu); -+ -+ dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache); -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->rx_queue, false); -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false); -+ -+ /* The final zeroing takes care of clearing any remaining handshake key -+ * material and other potentially sensitive information. -+ */ -+ kzfree(peer); -+} -+ -+static void kref_release(struct kref *refcount) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(refcount, struct wg_peer, refcount); -+ -+ pr_debug("%s: Peer %llu (%pISpfsc) destroyed\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ -+ /* Remove ourself from dynamic runtime lookup structures, now that the -+ * last reference is gone. -+ */ -+ wg_index_hashtable_remove(peer->device->index_hashtable, -+ &peer->handshake.entry); -+ -+ /* Remove any lingering packets that didn't have a chance to be -+ * transmitted. -+ */ -+ wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(peer); -+ -+ /* Free the memory used. */ -+ call_rcu(&peer->rcu, rcu_release); -+} -+ -+void wg_peer_put(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ if (unlikely(!peer)) -+ return; -+ kref_put(&peer->refcount, kref_release); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h -@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_PEER_H -+#define _WG_PEER_H -+ -+#include "device.h" -+#include "noise.h" -+#include "cookie.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+struct wg_device; -+ -+struct endpoint { -+ union { -+ struct sockaddr addr; -+ struct sockaddr_in addr4; -+ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6; -+ }; -+ union { -+ struct { -+ struct in_addr src4; -+ /* Essentially the same as addr6->scope_id */ -+ int src_if4; -+ }; -+ struct in6_addr src6; -+ }; -+}; -+ -+struct wg_peer { -+ struct wg_device *device; -+ struct crypt_queue tx_queue, rx_queue; -+ struct sk_buff_head staged_packet_queue; -+ int serial_work_cpu; -+ struct noise_keypairs keypairs; -+ struct endpoint endpoint; -+ struct dst_cache endpoint_cache; -+ rwlock_t endpoint_lock; -+ struct noise_handshake handshake; -+ atomic64_t last_sent_handshake; -+ struct work_struct transmit_handshake_work, clear_peer_work; -+ struct cookie latest_cookie; -+ struct hlist_node pubkey_hash; -+ u64 rx_bytes, tx_bytes; -+ struct timer_list timer_retransmit_handshake, timer_send_keepalive; -+ struct timer_list timer_new_handshake, timer_zero_key_material; -+ struct timer_list timer_persistent_keepalive; -+ unsigned int timer_handshake_attempts; -+ u16 persistent_keepalive_interval; -+ bool timer_need_another_keepalive; -+ bool sent_lastminute_handshake; -+ struct timespec64 walltime_last_handshake; -+ struct kref refcount; -+ struct rcu_head rcu; -+ struct list_head peer_list; -+ struct list_head allowedips_list; -+ u64 internal_id; -+ struct napi_struct napi; -+ bool is_dead; -+}; -+ -+struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg_device *wg, -+ const u8 public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]); -+ -+struct wg_peer *__must_check wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(struct wg_peer *peer); -+static inline struct wg_peer *wg_peer_get(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ kref_get(&peer->refcount); -+ return peer; -+} -+void wg_peer_put(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_peer_remove(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_peer_remove_all(struct wg_device *wg); -+ -+#endif /* _WG_PEER_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c -@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "peerlookup.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "noise.h" -+ -+static struct hlist_head *pubkey_bucket(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, -+ const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ /* siphash gives us a secure 64bit number based on a random key. Since -+ * the bits are uniformly distributed, we can then mask off to get the -+ * bits we need. -+ */ -+ const u64 hash = siphash(pubkey, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, &table->key); -+ -+ return &table->hashtable[hash & (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)]; -+} -+ -+struct pubkey_hashtable *wg_pubkey_hashtable_alloc(void) -+{ -+ struct pubkey_hashtable *table = kvmalloc(sizeof(*table), GFP_KERNEL); -+ -+ if (!table) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ get_random_bytes(&table->key, sizeof(table->key)); -+ hash_init(table->hashtable); -+ mutex_init(&table->lock); -+ return table; -+} -+ -+void wg_pubkey_hashtable_add(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, -+ struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ mutex_lock(&table->lock); -+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&peer->pubkey_hash, -+ pubkey_bucket(table, peer->handshake.remote_static)); -+ mutex_unlock(&table->lock); -+} -+ -+void wg_pubkey_hashtable_remove(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, -+ struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ mutex_lock(&table->lock); -+ hlist_del_init_rcu(&peer->pubkey_hash); -+ mutex_unlock(&table->lock); -+} -+ -+/* Returns a strong reference to a peer */ -+struct wg_peer * -+wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, -+ const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *iter_peer, *peer = NULL; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(iter_peer, pubkey_bucket(table, pubkey), -+ pubkey_hash) { -+ if (!memcmp(pubkey, iter_peer->handshake.remote_static, -+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)) { -+ peer = iter_peer; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ peer = wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(peer); -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ return peer; -+} -+ -+static struct hlist_head *index_bucket(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ const __le32 index) -+{ -+ /* Since the indices are random and thus all bits are uniformly -+ * distributed, we can find its bucket simply by masking. -+ */ -+ return &table->hashtable[(__force u32)index & -+ (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)]; -+} -+ -+struct index_hashtable *wg_index_hashtable_alloc(void) -+{ -+ struct index_hashtable *table = kvmalloc(sizeof(*table), GFP_KERNEL); -+ -+ if (!table) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ hash_init(table->hashtable); -+ spin_lock_init(&table->lock); -+ return table; -+} -+ -+/* At the moment, we limit ourselves to 2^20 total peers, which generally might -+ * amount to 2^20*3 items in this hashtable. The algorithm below works by -+ * picking a random number and testing it. We can see that these limits mean we -+ * usually succeed pretty quickly: -+ * -+ * >>> def calculation(tries, size): -+ * ... return (size / 2**32)**(tries - 1) * (1 - (size / 2**32)) -+ * ... -+ * >>> calculation(1, 2**20 * 3) -+ * 0.999267578125 -+ * >>> calculation(2, 2**20 * 3) -+ * 0.0007318854331970215 -+ * >>> calculation(3, 2**20 * 3) -+ * 5.360489012673497e-07 -+ * >>> calculation(4, 2**20 * 3) -+ * 3.9261394135792216e-10 -+ * -+ * At the moment, we don't do any masking, so this algorithm isn't exactly -+ * constant time in either the random guessing or in the hash list lookup. We -+ * could require a minimum of 3 tries, which would successfully mask the -+ * guessing. this would not, however, help with the growing hash lengths, which -+ * is another thing to consider moving forward. -+ */ -+ -+__le32 wg_index_hashtable_insert(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *entry) -+{ -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *existing_entry; -+ -+ spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); -+ hlist_del_init_rcu(&entry->index_hash); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ -+search_unused_slot: -+ /* First we try to find an unused slot, randomly, while unlocked. */ -+ entry->index = (__force __le32)get_random_u32(); -+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(existing_entry, -+ index_bucket(table, entry->index), -+ index_hash) { -+ if (existing_entry->index == entry->index) -+ /* If it's already in use, we continue searching. */ -+ goto search_unused_slot; -+ } -+ -+ /* Once we've found an unused slot, we lock it, and then double-check -+ * that nobody else stole it from us. -+ */ -+ spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); -+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(existing_entry, -+ index_bucket(table, entry->index), -+ index_hash) { -+ if (existing_entry->index == entry->index) { -+ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); -+ /* If it was stolen, we start over. */ -+ goto search_unused_slot; -+ } -+ } -+ /* Otherwise, we know we have it exclusively (since we're locked), -+ * so we insert. -+ */ -+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->index_hash, -+ index_bucket(table, entry->index)); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); -+ -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ -+ return entry->index; -+} -+ -+bool wg_index_hashtable_replace(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *old, -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *new) -+{ -+ if (unlikely(hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash))) -+ return false; -+ spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); -+ new->index = old->index; -+ hlist_replace_rcu(&old->index_hash, &new->index_hash); -+ -+ /* Calling init here NULLs out index_hash, and in fact after this -+ * function returns, it's theoretically possible for this to get -+ * reinserted elsewhere. That means the RCU lookup below might either -+ * terminate early or jump between buckets, in which case the packet -+ * simply gets dropped, which isn't terrible. -+ */ -+ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&old->index_hash); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); -+ return true; -+} -+ -+void wg_index_hashtable_remove(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *entry) -+{ -+ spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); -+ hlist_del_init_rcu(&entry->index_hash); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); -+} -+ -+/* Returns a strong reference to a entry->peer */ -+struct index_hashtable_entry * -+wg_index_hashtable_lookup(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ const enum index_hashtable_type type_mask, -+ const __le32 index, struct wg_peer **peer) -+{ -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *iter_entry, *entry = NULL; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(iter_entry, index_bucket(table, index), -+ index_hash) { -+ if (iter_entry->index == index) { -+ if (likely(iter_entry->type & type_mask)) -+ entry = iter_entry; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ if (likely(entry)) { -+ entry->peer = wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(entry->peer); -+ if (likely(entry->peer)) -+ *peer = entry->peer; -+ else -+ entry = NULL; -+ } -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ return entry; -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.h -@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_PEERLOOKUP_H -+#define _WG_PEERLOOKUP_H -+ -+#include "messages.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+struct wg_peer; -+ -+struct pubkey_hashtable { -+ /* TODO: move to rhashtable */ -+ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 11); -+ siphash_key_t key; -+ struct mutex lock; -+}; -+ -+struct pubkey_hashtable *wg_pubkey_hashtable_alloc(void); -+void wg_pubkey_hashtable_add(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, -+ struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_pubkey_hashtable_remove(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, -+ struct wg_peer *peer); -+struct wg_peer * -+wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, -+ const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]); -+ -+struct index_hashtable { -+ /* TODO: move to rhashtable */ -+ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 13); -+ spinlock_t lock; -+}; -+ -+enum index_hashtable_type { -+ INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE = 1U << 0, -+ INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR = 1U << 1 -+}; -+ -+struct index_hashtable_entry { -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ struct hlist_node index_hash; -+ enum index_hashtable_type type; -+ __le32 index; -+}; -+ -+struct index_hashtable *wg_index_hashtable_alloc(void); -+__le32 wg_index_hashtable_insert(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *entry); -+bool wg_index_hashtable_replace(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *old, -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *new); -+void wg_index_hashtable_remove(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ struct index_hashtable_entry *entry); -+struct index_hashtable_entry * -+wg_index_hashtable_lookup(struct index_hashtable *table, -+ const enum index_hashtable_type type_mask, -+ const __le32 index, struct wg_peer **peer); -+ -+#endif /* _WG_PEERLOOKUP_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c -@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "queueing.h" -+ -+struct multicore_worker __percpu * -+wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr) -+{ -+ int cpu; -+ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker = -+ alloc_percpu(struct multicore_worker); -+ -+ if (!worker) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { -+ per_cpu_ptr(worker, cpu)->ptr = ptr; -+ INIT_WORK(&per_cpu_ptr(worker, cpu)->work, function); -+ } -+ return worker; -+} -+ -+int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function, -+ bool multicore, unsigned int len) -+{ -+ int ret; -+ -+ memset(queue, 0, sizeof(*queue)); -+ ret = ptr_ring_init(&queue->ring, len, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (ret) -+ return ret; -+ if (function) { -+ if (multicore) { -+ queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( -+ function, queue); -+ if (!queue->worker) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ } else { -+ INIT_WORK(&queue->work, function); -+ } -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore) -+{ -+ if (multicore) -+ free_percpu(queue->worker); -+ WARN_ON(!__ptr_ring_empty(&queue->ring)); -+ ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_QUEUEING_H -+#define _WG_QUEUEING_H -+ -+#include "peer.h" -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+struct wg_device; -+struct wg_peer; -+struct multicore_worker; -+struct crypt_queue; -+struct sk_buff; -+ -+/* queueing.c APIs: */ -+int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function, -+ bool multicore, unsigned int len); -+void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore); -+struct multicore_worker __percpu * -+wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr); -+ -+/* receive.c APIs: */ -+void wg_packet_receive(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb); -+void wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker(struct work_struct *work); -+/* NAPI poll function: */ -+int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget); -+/* Workqueue worker: */ -+void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work); -+ -+/* send.c APIs: */ -+void wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer, -+ bool is_retry); -+void wg_packet_send_handshake_response(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(struct wg_device *wg, -+ struct sk_buff *initiating_skb, -+ __le32 sender_index); -+void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer); -+/* Workqueue workers: */ -+void wg_packet_handshake_send_worker(struct work_struct *work); -+void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work); -+void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work); -+ -+enum packet_state { -+ PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED, -+ PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED, -+ PACKET_STATE_DEAD -+}; -+ -+struct packet_cb { -+ u64 nonce; -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair; -+ atomic_t state; -+ u32 mtu; -+ u8 ds; -+}; -+ -+#define PACKET_CB(skb) ((struct packet_cb *)((skb)->cb)) -+#define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer) -+ -+/* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */ -+static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && -+ (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <= -+ skb_tail_pointer(skb) && -+ ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) -+ return htons(ETH_P_IP); -+ if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && -+ (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) <= -+ skb_tail_pointer(skb) && -+ ipv6_hdr(skb)->version == 6) -+ return htons(ETH_P_IPV6); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ const int pfmemalloc = skb->pfmemalloc; -+ -+ skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); -+ memset(&skb->headers_start, 0, -+ offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) - -+ offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start)); -+ skb->pfmemalloc = pfmemalloc; -+ skb->queue_mapping = 0; -+ skb->nohdr = 0; -+ skb->peeked = 0; -+ skb->mac_len = 0; -+ skb->dev = NULL; -+#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED -+ skb->tc_index = 0; -+#endif -+ skb_reset_redirect(skb); -+ skb->hdr_len = skb_headroom(skb); -+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb); -+ skb_reset_network_header(skb); -+ skb_reset_transport_header(skb); -+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb); -+ skb_reset_inner_headers(skb); -+} -+ -+static inline int wg_cpumask_choose_online(int *stored_cpu, unsigned int id) -+{ -+ unsigned int cpu = *stored_cpu, cpu_index, i; -+ -+ if (unlikely(cpu == nr_cpumask_bits || -+ !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_online_mask))) { -+ cpu_index = id % cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask); -+ cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask); -+ for (i = 0; i < cpu_index; ++i) -+ cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_online_mask); -+ *stored_cpu = cpu; -+ } -+ return cpu; -+} -+ -+/* This function is racy, in the sense that next is unlocked, so it could return -+ * the same CPU twice. A race-free version of this would be to instead store an -+ * atomic sequence number, do an increment-and-return, and then iterate through -+ * every possible CPU until we get to that index -- choose_cpu. However that's -+ * a bit slower, and it doesn't seem like this potential race actually -+ * introduces any performance loss, so we live with it. -+ */ -+static inline int wg_cpumask_next_online(int *next) -+{ -+ int cpu = *next; -+ -+ while (unlikely(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_online_mask))) -+ cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_online_mask) % nr_cpumask_bits; -+ *next = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_online_mask) % nr_cpumask_bits; -+ return cpu; -+} -+ -+static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer( -+ struct crypt_queue *device_queue, struct crypt_queue *peer_queue, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, struct workqueue_struct *wq, int *next_cpu) -+{ -+ int cpu; -+ -+ atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED); -+ /* We first queue this up for the peer ingestion, but the consumer -+ * will wait for the state to change to CRYPTED or DEAD before. -+ */ -+ if (unlikely(ptr_ring_produce_bh(&peer_queue->ring, skb))) -+ return -ENOSPC; -+ /* Then we queue it up in the device queue, which consumes the -+ * packet as soon as it can. -+ */ -+ cpu = wg_cpumask_next_online(next_cpu); -+ if (unlikely(ptr_ring_produce_bh(&device_queue->ring, skb))) -+ return -EPIPE; -+ queue_work_on(cpu, wq, &per_cpu_ptr(device_queue->worker, cpu)->work); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(struct crypt_queue *queue, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, -+ enum packet_state state) -+{ -+ /* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the -+ * peer can be freed from below us. -+ */ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = wg_peer_get(PACKET_PEER(skb)); -+ -+ atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, state); -+ queue_work_on(wg_cpumask_choose_online(&peer->serial_work_cpu, -+ peer->internal_id), -+ peer->device->packet_crypt_wq, &queue->work); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+} -+ -+static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(struct sk_buff *skb, -+ enum packet_state state) -+{ -+ /* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the -+ * peer can be freed from below us. -+ */ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = wg_peer_get(PACKET_PEER(skb)); -+ -+ atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, state); -+ napi_schedule(&peer->napi); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+} -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+bool wg_packet_counter_selftest(void); -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _WG_QUEUEING_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.c -@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "ratelimiter.h" -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+static struct kmem_cache *entry_cache; -+static hsiphash_key_t key; -+static spinlock_t table_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED("ratelimiter_table_lock"); -+static DEFINE_MUTEX(init_lock); -+static u64 init_refcnt; /* Protected by init_lock, hence not atomic. */ -+static atomic_t total_entries = ATOMIC_INIT(0); -+static unsigned int max_entries, table_size; -+static void wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(struct work_struct *); -+static DECLARE_DEFERRABLE_WORK(gc_work, wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries); -+static struct hlist_head *table_v4; -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+static struct hlist_head *table_v6; -+#endif -+ -+struct ratelimiter_entry { -+ u64 last_time_ns, tokens, ip; -+ void *net; -+ spinlock_t lock; -+ struct hlist_node hash; -+ struct rcu_head rcu; -+}; -+ -+enum { -+ PACKETS_PER_SECOND = 20, -+ PACKETS_BURSTABLE = 5, -+ PACKET_COST = NSEC_PER_SEC / PACKETS_PER_SECOND, -+ TOKEN_MAX = PACKET_COST * PACKETS_BURSTABLE -+}; -+ -+static void entry_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) -+{ -+ kmem_cache_free(entry_cache, -+ container_of(rcu, struct ratelimiter_entry, rcu)); -+ atomic_dec(&total_entries); -+} -+ -+static void entry_uninit(struct ratelimiter_entry *entry) -+{ -+ hlist_del_rcu(&entry->hash); -+ call_rcu(&entry->rcu, entry_free); -+} -+ -+/* Calling this function with a NULL work uninits all entries. */ -+static void wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(struct work_struct *work) -+{ -+ const u64 now = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ struct ratelimiter_entry *entry; -+ struct hlist_node *temp; -+ unsigned int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < table_size; ++i) { -+ spin_lock(&table_lock); -+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, temp, &table_v4[i], hash) { -+ if (unlikely(!work) || -+ now - entry->last_time_ns > NSEC_PER_SEC) -+ entry_uninit(entry); -+ } -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, temp, &table_v6[i], hash) { -+ if (unlikely(!work) || -+ now - entry->last_time_ns > NSEC_PER_SEC) -+ entry_uninit(entry); -+ } -+#endif -+ spin_unlock(&table_lock); -+ if (likely(work)) -+ cond_resched(); -+ } -+ if (likely(work)) -+ queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq, &gc_work, HZ); -+} -+ -+bool wg_ratelimiter_allow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net) -+{ -+ /* We only take the bottom half of the net pointer, so that we can hash -+ * 3 words in the end. This way, siphash's len param fits into the final -+ * u32, and we don't incur an extra round. -+ */ -+ const u32 net_word = (unsigned long)net; -+ struct ratelimiter_entry *entry; -+ struct hlist_head *bucket; -+ u64 ip; -+ -+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { -+ ip = (u64 __force)ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; -+ bucket = &table_v4[hsiphash_2u32(net_word, ip, &key) & -+ (table_size - 1)]; -+ } -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { -+ /* Only use 64 bits, so as to ratelimit the whole /64. */ -+ memcpy(&ip, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, sizeof(ip)); -+ bucket = &table_v6[hsiphash_3u32(net_word, ip >> 32, ip, &key) & -+ (table_size - 1)]; -+ } -+#endif -+ else -+ return false; -+ rcu_read_lock(); -+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, bucket, hash) { -+ if (entry->net == net && entry->ip == ip) { -+ u64 now, tokens; -+ bool ret; -+ /* Quasi-inspired by nft_limit.c, but this is actually a -+ * slightly different algorithm. Namely, we incorporate -+ * the burst as part of the maximum tokens, rather than -+ * as part of the rate. -+ */ -+ spin_lock(&entry->lock); -+ now = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ tokens = min_t(u64, TOKEN_MAX, -+ entry->tokens + now - -+ entry->last_time_ns); -+ entry->last_time_ns = now; -+ ret = tokens >= PACKET_COST; -+ entry->tokens = ret ? tokens - PACKET_COST : tokens; -+ spin_unlock(&entry->lock); -+ rcu_read_unlock(); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ } -+ rcu_read_unlock(); -+ -+ if (atomic_inc_return(&total_entries) > max_entries) -+ goto err_oom; -+ -+ entry = kmem_cache_alloc(entry_cache, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!entry)) -+ goto err_oom; -+ -+ entry->net = net; -+ entry->ip = ip; -+ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&entry->hash); -+ spin_lock_init(&entry->lock); -+ entry->last_time_ns = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ entry->tokens = TOKEN_MAX - PACKET_COST; -+ spin_lock(&table_lock); -+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->hash, bucket); -+ spin_unlock(&table_lock); -+ return true; -+ -+err_oom: -+ atomic_dec(&total_entries); -+ return false; -+} -+ -+int wg_ratelimiter_init(void) -+{ -+ mutex_lock(&init_lock); -+ if (++init_refcnt != 1) -+ goto out; -+ -+ entry_cache = KMEM_CACHE(ratelimiter_entry, 0); -+ if (!entry_cache) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* xt_hashlimit.c uses a slightly different algorithm for ratelimiting, -+ * but what it shares in common is that it uses a massive hashtable. So, -+ * we borrow their wisdom about good table sizes on different systems -+ * dependent on RAM. This calculation here comes from there. -+ */ -+ table_size = (totalram_pages() > (1U << 30) / PAGE_SIZE) ? 8192 : -+ max_t(unsigned long, 16, roundup_pow_of_two( -+ (totalram_pages() << PAGE_SHIFT) / -+ (1U << 14) / sizeof(struct hlist_head))); -+ max_entries = table_size * 8; -+ -+ table_v4 = kvzalloc(table_size * sizeof(*table_v4), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!table_v4)) -+ goto err_kmemcache; -+ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ table_v6 = kvzalloc(table_size * sizeof(*table_v6), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!table_v6)) { -+ kvfree(table_v4); -+ goto err_kmemcache; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq, &gc_work, HZ); -+ get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key)); -+out: -+ mutex_unlock(&init_lock); -+ return 0; -+ -+err_kmemcache: -+ kmem_cache_destroy(entry_cache); -+err: -+ --init_refcnt; -+ mutex_unlock(&init_lock); -+ return -ENOMEM; -+} -+ -+void wg_ratelimiter_uninit(void) -+{ -+ mutex_lock(&init_lock); -+ if (!init_refcnt || --init_refcnt) -+ goto out; -+ -+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&gc_work); -+ wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(NULL); -+ rcu_barrier(); -+ kvfree(table_v4); -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ kvfree(table_v6); -+#endif -+ kmem_cache_destroy(entry_cache); -+out: -+ mutex_unlock(&init_lock); -+} -+ -+#include "selftest/ratelimiter.c" ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.h -@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_RATELIMITER_H -+#define _WG_RATELIMITER_H -+ -+#include -+ -+int wg_ratelimiter_init(void); -+void wg_ratelimiter_uninit(void); -+bool wg_ratelimiter_allow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net); -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+bool wg_ratelimiter_selftest(void); -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _WG_RATELIMITER_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "timers.h" -+#include "messages.h" -+#include "cookie.h" -+#include "socket.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+/* Must be called with bh disabled. */ -+static void update_rx_stats(struct wg_peer *peer, size_t len) -+{ -+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = -+ get_cpu_ptr(peer->device->dev->tstats); -+ -+ u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp); -+ ++tstats->rx_packets; -+ tstats->rx_bytes += len; -+ peer->rx_bytes += len; -+ u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp); -+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats); -+} -+ -+#define SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) (((struct message_header *)(skb)->data)->type) -+ -+static size_t validate_header_len(struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof(struct message_header))) -+ return 0; -+ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_DATA) && -+ skb->len >= MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH) -+ return sizeof(struct message_data); -+ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION) && -+ skb->len == sizeof(struct message_handshake_initiation)) -+ return sizeof(struct message_handshake_initiation); -+ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE) && -+ skb->len == sizeof(struct message_handshake_response)) -+ return sizeof(struct message_handshake_response); -+ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE) && -+ skb->len == sizeof(struct message_handshake_cookie)) -+ return sizeof(struct message_handshake_cookie); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int prepare_skb_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wg_device *wg) -+{ -+ size_t data_offset, data_len, header_len; -+ struct udphdr *udp; -+ -+ if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol || -+ skb_transport_header(skb) < skb->head || -+ (skb_transport_header(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)) > -+ skb_tail_pointer(skb))) -+ return -EINVAL; /* Bogus IP header */ -+ udp = udp_hdr(skb); -+ data_offset = (u8 *)udp - skb->data; -+ if (unlikely(data_offset > U16_MAX || -+ data_offset + sizeof(struct udphdr) > skb->len)) -+ /* Packet has offset at impossible location or isn't big enough -+ * to have UDP fields. -+ */ -+ return -EINVAL; -+ data_len = ntohs(udp->len); -+ if (unlikely(data_len < sizeof(struct udphdr) || -+ data_len > skb->len - data_offset)) -+ /* UDP packet is reporting too small of a size or lying about -+ * its size. -+ */ -+ return -EINVAL; -+ data_len -= sizeof(struct udphdr); -+ data_offset = (u8 *)udp + sizeof(struct udphdr) - skb->data; -+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, -+ data_offset + sizeof(struct message_header)) || -+ pskb_trim(skb, data_len + data_offset) < 0)) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ skb_pull(skb, data_offset); -+ if (unlikely(skb->len != data_len)) -+ /* Final len does not agree with calculated len */ -+ return -EINVAL; -+ header_len = validate_header_len(skb); -+ if (unlikely(!header_len)) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ __skb_push(skb, data_offset); -+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, data_offset + header_len))) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ __skb_pull(skb, data_offset); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static void wg_receive_handshake_packet(struct wg_device *wg, -+ struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ enum cookie_mac_state mac_state; -+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; -+ /* This is global, so that our load calculation applies to the whole -+ * system. We don't care about races with it at all. -+ */ -+ static u64 last_under_load; -+ bool packet_needs_cookie; -+ bool under_load; -+ -+ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE)) { -+ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Receiving cookie response from %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, skb); -+ wg_cookie_message_consume( -+ (struct message_handshake_cookie *)skb->data, wg); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ under_load = skb_queue_len(&wg->incoming_handshakes) >= -+ MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES / 8; -+ if (under_load) -+ last_under_load = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ else if (last_under_load) -+ under_load = !wg_birthdate_has_expired(last_under_load, 1); -+ mac_state = wg_cookie_validate_packet(&wg->cookie_checker, skb, -+ under_load); -+ if ((under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE) || -+ (!under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_BUT_NO_COOKIE)) { -+ packet_needs_cookie = false; -+ } else if (under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_BUT_NO_COOKIE) { -+ packet_needs_cookie = true; -+ } else { -+ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid MAC of handshake, dropping packet from %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, skb); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ switch (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb)) { -+ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION): { -+ struct message_handshake_initiation *message = -+ (struct message_handshake_initiation *)skb->data; -+ -+ if (packet_needs_cookie) { -+ wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(wg, skb, -+ message->sender_index); -+ return; -+ } -+ peer = wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(message, wg); -+ if (unlikely(!peer)) { -+ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid handshake initiation from %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, skb); -+ return; -+ } -+ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint_from_skb(peer, skb); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Receiving handshake initiation from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ wg_packet_send_handshake_response(peer); -+ break; -+ } -+ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE): { -+ struct message_handshake_response *message = -+ (struct message_handshake_response *)skb->data; -+ -+ if (packet_needs_cookie) { -+ wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(wg, skb, -+ message->sender_index); -+ return; -+ } -+ peer = wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(message, wg); -+ if (unlikely(!peer)) { -+ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid handshake response from %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, skb); -+ return; -+ } -+ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint_from_skb(peer, skb); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Receiving handshake response from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ if (wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(&peer->handshake, -+ &peer->keypairs)) { -+ wg_timers_session_derived(peer); -+ wg_timers_handshake_complete(peer); -+ /* Calling this function will either send any existing -+ * packets in the queue and not send a keepalive, which -+ * is the best case, Or, if there's nothing in the -+ * queue, it will send a keepalive, in order to give -+ * immediate confirmation of the session. -+ */ -+ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); -+ } -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (unlikely(!peer)) { -+ WARN(1, "Somehow a wrong type of packet wound up in the handshake queue!\n"); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ local_bh_disable(); -+ update_rx_stats(peer, skb->len); -+ local_bh_enable(); -+ -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received(peer); -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker(struct work_struct *work) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg = container_of(work, struct multicore_worker, -+ work)->ptr; -+ struct sk_buff *skb; -+ -+ while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&wg->incoming_handshakes)) != NULL) { -+ wg_receive_handshake_packet(wg, skb); -+ dev_kfree_skb(skb); -+ cond_resched(); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair; -+ bool send = false; -+ -+ if (peer->sent_lastminute_handshake) -+ return; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); -+ if (likely(keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)) && -+ keypair->i_am_the_initiator && -+ unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, -+ REJECT_AFTER_TIME - KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT - REKEY_TIMEOUT))) -+ send = true; -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ -+ if (send) { -+ peer->sent_lastminute_handshake = true; -+ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); -+ } -+} -+ -+static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_symmetric_key *key) -+{ -+ struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8]; -+ struct sk_buff *trailer; -+ unsigned int offset; -+ int num_frags; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!key)) -+ return false; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid) || -+ wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || -+ key->counter.receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { -+ WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false); -+ return false; -+ } -+ -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce = -+ le64_to_cpu(((struct message_data *)skb->data)->counter); -+ -+ /* We ensure that the network header is part of the packet before we -+ * call skb_cow_data, so that there's no chance that data is removed -+ * from the skb, so that later we can extract the original endpoint. -+ */ -+ offset = skb->data - skb_network_header(skb); -+ skb_push(skb, offset); -+ num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); -+ offset += sizeof(struct message_data); -+ skb_pull(skb, offset); -+ if (unlikely(num_frags < 0 || num_frags > ARRAY_SIZE(sg))) -+ return false; -+ -+ sg_init_table(sg, num_frags); -+ if (skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len) <= 0) -+ return false; -+ -+ if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace(sg, skb->len, NULL, 0, -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, -+ key->key)) -+ return false; -+ -+ /* Another ugly situation of pushing and pulling the header so as to -+ * keep endpoint information intact. -+ */ -+ skb_push(skb, offset); -+ if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - noise_encrypted_len(0))) -+ return false; -+ skb_pull(skb, offset); -+ -+ return true; -+} -+ -+/* This is RFC6479, a replay detection bitmap algorithm that avoids bitshifts */ -+static bool counter_validate(union noise_counter *counter, u64 their_counter) -+{ -+ unsigned long index, index_current, top, i; -+ bool ret = false; -+ -+ spin_lock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); -+ -+ if (unlikely(counter->receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 || -+ their_counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ ++their_counter; -+ -+ if (unlikely((COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + their_counter) < -+ counter->receive.counter)) -+ goto out; -+ -+ index = their_counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); -+ -+ if (likely(their_counter > counter->receive.counter)) { -+ index_current = counter->receive.counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); -+ top = min_t(unsigned long, index - index_current, -+ COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG); -+ for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) -+ counter->receive.backtrack[(i + index_current) & -+ ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; -+ counter->receive.counter = their_counter; -+ } -+ -+ index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; -+ ret = !test_and_set_bit(their_counter & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1), -+ &counter->receive.backtrack[index]); -+ -+out: -+ spin_unlock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+#include "selftest/counter.c" -+ -+static void wg_packet_consume_data_done(struct wg_peer *peer, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, -+ struct endpoint *endpoint) -+{ -+ struct net_device *dev = peer->device->dev; -+ unsigned int len, len_before_trim; -+ struct wg_peer *routed_peer; -+ -+ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(peer, endpoint); -+ -+ if (unlikely(wg_noise_received_with_keypair(&peer->keypairs, -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair))) { -+ wg_timers_handshake_complete(peer); -+ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); -+ } -+ -+ keep_key_fresh(peer); -+ -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received(peer); -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); -+ -+ /* A packet with length 0 is a keepalive packet */ -+ if (unlikely(!skb->len)) { -+ update_rx_stats(peer, message_data_len(0)); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Receiving keepalive packet from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ goto packet_processed; -+ } -+ -+ wg_timers_data_received(peer); -+ -+ if (unlikely(skb_network_header(skb) < skb->head)) -+ goto dishonest_packet_size; -+ if (unlikely(!(pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) && -+ (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4 || -+ (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 6 && -+ pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))))))) -+ goto dishonest_packet_type; -+ -+ skb->dev = dev; -+ /* We've already verified the Poly1305 auth tag, which means this packet -+ * was not modified in transit. We can therefore tell the networking -+ * stack that all checksums of every layer of encapsulation have already -+ * been checked "by the hardware" and therefore is unneccessary to check -+ * again in software. -+ */ -+ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; -+ skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */ -+ skb->protocol = wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb); -+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { -+ len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); -+ if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) -+ goto dishonest_packet_size; -+ if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds)) -+ IP_ECN_set_ce(ip_hdr(skb)); -+ } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { -+ len = ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) + -+ sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); -+ if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds)) -+ IP6_ECN_set_ce(skb, ipv6_hdr(skb)); -+ } else { -+ goto dishonest_packet_type; -+ } -+ -+ if (unlikely(len > skb->len)) -+ goto dishonest_packet_size; -+ len_before_trim = skb->len; -+ if (unlikely(pskb_trim(skb, len))) -+ goto packet_processed; -+ -+ routed_peer = wg_allowedips_lookup_src(&peer->device->peer_allowedips, -+ skb); -+ wg_peer_put(routed_peer); /* We don't need the extra reference. */ -+ -+ if (unlikely(routed_peer != peer)) -+ goto dishonest_packet_peer; -+ -+ if (unlikely(napi_gro_receive(&peer->napi, skb) == GRO_DROP)) { -+ ++dev->stats.rx_dropped; -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Failed to give packet to userspace from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ } else { -+ update_rx_stats(peer, message_data_len(len_before_trim)); -+ } -+ return; -+ -+dishonest_packet_peer: -+ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Packet has unallowed src IP (%pISc) from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ dev->name, skb, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ ++dev->stats.rx_errors; -+ ++dev->stats.rx_frame_errors; -+ goto packet_processed; -+dishonest_packet_type: -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet is neither ipv4 nor ipv6 from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ dev->name, peer->internal_id, &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ ++dev->stats.rx_errors; -+ ++dev->stats.rx_frame_errors; -+ goto packet_processed; -+dishonest_packet_size: -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has incorrect size from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ dev->name, peer->internal_id, &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ ++dev->stats.rx_errors; -+ ++dev->stats.rx_length_errors; -+ goto packet_processed; -+packet_processed: -+ dev_kfree_skb(skb); -+} -+ -+int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(napi, struct wg_peer, napi); -+ struct crypt_queue *queue = &peer->rx_queue; -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair; -+ struct endpoint endpoint; -+ enum packet_state state; -+ struct sk_buff *skb; -+ int work_done = 0; -+ bool free; -+ -+ if (unlikely(budget <= 0)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ while ((skb = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL && -+ (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state)) != -+ PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { -+ __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring); -+ peer = PACKET_PEER(skb); -+ keypair = PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair; -+ free = true; -+ -+ if (unlikely(state != PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) -+ goto next; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!counter_validate(&keypair->receiving.counter, -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce))) { -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, -+ keypair->receiving.counter.receive.counter); -+ goto next; -+ } -+ -+ if (unlikely(wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, skb))) -+ goto next; -+ -+ wg_reset_packet(skb); -+ wg_packet_consume_data_done(peer, skb, &endpoint); -+ free = false; -+ -+next: -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ if (unlikely(free)) -+ dev_kfree_skb(skb); -+ -+ if (++work_done >= budget) -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ if (work_done < budget) -+ napi_complete_done(napi, work_done); -+ -+ return work_done; -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work) -+{ -+ struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct multicore_worker, -+ work)->ptr; -+ struct sk_buff *skb; -+ -+ while ((skb = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) { -+ enum packet_state state = likely(decrypt_packet(skb, -+ &PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->receiving)) ? -+ PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD; -+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void wg_packet_consume_data(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ __le32 idx = ((struct message_data *)skb->data)->key_idx; -+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; -+ int ret; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair = -+ (struct noise_keypair *)wg_index_hashtable_lookup( -+ wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR, idx, -+ &peer); -+ if (unlikely(!wg_noise_keypair_get(PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair))) -+ goto err_keypair; -+ -+ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) -+ goto err; -+ -+ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->decrypt_queue, -+ &peer->rx_queue, skb, -+ wg->packet_crypt_wq, -+ &wg->decrypt_queue.last_cpu); -+ if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) -+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); -+ if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) { -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ return; -+ } -+err: -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair, false); -+err_keypair: -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ dev_kfree_skb(skb); -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_receive(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ if (unlikely(prepare_skb_header(skb, wg) < 0)) -+ goto err; -+ switch (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb)) { -+ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION): -+ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE): -+ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE): { -+ int cpu; -+ -+ if (skb_queue_len(&wg->incoming_handshakes) > -+ MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES || -+ unlikely(!rng_is_initialized())) { -+ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Dropping handshake packet from %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, skb); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ skb_queue_tail(&wg->incoming_handshakes, skb); -+ /* Queues up a call to packet_process_queued_handshake_ -+ * packets(skb): -+ */ -+ cpu = wg_cpumask_next_online(&wg->incoming_handshake_cpu); -+ queue_work_on(cpu, wg->handshake_receive_wq, -+ &per_cpu_ptr(wg->incoming_handshakes_worker, cpu)->work); -+ break; -+ } -+ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_DATA): -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_get_dsfield(ip_hdr(skb), skb); -+ wg_packet_consume_data(wg, skb); -+ break; -+ default: -+ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid packet from %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, skb); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ return; -+ -+err: -+ dev_kfree_skb(skb); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/allowedips.c -@@ -0,0 +1,683 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ * -+ * This contains some basic static unit tests for the allowedips data structure. -+ * It also has two additional modes that are disabled and meant to be used by -+ * folks directly playing with this file. If you define the macro -+ * DEBUG_PRINT_TRIE_GRAPHVIZ to be 1, then every time there's a full tree in -+ * memory, it will be printed out as KERN_DEBUG in a format that can be passed -+ * to graphviz (the dot command) to visualize it. If you define the macro -+ * DEBUG_RANDOM_TRIE to be 1, then there will be an extremely costly set of -+ * randomized tests done against a trivial implementation, which may take -+ * upwards of a half-hour to complete. There's no set of users who should be -+ * enabling these, and the only developers that should go anywhere near these -+ * nobs are the ones who are reading this comment. -+ */ -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+ -+#include -+ -+static __init void swap_endian_and_apply_cidr(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, u8 bits, -+ u8 cidr) -+{ -+ swap_endian(dst, src, bits); -+ memset(dst + (cidr + 7) / 8, 0, bits / 8 - (cidr + 7) / 8); -+ if (cidr) -+ dst[(cidr + 7) / 8 - 1] &= ~0U << ((8 - (cidr % 8)) % 8); -+} -+ -+static __init void print_node(struct allowedips_node *node, u8 bits) -+{ -+ char *fmt_connection = KERN_DEBUG "\t\"%p/%d\" -> \"%p/%d\";\n"; -+ char *fmt_declaration = KERN_DEBUG -+ "\t\"%p/%d\"[style=%s, color=\"#%06x\"];\n"; -+ char *style = "dotted"; -+ u8 ip1[16], ip2[16]; -+ u32 color = 0; -+ -+ if (bits == 32) { -+ fmt_connection = KERN_DEBUG "\t\"%pI4/%d\" -> \"%pI4/%d\";\n"; -+ fmt_declaration = KERN_DEBUG -+ "\t\"%pI4/%d\"[style=%s, color=\"#%06x\"];\n"; -+ } else if (bits == 128) { -+ fmt_connection = KERN_DEBUG "\t\"%pI6/%d\" -> \"%pI6/%d\";\n"; -+ fmt_declaration = KERN_DEBUG -+ "\t\"%pI6/%d\"[style=%s, color=\"#%06x\"];\n"; -+ } -+ if (node->peer) { -+ hsiphash_key_t key = { { 0 } }; -+ -+ memcpy(&key, &node->peer, sizeof(node->peer)); -+ color = hsiphash_1u32(0xdeadbeef, &key) % 200 << 16 | -+ hsiphash_1u32(0xbabecafe, &key) % 200 << 8 | -+ hsiphash_1u32(0xabad1dea, &key) % 200; -+ style = "bold"; -+ } -+ swap_endian_and_apply_cidr(ip1, node->bits, bits, node->cidr); -+ printk(fmt_declaration, ip1, node->cidr, style, color); -+ if (node->bit[0]) { -+ swap_endian_and_apply_cidr(ip2, -+ rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[0])->bits, bits, -+ node->cidr); -+ printk(fmt_connection, ip1, node->cidr, ip2, -+ rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[0])->cidr); -+ print_node(rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[0]), bits); -+ } -+ if (node->bit[1]) { -+ swap_endian_and_apply_cidr(ip2, -+ rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[1])->bits, -+ bits, node->cidr); -+ printk(fmt_connection, ip1, node->cidr, ip2, -+ rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[1])->cidr); -+ print_node(rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[1]), bits); -+ } -+} -+ -+static __init void print_tree(struct allowedips_node __rcu *top, u8 bits) -+{ -+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "digraph trie {\n"); -+ print_node(rcu_dereference_raw(top), bits); -+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "}\n"); -+} -+ -+enum { -+ NUM_PEERS = 2000, -+ NUM_RAND_ROUTES = 400, -+ NUM_MUTATED_ROUTES = 100, -+ NUM_QUERIES = NUM_RAND_ROUTES * NUM_MUTATED_ROUTES * 30 -+}; -+ -+struct horrible_allowedips { -+ struct hlist_head head; -+}; -+ -+struct horrible_allowedips_node { -+ struct hlist_node table; -+ union nf_inet_addr ip; -+ union nf_inet_addr mask; -+ u8 ip_version; -+ void *value; -+}; -+ -+static __init void horrible_allowedips_init(struct horrible_allowedips *table) -+{ -+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&table->head); -+} -+ -+static __init void horrible_allowedips_free(struct horrible_allowedips *table) -+{ -+ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node; -+ struct hlist_node *h; -+ -+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(node, h, &table->head, table) { -+ hlist_del(&node->table); -+ kfree(node); -+ } -+} -+ -+static __init inline union nf_inet_addr horrible_cidr_to_mask(u8 cidr) -+{ -+ union nf_inet_addr mask; -+ -+ memset(&mask, 0x00, 128 / 8); -+ memset(&mask, 0xff, cidr / 8); -+ if (cidr % 32) -+ mask.all[cidr / 32] = (__force u32)htonl( -+ (0xFFFFFFFFUL << (32 - (cidr % 32))) & 0xFFFFFFFFUL); -+ return mask; -+} -+ -+static __init inline u8 horrible_mask_to_cidr(union nf_inet_addr subnet) -+{ -+ return hweight32(subnet.all[0]) + hweight32(subnet.all[1]) + -+ hweight32(subnet.all[2]) + hweight32(subnet.all[3]); -+} -+ -+static __init inline void -+horrible_mask_self(struct horrible_allowedips_node *node) -+{ -+ if (node->ip_version == 4) { -+ node->ip.ip &= node->mask.ip; -+ } else if (node->ip_version == 6) { -+ node->ip.ip6[0] &= node->mask.ip6[0]; -+ node->ip.ip6[1] &= node->mask.ip6[1]; -+ node->ip.ip6[2] &= node->mask.ip6[2]; -+ node->ip.ip6[3] &= node->mask.ip6[3]; -+ } -+} -+ -+static __init inline bool -+horrible_match_v4(const struct horrible_allowedips_node *node, -+ struct in_addr *ip) -+{ -+ return (ip->s_addr & node->mask.ip) == node->ip.ip; -+} -+ -+static __init inline bool -+horrible_match_v6(const struct horrible_allowedips_node *node, -+ struct in6_addr *ip) -+{ -+ return (ip->in6_u.u6_addr32[0] & node->mask.ip6[0]) == -+ node->ip.ip6[0] && -+ (ip->in6_u.u6_addr32[1] & node->mask.ip6[1]) == -+ node->ip.ip6[1] && -+ (ip->in6_u.u6_addr32[2] & node->mask.ip6[2]) == -+ node->ip.ip6[2] && -+ (ip->in6_u.u6_addr32[3] & node->mask.ip6[3]) == node->ip.ip6[3]; -+} -+ -+static __init void -+horrible_insert_ordered(struct horrible_allowedips *table, -+ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node) -+{ -+ struct horrible_allowedips_node *other = NULL, *where = NULL; -+ u8 my_cidr = horrible_mask_to_cidr(node->mask); -+ -+ hlist_for_each_entry(other, &table->head, table) { -+ if (!memcmp(&other->mask, &node->mask, -+ sizeof(union nf_inet_addr)) && -+ !memcmp(&other->ip, &node->ip, -+ sizeof(union nf_inet_addr)) && -+ other->ip_version == node->ip_version) { -+ other->value = node->value; -+ kfree(node); -+ return; -+ } -+ where = other; -+ if (horrible_mask_to_cidr(other->mask) <= my_cidr) -+ break; -+ } -+ if (!other && !where) -+ hlist_add_head(&node->table, &table->head); -+ else if (!other) -+ hlist_add_behind(&node->table, &where->table); -+ else -+ hlist_add_before(&node->table, &where->table); -+} -+ -+static __init int -+horrible_allowedips_insert_v4(struct horrible_allowedips *table, -+ struct in_addr *ip, u8 cidr, void *value) -+{ -+ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), -+ GFP_KERNEL); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!node)) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ node->ip.in = *ip; -+ node->mask = horrible_cidr_to_mask(cidr); -+ node->ip_version = 4; -+ node->value = value; -+ horrible_mask_self(node); -+ horrible_insert_ordered(table, node); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static __init int -+horrible_allowedips_insert_v6(struct horrible_allowedips *table, -+ struct in6_addr *ip, u8 cidr, void *value) -+{ -+ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), -+ GFP_KERNEL); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!node)) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ node->ip.in6 = *ip; -+ node->mask = horrible_cidr_to_mask(cidr); -+ node->ip_version = 6; -+ node->value = value; -+ horrible_mask_self(node); -+ horrible_insert_ordered(table, node); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static __init void * -+horrible_allowedips_lookup_v4(struct horrible_allowedips *table, -+ struct in_addr *ip) -+{ -+ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node; -+ void *ret = NULL; -+ -+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, &table->head, table) { -+ if (node->ip_version != 4) -+ continue; -+ if (horrible_match_v4(node, ip)) { -+ ret = node->value; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static __init void * -+horrible_allowedips_lookup_v6(struct horrible_allowedips *table, -+ struct in6_addr *ip) -+{ -+ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node; -+ void *ret = NULL; -+ -+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, &table->head, table) { -+ if (node->ip_version != 6) -+ continue; -+ if (horrible_match_v6(node, ip)) { -+ ret = node->value; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static __init bool randomized_test(void) -+{ -+ unsigned int i, j, k, mutate_amount, cidr; -+ u8 ip[16], mutate_mask[16], mutated[16]; -+ struct wg_peer **peers, *peer; -+ struct horrible_allowedips h; -+ DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); -+ struct allowedips t; -+ bool ret = false; -+ -+ mutex_init(&mutex); -+ -+ wg_allowedips_init(&t); -+ horrible_allowedips_init(&h); -+ -+ peers = kcalloc(NUM_PEERS, sizeof(*peers), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!peers)) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free; -+ } -+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_PEERS; ++i) { -+ peers[i] = kzalloc(sizeof(*peers[i]), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!peers[i])) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free; -+ } -+ kref_init(&peers[i]->refcount); -+ } -+ -+ mutex_lock(&mutex); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RAND_ROUTES; ++i) { -+ prandom_bytes(ip, 4); -+ cidr = prandom_u32_max(32) + 1; -+ peer = peers[prandom_u32_max(NUM_PEERS)]; -+ if (wg_allowedips_insert_v4(&t, (struct in_addr *)ip, cidr, -+ peer, &mutex) < 0) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free_locked; -+ } -+ if (horrible_allowedips_insert_v4(&h, (struct in_addr *)ip, -+ cidr, peer) < 0) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free_locked; -+ } -+ for (j = 0; j < NUM_MUTATED_ROUTES; ++j) { -+ memcpy(mutated, ip, 4); -+ prandom_bytes(mutate_mask, 4); -+ mutate_amount = prandom_u32_max(32); -+ for (k = 0; k < mutate_amount / 8; ++k) -+ mutate_mask[k] = 0xff; -+ mutate_mask[k] = 0xff -+ << ((8 - (mutate_amount % 8)) % 8); -+ for (; k < 4; ++k) -+ mutate_mask[k] = 0; -+ for (k = 0; k < 4; ++k) -+ mutated[k] = (mutated[k] & mutate_mask[k]) | -+ (~mutate_mask[k] & -+ prandom_u32_max(256)); -+ cidr = prandom_u32_max(32) + 1; -+ peer = peers[prandom_u32_max(NUM_PEERS)]; -+ if (wg_allowedips_insert_v4(&t, -+ (struct in_addr *)mutated, -+ cidr, peer, &mutex) < 0) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free_locked; -+ } -+ if (horrible_allowedips_insert_v4(&h, -+ (struct in_addr *)mutated, cidr, peer)) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free_locked; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RAND_ROUTES; ++i) { -+ prandom_bytes(ip, 16); -+ cidr = prandom_u32_max(128) + 1; -+ peer = peers[prandom_u32_max(NUM_PEERS)]; -+ if (wg_allowedips_insert_v6(&t, (struct in6_addr *)ip, cidr, -+ peer, &mutex) < 0) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free_locked; -+ } -+ if (horrible_allowedips_insert_v6(&h, (struct in6_addr *)ip, -+ cidr, peer) < 0) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free_locked; -+ } -+ for (j = 0; j < NUM_MUTATED_ROUTES; ++j) { -+ memcpy(mutated, ip, 16); -+ prandom_bytes(mutate_mask, 16); -+ mutate_amount = prandom_u32_max(128); -+ for (k = 0; k < mutate_amount / 8; ++k) -+ mutate_mask[k] = 0xff; -+ mutate_mask[k] = 0xff -+ << ((8 - (mutate_amount % 8)) % 8); -+ for (; k < 4; ++k) -+ mutate_mask[k] = 0; -+ for (k = 0; k < 4; ++k) -+ mutated[k] = (mutated[k] & mutate_mask[k]) | -+ (~mutate_mask[k] & -+ prandom_u32_max(256)); -+ cidr = prandom_u32_max(128) + 1; -+ peer = peers[prandom_u32_max(NUM_PEERS)]; -+ if (wg_allowedips_insert_v6(&t, -+ (struct in6_addr *)mutated, -+ cidr, peer, &mutex) < 0) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free_locked; -+ } -+ if (horrible_allowedips_insert_v6( -+ &h, (struct in6_addr *)mutated, cidr, -+ peer)) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free_locked; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ -+ mutex_unlock(&mutex); -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(DEBUG_PRINT_TRIE_GRAPHVIZ)) { -+ print_tree(t.root4, 32); -+ print_tree(t.root6, 128); -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_QUERIES; ++i) { -+ prandom_bytes(ip, 4); -+ if (lookup(t.root4, 32, ip) != -+ horrible_allowedips_lookup_v4(&h, (struct in_addr *)ip)) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_QUERIES; ++i) { -+ prandom_bytes(ip, 16); -+ if (lookup(t.root6, 128, ip) != -+ horrible_allowedips_lookup_v6(&h, (struct in6_addr *)ip)) { -+ pr_err("allowedips random self-test: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free; -+ } -+ } -+ ret = true; -+ -+free: -+ mutex_lock(&mutex); -+free_locked: -+ wg_allowedips_free(&t, &mutex); -+ mutex_unlock(&mutex); -+ horrible_allowedips_free(&h); -+ if (peers) { -+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_PEERS; ++i) -+ kfree(peers[i]); -+ } -+ kfree(peers); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static __init inline struct in_addr *ip4(u8 a, u8 b, u8 c, u8 d) -+{ -+ static struct in_addr ip; -+ u8 *split = (u8 *)&ip; -+ -+ split[0] = a; -+ split[1] = b; -+ split[2] = c; -+ split[3] = d; -+ return &ip; -+} -+ -+static __init inline struct in6_addr *ip6(u32 a, u32 b, u32 c, u32 d) -+{ -+ static struct in6_addr ip; -+ __be32 *split = (__be32 *)&ip; -+ -+ split[0] = cpu_to_be32(a); -+ split[1] = cpu_to_be32(b); -+ split[2] = cpu_to_be32(c); -+ split[3] = cpu_to_be32(d); -+ return &ip; -+} -+ -+static __init struct wg_peer *init_peer(void) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = kzalloc(sizeof(*peer), GFP_KERNEL); -+ -+ if (!peer) -+ return NULL; -+ kref_init(&peer->refcount); -+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&peer->allowedips_list); -+ return peer; -+} -+ -+#define insert(version, mem, ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd, cidr) \ -+ wg_allowedips_insert_v##version(&t, ip##version(ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd), \ -+ cidr, mem, &mutex) -+ -+#define maybe_fail() do { \ -+ ++i; \ -+ if (!_s) { \ -+ pr_info("allowedips self-test %zu: FAIL\n", i); \ -+ success = false; \ -+ } \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+#define test(version, mem, ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd) do { \ -+ bool _s = lookup(t.root##version, (version) == 4 ? 32 : 128, \ -+ ip##version(ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd)) == (mem); \ -+ maybe_fail(); \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+#define test_negative(version, mem, ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd) do { \ -+ bool _s = lookup(t.root##version, (version) == 4 ? 32 : 128, \ -+ ip##version(ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd)) != (mem); \ -+ maybe_fail(); \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+#define test_boolean(cond) do { \ -+ bool _s = (cond); \ -+ maybe_fail(); \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+bool __init wg_allowedips_selftest(void) -+{ -+ bool found_a = false, found_b = false, found_c = false, found_d = false, -+ found_e = false, found_other = false; -+ struct wg_peer *a = init_peer(), *b = init_peer(), *c = init_peer(), -+ *d = init_peer(), *e = init_peer(), *f = init_peer(), -+ *g = init_peer(), *h = init_peer(); -+ struct allowedips_node *iter_node; -+ bool success = false; -+ struct allowedips t; -+ DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); -+ struct in6_addr ip; -+ size_t i = 0, count = 0; -+ __be64 part; -+ -+ mutex_init(&mutex); -+ mutex_lock(&mutex); -+ wg_allowedips_init(&t); -+ -+ if (!a || !b || !c || !d || !e || !f || !g || !h) { -+ pr_err("allowedips self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ goto free; -+ } -+ -+ insert(4, a, 192, 168, 4, 0, 24); -+ insert(4, b, 192, 168, 4, 4, 32); -+ insert(4, c, 192, 168, 0, 0, 16); -+ insert(4, d, 192, 95, 5, 64, 27); -+ /* replaces previous entry, and maskself is required */ -+ insert(4, c, 192, 95, 5, 65, 27); -+ insert(6, d, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc05f0543, 128); -+ insert(6, c, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0, 64); -+ insert(4, e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); -+ insert(6, e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); -+ /* replaces previous entry */ -+ insert(6, f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); -+ insert(6, g, 0x24046800, 0, 0, 0, 32); -+ /* maskself is required */ -+ insert(6, h, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0xdeadbeef, 0xdeadbeef, 64); -+ insert(6, a, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0xdeadbeef, 0xdeadbeef, 128); -+ insert(6, c, 0x24446800, 0x40e40800, 0xdeaebeef, 0xdefbeef, 128); -+ insert(6, b, 0x24446800, 0xf0e40800, 0xeeaebeef, 0, 98); -+ insert(4, g, 64, 15, 112, 0, 20); -+ /* maskself is required */ -+ insert(4, h, 64, 15, 123, 211, 25); -+ insert(4, a, 10, 0, 0, 0, 25); -+ insert(4, b, 10, 0, 0, 128, 25); -+ insert(4, a, 10, 1, 0, 0, 30); -+ insert(4, b, 10, 1, 0, 4, 30); -+ insert(4, c, 10, 1, 0, 8, 29); -+ insert(4, d, 10, 1, 0, 16, 29); -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(DEBUG_PRINT_TRIE_GRAPHVIZ)) { -+ print_tree(t.root4, 32); -+ print_tree(t.root6, 128); -+ } -+ -+ success = true; -+ -+ test(4, a, 192, 168, 4, 20); -+ test(4, a, 192, 168, 4, 0); -+ test(4, b, 192, 168, 4, 4); -+ test(4, c, 192, 168, 200, 182); -+ test(4, c, 192, 95, 5, 68); -+ test(4, e, 192, 95, 5, 96); -+ test(6, d, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc05f0543); -+ test(6, c, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc02e01ee); -+ test(6, f, 0x26075300, 0x60006b01, 0, 0); -+ test(6, g, 0x24046800, 0x40040806, 0, 0x1006); -+ test(6, g, 0x24046800, 0x40040806, 0x1234, 0x5678); -+ test(6, f, 0x240467ff, 0x40040806, 0x1234, 0x5678); -+ test(6, f, 0x24046801, 0x40040806, 0x1234, 0x5678); -+ test(6, h, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0x1234, 0x5678); -+ test(6, h, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0, 0); -+ test(6, h, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0x10101010, 0x10101010); -+ test(6, a, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0xdeadbeef, 0xdeadbeef); -+ test(4, g, 64, 15, 116, 26); -+ test(4, g, 64, 15, 127, 3); -+ test(4, g, 64, 15, 123, 1); -+ test(4, h, 64, 15, 123, 128); -+ test(4, h, 64, 15, 123, 129); -+ test(4, a, 10, 0, 0, 52); -+ test(4, b, 10, 0, 0, 220); -+ test(4, a, 10, 1, 0, 2); -+ test(4, b, 10, 1, 0, 6); -+ test(4, c, 10, 1, 0, 10); -+ test(4, d, 10, 1, 0, 20); -+ -+ insert(4, a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 32); -+ insert(4, a, 64, 0, 0, 0, 32); -+ insert(4, a, 128, 0, 0, 0, 32); -+ insert(4, a, 192, 0, 0, 0, 32); -+ insert(4, a, 255, 0, 0, 0, 32); -+ wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(&t, a, &mutex); -+ test_negative(4, a, 1, 0, 0, 0); -+ test_negative(4, a, 64, 0, 0, 0); -+ test_negative(4, a, 128, 0, 0, 0); -+ test_negative(4, a, 192, 0, 0, 0); -+ test_negative(4, a, 255, 0, 0, 0); -+ -+ wg_allowedips_free(&t, &mutex); -+ wg_allowedips_init(&t); -+ insert(4, a, 192, 168, 0, 0, 16); -+ insert(4, a, 192, 168, 0, 0, 24); -+ wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(&t, a, &mutex); -+ test_negative(4, a, 192, 168, 0, 1); -+ -+ /* These will hit the WARN_ON(len >= 128) in free_node if something -+ * goes wrong. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < 128; ++i) { -+ part = cpu_to_be64(~(1LLU << (i % 64))); -+ memset(&ip, 0xff, 16); -+ memcpy((u8 *)&ip + (i < 64) * 8, &part, 8); -+ wg_allowedips_insert_v6(&t, &ip, 128, a, &mutex); -+ } -+ -+ wg_allowedips_free(&t, &mutex); -+ -+ wg_allowedips_init(&t); -+ insert(4, a, 192, 95, 5, 93, 27); -+ insert(6, a, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc05f0543, 128); -+ insert(4, a, 10, 1, 0, 20, 29); -+ insert(6, a, 0x26075300, 0x6d8a6bf8, 0xdab1f1df, 0xc05f1523, 83); -+ insert(6, a, 0x26075300, 0x6d8a6bf8, 0xdab1f1df, 0xc05f1523, 21); -+ list_for_each_entry(iter_node, &a->allowedips_list, peer_list) { -+ u8 cidr, ip[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); -+ int family = wg_allowedips_read_node(iter_node, ip, &cidr); -+ -+ count++; -+ -+ if (cidr == 27 && family == AF_INET && -+ !memcmp(ip, ip4(192, 95, 5, 64), sizeof(struct in_addr))) -+ found_a = true; -+ else if (cidr == 128 && family == AF_INET6 && -+ !memcmp(ip, ip6(0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc05f0543), -+ sizeof(struct in6_addr))) -+ found_b = true; -+ else if (cidr == 29 && family == AF_INET && -+ !memcmp(ip, ip4(10, 1, 0, 16), sizeof(struct in_addr))) -+ found_c = true; -+ else if (cidr == 83 && family == AF_INET6 && -+ !memcmp(ip, ip6(0x26075300, 0x6d8a6bf8, 0xdab1e000, 0), -+ sizeof(struct in6_addr))) -+ found_d = true; -+ else if (cidr == 21 && family == AF_INET6 && -+ !memcmp(ip, ip6(0x26075000, 0, 0, 0), -+ sizeof(struct in6_addr))) -+ found_e = true; -+ else -+ found_other = true; -+ } -+ test_boolean(count == 5); -+ test_boolean(found_a); -+ test_boolean(found_b); -+ test_boolean(found_c); -+ test_boolean(found_d); -+ test_boolean(found_e); -+ test_boolean(!found_other); -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(DEBUG_RANDOM_TRIE) && success) -+ success = randomized_test(); -+ -+ if (success) -+ pr_info("allowedips self-tests: pass\n"); -+ -+free: -+ wg_allowedips_free(&t, &mutex); -+ kfree(a); -+ kfree(b); -+ kfree(c); -+ kfree(d); -+ kfree(e); -+ kfree(f); -+ kfree(g); -+ kfree(h); -+ mutex_unlock(&mutex); -+ -+ return success; -+} -+ -+#undef test_negative -+#undef test -+#undef remove -+#undef insert -+#undef init_peer -+ -+#endif ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c -@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+bool __init wg_packet_counter_selftest(void) -+{ -+ unsigned int test_num = 0, i; -+ union noise_counter counter; -+ bool success = true; -+ -+#define T_INIT do { \ -+ memset(&counter, 0, sizeof(union noise_counter)); \ -+ spin_lock_init(&counter.receive.lock); \ -+ } while (0) -+#define T_LIM (COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1) -+#define T(n, v) do { \ -+ ++test_num; \ -+ if (counter_validate(&counter, n) != (v)) { \ -+ pr_err("nonce counter self-test %u: FAIL\n", \ -+ test_num); \ -+ success = false; \ -+ } \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+ T_INIT; -+ /* 1 */ T(0, true); -+ /* 2 */ T(1, true); -+ /* 3 */ T(1, false); -+ /* 4 */ T(9, true); -+ /* 5 */ T(8, true); -+ /* 6 */ T(7, true); -+ /* 7 */ T(7, false); -+ /* 8 */ T(T_LIM, true); -+ /* 9 */ T(T_LIM - 1, true); -+ /* 10 */ T(T_LIM - 1, false); -+ /* 11 */ T(T_LIM - 2, true); -+ /* 12 */ T(2, true); -+ /* 13 */ T(2, false); -+ /* 14 */ T(T_LIM + 16, true); -+ /* 15 */ T(3, false); -+ /* 16 */ T(T_LIM + 16, false); -+ /* 17 */ T(T_LIM * 4, true); -+ /* 18 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM - 1), true); -+ /* 19 */ T(10, false); -+ /* 20 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - T_LIM, false); -+ /* 21 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM + 1), false); -+ /* 22 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM - 2), true); -+ /* 23 */ T(T_LIM * 4 + 1 - T_LIM, false); -+ /* 24 */ T(0, false); -+ /* 25 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES, false); -+ /* 26 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 1, true); -+ /* 27 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES, false); -+ /* 28 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 1, false); -+ /* 29 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 2, true); -+ /* 30 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1, false); -+ /* 31 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 2, false); -+ /* 32 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 2, false); -+ /* 33 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 3, true); -+ /* 34 */ T(0, false); -+ -+ T_INIT; -+ for (i = 1; i <= COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE; ++i) -+ T(i, true); -+ T(0, true); -+ T(0, false); -+ -+ T_INIT; -+ for (i = 2; i <= COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; ++i) -+ T(i, true); -+ T(1, true); -+ T(0, false); -+ -+ T_INIT; -+ for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 0;) -+ T(i, true); -+ -+ T_INIT; -+ for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 2; i-- > 1;) -+ T(i, true); -+ T(0, false); -+ -+ T_INIT; -+ for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 1;) -+ T(i, true); -+ T(COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1, true); -+ T(0, false); -+ -+ T_INIT; -+ for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 1;) -+ T(i, true); -+ T(0, true); -+ T(COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1, true); -+ -+#undef T -+#undef T_LIM -+#undef T_INIT -+ -+ if (success) -+ pr_info("nonce counter self-tests: pass\n"); -+ return success; -+} -+#endif ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c -@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+ -+#include -+ -+static const struct { -+ bool result; -+ unsigned int msec_to_sleep_before; -+} expected_results[] __initconst = { -+ [0 ... PACKETS_BURSTABLE - 1] = { true, 0 }, -+ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE] = { false, 0 }, -+ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 1] = { true, MSEC_PER_SEC / PACKETS_PER_SECOND }, -+ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 2] = { false, 0 }, -+ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 3] = { true, (MSEC_PER_SEC / PACKETS_PER_SECOND) * 2 }, -+ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 4] = { true, 0 }, -+ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 5] = { false, 0 } -+}; -+ -+static __init unsigned int maximum_jiffies_at_index(int index) -+{ -+ unsigned int total_msecs = 2 * MSEC_PER_SEC / PACKETS_PER_SECOND / 3; -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i <= index; ++i) -+ total_msecs += expected_results[i].msec_to_sleep_before; -+ return msecs_to_jiffies(total_msecs); -+} -+ -+static __init int timings_test(struct sk_buff *skb4, struct iphdr *hdr4, -+ struct sk_buff *skb6, struct ipv6hdr *hdr6, -+ int *test) -+{ -+ unsigned long loop_start_time; -+ int i; -+ -+ wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(NULL); -+ rcu_barrier(); -+ loop_start_time = jiffies; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(expected_results); ++i) { -+ if (expected_results[i].msec_to_sleep_before) -+ msleep(expected_results[i].msec_to_sleep_before); -+ -+ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + -+ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) -+ return -ETIMEDOUT; -+ if (wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb4, &init_net) != -+ expected_results[i].result) -+ return -EXFULL; -+ ++(*test); -+ -+ hdr4->saddr = htonl(ntohl(hdr4->saddr) + i + 1); -+ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + -+ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) -+ return -ETIMEDOUT; -+ if (!wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb4, &init_net)) -+ return -EXFULL; -+ ++(*test); -+ -+ hdr4->saddr = htonl(ntohl(hdr4->saddr) - i - 1); -+ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[2] = htonl(i); -+ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[3] = htonl(i); -+ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + -+ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) -+ return -ETIMEDOUT; -+ if (wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb6, &init_net) != -+ expected_results[i].result) -+ return -EXFULL; -+ ++(*test); -+ -+ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0] = -+ htonl(ntohl(hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0]) + i + 1); -+ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + -+ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) -+ return -ETIMEDOUT; -+ if (!wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb6, &init_net)) -+ return -EXFULL; -+ ++(*test); -+ -+ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0] = -+ htonl(ntohl(hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0]) - i - 1); -+ -+ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + -+ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) -+ return -ETIMEDOUT; -+#endif -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static __init int capacity_test(struct sk_buff *skb4, struct iphdr *hdr4, -+ int *test) -+{ -+ int i; -+ -+ wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(NULL); -+ rcu_barrier(); -+ -+ if (atomic_read(&total_entries)) -+ return -EXFULL; -+ ++(*test); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i <= max_entries; ++i) { -+ hdr4->saddr = htonl(i); -+ if (wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb4, &init_net) != (i != max_entries)) -+ return -EXFULL; -+ ++(*test); -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+bool __init wg_ratelimiter_selftest(void) -+{ -+ enum { TRIALS_BEFORE_GIVING_UP = 5000 }; -+ bool success = false; -+ int test = 0, trials; -+ struct sk_buff *skb4, *skb6; -+ struct iphdr *hdr4; -+ struct ipv6hdr *hdr6; -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UBSAN)) -+ return true; -+ -+ BUILD_BUG_ON(MSEC_PER_SEC % PACKETS_PER_SECOND != 0); -+ -+ if (wg_ratelimiter_init()) -+ goto out; -+ ++test; -+ if (wg_ratelimiter_init()) { -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ ++test; -+ if (wg_ratelimiter_init()) { -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ ++test; -+ -+ skb4 = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct iphdr), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!skb4)) -+ goto err_nofree; -+ skb4->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); -+ hdr4 = (struct iphdr *)skb_put(skb4, sizeof(*hdr4)); -+ hdr4->saddr = htonl(8182); -+ skb_reset_network_header(skb4); -+ ++test; -+ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ skb6 = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!skb6)) { -+ kfree_skb(skb4); -+ goto err_nofree; -+ } -+ skb6->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); -+ hdr6 = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_put(skb6, sizeof(*hdr6)); -+ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0] = htonl(1212); -+ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[1] = htonl(289188); -+ skb_reset_network_header(skb6); -+ ++test; -+#endif -+ -+ for (trials = TRIALS_BEFORE_GIVING_UP;;) { -+ int test_count = 0, ret; -+ -+ ret = timings_test(skb4, hdr4, skb6, hdr6, &test_count); -+ if (ret == -ETIMEDOUT) { -+ if (!trials--) { -+ test += test_count; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ msleep(500); -+ continue; -+ } else if (ret < 0) { -+ test += test_count; -+ goto err; -+ } else { -+ test += test_count; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ for (trials = TRIALS_BEFORE_GIVING_UP;;) { -+ int test_count = 0; -+ -+ if (capacity_test(skb4, hdr4, &test_count) < 0) { -+ if (!trials--) { -+ test += test_count; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ msleep(50); -+ continue; -+ } -+ test += test_count; -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ success = true; -+ -+err: -+ kfree_skb(skb4); -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ kfree_skb(skb6); -+#endif -+err_nofree: -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+ /* Uninit one extra time to check underflow detection. */ -+ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); -+out: -+ if (success) -+ pr_info("ratelimiter self-tests: pass\n"); -+ else -+ pr_err("ratelimiter self-test %d: FAIL\n", test); -+ -+ return success; -+} -+#endif ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -@@ -0,0 +1,413 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "timers.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "socket.h" -+#include "messages.h" -+#include "cookie.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+static void wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct message_handshake_initiation packet; -+ -+ if (!wg_birthdate_has_expired(atomic64_read(&peer->last_sent_handshake), -+ REKEY_TIMEOUT)) -+ return; /* This function is rate limited. */ -+ -+ atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending handshake initiation to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ -+ if (wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(&packet, &peer->handshake)) { -+ wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(&packet, sizeof(packet), peer); -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); -+ atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, -+ ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); -+ wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(peer, &packet, sizeof(packet), -+ HANDSHAKE_DSCP); -+ wg_timers_handshake_initiated(peer); -+ } -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_handshake_send_worker(struct work_struct *work) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, -+ transmit_handshake_work); -+ -+ wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation(peer); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer, -+ bool is_retry) -+{ -+ if (!is_retry) -+ peer->timer_handshake_attempts = 0; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ /* We check last_sent_handshake here in addition to the actual function -+ * we're queueing up, so that we don't queue things if not strictly -+ * necessary: -+ */ -+ if (!wg_birthdate_has_expired(atomic64_read(&peer->last_sent_handshake), -+ REKEY_TIMEOUT) || -+ unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ wg_peer_get(peer); -+ /* Queues up calling packet_send_queued_handshakes(peer), where we do a -+ * peer_put(peer) after: -+ */ -+ if (!queue_work(peer->device->handshake_send_wq, -+ &peer->transmit_handshake_work)) -+ /* If the work was already queued, we want to drop the -+ * extra reference: -+ */ -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+out: -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_send_handshake_response(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct message_handshake_response packet; -+ -+ atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending handshake response to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ -+ if (wg_noise_handshake_create_response(&packet, &peer->handshake)) { -+ wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(&packet, sizeof(packet), peer); -+ if (wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(&peer->handshake, -+ &peer->keypairs)) { -+ wg_timers_session_derived(peer); -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); -+ atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, -+ ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); -+ wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(peer, &packet, -+ sizeof(packet), -+ HANDSHAKE_DSCP); -+ } -+ } -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(struct wg_device *wg, -+ struct sk_buff *initiating_skb, -+ __le32 sender_index) -+{ -+ struct message_handshake_cookie packet; -+ -+ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Sending cookie response for denied handshake message for %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, initiating_skb); -+ wg_cookie_message_create(&packet, initiating_skb, sender_index, -+ &wg->cookie_checker); -+ wg_socket_send_buffer_as_reply_to_skb(wg, initiating_skb, &packet, -+ sizeof(packet)); -+} -+ -+static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair; -+ bool send = false; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); -+ if (likely(keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)) && -+ (unlikely(atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > -+ REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES) || -+ (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && -+ unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, -+ REKEY_AFTER_TIME))))) -+ send = true; -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ -+ if (send) -+ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); -+} -+ -+static unsigned int calculate_skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ /* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking -+ * layer gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. In that case, we -+ * wouldn't want the final subtraction to overflow in the case of the -+ * padded_size being clamped. -+ */ -+ unsigned int last_unit = skb->len % PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; -+ unsigned int padded_size = ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE); -+ -+ if (padded_size > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu) -+ padded_size = PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; -+ return padded_size - last_unit; -+} -+ -+static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) -+{ -+ unsigned int padding_len, plaintext_len, trailer_len; -+ struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8]; -+ struct message_data *header; -+ struct sk_buff *trailer; -+ int num_frags; -+ -+ /* Calculate lengths. */ -+ padding_len = calculate_skb_padding(skb); -+ trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0); -+ plaintext_len = skb->len + padding_len; -+ -+ /* Expand data section to have room for padding and auth tag. */ -+ num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, trailer_len, &trailer); -+ if (unlikely(num_frags < 0 || num_frags > ARRAY_SIZE(sg))) -+ return false; -+ -+ /* Set the padding to zeros, and make sure it and the auth tag are part -+ * of the skb. -+ */ -+ memset(skb_tail_pointer(trailer), 0, padding_len); -+ -+ /* Expand head section to have room for our header and the network -+ * stack's headers. -+ */ -+ if (unlikely(skb_cow_head(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM) < 0)) -+ return false; -+ -+ /* Finalize checksum calculation for the inner packet, if required. */ -+ if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && -+ skb_checksum_help(skb))) -+ return false; -+ -+ /* Only after checksumming can we safely add on the padding at the end -+ * and the header. -+ */ -+ skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, 0); -+ header = (struct message_data *)skb_push(skb, sizeof(*header)); -+ header->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_DATA); -+ header->key_idx = keypair->remote_index; -+ header->counter = cpu_to_le64(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce); -+ pskb_put(skb, trailer, trailer_len); -+ -+ /* Now we can encrypt the scattergather segments */ -+ sg_init_table(sg, num_frags); -+ if (skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct message_data), -+ noise_encrypted_len(plaintext_len)) <= 0) -+ return false; -+ return chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg_inplace(sg, plaintext_len, NULL, 0, -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, -+ keypair->sending.key); -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct sk_buff *skb; -+ -+ if (skb_queue_empty(&peer->staged_packet_queue)) { -+ skb = alloc_skb(DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM + MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH, -+ GFP_ATOMIC); -+ if (unlikely(!skb)) -+ return; -+ skb_reserve(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM); -+ skb->dev = peer->device->dev; -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu = skb->dev->mtu; -+ skb_queue_tail(&peer->staged_packet_queue, skb); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending keepalive packet to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr); -+ } -+ -+ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); -+} -+ -+static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct sk_buff *first, -+ struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct sk_buff *skb, *next; -+ bool is_keepalive, data_sent = false; -+ -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); -+ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); -+ skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) { -+ is_keepalive = skb->len == message_data_len(0); -+ if (likely(!wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(peer, skb, -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->ds) && !is_keepalive)) -+ data_sent = true; -+ } -+ -+ if (likely(data_sent)) -+ wg_timers_data_sent(peer); -+ -+ keep_key_fresh(peer); -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work) -+{ -+ struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct crypt_queue, -+ work); -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair; -+ enum packet_state state; -+ struct sk_buff *first; -+ struct wg_peer *peer; -+ -+ while ((first = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL && -+ (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(first)->state)) != -+ PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { -+ __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring); -+ peer = PACKET_PEER(first); -+ keypair = PACKET_CB(first)->keypair; -+ -+ if (likely(state == PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) -+ wg_packet_create_data_done(first, peer); -+ else -+ kfree_skb_list(first); -+ -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ } -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work) -+{ -+ struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct multicore_worker, -+ work)->ptr; -+ struct sk_buff *first, *skb, *next; -+ -+ while ((first = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) { -+ enum packet_state state = PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED; -+ -+ skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) { -+ if (likely(encrypt_packet(skb, -+ PACKET_CB(first)->keypair))) { -+ wg_reset_packet(skb); -+ } else { -+ state = PACKET_STATE_DEAD; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first, -+ state); -+ -+ } -+} -+ -+static void wg_packet_create_data(struct sk_buff *first) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = PACKET_PEER(first); -+ struct wg_device *wg = peer->device; -+ int ret = -EINVAL; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) -+ goto err; -+ -+ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, -+ &peer->tx_queue, first, -+ wg->packet_crypt_wq, -+ &wg->encrypt_queue.last_cpu); -+ if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) -+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&peer->tx_queue, first, -+ PACKET_STATE_DEAD); -+err: -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) -+ return; -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(PACKET_CB(first)->keypair, false); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ kfree_skb_list(first); -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); -+ peer->device->dev->stats.tx_dropped += peer->staged_packet_queue.qlen; -+ __skb_queue_purge(&peer->staged_packet_queue); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); -+} -+ -+void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ struct noise_symmetric_key *key; -+ struct noise_keypair *keypair; -+ struct sk_buff_head packets; -+ struct sk_buff *skb; -+ -+ /* Steal the current queue into our local one. */ -+ __skb_queue_head_init(&packets); -+ spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); -+ skb_queue_splice_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue, &packets); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); -+ if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&packets))) -+ return; -+ -+ /* First we make sure we have a valid reference to a valid key. */ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ keypair = wg_noise_keypair_get( -+ rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair)); -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ if (unlikely(!keypair)) -+ goto out_nokey; -+ key = &keypair->sending; -+ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid))) -+ goto out_nokey; -+ if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, -+ REJECT_AFTER_TIME))) -+ goto out_invalid; -+ -+ /* After we know we have a somewhat valid key, we now try to assign -+ * nonces to all of the packets in the queue. If we can't assign nonces -+ * for all of them, we just consider it a failure and wait for the next -+ * handshake. -+ */ -+ skb_queue_walk(&packets, skb) { -+ /* 0 for no outer TOS: no leak. TODO: at some later point, we -+ * might consider using flowi->tos as outer instead. -+ */ -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(0, ip_hdr(skb), skb); -+ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce = -+ atomic64_inc_return(&key->counter.counter) - 1; -+ if (unlikely(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) -+ goto out_invalid; -+ } -+ -+ packets.prev->next = NULL; -+ wg_peer_get(keypair->entry.peer); -+ PACKET_CB(packets.next)->keypair = keypair; -+ wg_packet_create_data(packets.next); -+ return; -+ -+out_invalid: -+ WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false); -+out_nokey: -+ wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); -+ -+ /* We orphan the packets if we're waiting on a handshake, so that they -+ * don't block a socket's pool. -+ */ -+ skb_queue_walk(&packets, skb) -+ skb_orphan(skb); -+ /* Then we put them back on the top of the queue. We're not too -+ * concerned about accidentally getting things a little out of order if -+ * packets are being added really fast, because this queue is for before -+ * packets can even be sent and it's small anyway. -+ */ -+ spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); -+ skb_queue_splice(&packets, &peer->staged_packet_queue); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); -+ -+ /* If we're exiting because there's something wrong with the key, it -+ * means we should initiate a new handshake. -+ */ -+ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "device.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "socket.h" -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "messages.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb, -+ struct endpoint *endpoint, u8 ds, struct dst_cache *cache) -+{ -+ struct flowi4 fl = { -+ .saddr = endpoint->src4.s_addr, -+ .daddr = endpoint->addr4.sin_addr.s_addr, -+ .fl4_dport = endpoint->addr4.sin_port, -+ .flowi4_mark = wg->fwmark, -+ .flowi4_proto = IPPROTO_UDP -+ }; -+ struct rtable *rt = NULL; -+ struct sock *sock; -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); -+ skb->dev = wg->dev; -+ skb->mark = wg->fwmark; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ sock = rcu_dereference_bh(wg->sock4); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!sock)) { -+ ret = -ENONET; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ fl.fl4_sport = inet_sk(sock)->inet_sport; -+ -+ if (cache) -+ rt = dst_cache_get_ip4(cache, &fl.saddr); -+ -+ if (!rt) { -+ security_sk_classify_flow(sock, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl)); -+ if (unlikely(!inet_confirm_addr(sock_net(sock), NULL, 0, -+ fl.saddr, RT_SCOPE_HOST))) { -+ endpoint->src4.s_addr = 0; -+ *(__force __be32 *)&endpoint->src_if4 = 0; -+ fl.saddr = 0; -+ if (cache) -+ dst_cache_reset(cache); -+ } -+ rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sock), &fl, sock); -+ if (unlikely(endpoint->src_if4 && ((IS_ERR(rt) && -+ PTR_ERR(rt) == -EINVAL) || (!IS_ERR(rt) && -+ rt->dst.dev->ifindex != endpoint->src_if4)))) { -+ endpoint->src4.s_addr = 0; -+ *(__force __be32 *)&endpoint->src_if4 = 0; -+ fl.saddr = 0; -+ if (cache) -+ dst_cache_reset(cache); -+ if (!IS_ERR(rt)) -+ ip_rt_put(rt); -+ rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sock), &fl, sock); -+ } -+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(rt))) { -+ ret = PTR_ERR(rt); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", -+ wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); -+ goto err; -+ } else if (unlikely(rt->dst.dev == skb->dev)) { -+ ip_rt_put(rt); -+ ret = -ELOOP; -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (cache) -+ dst_cache_set_ip4(cache, &rt->dst, fl.saddr); -+ } -+ -+ skb->ignore_df = 1; -+ udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(rt, sock, skb, fl.saddr, fl.daddr, ds, -+ ip4_dst_hoplimit(&rt->dst), 0, fl.fl4_sport, -+ fl.fl4_dport, false, false); -+ goto out; -+ -+err: -+ kfree_skb(skb); -+out: -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static int send6(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb, -+ struct endpoint *endpoint, u8 ds, struct dst_cache *cache) -+{ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ struct flowi6 fl = { -+ .saddr = endpoint->src6, -+ .daddr = endpoint->addr6.sin6_addr, -+ .fl6_dport = endpoint->addr6.sin6_port, -+ .flowi6_mark = wg->fwmark, -+ .flowi6_oif = endpoint->addr6.sin6_scope_id, -+ .flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_UDP -+ /* TODO: addr->sin6_flowinfo */ -+ }; -+ struct dst_entry *dst = NULL; -+ struct sock *sock; -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); -+ skb->dev = wg->dev; -+ skb->mark = wg->fwmark; -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ sock = rcu_dereference_bh(wg->sock6); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!sock)) { -+ ret = -ENONET; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ fl.fl6_sport = inet_sk(sock)->inet_sport; -+ -+ if (cache) -+ dst = dst_cache_get_ip6(cache, &fl.saddr); -+ -+ if (!dst) { -+ security_sk_classify_flow(sock, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl)); -+ if (unlikely(!ipv6_addr_any(&fl.saddr) && -+ !ipv6_chk_addr(sock_net(sock), &fl.saddr, NULL, 0))) { -+ endpoint->src6 = fl.saddr = in6addr_any; -+ if (cache) -+ dst_cache_reset(cache); -+ } -+ dst = ipv6_stub->ipv6_dst_lookup_flow(sock_net(sock), sock, &fl, -+ NULL); -+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(dst))) { -+ ret = PTR_ERR(dst); -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", -+ wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); -+ goto err; -+ } else if (unlikely(dst->dev == skb->dev)) { -+ dst_release(dst); -+ ret = -ELOOP; -+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n", -+ wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (cache) -+ dst_cache_set_ip6(cache, dst, &fl.saddr); -+ } -+ -+ skb->ignore_df = 1; -+ udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb(dst, sock, skb, skb->dev, &fl.saddr, &fl.daddr, ds, -+ ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst), 0, fl.fl6_sport, -+ fl.fl6_dport, false); -+ goto out; -+ -+err: -+ kfree_skb(skb); -+out: -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+ return ret; -+#else -+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT; -+#endif -+} -+ -+int wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 ds) -+{ -+ size_t skb_len = skb->len; -+ int ret = -EAFNOSUPPORT; -+ -+ read_lock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+ if (peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET) -+ ret = send4(peer->device, skb, &peer->endpoint, ds, -+ &peer->endpoint_cache); -+ else if (peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) -+ ret = send6(peer->device, skb, &peer->endpoint, ds, -+ &peer->endpoint_cache); -+ else -+ dev_kfree_skb(skb); -+ if (likely(!ret)) -+ peer->tx_bytes += skb_len; -+ read_unlock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+int wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, void *buffer, -+ size_t len, u8 ds) -+{ -+ struct sk_buff *skb = alloc_skb(len + SKB_HEADER_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); -+ -+ if (unlikely(!skb)) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ -+ skb_reserve(skb, SKB_HEADER_LEN); -+ skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, 0); -+ skb_put_data(skb, buffer, len); -+ return wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(peer, skb, ds); -+} -+ -+int wg_socket_send_buffer_as_reply_to_skb(struct wg_device *wg, -+ struct sk_buff *in_skb, void *buffer, -+ size_t len) -+{ -+ int ret = 0; -+ struct sk_buff *skb; -+ struct endpoint endpoint; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!in_skb)) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ ret = wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, in_skb); -+ if (unlikely(ret < 0)) -+ return ret; -+ -+ skb = alloc_skb(len + SKB_HEADER_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); -+ if (unlikely(!skb)) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ skb_reserve(skb, SKB_HEADER_LEN); -+ skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, 0); -+ skb_put_data(skb, buffer, len); -+ -+ if (endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET) -+ ret = send4(wg, skb, &endpoint, 0, NULL); -+ else if (endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) -+ ret = send6(wg, skb, &endpoint, 0, NULL); -+ /* No other possibilities if the endpoint is valid, which it is, -+ * as we checked above. -+ */ -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+int wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(struct endpoint *endpoint, -+ const struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ memset(endpoint, 0, sizeof(*endpoint)); -+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { -+ endpoint->addr4.sin_family = AF_INET; -+ endpoint->addr4.sin_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source; -+ endpoint->addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; -+ endpoint->src4.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr; -+ endpoint->src_if4 = skb->skb_iif; -+ } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { -+ endpoint->addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; -+ endpoint->addr6.sin6_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source; -+ endpoint->addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; -+ endpoint->addr6.sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id( -+ &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, skb->skb_iif); -+ endpoint->src6 = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; -+ } else { -+ return -EINVAL; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static bool endpoint_eq(const struct endpoint *a, const struct endpoint *b) -+{ -+ return (a->addr.sa_family == AF_INET && b->addr.sa_family == AF_INET && -+ a->addr4.sin_port == b->addr4.sin_port && -+ a->addr4.sin_addr.s_addr == b->addr4.sin_addr.s_addr && -+ a->src4.s_addr == b->src4.s_addr && a->src_if4 == b->src_if4) || -+ (a->addr.sa_family == AF_INET6 && -+ b->addr.sa_family == AF_INET6 && -+ a->addr6.sin6_port == b->addr6.sin6_port && -+ ipv6_addr_equal(&a->addr6.sin6_addr, &b->addr6.sin6_addr) && -+ a->addr6.sin6_scope_id == b->addr6.sin6_scope_id && -+ ipv6_addr_equal(&a->src6, &b->src6)) || -+ unlikely(!a->addr.sa_family && !b->addr.sa_family); -+} -+ -+void wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(struct wg_peer *peer, -+ const struct endpoint *endpoint) -+{ -+ /* First we check unlocked, in order to optimize, since it's pretty rare -+ * that an endpoint will change. If we happen to be mid-write, and two -+ * CPUs wind up writing the same thing or something slightly different, -+ * it doesn't really matter much either. -+ */ -+ if (endpoint_eq(endpoint, &peer->endpoint)) -+ return; -+ write_lock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+ if (endpoint->addr.sa_family == AF_INET) { -+ peer->endpoint.addr4 = endpoint->addr4; -+ peer->endpoint.src4 = endpoint->src4; -+ peer->endpoint.src_if4 = endpoint->src_if4; -+ } else if (endpoint->addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) { -+ peer->endpoint.addr6 = endpoint->addr6; -+ peer->endpoint.src6 = endpoint->src6; -+ } else { -+ goto out; -+ } -+ dst_cache_reset(&peer->endpoint_cache); -+out: -+ write_unlock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+} -+ -+void wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint_from_skb(struct wg_peer *peer, -+ const struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ struct endpoint endpoint; -+ -+ if (!wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, skb)) -+ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(peer, &endpoint); -+} -+ -+void wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ write_lock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+ memset(&peer->endpoint.src6, 0, sizeof(peer->endpoint.src6)); -+ dst_cache_reset(&peer->endpoint_cache); -+ write_unlock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); -+} -+ -+static int wg_receive(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ struct wg_device *wg; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!sk)) -+ goto err; -+ wg = sk->sk_user_data; -+ if (unlikely(!wg)) -+ goto err; -+ wg_packet_receive(wg, skb); -+ return 0; -+ -+err: -+ kfree_skb(skb); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static void sock_free(struct sock *sock) -+{ -+ if (unlikely(!sock)) -+ return; -+ sk_clear_memalloc(sock); -+ udp_tunnel_sock_release(sock->sk_socket); -+} -+ -+static void set_sock_opts(struct socket *sock) -+{ -+ sock->sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC; -+ sock->sk->sk_sndbuf = INT_MAX; -+ sk_set_memalloc(sock->sk); -+} -+ -+int wg_socket_init(struct wg_device *wg, u16 port) -+{ -+ int ret; -+ struct udp_tunnel_sock_cfg cfg = { -+ .sk_user_data = wg, -+ .encap_type = 1, -+ .encap_rcv = wg_receive -+ }; -+ struct socket *new4 = NULL, *new6 = NULL; -+ struct udp_port_cfg port4 = { -+ .family = AF_INET, -+ .local_ip.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY), -+ .local_udp_port = htons(port), -+ .use_udp_checksums = true -+ }; -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ int retries = 0; -+ struct udp_port_cfg port6 = { -+ .family = AF_INET6, -+ .local_ip6 = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT, -+ .use_udp6_tx_checksums = true, -+ .use_udp6_rx_checksums = true, -+ .ipv6_v6only = true -+ }; -+#endif -+ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+retry: -+#endif -+ -+ ret = udp_sock_create(wg->creating_net, &port4, &new4); -+ if (ret < 0) { -+ pr_err("%s: Could not create IPv4 socket\n", wg->dev->name); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ set_sock_opts(new4); -+ setup_udp_tunnel_sock(wg->creating_net, new4, &cfg); -+ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -+ if (ipv6_mod_enabled()) { -+ port6.local_udp_port = inet_sk(new4->sk)->inet_sport; -+ ret = udp_sock_create(wg->creating_net, &port6, &new6); -+ if (ret < 0) { -+ udp_tunnel_sock_release(new4); -+ if (ret == -EADDRINUSE && !port && retries++ < 100) -+ goto retry; -+ pr_err("%s: Could not create IPv6 socket\n", -+ wg->dev->name); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ set_sock_opts(new6); -+ setup_udp_tunnel_sock(wg->creating_net, new6, &cfg); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ wg_socket_reinit(wg, new4->sk, new6 ? new6->sk : NULL); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device *wg, struct sock *new4, -+ struct sock *new6) -+{ -+ struct sock *old4, *old6; -+ -+ mutex_lock(&wg->socket_update_lock); -+ old4 = rcu_dereference_protected(wg->sock4, -+ lockdep_is_held(&wg->socket_update_lock)); -+ old6 = rcu_dereference_protected(wg->sock6, -+ lockdep_is_held(&wg->socket_update_lock)); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->sock4, new4); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->sock6, new6); -+ if (new4) -+ wg->incoming_port = ntohs(inet_sk(new4)->inet_sport); -+ mutex_unlock(&wg->socket_update_lock); -+ synchronize_rcu(); -+ synchronize_net(); -+ sock_free(old4); -+ sock_free(old6); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.h -@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_SOCKET_H -+#define _WG_SOCKET_H -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+int wg_socket_init(struct wg_device *wg, u16 port); -+void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device *wg, struct sock *new4, -+ struct sock *new6); -+int wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, void *data, -+ size_t len, u8 ds); -+int wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb, -+ u8 ds); -+int wg_socket_send_buffer_as_reply_to_skb(struct wg_device *wg, -+ struct sk_buff *in_skb, -+ void *out_buffer, size_t len); -+ -+int wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(struct endpoint *endpoint, -+ const struct sk_buff *skb); -+void wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(struct wg_peer *peer, -+ const struct endpoint *endpoint); -+void wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint_from_skb(struct wg_peer *peer, -+ const struct sk_buff *skb); -+void wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(struct wg_peer *peer); -+ -+#if defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) || defined(DEBUG) -+#define net_dbg_skb_ratelimited(fmt, dev, skb, ...) do { \ -+ struct endpoint __endpoint; \ -+ wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&__endpoint, skb); \ -+ net_dbg_ratelimited(fmt, dev, &__endpoint.addr, \ -+ ##__VA_ARGS__); \ -+ } while (0) -+#else -+#define net_dbg_skb_ratelimited(fmt, skb, ...) -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _WG_SOCKET_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/timers.c -@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#include "timers.h" -+#include "device.h" -+#include "peer.h" -+#include "queueing.h" -+#include "socket.h" -+ -+/* -+ * - Timer for retransmitting the handshake if we don't hear back after -+ * `REKEY_TIMEOUT + jitter` ms. -+ * -+ * - Timer for sending empty packet if we have received a packet but after have -+ * not sent one for `KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT` ms. -+ * -+ * - Timer for initiating new handshake if we have sent a packet but after have -+ * not received one (even empty) for `(KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT + REKEY_TIMEOUT) + -+ * jitter` ms. -+ * -+ * - Timer for zeroing out all ephemeral keys after `(REJECT_AFTER_TIME * 3)` ms -+ * if no new keys have been received. -+ * -+ * - Timer for, if enabled, sending an empty authenticated packet every user- -+ * specified seconds. -+ */ -+ -+static inline void mod_peer_timer(struct wg_peer *peer, -+ struct timer_list *timer, -+ unsigned long expires) -+{ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ if (likely(netif_running(peer->device->dev) && -+ !READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) -+ mod_timer(timer, expires); -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+} -+ -+static void wg_expired_retransmit_handshake(struct timer_list *timer) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, -+ timer_retransmit_handshake); -+ -+ if (peer->timer_handshake_attempts > MAX_TIMER_HANDSHAKES) { -+ pr_debug("%s: Handshake for peer %llu (%pISpfsc) did not complete after %d attempts, giving up\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr, MAX_TIMER_HANDSHAKES + 2); -+ -+ del_timer(&peer->timer_send_keepalive); -+ /* We drop all packets without a keypair and don't try again, -+ * if we try unsuccessfully for too long to make a handshake. -+ */ -+ wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(peer); -+ -+ /* We set a timer for destroying any residue that might be left -+ * of a partial exchange. -+ */ -+ if (!timer_pending(&peer->timer_zero_key_material)) -+ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_zero_key_material, -+ jiffies + REJECT_AFTER_TIME * 3 * HZ); -+ } else { -+ ++peer->timer_handshake_attempts; -+ pr_debug("%s: Handshake for peer %llu (%pISpfsc) did not complete after %d seconds, retrying (try %d)\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr, REKEY_TIMEOUT, -+ peer->timer_handshake_attempts + 1); -+ -+ /* We clear the endpoint address src address, in case this is -+ * the cause of trouble. -+ */ -+ wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(peer); -+ -+ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, true); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void wg_expired_send_keepalive(struct timer_list *timer) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, timer_send_keepalive); -+ -+ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); -+ if (peer->timer_need_another_keepalive) { -+ peer->timer_need_another_keepalive = false; -+ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_send_keepalive, -+ jiffies + KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT * HZ); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void wg_expired_new_handshake(struct timer_list *timer) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, timer_new_handshake); -+ -+ pr_debug("%s: Retrying handshake with peer %llu (%pISpfsc) because we stopped hearing back after %d seconds\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr, KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT + REKEY_TIMEOUT); -+ /* We clear the endpoint address src address, in case this is the cause -+ * of trouble. -+ */ -+ wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(peer); -+ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); -+} -+ -+static void wg_expired_zero_key_material(struct timer_list *timer) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, timer_zero_key_material); -+ -+ rcu_read_lock_bh(); -+ if (!READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead)) { -+ wg_peer_get(peer); -+ if (!queue_work(peer->device->handshake_send_wq, -+ &peer->clear_peer_work)) -+ /* If the work was already on the queue, we want to drop -+ * the extra reference. -+ */ -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+ } -+ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -+} -+ -+static void wg_queued_expired_zero_key_material(struct work_struct *work) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, -+ clear_peer_work); -+ -+ pr_debug("%s: Zeroing out all keys for peer %llu (%pISpfsc), since we haven't received a new one in %d seconds\n", -+ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, -+ &peer->endpoint.addr, REJECT_AFTER_TIME * 3); -+ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake); -+ wg_noise_keypairs_clear(&peer->keypairs); -+ wg_peer_put(peer); -+} -+ -+static void wg_expired_send_persistent_keepalive(struct timer_list *timer) -+{ -+ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, -+ timer_persistent_keepalive); -+ -+ if (likely(peer->persistent_keepalive_interval)) -+ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); -+} -+ -+/* Should be called after an authenticated data packet is sent. */ -+void wg_timers_data_sent(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ if (!timer_pending(&peer->timer_new_handshake)) -+ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_new_handshake, -+ jiffies + (KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT + REKEY_TIMEOUT) * HZ + -+ prandom_u32_max(REKEY_TIMEOUT_JITTER_MAX_JIFFIES)); -+} -+ -+/* Should be called after an authenticated data packet is received. */ -+void wg_timers_data_received(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ if (likely(netif_running(peer->device->dev))) { -+ if (!timer_pending(&peer->timer_send_keepalive)) -+ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_send_keepalive, -+ jiffies + KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT * HZ); -+ else -+ peer->timer_need_another_keepalive = true; -+ } -+} -+ -+/* Should be called after any type of authenticated packet is sent, whether -+ * keepalive, data, or handshake. -+ */ -+void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ del_timer(&peer->timer_send_keepalive); -+} -+ -+/* Should be called after any type of authenticated packet is received, whether -+ * keepalive, data, or handshake. -+ */ -+void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ del_timer(&peer->timer_new_handshake); -+} -+ -+/* Should be called after a handshake initiation message is sent. */ -+void wg_timers_handshake_initiated(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_retransmit_handshake, -+ jiffies + REKEY_TIMEOUT * HZ + -+ prandom_u32_max(REKEY_TIMEOUT_JITTER_MAX_JIFFIES)); -+} -+ -+/* Should be called after a handshake response message is received and processed -+ * or when getting key confirmation via the first data message. -+ */ -+void wg_timers_handshake_complete(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ del_timer(&peer->timer_retransmit_handshake); -+ peer->timer_handshake_attempts = 0; -+ peer->sent_lastminute_handshake = false; -+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&peer->walltime_last_handshake); -+} -+ -+/* Should be called after an ephemeral key is created, which is before sending a -+ * handshake response or after receiving a handshake response. -+ */ -+void wg_timers_session_derived(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_zero_key_material, -+ jiffies + REJECT_AFTER_TIME * 3 * HZ); -+} -+ -+/* Should be called before a packet with authentication, whether -+ * keepalive, data, or handshakem is sent, or after one is received. -+ */ -+void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ if (peer->persistent_keepalive_interval) -+ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_persistent_keepalive, -+ jiffies + peer->persistent_keepalive_interval * HZ); -+} -+ -+void wg_timers_init(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ timer_setup(&peer->timer_retransmit_handshake, -+ wg_expired_retransmit_handshake, 0); -+ timer_setup(&peer->timer_send_keepalive, wg_expired_send_keepalive, 0); -+ timer_setup(&peer->timer_new_handshake, wg_expired_new_handshake, 0); -+ timer_setup(&peer->timer_zero_key_material, -+ wg_expired_zero_key_material, 0); -+ timer_setup(&peer->timer_persistent_keepalive, -+ wg_expired_send_persistent_keepalive, 0); -+ INIT_WORK(&peer->clear_peer_work, wg_queued_expired_zero_key_material); -+ peer->timer_handshake_attempts = 0; -+ peer->sent_lastminute_handshake = false; -+ peer->timer_need_another_keepalive = false; -+} -+ -+void wg_timers_stop(struct wg_peer *peer) -+{ -+ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_retransmit_handshake); -+ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_send_keepalive); -+ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_new_handshake); -+ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_zero_key_material); -+ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_persistent_keepalive); -+ flush_work(&peer->clear_peer_work); -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/timers.h -@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_TIMERS_H -+#define _WG_TIMERS_H -+ -+#include -+ -+struct wg_peer; -+ -+void wg_timers_init(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_stop(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_data_sent(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_data_received(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_handshake_initiated(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_handshake_complete(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_session_derived(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(struct wg_peer *peer); -+ -+static inline bool wg_birthdate_has_expired(u64 birthday_nanoseconds, -+ u64 expiration_seconds) -+{ -+ return (s64)(birthday_nanoseconds + expiration_seconds * NSEC_PER_SEC) -+ <= (s64)ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+} -+ -+#endif /* _WG_TIMERS_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/version.h -@@ -0,0 +1 @@ -+#define WIREGUARD_VERSION "1.0.0" ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h -@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ -+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ * -+ * Documentation -+ * ============= -+ * -+ * The below enums and macros are for interfacing with WireGuard, using generic -+ * netlink, with family WG_GENL_NAME and version WG_GENL_VERSION. It defines two -+ * methods: get and set. Note that while they share many common attributes, -+ * these two functions actually accept a slightly different set of inputs and -+ * outputs. -+ * -+ * WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE -+ * ----------------- -+ * -+ * May only be called via NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_DUMP. The command should contain -+ * one but not both of: -+ * -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 -+ * -+ * The kernel will then return several messages (NLM_F_MULTI) containing the -+ * following tree of nested items: -+ * -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN -+ * WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN -+ * WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT: NLA_U16 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK: NLA_U32 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_PEERS: NLA_NESTED -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN -+ * WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN -+ * WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT: NLA_MIN_LEN(struct sockaddr), struct sockaddr_in or struct sockaddr_in6 -+ * WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL: NLA_U16 -+ * WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME: NLA_EXACT_LEN, struct __kernel_timespec -+ * WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES: NLA_U64 -+ * WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES: NLA_U64 -+ * WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS: NLA_NESTED -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY: NLA_U16 -+ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR: NLA_MIN_LEN(struct in_addr), struct in_addr or struct in6_addr -+ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK: NLA_U8 -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * ... -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * ... -+ * ... -+ * WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION: NLA_U32 -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * ... -+ * ... -+ * -+ * It is possible that all of the allowed IPs of a single peer will not -+ * fit within a single netlink message. In that case, the same peer will -+ * be written in the following message, except it will only contain -+ * WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY and WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS. This may occur several -+ * times in a row for the same peer. It is then up to the receiver to -+ * coalesce adjacent peers. Likewise, it is possible that all peers will -+ * not fit within a single message. So, subsequent peers will be sent -+ * in following messages, except those will only contain WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME -+ * and WGDEVICE_A_PEERS. It is then up to the receiver to coalesce these -+ * messages to form the complete list of peers. -+ * -+ * Since this is an NLA_F_DUMP command, the final message will always be -+ * NLMSG_DONE, even if an error occurs. However, this NLMSG_DONE message -+ * contains an integer error code. It is either zero or a negative error -+ * code corresponding to the errno. -+ * -+ * WG_CMD_SET_DEVICE -+ * ----------------- -+ * -+ * May only be called via NLM_F_REQUEST. The command should contain the -+ * following tree of nested items, containing one but not both of -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX and WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: -+ * -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS: NLA_U32, 0 or WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS if all current -+ * peers should be removed prior to adding the list below. -+ * WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN, all zeros to remove -+ * WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT: NLA_U16, 0 to choose randomly -+ * WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK: NLA_U32, 0 to disable -+ * WGDEVICE_A_PEERS: NLA_NESTED -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN -+ * WGPEER_A_FLAGS: NLA_U32, 0 and/or WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME if the -+ * specified peer should not exist at the end of the -+ * operation, rather than added/updated and/or -+ * WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS if all current allowed -+ * IPs of this peer should be removed prior to adding -+ * the list below and/or WGPEER_F_UPDATE_ONLY if the -+ * peer should only be set if it already exists. -+ * WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN, all zeros to remove -+ * WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT: struct sockaddr_in or struct sockaddr_in6 -+ * WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL: NLA_U16, 0 to disable -+ * WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS: NLA_NESTED -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY: NLA_U16 -+ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR: struct in_addr or struct in6_addr -+ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK: NLA_U8 -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * ... -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * ... -+ * ... -+ * WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION: NLA_U32, should not be set or used at -+ * all by most users of this API, as the -+ * most recent protocol will be used when -+ * this is unset. Otherwise, must be set -+ * to 1. -+ * 0: NLA_NESTED -+ * ... -+ * ... -+ * -+ * It is possible that the amount of configuration data exceeds that of -+ * the maximum message length accepted by the kernel. In that case, several -+ * messages should be sent one after another, with each successive one -+ * filling in information not contained in the prior. Note that if -+ * WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS is specified in the first message, it probably -+ * should not be specified in fragments that come after, so that the list -+ * of peers is only cleared the first time but appened after. Likewise for -+ * peers, if WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS is specified in the first message -+ * of a peer, it likely should not be specified in subsequent fragments. -+ * -+ * If an error occurs, NLMSG_ERROR will reply containing an errno. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _WG_UAPI_WIREGUARD_H -+#define _WG_UAPI_WIREGUARD_H -+ -+#define WG_GENL_NAME "wireguard" -+#define WG_GENL_VERSION 1 -+ -+#define WG_KEY_LEN 32 -+ -+enum wg_cmd { -+ WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE, -+ WG_CMD_SET_DEVICE, -+ __WG_CMD_MAX -+}; -+#define WG_CMD_MAX (__WG_CMD_MAX - 1) -+ -+enum wgdevice_flag { -+ WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS = 1U << 0, -+ __WGDEVICE_F_ALL = WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS -+}; -+enum wgdevice_attribute { -+ WGDEVICE_A_UNSPEC, -+ WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX, -+ WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME, -+ WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY, -+ WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY, -+ WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS, -+ WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT, -+ WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK, -+ WGDEVICE_A_PEERS, -+ __WGDEVICE_A_LAST -+}; -+#define WGDEVICE_A_MAX (__WGDEVICE_A_LAST - 1) -+ -+enum wgpeer_flag { -+ WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME = 1U << 0, -+ WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS = 1U << 1, -+ WGPEER_F_UPDATE_ONLY = 1U << 2, -+ __WGPEER_F_ALL = WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME | WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS | -+ WGPEER_F_UPDATE_ONLY -+}; -+enum wgpeer_attribute { -+ WGPEER_A_UNSPEC, -+ WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY, -+ WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY, -+ WGPEER_A_FLAGS, -+ WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT, -+ WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL, -+ WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME, -+ WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES, -+ WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES, -+ WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS, -+ WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION, -+ __WGPEER_A_LAST -+}; -+#define WGPEER_A_MAX (__WGPEER_A_LAST - 1) -+ -+enum wgallowedip_attribute { -+ WGALLOWEDIP_A_UNSPEC, -+ WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY, -+ WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR, -+ WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK, -+ __WGALLOWEDIP_A_LAST -+}; -+#define WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX (__WGALLOWEDIP_A_LAST - 1) -+ -+#endif /* _WG_UAPI_WIREGUARD_H */ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@ -+#!/bin/bash -+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+# -+# Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+# -+# This script tests the below topology: -+# -+# ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐ -+# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns0 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │ -+# │ │ │ │ │ │ -+# │┌────────┐ │ │ ┌────────┐ │ │ ┌────────┐│ -+# ││ wg0 │───────────┼───┼────────────│ lo │────────────┼───┼───────────│ wg0 ││ -+# │├────────┴──────────┐│ │ ┌───────┴────────┴────────┐ │ │┌──────────┴────────┤│ -+# ││192.168.241.1/24 ││ │ │(ns1) (ns2) │ │ ││192.168.241.2/24 ││ -+# ││fd00::1/24 ││ │ │127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2│ │ ││fd00::2/24 ││ -+# │└───────────────────┘│ │ │[::]:1 [::]:2 │ │ │└───────────────────┘│ -+# └─────────────────────┘ │ └─────────────────────────┘ │ └─────────────────────┘ -+# └──────────────────────────────────┘ -+# -+# After the topology is prepared we run a series of TCP/UDP iperf3 tests between the -+# wireguard peers in $ns1 and $ns2. Note that $ns0 is the endpoint for the wg0 -+# interfaces in $ns1 and $ns2. See https://www.wireguard.com/netns/ for further -+# details on how this is accomplished. -+set -e -+ -+exec 3>&1 -+export WG_HIDE_KEYS=never -+netns0="wg-test-$$-0" -+netns1="wg-test-$$-1" -+netns2="wg-test-$$-2" -+pretty() { echo -e "\x1b[32m\x1b[1m[+] ${1:+NS$1: }${2}\x1b[0m" >&3; } -+pp() { pretty "" "$*"; "$@"; } -+maybe_exec() { if [[ $BASHPID -eq $$ ]]; then "$@"; else exec "$@"; fi; } -+n0() { pretty 0 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns0 "$@"; } -+n1() { pretty 1 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns1 "$@"; } -+n2() { pretty 2 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns2 "$@"; } -+ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 "$@"; } -+ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; } -+ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; } -+sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 0 || true; } -+waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 5201') != *iperf3* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } -+waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } -+waitncattcp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for tcp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } -+waitiface() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for $2 to come up"; ip netns exec "$1" bash -c "while [[ \$(< \"/sys/class/net/$2/operstate\") != up ]]; do read -t .1 -N 0 || true; done;"; } -+ -+cleanup() { -+ set +e -+ exec 2>/dev/null -+ printf "$orig_message_cost" > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost -+ ip0 link del dev wg0 -+ ip1 link del dev wg0 -+ ip2 link del dev wg0 -+ local to_kill="$(ip netns pids $netns0) $(ip netns pids $netns1) $(ip netns pids $netns2)" -+ [[ -n $to_kill ]] && kill $to_kill -+ pp ip netns del $netns1 -+ pp ip netns del $netns2 -+ pp ip netns del $netns0 -+ exit -+} -+ -+orig_message_cost="$(< /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost)" -+trap cleanup EXIT -+printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost -+ -+ip netns del $netns0 2>/dev/null || true -+ip netns del $netns1 2>/dev/null || true -+ip netns del $netns2 2>/dev/null || true -+pp ip netns add $netns0 -+pp ip netns add $netns1 -+pp ip netns add $netns2 -+ip0 link set up dev lo -+ -+ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard -+ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns1 -+ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard -+ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns2 -+key1="$(pp wg genkey)" -+key2="$(pp wg genkey)" -+key3="$(pp wg genkey)" -+pub1="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key1")" -+pub2="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key2")" -+pub3="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key3")" -+psk="$(pp wg genpsk)" -+[[ -n $key1 && -n $key2 && -n $psk ]] -+ -+configure_peers() { -+ ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg0 -+ ip1 addr add fd00::1/24 dev wg0 -+ -+ ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg0 -+ ip2 addr add fd00::2/24 dev wg0 -+ -+ n1 wg set wg0 \ -+ private-key <(echo "$key1") \ -+ listen-port 1 \ -+ peer "$pub2" \ -+ preshared-key <(echo "$psk") \ -+ allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32,fd00::2/128 -+ n2 wg set wg0 \ -+ private-key <(echo "$key2") \ -+ listen-port 2 \ -+ peer "$pub1" \ -+ preshared-key <(echo "$psk") \ -+ allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32,fd00::1/128 -+ -+ ip1 link set up dev wg0 -+ ip2 link set up dev wg0 -+} -+configure_peers -+ -+tests() { -+ # Ping over IPv4 -+ n2 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.1 -+ n1 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.2 -+ -+ # Ping over IPv6 -+ n2 ping6 -c 10 -f -W 1 fd00::1 -+ n1 ping6 -c 10 -f -W 1 fd00::2 -+ -+ # TCP over IPv4 -+ n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.2 & -+ waitiperf $netns2 -+ n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c 192.168.241.2 -+ -+ # TCP over IPv6 -+ n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::1 & -+ waitiperf $netns1 -+ n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c fd00::1 -+ -+ # UDP over IPv4 -+ n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.1 & -+ waitiperf $netns1 -+ n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c 192.168.241.1 -+ -+ # UDP over IPv6 -+ n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::2 & -+ waitiperf $netns2 -+ n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c fd00::2 -+} -+ -+[[ $(ip1 link show dev wg0) =~ mtu\ ([0-9]+) ]] && orig_mtu="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" -+big_mtu=$(( 34816 - 1500 + $orig_mtu )) -+ -+# Test using IPv4 as outer transport -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 127.0.0.1:1 -+# Before calling tests, we first make sure that the stats counters and timestamper are working -+n2 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.1 -+{ read _; read _; read _; read rx_bytes _; read _; read tx_bytes _; } < <(ip2 -stats link show dev wg0) -+(( rx_bytes == 1372 && (tx_bytes == 1428 || tx_bytes == 1460) )) -+{ read _; read _; read _; read rx_bytes _; read _; read tx_bytes _; } < <(ip1 -stats link show dev wg0) -+(( tx_bytes == 1372 && (rx_bytes == 1428 || rx_bytes == 1460) )) -+read _ rx_bytes tx_bytes < <(n2 wg show wg0 transfer) -+(( rx_bytes == 1372 && (tx_bytes == 1428 || tx_bytes == 1460) )) -+read _ rx_bytes tx_bytes < <(n1 wg show wg0 transfer) -+(( tx_bytes == 1372 && (rx_bytes == 1428 || rx_bytes == 1460) )) -+read _ timestamp < <(n1 wg show wg0 latest-handshakes) -+(( timestamp != 0 )) -+ -+tests -+ip1 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu -+ip2 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu -+tests -+ -+ip1 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu -+ip2 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu -+ -+# Test using IPv6 as outer transport -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [::1]:2 -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [::1]:1 -+tests -+ip1 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu -+ip2 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu -+tests -+ -+# Test that route MTUs work with the padding -+ip1 link set wg0 mtu 1300 -+ip2 link set wg0 mtu 1300 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 127.0.0.1:1 -+n0 iptables -A INPUT -m length --length 1360 -j DROP -+n1 ip route add 192.168.241.2/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299 -+n2 ip route add 192.168.241.1/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299 -+n2 ping -c 1 -W 1 -s 1269 192.168.241.1 -+n2 ip route delete 192.168.241.1/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299 -+n1 ip route delete 192.168.241.2/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299 -+n0 iptables -F INPUT -+ -+ip1 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu -+ip2 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu -+ -+# Test using IPv4 that roaming works -+ip0 -4 addr del 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo -+ip0 -4 addr add 127.212.121.99/8 dev lo -+n1 wg set wg0 listen-port 9999 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 -+n1 ping6 -W 1 -c 1 fd00::2 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 127.212.121.99:9999" ]] -+ -+# Test using IPv6 that roaming works -+n1 wg set wg0 listen-port 9998 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [::1]:2 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [::1]:9998" ]] -+ -+# Test that crypto-RP filter works -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.241.0/24 -+exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111) -+ncat_pid=$! -+waitncatudp $netns1 -+n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X" -+read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 && [[ $out == "X" ]] -+kill $ncat_pid -+more_specific_key="$(pp wg genkey | pp wg pubkey)" -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key" allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32 -+n2 wg set wg0 listen-port 9997 -+exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111) -+ncat_pid=$! -+waitncatudp $netns1 -+n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X" -+! read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 || false -+kill $ncat_pid -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key" remove -+[[ $(n1 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub2 [::1]:9997" ]] -+ -+# Test that we can change private keys keys and immediately handshake -+n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32 endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 -+n2 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2") listen-port 2 peer "$pub1" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key3") -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32 peer "$pub1" remove -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+ -+ip1 link del wg0 -+ip2 link del wg0 -+ -+# Test using NAT. We now change the topology to this: -+# ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ -+# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns0 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │ -+# │ │ │ │ │ │ -+# │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ │ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ │ │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ -+# │ │ wg0 │─────────────│vethc│───────────┼────┼────│vethrc│ │vethrs│──────────────┼─────┼──│veths│────────────│ wg0 │ │ -+# │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐│ │ ├──────┴─────────┐ ├──────┴────────────┐ │ │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐ │ -+# │ │192.168.241.1/24│ │192.168.1.100/24││ │ │192.168.1.1/24 │ │10.0.0.1/24 │ │ │ │10.0.0.100/24 │ │192.168.241.2/24│ │ -+# │ │fd00::1/24 │ │ ││ │ │ │ │SNAT:192.168.1.0/24│ │ │ │ │ │fd00::2/24 │ │ -+# │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘│ │ └────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ │ │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ -+# └────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────┘ -+ -+ip1 link add dev wg0 type wireguard -+ip2 link add dev wg0 type wireguard -+configure_peers -+ -+ip0 link add vethrc type veth peer name vethc -+ip0 link add vethrs type veth peer name veths -+ip0 link set vethc netns $netns1 -+ip0 link set veths netns $netns2 -+ip0 link set vethrc up -+ip0 link set vethrs up -+ip0 addr add 192.168.1.1/24 dev vethrc -+ip0 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev vethrs -+ip1 addr add 192.168.1.100/24 dev vethc -+ip1 link set vethc up -+ip1 route add default via 192.168.1.1 -+ip2 addr add 10.0.0.100/24 dev veths -+ip2 link set veths up -+waitiface $netns0 vethrc -+waitiface $netns0 vethrs -+waitiface $netns1 vethc -+waitiface $netns2 veths -+ -+n0 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward' -+n0 bash -c 'printf 2 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_udp_timeout' -+n0 bash -c 'printf 2 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_udp_timeout_stream' -+n0 iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.1.0/24 -d 10.0.0.0/24 -j SNAT --to 10.0.0.1 -+ -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.100:2 persistent-keepalive 1 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]] -+# Demonstrate n2 can still send packets to n1, since persistent-keepalive will prevent connection tracking entry from expiring (to see entries: `n0 conntrack -L`). -+pp sleep 3 -+n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" persistent-keepalive 0 -+ -+# Do a wg-quick(8)-style policy routing for the default route, making sure vethc has a v6 address to tease out bugs. -+ip1 -6 addr add fc00::9/96 dev vethc -+ip1 -6 route add default via fc00::1 -+ip2 -4 addr add 192.168.99.7/32 dev wg0 -+ip2 -6 addr add abab::1111/128 dev wg0 -+n1 wg set wg0 fwmark 51820 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.99.7,abab::1111 -+ip1 -6 route add default dev wg0 table 51820 -+ip1 -6 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820 -+ip1 -6 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0 -+ip1 -4 route add default dev wg0 table 51820 -+ip1 -4 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820 -+ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0 -+# suppress_prefixlength only got added in 3.12, and we want to support 3.10+. -+if [[ $(ip1 -4 rule show all) == *suppress_prefixlength* ]]; then -+ # Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs. -+ n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7 -+ n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111 -+fi -+ -+n0 iptables -t nat -F -+ip0 link del vethrc -+ip0 link del vethrs -+ip1 link del wg0 -+ip2 link del wg0 -+ -+# Test that saddr routing is sticky but not too sticky, changing to this topology: -+# ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ -+# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │ -+# │ │ │ │ -+# │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ -+# │ │ wg0 │─────────────│veth1│───────────┼────┼──│veth2│────────────│ wg0 │ │ -+# │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐│ │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐ │ -+# │ │192.168.241.1/24│ │10.0.0.1/24 ││ │ │10.0.0.2/24 │ │192.168.241.2/24│ │ -+# │ │fd00::1/24 │ │fd00:aa::1/96 ││ │ │fd00:aa::2/96 │ │fd00::2/24 │ │ -+# │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘│ │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ -+# └────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────┘ -+ -+ip1 link add dev wg0 type wireguard -+ip2 link add dev wg0 type wireguard -+configure_peers -+ip1 link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 -+ip1 link set veth2 netns $netns2 -+n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad' -+n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad' -+n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/veth1/accept_dad' -+n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/veth2/accept_dad' -+n1 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth1/promote_secondaries' -+ -+# First we check that we aren't overly sticky and can fall over to new IPs when old ones are removed -+ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1 -+ip1 addr add fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1 -+ip2 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth2 -+ip2 addr add fd00:aa::2/96 dev veth2 -+ip1 link set veth1 up -+ip2 link set veth2 up -+waitiface $netns1 veth1 -+waitiface $netns2 veth2 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.2:2 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+ip1 addr add 10.0.0.10/24 dev veth1 -+ip1 addr del 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [fd00:aa::2]:2 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+ip1 addr add fd00:aa::10/96 dev veth1 -+ip1 addr del fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+ -+# Now we show that we can successfully do reply to sender routing -+ip1 link set veth1 down -+ip2 link set veth2 down -+ip1 addr flush dev veth1 -+ip2 addr flush dev veth2 -+ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1 -+ip1 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth1 -+ip1 addr add fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1 -+ip1 addr add fd00:aa::2/96 dev veth1 -+ip2 addr add 10.0.0.3/24 dev veth2 -+ip2 addr add fd00:aa::3/96 dev veth2 -+ip1 link set veth1 up -+ip2 link set veth2 up -+waitiface $netns1 veth1 -+waitiface $netns2 veth2 -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.0.0.1:1 -+n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]] -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [fd00:aa::1]:1 -+n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [fd00:aa::1]:1" ]] -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.0.0.2:1 -+n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.2:1" ]] -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [fd00:aa::2]:1 -+n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [fd00:aa::2]:1" ]] -+ -+# What happens if the inbound destination address belongs to a different interface as the default route? -+ip1 link add dummy0 type dummy -+ip1 addr add 10.50.0.1/24 dev dummy0 -+ip1 link set dummy0 up -+ip2 route add 10.50.0.0/24 dev veth2 -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.50.0.1:1 -+n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.50.0.1:1" ]] -+ -+ip1 link del dummy0 -+ip1 addr flush dev veth1 -+ip2 addr flush dev veth2 -+ip1 route flush dev veth1 -+ip2 route flush dev veth2 -+ -+# Now we see what happens if another interface route takes precedence over an ongoing one -+ip1 link add veth3 type veth peer name veth4 -+ip1 link set veth4 netns $netns2 -+ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1 -+ip2 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth2 -+ip1 addr add 10.0.0.3/24 dev veth3 -+ip1 link set veth1 up -+ip2 link set veth2 up -+ip1 link set veth3 up -+ip2 link set veth4 up -+waitiface $netns1 veth1 -+waitiface $netns2 veth2 -+waitiface $netns1 veth3 -+waitiface $netns2 veth4 -+ip1 route flush dev veth1 -+ip1 route flush dev veth3 -+ip1 route add 10.0.0.0/24 dev veth1 src 10.0.0.1 metric 2 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.2:2 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]] -+ip1 route add 10.0.0.0/24 dev veth3 src 10.0.0.3 metric 1 -+n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth1/rp_filter' -+n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth4/rp_filter' -+n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter' -+n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter' -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.3:1" ]] -+ -+ip1 link del veth1 -+ip1 link del veth3 -+ip1 link del wg0 -+ip2 link del wg0 -+ -+# We test that Netlink/IPC is working properly by doing things that usually cause split responses -+ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard -+config=( "[Interface]" "PrivateKey=$(wg genkey)" "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" ) -+for a in {1..255}; do -+ for b in {0..255}; do -+ config+=( "AllowedIPs=$a.$b.0.0/16,$a::$b/128" ) -+ done -+done -+n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}") -+i=0 -+for ip in $(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips); do -+ ((++i)) -+done -+((i == 255*256*2+1)) -+ip0 link del wg0 -+ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard -+config=( "[Interface]" "PrivateKey=$(wg genkey)" ) -+for a in {1..40}; do -+ config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" ) -+ for b in {1..52}; do -+ config+=( "AllowedIPs=$a.$b.0.0/16" ) -+ done -+done -+n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}") -+i=0 -+while read -r line; do -+ j=0 -+ for ip in $line; do -+ ((++j)) -+ done -+ ((j == 53)) -+ ((++i)) -+done < <(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips) -+((i == 40)) -+ip0 link del wg0 -+ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard -+config=( ) -+for i in {1..29}; do -+ config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" ) -+done -+config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" "AllowedIPs=255.2.3.4/32,abcd::255/128" ) -+n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}") -+n0 wg showconf wg0 > /dev/null -+ip0 link del wg0 -+ -+allowedips=( ) -+for i in {1..197}; do -+ allowedips+=( abcd::$i ) -+done -+saved_ifs="$IFS" -+IFS=, -+allowedips="${allowedips[*]}" -+IFS="$saved_ifs" -+ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips "$allowedips" -+{ -+ read -r pub allowedips -+ [[ $pub == "$pub1" && $allowedips == "(none)" ]] -+ read -r pub allowedips -+ [[ $pub == "$pub2" ]] -+ i=0 -+ for _ in $allowedips; do -+ ((++i)) -+ done -+ ((i == 197)) -+} < <(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips) -+ip0 link del wg0 -+ -+! n0 wg show doesnotexist || false -+ -+ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard -+n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") -+[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "$key1" ]] -+[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 preshared-keys) == "$pub2 $psk" ]] -+n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null peer "$pub2" preshared-key /dev/null -+[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "(none)" ]] -+[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 preshared-keys) == "$pub2 (none)" ]] -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" -+n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2") -+[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 public-key) == "$pub2" ]] -+[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" -+[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] -+n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" -+[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) == "$pub2" ]] -+n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "/${key1:1}") -+[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "+${key1:1}" ]] -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0,10.0.0.0/8,100.0.0.0/10,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16 -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0 -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75 -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0 -+ip0 link del wg0 -+ -+declare -A objects -+while read -t 0.1 -r line 2>/dev/null || [[ $? -ne 142 ]]; do -+ [[ $line =~ .*(wg[0-9]+:\ [A-Z][a-z]+\ [0-9]+)\ .*(created|destroyed).* ]] || continue -+ objects["${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"]+="${BASH_REMATCH[2]}" -+done < /dev/kmsg -+alldeleted=1 -+for object in "${!objects[@]}"; do -+ if [[ ${objects["$object"]} != *createddestroyed ]]; then -+ echo "Error: $object: merely ${objects["$object"]}" >&3 -+ alldeleted=0 -+ fi -+done -+[[ $alldeleted -eq 1 ]] -+pretty "" "Objects that were created were also destroyed." diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0073-net-icmp-pass-zeroed-opts-from-icmp-v6-_ndo_send-bef.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0073-net-icmp-pass-zeroed-opts-from-icmp-v6-_ndo_send-bef.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a5c356f14 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0073-net-icmp-pass-zeroed-opts-from-icmp-v6-_ndo_send-bef.patch @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 14:18:58 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] net: icmp: pass zeroed opts from icmp{,v6}_ndo_send before + sending + +commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream. + +The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting +it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the +inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially +when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that +point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory +contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one +reported by a user: + + panic+0x108/0x2ea + __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20 + __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0 + icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160 + +In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read +from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can +induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen +in __ip_options_echo. For example: + + // sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes + sptr = skb_network_header(skb); + // dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send + dptr = dopt->__data; + // sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question + if (sopt->rr) { + optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data + soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data + // this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over + // flowing the stack: + memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen); + } + +In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only +IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is +worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does +a bit of bounds checking on the value. + +This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41, +sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by +good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've +avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN: + + BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0 + Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89 + CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5 + Call Trace: + dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc + print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160 + __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 + kasan_report+0x32/0x40 + check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0 + memcpy+0x39/0x60 + __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0 + __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700 + +Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for +the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the +gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the +shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send. + +This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to +the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was +already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function. +For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it +behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward. + +Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs") +Reported-by: SinYu +Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/ +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +[Jason: the gtp part didn't apply because it doesn't use icmp_ndo_send on 5.4] +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + include/linux/icmpv6.h | 17 ++++++++++++++--- + include/linux/ipv6.h | 1 - + include/net/icmp.h | 6 +++++- + net/ipv4/icmp.c | 5 +++-- + net/ipv6/icmp.c | 16 ++++++++-------- + net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | 12 +++++++----- + 6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h ++++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h +@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ + #define _LINUX_ICMPV6_H + + #include ++#include + #include + + static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb) +@@ -13,10 +14,16 @@ static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr + #include + + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) +-extern void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info); ++extern void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, ++ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm); + ++static inline void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) ++{ ++ __icmpv6_send(skb, type, code, info, IP6CB(skb)); ++} + typedef void ip6_icmp_send_t(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, +- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr); ++ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr, ++ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm); + extern int inet6_register_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn); + extern int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn); + int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type, +@@ -25,7 +32,11 @@ int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) + void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info); + #else +-#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send ++static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) ++{ ++ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 }; ++ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm); ++} + #endif + + #else +--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h ++++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h +@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ struct ipv6_params { + __s32 autoconf; + }; + extern struct ipv6_params ipv6_defaults; +-#include + #include + #include + +--- a/include/net/icmp.h ++++ b/include/net/icmp.h +@@ -46,7 +46,11 @@ static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_b + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) + void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info); + #else +-#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send ++static inline void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info) ++{ ++ struct ip_options opts = { 0 }; ++ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts); ++} + #endif + + int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb); +--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c +@@ -755,13 +755,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send); + void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info) + { + struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; ++ struct ip_options opts = { 0 }; + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + struct nf_conn *ct; + __be32 orig_ip; + + ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); + if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) { +- icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info); ++ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts); + return; + } + +@@ -776,7 +777,7 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_i + + orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; + ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip; +- icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info); ++ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts); + ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; + out: + consume_skb(cloned_skb); +--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c +@@ -312,10 +312,9 @@ static int icmpv6_getfrag(void *from, ch + } + + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6) +-static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb) ++static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt) + { + struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb); +- struct inet6_skb_parm *opt = IP6CB(skb); + struct ipv6_destopt_hao *hao; + struct in6_addr tmp; + int off; +@@ -332,7 +331,7 @@ static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buf + } + } + #else +-static inline void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb) {} ++static inline void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt) {} + #endif + + static struct dst_entry *icmpv6_route_lookup(struct net *net, +@@ -427,7 +426,8 @@ static int icmp6_iif(const struct sk_buf + * Send an ICMP message in response to a packet in error + */ + static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, +- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr) ++ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr, ++ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm) + { + struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL; + struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb); +@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *s + if (!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && !icmpv6_global_allow(net, type)) + goto out_bh_enable; + +- mip6_addr_swap(skb); ++ mip6_addr_swap(skb, parm); + + memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6)); + fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_ICMPV6; +@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ out_bh_enable: + */ + void icmpv6_param_prob(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 code, int pos) + { +- icmp6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PARAMPROB, code, pos, NULL); ++ icmp6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PARAMPROB, code, pos, NULL, IP6CB(skb)); + kfree_skb(skb); + } + +@@ -662,10 +662,10 @@ int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk + } + if (type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED) + icmp6_send(skb2, ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED, ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT, +- info, &temp_saddr); ++ info, &temp_saddr, IP6CB(skb2)); + else + icmp6_send(skb2, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, +- info, &temp_saddr); ++ info, &temp_saddr, IP6CB(skb2)); + if (rt) + ip6_rt_put(rt); + +--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c +@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(ip6_icm + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_unregister_icmp_sender); + +-void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) ++void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, ++ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm) + { + ip6_icmp_send_t *send; + +@@ -40,16 +41,17 @@ void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 + + if (!send) + goto out; +- send(skb, type, code, info, NULL); ++ send(skb, type, code, info, NULL, parm); + out: + rcu_read_unlock(); + } +-EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_send); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmpv6_send); + + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) + #include + void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) + { ++ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 }; + struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + struct in6_addr orig_ip; +@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb + + ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); + if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) { +- icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info); ++ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm); + return; + } + +@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb + + orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; + ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6; +- icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info); ++ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm); + ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; + out: + consume_skb(cloned_skb); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0074-net-WireGuard-secure-network-tunnel.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0074-net-WireGuard-secure-network-tunnel.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9e37bbb60c --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0074-net-WireGuard-secure-network-tunnel.patch @@ -0,0 +1,8071 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 00:27:34 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] net: WireGuard secure network tunnel + +commit e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd upstream. + +WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for +the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. +Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and +considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are +available at: + + * https://www.wireguard.com/ + * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf + +This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, +accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It +makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of +networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing +system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption +operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. +Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from +the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools +have already implemented the API. + +This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel +tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit +of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the +namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like +the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for +pictures and examples. + +The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything +into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, +making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as +follows: + + * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the + cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in + nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of + bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared + pieces of data, like keys and key lists. + + * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for + ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance + with particular WireGuard semantics. + + * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of + WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an + integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just + being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. + + * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for + rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and + wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. + + * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions + available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. + + * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and + the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving + ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky + socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. + + * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard + peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace + tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project + distributes the basic wg(8) tool. + + * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling + the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. + + * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on + multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via + workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie + messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. + + * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on + multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via + the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI + poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages + as part of the protocol, in parallel. + + * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular + event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry + point functions for callers. + + * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. + + * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security + sensitive functions. + + * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing + script using network namespaces. + +This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing +WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or +coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future +optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and +vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally +standalone. + +We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a +verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Cc: David Miller +Cc: Greg KH +Cc: Linus Torvalds +Cc: Herbert Xu +Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org +Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org +Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +[Jason: ported to 5.4 by doing the following: + - wg_get_device_start uses genl_family_attrbuf + - trival skb_redirect_reset change from 2c64605b590e is folded in + - skb_list_walk_safe was already backported prior] +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + MAINTAINERS | 8 + + drivers/net/Kconfig | 41 + + drivers/net/Makefile | 1 + + drivers/net/wireguard/Makefile | 18 + + drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 381 +++++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.h | 59 ++ + drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c | 236 ++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.h | 59 ++ + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 458 ++++++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | 65 ++ + drivers/net/wireguard/main.c | 64 ++ + drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h | 128 +++ + drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 648 +++++++++++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.h | 12 + + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 828 +++++++++++++++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h | 137 +++ + drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 240 ++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h | 83 ++ + drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c | 221 +++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.h | 64 ++ + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c | 53 ++ + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 197 +++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.c | 223 +++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.h | 19 + + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 595 +++++++++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/allowedips.c | 683 +++++++++++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c | 104 +++ + drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c | 226 +++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 413 +++++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 437 ++++++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/socket.h | 44 + + drivers/net/wireguard/timers.c | 243 ++++++ + drivers/net/wireguard/timers.h | 31 + + drivers/net/wireguard/version.h | 1 + + include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h | 196 +++++ + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 537 ++++++++++++ + 36 files changed, 7753 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/Makefile + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/device.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/main.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/allowedips.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/timers.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/timers.h + create mode 100644 drivers/net/wireguard/version.h + create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h + create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh + +--- a/MAINTAINERS ++++ b/MAINTAINERS +@@ -17584,6 +17584,14 @@ L: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org + S: Maintained + F: drivers/gpio/gpio-ws16c48.c + ++WIREGUARD SECURE NETWORK TUNNEL ++M: Jason A. Donenfeld ++S: Maintained ++F: drivers/net/wireguard/ ++F: tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/ ++L: wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com ++L: netdev@vger.kernel.org ++ + WISTRON LAPTOP BUTTON DRIVER + M: Miloslav Trmac + S: Maintained +--- a/drivers/net/Kconfig ++++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig +@@ -71,6 +71,47 @@ config DUMMY + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module + will be called dummy. + ++config WIREGUARD ++ tristate "WireGuard secure network tunnel" ++ depends on NET && INET ++ depends on IPV6 || !IPV6 ++ select NET_UDP_TUNNEL ++ select DST_CACHE ++ select CRYPTO ++ select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519 ++ select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305 ++ select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S ++ select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT ++ select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT ++ select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT ++ select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86 if X86 && 64BIT ++ select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if (ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON ++ select CRYPTO_POLY1305_NEON if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON ++ select CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM if ARM ++ select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_NEON if ARM && KERNEL_MODE_NEON ++ select CRYPTO_CHACHA_MIPS if CPU_MIPS32_R2 ++ select CRYPTO_POLY1305_MIPS if CPU_MIPS32 || (CPU_MIPS64 && 64BIT) ++ help ++ WireGuard is a secure, fast, and easy to use replacement for IPSec ++ that uses modern cryptography and clever networking tricks. It's ++ designed to be fairly general purpose and abstract enough to fit most ++ use cases, while at the same time remaining extremely simple to ++ configure. See www.wireguard.com for more info. ++ ++ It's safe to say Y or M here, as the driver is very lightweight and ++ is only in use when an administrator chooses to add an interface. ++ ++config WIREGUARD_DEBUG ++ bool "Debugging checks and verbose messages" ++ depends on WIREGUARD ++ help ++ This will write log messages for handshake and other events ++ that occur for a WireGuard interface. It will also perform some ++ extra validation checks and unit tests at various points. This is ++ only useful for debugging. ++ ++ Say N here unless you know what you're doing. ++ + config EQUALIZER + tristate "EQL (serial line load balancing) support" + ---help--- +--- a/drivers/net/Makefile ++++ b/drivers/net/Makefile +@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BONDING) += bonding/ + obj-$(CONFIG_IPVLAN) += ipvlan/ + obj-$(CONFIG_IPVTAP) += ipvlan/ + obj-$(CONFIG_DUMMY) += dummy.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_WIREGUARD) += wireguard/ + obj-$(CONFIG_EQUALIZER) += eql.o + obj-$(CONFIG_IFB) += ifb.o + obj-$(CONFIG_MACSEC) += macsec.o +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/Makefile +@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ ++ccflags-y := -O3 ++ccflags-y += -D'pr_fmt(fmt)=KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt' ++ccflags-$(CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG) += -DDEBUG ++wireguard-y := main.o ++wireguard-y += noise.o ++wireguard-y += device.o ++wireguard-y += peer.o ++wireguard-y += timers.o ++wireguard-y += queueing.o ++wireguard-y += send.o ++wireguard-y += receive.o ++wireguard-y += socket.o ++wireguard-y += peerlookup.o ++wireguard-y += allowedips.o ++wireguard-y += ratelimiter.o ++wireguard-y += cookie.o ++wireguard-y += netlink.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_WIREGUARD) := wireguard.o +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c +@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "allowedips.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++ ++static void swap_endian(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, u8 bits) ++{ ++ if (bits == 32) { ++ *(u32 *)dst = be32_to_cpu(*(const __be32 *)src); ++ } else if (bits == 128) { ++ ((u64 *)dst)[0] = be64_to_cpu(((const __be64 *)src)[0]); ++ ((u64 *)dst)[1] = be64_to_cpu(((const __be64 *)src)[1]); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void copy_and_assign_cidr(struct allowedips_node *node, const u8 *src, ++ u8 cidr, u8 bits) ++{ ++ node->cidr = cidr; ++ node->bit_at_a = cidr / 8U; ++#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ node->bit_at_a ^= (bits / 8U - 1U) % 8U; ++#endif ++ node->bit_at_b = 7U - (cidr % 8U); ++ node->bitlen = bits; ++ memcpy(node->bits, src, bits / 8U); ++} ++#define CHOOSE_NODE(parent, key) \ ++ parent->bit[(key[parent->bit_at_a] >> parent->bit_at_b) & 1] ++ ++static void node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) ++{ ++ kfree(container_of(rcu, struct allowedips_node, rcu)); ++} ++ ++static void push_rcu(struct allowedips_node **stack, ++ struct allowedips_node __rcu *p, unsigned int *len) ++{ ++ if (rcu_access_pointer(p)) { ++ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && *len >= 128); ++ stack[(*len)++] = rcu_dereference_raw(p); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void root_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) ++{ ++ struct allowedips_node *node, *stack[128] = { ++ container_of(rcu, struct allowedips_node, rcu) }; ++ unsigned int len = 1; ++ ++ while (len > 0 && (node = stack[--len])) { ++ push_rcu(stack, node->bit[0], &len); ++ push_rcu(stack, node->bit[1], &len); ++ kfree(node); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void root_remove_peer_lists(struct allowedips_node *root) ++{ ++ struct allowedips_node *node, *stack[128] = { root }; ++ unsigned int len = 1; ++ ++ while (len > 0 && (node = stack[--len])) { ++ push_rcu(stack, node->bit[0], &len); ++ push_rcu(stack, node->bit[1], &len); ++ if (rcu_access_pointer(node->peer)) ++ list_del(&node->peer_list); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void walk_remove_by_peer(struct allowedips_node __rcu **top, ++ struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) ++{ ++#define REF(p) rcu_access_pointer(p) ++#define DEREF(p) rcu_dereference_protected(*(p), lockdep_is_held(lock)) ++#define PUSH(p) ({ \ ++ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && len >= 128); \ ++ stack[len++] = p; \ ++ }) ++ ++ struct allowedips_node __rcu **stack[128], **nptr; ++ struct allowedips_node *node, *prev; ++ unsigned int len; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!peer || !REF(*top))) ++ return; ++ ++ for (prev = NULL, len = 0, PUSH(top); len > 0; prev = node) { ++ nptr = stack[len - 1]; ++ node = DEREF(nptr); ++ if (!node) { ++ --len; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (!prev || REF(prev->bit[0]) == node || ++ REF(prev->bit[1]) == node) { ++ if (REF(node->bit[0])) ++ PUSH(&node->bit[0]); ++ else if (REF(node->bit[1])) ++ PUSH(&node->bit[1]); ++ } else if (REF(node->bit[0]) == prev) { ++ if (REF(node->bit[1])) ++ PUSH(&node->bit[1]); ++ } else { ++ if (rcu_dereference_protected(node->peer, ++ lockdep_is_held(lock)) == peer) { ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(node->peer, NULL); ++ list_del_init(&node->peer_list); ++ if (!node->bit[0] || !node->bit[1]) { ++ rcu_assign_pointer(*nptr, DEREF( ++ &node->bit[!REF(node->bit[0])])); ++ call_rcu(&node->rcu, node_free_rcu); ++ node = DEREF(nptr); ++ } ++ } ++ --len; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#undef REF ++#undef DEREF ++#undef PUSH ++} ++ ++static unsigned int fls128(u64 a, u64 b) ++{ ++ return a ? fls64(a) + 64U : fls64(b); ++} ++ ++static u8 common_bits(const struct allowedips_node *node, const u8 *key, ++ u8 bits) ++{ ++ if (bits == 32) ++ return 32U - fls(*(const u32 *)node->bits ^ *(const u32 *)key); ++ else if (bits == 128) ++ return 128U - fls128( ++ *(const u64 *)&node->bits[0] ^ *(const u64 *)&key[0], ++ *(const u64 *)&node->bits[8] ^ *(const u64 *)&key[8]); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static bool prefix_matches(const struct allowedips_node *node, const u8 *key, ++ u8 bits) ++{ ++ /* This could be much faster if it actually just compared the common ++ * bits properly, by precomputing a mask bswap(~0 << (32 - cidr)), and ++ * the rest, but it turns out that common_bits is already super fast on ++ * modern processors, even taking into account the unfortunate bswap. ++ * So, we just inline it like this instead. ++ */ ++ return common_bits(node, key, bits) >= node->cidr; ++} ++ ++static struct allowedips_node *find_node(struct allowedips_node *trie, u8 bits, ++ const u8 *key) ++{ ++ struct allowedips_node *node = trie, *found = NULL; ++ ++ while (node && prefix_matches(node, key, bits)) { ++ if (rcu_access_pointer(node->peer)) ++ found = node; ++ if (node->cidr == bits) ++ break; ++ node = rcu_dereference_bh(CHOOSE_NODE(node, key)); ++ } ++ return found; ++} ++ ++/* Returns a strong reference to a peer */ ++static struct wg_peer *lookup(struct allowedips_node __rcu *root, u8 bits, ++ const void *be_ip) ++{ ++ /* Aligned so it can be passed to fls/fls64 */ ++ u8 ip[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); ++ struct allowedips_node *node; ++ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; ++ ++ swap_endian(ip, be_ip, bits); ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++retry: ++ node = find_node(rcu_dereference_bh(root), bits, ip); ++ if (node) { ++ peer = wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(rcu_dereference_bh(node->peer)); ++ if (!peer) ++ goto retry; ++ } ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ return peer; ++} ++ ++static bool node_placement(struct allowedips_node __rcu *trie, const u8 *key, ++ u8 cidr, u8 bits, struct allowedips_node **rnode, ++ struct mutex *lock) ++{ ++ struct allowedips_node *node = rcu_dereference_protected(trie, ++ lockdep_is_held(lock)); ++ struct allowedips_node *parent = NULL; ++ bool exact = false; ++ ++ while (node && node->cidr <= cidr && prefix_matches(node, key, bits)) { ++ parent = node; ++ if (parent->cidr == cidr) { ++ exact = true; ++ break; ++ } ++ node = rcu_dereference_protected(CHOOSE_NODE(parent, key), ++ lockdep_is_held(lock)); ++ } ++ *rnode = parent; ++ return exact; ++} ++ ++static int add(struct allowedips_node __rcu **trie, u8 bits, const u8 *key, ++ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) ++{ ++ struct allowedips_node *node, *parent, *down, *newnode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(cidr > bits || !peer)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (!rcu_access_pointer(*trie)) { ++ node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!node)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(node->peer, peer); ++ list_add_tail(&node->peer_list, &peer->allowedips_list); ++ copy_and_assign_cidr(node, key, cidr, bits); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(*trie, node); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ if (node_placement(*trie, key, cidr, bits, &node, lock)) { ++ rcu_assign_pointer(node->peer, peer); ++ list_move_tail(&node->peer_list, &peer->allowedips_list); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ newnode = kzalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!newnode)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnode->peer, peer); ++ list_add_tail(&newnode->peer_list, &peer->allowedips_list); ++ copy_and_assign_cidr(newnode, key, cidr, bits); ++ ++ if (!node) { ++ down = rcu_dereference_protected(*trie, lockdep_is_held(lock)); ++ } else { ++ down = rcu_dereference_protected(CHOOSE_NODE(node, key), ++ lockdep_is_held(lock)); ++ if (!down) { ++ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(node, key), newnode); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ cidr = min(cidr, common_bits(down, key, bits)); ++ parent = node; ++ ++ if (newnode->cidr == cidr) { ++ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(newnode, down->bits), down); ++ if (!parent) ++ rcu_assign_pointer(*trie, newnode); ++ else ++ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(parent, newnode->bits), ++ newnode); ++ } else { ++ node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!node)) { ++ kfree(newnode); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->peer_list); ++ copy_and_assign_cidr(node, newnode->bits, cidr, bits); ++ ++ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(node, down->bits), down); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(node, newnode->bits), newnode); ++ if (!parent) ++ rcu_assign_pointer(*trie, node); ++ else ++ rcu_assign_pointer(CHOOSE_NODE(parent, node->bits), ++ node); ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void wg_allowedips_init(struct allowedips *table) ++{ ++ table->root4 = table->root6 = NULL; ++ table->seq = 1; ++} ++ ++void wg_allowedips_free(struct allowedips *table, struct mutex *lock) ++{ ++ struct allowedips_node __rcu *old4 = table->root4, *old6 = table->root6; ++ ++ ++table->seq; ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(table->root4, NULL); ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(table->root6, NULL); ++ if (rcu_access_pointer(old4)) { ++ struct allowedips_node *node = rcu_dereference_protected(old4, ++ lockdep_is_held(lock)); ++ ++ root_remove_peer_lists(node); ++ call_rcu(&node->rcu, root_free_rcu); ++ } ++ if (rcu_access_pointer(old6)) { ++ struct allowedips_node *node = rcu_dereference_protected(old6, ++ lockdep_is_held(lock)); ++ ++ root_remove_peer_lists(node); ++ call_rcu(&node->rcu, root_free_rcu); ++ } ++} ++ ++int wg_allowedips_insert_v4(struct allowedips *table, const struct in_addr *ip, ++ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) ++{ ++ /* Aligned so it can be passed to fls */ ++ u8 key[4] __aligned(__alignof(u32)); ++ ++ ++table->seq; ++ swap_endian(key, (const u8 *)ip, 32); ++ return add(&table->root4, 32, key, cidr, peer, lock); ++} ++ ++int wg_allowedips_insert_v6(struct allowedips *table, const struct in6_addr *ip, ++ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) ++{ ++ /* Aligned so it can be passed to fls64 */ ++ u8 key[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); ++ ++ ++table->seq; ++ swap_endian(key, (const u8 *)ip, 128); ++ return add(&table->root6, 128, key, cidr, peer, lock); ++} ++ ++void wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(struct allowedips *table, ++ struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock) ++{ ++ ++table->seq; ++ walk_remove_by_peer(&table->root4, peer, lock); ++ walk_remove_by_peer(&table->root6, peer, lock); ++} ++ ++int wg_allowedips_read_node(struct allowedips_node *node, u8 ip[16], u8 *cidr) ++{ ++ const unsigned int cidr_bytes = DIV_ROUND_UP(node->cidr, 8U); ++ swap_endian(ip, node->bits, node->bitlen); ++ memset(ip + cidr_bytes, 0, node->bitlen / 8U - cidr_bytes); ++ if (node->cidr) ++ ip[cidr_bytes - 1U] &= ~0U << (-node->cidr % 8U); ++ ++ *cidr = node->cidr; ++ return node->bitlen == 32 ? AF_INET : AF_INET6; ++} ++ ++/* Returns a strong reference to a peer */ ++struct wg_peer *wg_allowedips_lookup_dst(struct allowedips *table, ++ struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) ++ return lookup(table->root4, 32, &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); ++ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) ++ return lookup(table->root6, 128, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++/* Returns a strong reference to a peer */ ++struct wg_peer *wg_allowedips_lookup_src(struct allowedips *table, ++ struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) ++ return lookup(table->root4, 32, &ip_hdr(skb)->saddr); ++ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) ++ return lookup(table->root6, 128, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++#include "selftest/allowedips.c" +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.h +@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_ALLOWEDIPS_H ++#define _WG_ALLOWEDIPS_H ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++struct wg_peer; ++ ++struct allowedips_node { ++ struct wg_peer __rcu *peer; ++ struct allowedips_node __rcu *bit[2]; ++ /* While it may seem scandalous that we waste space for v4, ++ * we're alloc'ing to the nearest power of 2 anyway, so this ++ * doesn't actually make a difference. ++ */ ++ u8 bits[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); ++ u8 cidr, bit_at_a, bit_at_b, bitlen; ++ ++ /* Keep rarely used list at bottom to be beyond cache line. */ ++ union { ++ struct list_head peer_list; ++ struct rcu_head rcu; ++ }; ++}; ++ ++struct allowedips { ++ struct allowedips_node __rcu *root4; ++ struct allowedips_node __rcu *root6; ++ u64 seq; ++}; ++ ++void wg_allowedips_init(struct allowedips *table); ++void wg_allowedips_free(struct allowedips *table, struct mutex *mutex); ++int wg_allowedips_insert_v4(struct allowedips *table, const struct in_addr *ip, ++ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock); ++int wg_allowedips_insert_v6(struct allowedips *table, const struct in6_addr *ip, ++ u8 cidr, struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock); ++void wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(struct allowedips *table, ++ struct wg_peer *peer, struct mutex *lock); ++/* The ip input pointer should be __aligned(__alignof(u64))) */ ++int wg_allowedips_read_node(struct allowedips_node *node, u8 ip[16], u8 *cidr); ++ ++/* These return a strong reference to a peer: */ ++struct wg_peer *wg_allowedips_lookup_dst(struct allowedips *table, ++ struct sk_buff *skb); ++struct wg_peer *wg_allowedips_lookup_src(struct allowedips *table, ++ struct sk_buff *skb); ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++bool wg_allowedips_selftest(void); ++#endif ++ ++#endif /* _WG_ALLOWEDIPS_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c +@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "cookie.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "messages.h" ++#include "ratelimiter.h" ++#include "timers.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++void wg_cookie_checker_init(struct cookie_checker *checker, ++ struct wg_device *wg) ++{ ++ init_rwsem(&checker->secret_lock); ++ checker->secret_birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ get_random_bytes(checker->secret, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ checker->device = wg; ++} ++ ++enum { COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN = 8 }; ++static const u8 mac1_key_label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN] = "mac1----"; ++static const u8 cookie_key_label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN] = "cookie--"; ++ ++static void precompute_key(u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN]) ++{ ++ struct blake2s_state blake; ++ ++ blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ blake2s_update(&blake, label, COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN); ++ blake2s_update(&blake, pubkey, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ blake2s_final(&blake, key); ++} ++ ++/* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */ ++void wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(struct cookie_checker *checker) ++{ ++ if (likely(checker->device->static_identity.has_identity)) { ++ precompute_key(checker->cookie_encryption_key, ++ checker->device->static_identity.static_public, ++ cookie_key_label); ++ precompute_key(checker->message_mac1_key, ++ checker->device->static_identity.static_public, ++ mac1_key_label); ++ } else { ++ memset(checker->cookie_encryption_key, 0, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memset(checker->message_mac1_key, 0, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ } ++} ++ ++void wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ precompute_key(peer->latest_cookie.cookie_decryption_key, ++ peer->handshake.remote_static, cookie_key_label); ++ precompute_key(peer->latest_cookie.message_mac1_key, ++ peer->handshake.remote_static, mac1_key_label); ++} ++ ++void wg_cookie_init(struct cookie *cookie) ++{ ++ memset(cookie, 0, sizeof(*cookie)); ++ init_rwsem(&cookie->lock); ++} ++ ++static void compute_mac1(u8 mac1[COOKIE_LEN], const void *message, size_t len, ++ const u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ len = len - sizeof(struct message_macs) + ++ offsetof(struct message_macs, mac1); ++ blake2s(mac1, message, key, COOKIE_LEN, len, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++} ++ ++static void compute_mac2(u8 mac2[COOKIE_LEN], const void *message, size_t len, ++ const u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]) ++{ ++ len = len - sizeof(struct message_macs) + ++ offsetof(struct message_macs, mac2); ++ blake2s(mac2, message, cookie, COOKIE_LEN, len, COOKIE_LEN); ++} ++ ++static void make_cookie(u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN], struct sk_buff *skb, ++ struct cookie_checker *checker) ++{ ++ struct blake2s_state state; ++ ++ if (wg_birthdate_has_expired(checker->secret_birthdate, ++ COOKIE_SECRET_MAX_AGE)) { ++ down_write(&checker->secret_lock); ++ checker->secret_birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ get_random_bytes(checker->secret, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ up_write(&checker->secret_lock); ++ } ++ ++ down_read(&checker->secret_lock); ++ ++ blake2s_init_key(&state, COOKIE_LEN, checker->secret, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) ++ blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, ++ sizeof(struct in_addr)); ++ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) ++ blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, ++ sizeof(struct in6_addr)); ++ blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&udp_hdr(skb)->source, sizeof(__be16)); ++ blake2s_final(&state, cookie); ++ ++ up_read(&checker->secret_lock); ++} ++ ++enum cookie_mac_state wg_cookie_validate_packet(struct cookie_checker *checker, ++ struct sk_buff *skb, ++ bool check_cookie) ++{ ++ struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *) ++ (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*macs)); ++ enum cookie_mac_state ret; ++ u8 computed_mac[COOKIE_LEN]; ++ u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]; ++ ++ ret = INVALID_MAC; ++ compute_mac1(computed_mac, skb->data, skb->len, ++ checker->message_mac1_key); ++ if (crypto_memneq(computed_mac, macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ret = VALID_MAC_BUT_NO_COOKIE; ++ ++ if (!check_cookie) ++ goto out; ++ ++ make_cookie(cookie, skb, checker); ++ ++ compute_mac2(computed_mac, skb->data, skb->len, cookie); ++ if (crypto_memneq(computed_mac, macs->mac2, COOKIE_LEN)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ret = VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE_BUT_RATELIMITED; ++ if (!wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb, dev_net(checker->device->dev))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ret = VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE; ++ ++out: ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++void wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(void *message, size_t len, ++ struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *) ++ ((u8 *)message + len - sizeof(*macs)); ++ ++ down_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++ compute_mac1(macs->mac1, message, len, ++ peer->latest_cookie.message_mac1_key); ++ memcpy(peer->latest_cookie.last_mac1_sent, macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN); ++ peer->latest_cookie.have_sent_mac1 = true; ++ up_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++ ++ down_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++ if (peer->latest_cookie.is_valid && ++ !wg_birthdate_has_expired(peer->latest_cookie.birthdate, ++ COOKIE_SECRET_MAX_AGE - COOKIE_SECRET_LATENCY)) ++ compute_mac2(macs->mac2, message, len, ++ peer->latest_cookie.cookie); ++ else ++ memset(macs->mac2, 0, COOKIE_LEN); ++ up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++} ++ ++void wg_cookie_message_create(struct message_handshake_cookie *dst, ++ struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 index, ++ struct cookie_checker *checker) ++{ ++ struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *) ++ ((u8 *)skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*macs)); ++ u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]; ++ ++ dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE); ++ dst->receiver_index = index; ++ get_random_bytes_wait(dst->nonce, COOKIE_NONCE_LEN); ++ ++ make_cookie(cookie, skb, checker); ++ xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst->encrypted_cookie, cookie, COOKIE_LEN, ++ macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN, dst->nonce, ++ checker->cookie_encryption_key); ++} ++ ++void wg_cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, ++ struct wg_device *wg) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; ++ u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]; ++ bool ret; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!wg_index_hashtable_lookup(wg->index_hashtable, ++ INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE | ++ INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR, ++ src->receiver_index, &peer))) ++ return; ++ ++ down_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++ if (unlikely(!peer->latest_cookie.have_sent_mac1)) { ++ up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ret = xchacha20poly1305_decrypt( ++ cookie, src->encrypted_cookie, sizeof(src->encrypted_cookie), ++ peer->latest_cookie.last_mac1_sent, COOKIE_LEN, src->nonce, ++ peer->latest_cookie.cookie_decryption_key); ++ up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++ ++ if (ret) { ++ down_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++ memcpy(peer->latest_cookie.cookie, cookie, COOKIE_LEN); ++ peer->latest_cookie.birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ peer->latest_cookie.is_valid = true; ++ peer->latest_cookie.have_sent_mac1 = false; ++ up_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock); ++ } else { ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Could not decrypt invalid cookie response\n", ++ wg->dev->name); ++ } ++ ++out: ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.h +@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_COOKIE_H ++#define _WG_COOKIE_H ++ ++#include "messages.h" ++#include ++ ++struct wg_peer; ++ ++struct cookie_checker { ++ u8 secret[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; ++ u8 cookie_encryption_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 message_mac1_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u64 secret_birthdate; ++ struct rw_semaphore secret_lock; ++ struct wg_device *device; ++}; ++ ++struct cookie { ++ u64 birthdate; ++ bool is_valid; ++ u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN]; ++ bool have_sent_mac1; ++ u8 last_mac1_sent[COOKIE_LEN]; ++ u8 cookie_decryption_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 message_mac1_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ struct rw_semaphore lock; ++}; ++ ++enum cookie_mac_state { ++ INVALID_MAC, ++ VALID_MAC_BUT_NO_COOKIE, ++ VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE_BUT_RATELIMITED, ++ VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE ++}; ++ ++void wg_cookie_checker_init(struct cookie_checker *checker, ++ struct wg_device *wg); ++void wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(struct cookie_checker *checker); ++void wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_cookie_init(struct cookie *cookie); ++ ++enum cookie_mac_state wg_cookie_validate_packet(struct cookie_checker *checker, ++ struct sk_buff *skb, ++ bool check_cookie); ++void wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(void *message, size_t len, ++ struct wg_peer *peer); ++ ++void wg_cookie_message_create(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, ++ struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 index, ++ struct cookie_checker *checker); ++void wg_cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, ++ struct wg_device *wg); ++ ++#endif /* _WG_COOKIE_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "socket.h" ++#include "timers.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "ratelimiter.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "messages.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static LIST_HEAD(device_list); ++ ++static int wg_open(struct net_device *dev) ++{ ++ struct in_device *dev_v4 = __in_dev_get_rtnl(dev); ++ struct inet6_dev *dev_v6 = __in6_dev_get(dev); ++ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ int ret; ++ ++ if (dev_v4) { ++ /* At some point we might put this check near the ip_rt_send_ ++ * redirect call of ip_forward in net/ipv4/ip_forward.c, similar ++ * to the current secpath check. ++ */ ++ IN_DEV_CONF_SET(dev_v4, SEND_REDIRECTS, false); ++ IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(dev_net(dev), SEND_REDIRECTS) = false; ++ } ++ if (dev_v6) ++ dev_v6->cnf.addr_gen_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE; ++ ++ ret = wg_socket_init(wg, wg->incoming_port); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ return ret; ++ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { ++ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); ++ if (peer->persistent_keepalive_interval) ++ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); ++ } ++ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP ++static int wg_pm_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, ++ void *data) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg; ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ ++ /* If the machine is constantly suspending and resuming, as part of ++ * its normal operation rather than as a somewhat rare event, then we ++ * don't actually want to clear keys. ++ */ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ANDROID)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (action != PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE && action != PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE) ++ return 0; ++ ++ rtnl_lock(); ++ list_for_each_entry(wg, &device_list, device_list) { ++ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { ++ del_timer(&peer->timer_zero_key_material); ++ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake); ++ wg_noise_keypairs_clear(&peer->keypairs); ++ } ++ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ } ++ rtnl_unlock(); ++ rcu_barrier(); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static struct notifier_block pm_notifier = { .notifier_call = wg_pm_notification }; ++#endif ++ ++static int wg_stop(struct net_device *dev) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ ++ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { ++ wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(peer); ++ wg_timers_stop(peer); ++ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake); ++ wg_noise_keypairs_clear(&peer->keypairs); ++ wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(&peer->last_sent_handshake); ++ } ++ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ skb_queue_purge(&wg->incoming_handshakes); ++ wg_socket_reinit(wg, NULL, NULL); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); ++ struct sk_buff_head packets; ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ struct sk_buff *next; ++ sa_family_t family; ++ u32 mtu; ++ int ret; ++ ++ if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol)) { ++ ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Invalid IP packet\n", dev->name); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ peer = wg_allowedips_lookup_dst(&wg->peer_allowedips, skb); ++ if (unlikely(!peer)) { ++ ret = -ENOKEY; ++ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No peer has allowed IPs matching %pI4\n", ++ dev->name, &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); ++ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No peer has allowed IPs matching %pI6\n", ++ dev->name, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ family = READ_ONCE(peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family); ++ if (unlikely(family != AF_INET && family != AF_INET6)) { ++ ret = -EDESTADDRREQ; ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No valid endpoint has been configured or discovered for peer %llu\n", ++ dev->name, peer->internal_id); ++ goto err_peer; ++ } ++ ++ mtu = skb_dst(skb) ? dst_mtu(skb_dst(skb)) : dev->mtu; ++ ++ __skb_queue_head_init(&packets); ++ if (!skb_is_gso(skb)) { ++ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); ++ } else { ++ struct sk_buff *segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, 0); ++ ++ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(segs))) { ++ ret = PTR_ERR(segs); ++ goto err_peer; ++ } ++ dev_kfree_skb(skb); ++ skb = segs; ++ } ++ ++ skb_list_walk_safe(skb, skb, next) { ++ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); ++ ++ skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); ++ if (unlikely(!skb)) ++ continue; ++ ++ /* We only need to keep the original dst around for icmp, ++ * so at this point we're in a position to drop it. ++ */ ++ skb_dst_drop(skb); ++ ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu = mtu; ++ ++ __skb_queue_tail(&packets, skb); ++ } ++ ++ spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); ++ /* If the queue is getting too big, we start removing the oldest packets ++ * until it's small again. We do this before adding the new packet, so ++ * we don't remove GSO segments that are in excess. ++ */ ++ while (skb_queue_len(&peer->staged_packet_queue) > MAX_STAGED_PACKETS) { ++ dev_kfree_skb(__skb_dequeue(&peer->staged_packet_queue)); ++ ++dev->stats.tx_dropped; ++ } ++ skb_queue_splice_tail(&packets, &peer->staged_packet_queue); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); ++ ++ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); ++ ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ return NETDEV_TX_OK; ++ ++err_peer: ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++err: ++ ++dev->stats.tx_errors; ++ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) ++ icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0); ++ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) ++ icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0); ++ kfree_skb(skb); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static const struct net_device_ops netdev_ops = { ++ .ndo_open = wg_open, ++ .ndo_stop = wg_stop, ++ .ndo_start_xmit = wg_xmit, ++ .ndo_get_stats64 = ip_tunnel_get_stats64 ++}; ++ ++static void wg_destruct(struct net_device *dev) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); ++ ++ rtnl_lock(); ++ list_del(&wg->device_list); ++ rtnl_unlock(); ++ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ wg->incoming_port = 0; ++ wg_socket_reinit(wg, NULL, NULL); ++ /* The final references are cleared in the below calls to destroy_workqueue. */ ++ wg_peer_remove_all(wg); ++ destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_receive_wq); ++ destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_send_wq); ++ destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq); ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true); ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true); ++ rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for all the peers to be actually freed. */ ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++ memzero_explicit(&wg->static_identity, sizeof(wg->static_identity)); ++ skb_queue_purge(&wg->incoming_handshakes); ++ free_percpu(dev->tstats); ++ free_percpu(wg->incoming_handshakes_worker); ++ if (wg->have_creating_net_ref) ++ put_net(wg->creating_net); ++ kvfree(wg->index_hashtable); ++ kvfree(wg->peer_hashtable); ++ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ ++ pr_debug("%s: Interface deleted\n", dev->name); ++ free_netdev(dev); ++} ++ ++static const struct device_type device_type = { .name = KBUILD_MODNAME }; ++ ++static void wg_setup(struct net_device *dev) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); ++ enum { WG_NETDEV_FEATURES = NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM | ++ NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_GSO | ++ NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE | NETIF_F_HIGHDMA }; ++ ++ dev->netdev_ops = &netdev_ops; ++ dev->hard_header_len = 0; ++ dev->addr_len = 0; ++ dev->needed_headroom = DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM; ++ dev->needed_tailroom = noise_encrypted_len(MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE); ++ dev->type = ARPHRD_NONE; ++ dev->flags = IFF_POINTOPOINT | IFF_NOARP; ++ dev->priv_flags |= IFF_NO_QUEUE; ++ dev->features |= NETIF_F_LLTX; ++ dev->features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; ++ dev->hw_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; ++ dev->hw_enc_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; ++ dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH - ++ sizeof(struct udphdr) - ++ max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr)); ++ ++ SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &device_type); ++ ++ /* We need to keep the dst around in case of icmp replies. */ ++ netif_keep_dst(dev); ++ ++ memset(wg, 0, sizeof(*wg)); ++ wg->dev = dev; ++} ++ ++static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev, ++ struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[], ++ struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); ++ int ret = -ENOMEM; ++ ++ wg->creating_net = src_net; ++ init_rwsem(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ mutex_init(&wg->socket_update_lock); ++ mutex_init(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ skb_queue_head_init(&wg->incoming_handshakes); ++ wg_allowedips_init(&wg->peer_allowedips); ++ wg_cookie_checker_init(&wg->cookie_checker, wg); ++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&wg->peer_list); ++ wg->device_update_gen = 1; ++ ++ wg->peer_hashtable = wg_pubkey_hashtable_alloc(); ++ if (!wg->peer_hashtable) ++ return ret; ++ ++ wg->index_hashtable = wg_index_hashtable_alloc(); ++ if (!wg->index_hashtable) ++ goto err_free_peer_hashtable; ++ ++ dev->tstats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct pcpu_sw_netstats); ++ if (!dev->tstats) ++ goto err_free_index_hashtable; ++ ++ wg->incoming_handshakes_worker = ++ wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( ++ wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker, wg); ++ if (!wg->incoming_handshakes_worker) ++ goto err_free_tstats; ++ ++ wg->handshake_receive_wq = alloc_workqueue("wg-kex-%s", ++ WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_FREEZABLE, 0, dev->name); ++ if (!wg->handshake_receive_wq) ++ goto err_free_incoming_handshakes; ++ ++ wg->handshake_send_wq = alloc_workqueue("wg-kex-%s", ++ WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_FREEZABLE, 0, dev->name); ++ if (!wg->handshake_send_wq) ++ goto err_destroy_handshake_receive; ++ ++ wg->packet_crypt_wq = alloc_workqueue("wg-crypt-%s", ++ WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0, dev->name); ++ if (!wg->packet_crypt_wq) ++ goto err_destroy_handshake_send; ++ ++ ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->encrypt_queue, wg_packet_encrypt_worker, ++ true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto err_destroy_packet_crypt; ++ ++ ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->decrypt_queue, wg_packet_decrypt_worker, ++ true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto err_free_encrypt_queue; ++ ++ ret = wg_ratelimiter_init(); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto err_free_decrypt_queue; ++ ++ ret = register_netdevice(dev); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto err_uninit_ratelimiter; ++ ++ list_add(&wg->device_list, &device_list); ++ ++ /* We wait until the end to assign priv_destructor, so that ++ * register_netdevice doesn't call it for us if it fails. ++ */ ++ dev->priv_destructor = wg_destruct; ++ ++ pr_debug("%s: Interface created\n", dev->name); ++ return ret; ++ ++err_uninit_ratelimiter: ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++err_free_decrypt_queue: ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true); ++err_free_encrypt_queue: ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true); ++err_destroy_packet_crypt: ++ destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq); ++err_destroy_handshake_send: ++ destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_send_wq); ++err_destroy_handshake_receive: ++ destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_receive_wq); ++err_free_incoming_handshakes: ++ free_percpu(wg->incoming_handshakes_worker); ++err_free_tstats: ++ free_percpu(dev->tstats); ++err_free_index_hashtable: ++ kvfree(wg->index_hashtable); ++err_free_peer_hashtable: ++ kvfree(wg->peer_hashtable); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static struct rtnl_link_ops link_ops __read_mostly = { ++ .kind = KBUILD_MODNAME, ++ .priv_size = sizeof(struct wg_device), ++ .setup = wg_setup, ++ .newlink = wg_newlink, ++}; ++ ++static int wg_netdevice_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, ++ unsigned long action, void *data) ++{ ++ struct net_device *dev = ((struct netdev_notifier_info *)data)->dev; ++ struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); ++ ++ ASSERT_RTNL(); ++ ++ if (action != NETDEV_REGISTER || dev->netdev_ops != &netdev_ops) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (dev_net(dev) == wg->creating_net && wg->have_creating_net_ref) { ++ put_net(wg->creating_net); ++ wg->have_creating_net_ref = false; ++ } else if (dev_net(dev) != wg->creating_net && ++ !wg->have_creating_net_ref) { ++ wg->have_creating_net_ref = true; ++ get_net(wg->creating_net); ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static struct notifier_block netdevice_notifier = { ++ .notifier_call = wg_netdevice_notification ++}; ++ ++int __init wg_device_init(void) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP ++ ret = register_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++#endif ++ ++ ret = register_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); ++ if (ret) ++ goto error_pm; ++ ++ ret = rtnl_link_register(&link_ops); ++ if (ret) ++ goto error_netdevice; ++ ++ return 0; ++ ++error_netdevice: ++ unregister_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); ++error_pm: ++#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP ++ unregister_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); ++#endif ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++void wg_device_uninit(void) ++{ ++ rtnl_link_unregister(&link_ops); ++ unregister_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); ++#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP ++ unregister_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); ++#endif ++ rcu_barrier(); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h +@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_DEVICE_H ++#define _WG_DEVICE_H ++ ++#include "noise.h" ++#include "allowedips.h" ++#include "peerlookup.h" ++#include "cookie.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++struct wg_device; ++ ++struct multicore_worker { ++ void *ptr; ++ struct work_struct work; ++}; ++ ++struct crypt_queue { ++ struct ptr_ring ring; ++ union { ++ struct { ++ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker; ++ int last_cpu; ++ }; ++ struct work_struct work; ++ }; ++}; ++ ++struct wg_device { ++ struct net_device *dev; ++ struct crypt_queue encrypt_queue, decrypt_queue; ++ struct sock __rcu *sock4, *sock6; ++ struct net *creating_net; ++ struct noise_static_identity static_identity; ++ struct workqueue_struct *handshake_receive_wq, *handshake_send_wq; ++ struct workqueue_struct *packet_crypt_wq; ++ struct sk_buff_head incoming_handshakes; ++ int incoming_handshake_cpu; ++ struct multicore_worker __percpu *incoming_handshakes_worker; ++ struct cookie_checker cookie_checker; ++ struct pubkey_hashtable *peer_hashtable; ++ struct index_hashtable *index_hashtable; ++ struct allowedips peer_allowedips; ++ struct mutex device_update_lock, socket_update_lock; ++ struct list_head device_list, peer_list; ++ unsigned int num_peers, device_update_gen; ++ u32 fwmark; ++ u16 incoming_port; ++ bool have_creating_net_ref; ++}; ++ ++int wg_device_init(void); ++void wg_device_uninit(void); ++ ++#endif /* _WG_DEVICE_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/main.c +@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "version.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "noise.h" ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "ratelimiter.h" ++#include "netlink.h" ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static int __init mod_init(void) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ if (!wg_allowedips_selftest() || !wg_packet_counter_selftest() || ++ !wg_ratelimiter_selftest()) ++ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; ++#endif ++ wg_noise_init(); ++ ++ ret = wg_device_init(); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto err_device; ++ ++ ret = wg_genetlink_init(); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto err_netlink; ++ ++ pr_info("WireGuard " WIREGUARD_VERSION " loaded. See www.wireguard.com for information.\n"); ++ pr_info("Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved.\n"); ++ ++ return 0; ++ ++err_netlink: ++ wg_device_uninit(); ++err_device: ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static void __exit mod_exit(void) ++{ ++ wg_genetlink_uninit(); ++ wg_device_uninit(); ++} ++ ++module_init(mod_init); ++module_exit(mod_exit); ++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); ++MODULE_DESCRIPTION("WireGuard secure network tunnel"); ++MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld "); ++MODULE_VERSION(WIREGUARD_VERSION); ++MODULE_ALIAS_RTNL_LINK(KBUILD_MODNAME); ++MODULE_ALIAS_GENL_FAMILY(WG_GENL_NAME); +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h +@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_MESSAGES_H ++#define _WG_MESSAGES_H ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++enum noise_lengths { ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN = CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN = CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE, ++ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN = sizeof(u64) + sizeof(u32), ++ NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN = CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE, ++ NOISE_HASH_LEN = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ++}; ++ ++#define noise_encrypted_len(plain_len) ((plain_len) + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN) ++ ++enum cookie_values { ++ COOKIE_SECRET_MAX_AGE = 2 * 60, ++ COOKIE_SECRET_LATENCY = 5, ++ COOKIE_NONCE_LEN = XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE, ++ COOKIE_LEN = 16 ++}; ++ ++enum counter_values { ++ COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL = 2048, ++ COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS = BITS_PER_LONG, ++ COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE = COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL - COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS ++}; ++ ++enum limits { ++ REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES = 1ULL << 60, ++ REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES = U64_MAX - COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE - 1, ++ REKEY_TIMEOUT = 5, ++ REKEY_TIMEOUT_JITTER_MAX_JIFFIES = HZ / 3, ++ REKEY_AFTER_TIME = 120, ++ REJECT_AFTER_TIME = 180, ++ INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND = 50, ++ MAX_PEERS_PER_DEVICE = 1U << 20, ++ KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT = 10, ++ MAX_TIMER_HANDSHAKES = 90 / REKEY_TIMEOUT, ++ MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES = 4096, /* TODO: replace this with DQL */ ++ MAX_STAGED_PACKETS = 128, ++ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS = 1024 /* TODO: replace this with DQL */ ++}; ++ ++enum message_type { ++ MESSAGE_INVALID = 0, ++ MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION = 1, ++ MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE = 2, ++ MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE = 3, ++ MESSAGE_DATA = 4 ++}; ++ ++struct message_header { ++ /* The actual layout of this that we want is: ++ * u8 type ++ * u8 reserved_zero[3] ++ * ++ * But it turns out that by encoding this as little endian, ++ * we achieve the same thing, and it makes checking faster. ++ */ ++ __le32 type; ++}; ++ ++struct message_macs { ++ u8 mac1[COOKIE_LEN]; ++ u8 mac2[COOKIE_LEN]; ++}; ++ ++struct message_handshake_initiation { ++ struct message_header header; ++ __le32 sender_index; ++ u8 unencrypted_ephemeral[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 encrypted_static[noise_encrypted_len(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)]; ++ u8 encrypted_timestamp[noise_encrypted_len(NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN)]; ++ struct message_macs macs; ++}; ++ ++struct message_handshake_response { ++ struct message_header header; ++ __le32 sender_index; ++ __le32 receiver_index; ++ u8 unencrypted_ephemeral[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 encrypted_nothing[noise_encrypted_len(0)]; ++ struct message_macs macs; ++}; ++ ++struct message_handshake_cookie { ++ struct message_header header; ++ __le32 receiver_index; ++ u8 nonce[COOKIE_NONCE_LEN]; ++ u8 encrypted_cookie[noise_encrypted_len(COOKIE_LEN)]; ++}; ++ ++struct message_data { ++ struct message_header header; ++ __le32 key_idx; ++ __le64 counter; ++ u8 encrypted_data[]; ++}; ++ ++#define message_data_len(plain_len) \ ++ (noise_encrypted_len(plain_len) + sizeof(struct message_data)) ++ ++enum message_alignments { ++ MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE = 16, ++ MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH = message_data_len(0) ++}; ++ ++#define SKB_HEADER_LEN \ ++ (max(sizeof(struct iphdr), sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) + \ ++ sizeof(struct udphdr) + NET_SKB_PAD) ++#define DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM \ ++ ALIGN(sizeof(struct message_data) + SKB_HEADER_LEN, 4) ++ ++enum { HANDSHAKE_DSCP = 0x88 /* AF41, plus 00 ECN */ }; ++ ++#endif /* _WG_MESSAGES_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c +@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "netlink.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "socket.h" ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "messages.h" ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static struct genl_family genl_family; ++ ++static const struct nla_policy device_policy[WGDEVICE_A_MAX + 1] = { ++ [WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, ++ [WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING, .len = IFNAMSIZ - 1 }, ++ [WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, ++ [WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, ++ [WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, ++ [WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, ++ [WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, ++ [WGDEVICE_A_PEERS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED } ++}; ++ ++static const struct nla_policy peer_policy[WGPEER_A_MAX + 1] = { ++ [WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, ++ [WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN }, ++ [WGPEER_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, ++ [WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct sockaddr) }, ++ [WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, ++ [WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct __kernel_timespec) }, ++ [WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, ++ [WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, ++ [WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, ++ [WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION] = { .type = NLA_U32 } ++}; ++ ++static const struct nla_policy allowedip_policy[WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX + 1] = { ++ [WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, ++ [WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) }, ++ [WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U8 } ++}; ++ ++static struct wg_device *lookup_interface(struct nlattr **attrs, ++ struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ struct net_device *dev = NULL; ++ ++ if (!attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX] == !attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME]) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EBADR); ++ if (attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX]) ++ dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(skb->sk), ++ nla_get_u32(attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX])); ++ else if (attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME]) ++ dev = dev_get_by_name(sock_net(skb->sk), ++ nla_data(attrs[WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME])); ++ if (!dev) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); ++ if (!dev->rtnl_link_ops || !dev->rtnl_link_ops->kind || ++ strcmp(dev->rtnl_link_ops->kind, KBUILD_MODNAME)) { ++ dev_put(dev); ++ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); ++ } ++ return netdev_priv(dev); ++} ++ ++static int get_allowedips(struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *ip, u8 cidr, ++ int family) ++{ ++ struct nlattr *allowedip_nest; ++ ++ allowedip_nest = nla_nest_start(skb, 0); ++ if (!allowedip_nest) ++ return -EMSGSIZE; ++ ++ if (nla_put_u8(skb, WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK, cidr) || ++ nla_put_u16(skb, WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY, family) || ++ nla_put(skb, WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR, family == AF_INET6 ? ++ sizeof(struct in6_addr) : sizeof(struct in_addr), ip)) { ++ nla_nest_cancel(skb, allowedip_nest); ++ return -EMSGSIZE; ++ } ++ ++ nla_nest_end(skb, allowedip_nest); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++struct dump_ctx { ++ struct wg_device *wg; ++ struct wg_peer *next_peer; ++ u64 allowedips_seq; ++ struct allowedips_node *next_allowedip; ++}; ++ ++#define DUMP_CTX(cb) ((struct dump_ctx *)(cb)->args) ++ ++static int ++get_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb, struct dump_ctx *ctx) ++{ ++ ++ struct nlattr *allowedips_nest, *peer_nest = nla_nest_start(skb, 0); ++ struct allowedips_node *allowedips_node = ctx->next_allowedip; ++ bool fail; ++ ++ if (!peer_nest) ++ return -EMSGSIZE; ++ ++ down_read(&peer->handshake.lock); ++ fail = nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ++ peer->handshake.remote_static); ++ up_read(&peer->handshake.lock); ++ if (fail) ++ goto err; ++ ++ if (!allowedips_node) { ++ const struct __kernel_timespec last_handshake = { ++ .tv_sec = peer->walltime_last_handshake.tv_sec, ++ .tv_nsec = peer->walltime_last_handshake.tv_nsec ++ }; ++ ++ down_read(&peer->handshake.lock); ++ fail = nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, ++ peer->handshake.preshared_key); ++ up_read(&peer->handshake.lock); ++ if (fail) ++ goto err; ++ ++ if (nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME, ++ sizeof(last_handshake), &last_handshake) || ++ nla_put_u16(skb, WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL, ++ peer->persistent_keepalive_interval) || ++ nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES, peer->tx_bytes, ++ WGPEER_A_UNSPEC) || ++ nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES, peer->rx_bytes, ++ WGPEER_A_UNSPEC) || ++ nla_put_u32(skb, WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1)) ++ goto err; ++ ++ read_lock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++ if (peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET) ++ fail = nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT, ++ sizeof(peer->endpoint.addr4), ++ &peer->endpoint.addr4); ++ else if (peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) ++ fail = nla_put(skb, WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT, ++ sizeof(peer->endpoint.addr6), ++ &peer->endpoint.addr6); ++ read_unlock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++ if (fail) ++ goto err; ++ allowedips_node = ++ list_first_entry_or_null(&peer->allowedips_list, ++ struct allowedips_node, peer_list); ++ } ++ if (!allowedips_node) ++ goto no_allowedips; ++ if (!ctx->allowedips_seq) ++ ctx->allowedips_seq = peer->device->peer_allowedips.seq; ++ else if (ctx->allowedips_seq != peer->device->peer_allowedips.seq) ++ goto no_allowedips; ++ ++ allowedips_nest = nla_nest_start(skb, WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS); ++ if (!allowedips_nest) ++ goto err; ++ ++ list_for_each_entry_from(allowedips_node, &peer->allowedips_list, ++ peer_list) { ++ u8 cidr, ip[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); ++ int family; ++ ++ family = wg_allowedips_read_node(allowedips_node, ip, &cidr); ++ if (get_allowedips(skb, ip, cidr, family)) { ++ nla_nest_end(skb, allowedips_nest); ++ nla_nest_end(skb, peer_nest); ++ ctx->next_allowedip = allowedips_node; ++ return -EMSGSIZE; ++ } ++ } ++ nla_nest_end(skb, allowedips_nest); ++no_allowedips: ++ nla_nest_end(skb, peer_nest); ++ ctx->next_allowedip = NULL; ++ ctx->allowedips_seq = 0; ++ return 0; ++err: ++ nla_nest_cancel(skb, peer_nest); ++ return -EMSGSIZE; ++} ++ ++static int wg_get_device_start(struct netlink_callback *cb) ++{ ++ struct nlattr **attrs = genl_family_attrbuf(&genl_family); ++ struct wg_device *wg; ++ int ret; ++ ++ ret = nlmsg_parse(cb->nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + genl_family.hdrsize, attrs, ++ genl_family.maxattr, device_policy, NULL); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ return ret; ++ wg = lookup_interface(attrs, cb->skb); ++ if (IS_ERR(wg)) ++ return PTR_ERR(wg); ++ DUMP_CTX(cb)->wg = wg; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int wg_get_device_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer, *next_peer_cursor; ++ struct dump_ctx *ctx = DUMP_CTX(cb); ++ struct wg_device *wg = ctx->wg; ++ struct nlattr *peers_nest; ++ int ret = -EMSGSIZE; ++ bool done = true; ++ void *hdr; ++ ++ rtnl_lock(); ++ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ cb->seq = wg->device_update_gen; ++ next_peer_cursor = ctx->next_peer; ++ ++ hdr = genlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, ++ &genl_family, NLM_F_MULTI, WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE); ++ if (!hdr) ++ goto out; ++ genl_dump_check_consistent(cb, hdr); ++ ++ if (!ctx->next_peer) { ++ if (nla_put_u16(skb, WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT, ++ wg->incoming_port) || ++ nla_put_u32(skb, WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK, wg->fwmark) || ++ nla_put_u32(skb, WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX, wg->dev->ifindex) || ++ nla_put_string(skb, WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME, wg->dev->name)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ if (wg->static_identity.has_identity) { ++ if (nla_put(skb, WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ++ wg->static_identity.static_private) || ++ nla_put(skb, WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ++ wg->static_identity.static_public)) { ++ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } ++ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ } ++ ++ peers_nest = nla_nest_start(skb, WGDEVICE_A_PEERS); ++ if (!peers_nest) ++ goto out; ++ ret = 0; ++ /* If the last cursor was removed via list_del_init in peer_remove, then ++ * we just treat this the same as there being no more peers left. The ++ * reason is that seq_nr should indicate to userspace that this isn't a ++ * coherent dump anyway, so they'll try again. ++ */ ++ if (list_empty(&wg->peer_list) || ++ (ctx->next_peer && list_empty(&ctx->next_peer->peer_list))) { ++ nla_nest_cancel(skb, peers_nest); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ lockdep_assert_held(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ peer = list_prepare_entry(ctx->next_peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list); ++ list_for_each_entry_continue(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { ++ if (get_peer(peer, skb, ctx)) { ++ done = false; ++ break; ++ } ++ next_peer_cursor = peer; ++ } ++ nla_nest_end(skb, peers_nest); ++ ++out: ++ if (!ret && !done && next_peer_cursor) ++ wg_peer_get(next_peer_cursor); ++ wg_peer_put(ctx->next_peer); ++ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ rtnl_unlock(); ++ ++ if (ret) { ++ genlmsg_cancel(skb, hdr); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ genlmsg_end(skb, hdr); ++ if (done) { ++ ctx->next_peer = NULL; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ctx->next_peer = next_peer_cursor; ++ return skb->len; ++ ++ /* At this point, we can't really deal ourselves with safely zeroing out ++ * the private key material after usage. This will need an additional API ++ * in the kernel for marking skbs as zero_on_free. ++ */ ++} ++ ++static int wg_get_device_done(struct netlink_callback *cb) ++{ ++ struct dump_ctx *ctx = DUMP_CTX(cb); ++ ++ if (ctx->wg) ++ dev_put(ctx->wg->dev); ++ wg_peer_put(ctx->next_peer); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int set_port(struct wg_device *wg, u16 port) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ ++ if (wg->incoming_port == port) ++ return 0; ++ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) ++ wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(peer); ++ if (!netif_running(wg->dev)) { ++ wg->incoming_port = port; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ return wg_socket_init(wg, port); ++} ++ ++static int set_allowedip(struct wg_peer *peer, struct nlattr **attrs) ++{ ++ int ret = -EINVAL; ++ u16 family; ++ u8 cidr; ++ ++ if (!attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY] || !attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR] || ++ !attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK]) ++ return ret; ++ family = nla_get_u16(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY]); ++ cidr = nla_get_u8(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK]); ++ ++ if (family == AF_INET && cidr <= 32 && ++ nla_len(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR]) == sizeof(struct in_addr)) ++ ret = wg_allowedips_insert_v4( ++ &peer->device->peer_allowedips, ++ nla_data(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR]), cidr, peer, ++ &peer->device->device_update_lock); ++ else if (family == AF_INET6 && cidr <= 128 && ++ nla_len(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR]) == sizeof(struct in6_addr)) ++ ret = wg_allowedips_insert_v6( ++ &peer->device->peer_allowedips, ++ nla_data(attrs[WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR]), cidr, peer, ++ &peer->device->device_update_lock); ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static int set_peer(struct wg_device *wg, struct nlattr **attrs) ++{ ++ u8 *public_key = NULL, *preshared_key = NULL; ++ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; ++ u32 flags = 0; ++ int ret; ++ ++ ret = -EINVAL; ++ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] && ++ nla_len(attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY]) == NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) ++ public_key = nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY]); ++ else ++ goto out; ++ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] && ++ nla_len(attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY]) == NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN) ++ preshared_key = nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY]); ++ ++ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_FLAGS]) ++ flags = nla_get_u32(attrs[WGPEER_A_FLAGS]); ++ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; ++ if (flags & ~__WGPEER_F_ALL) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ret = -EPFNOSUPPORT; ++ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION]) { ++ if (nla_get_u32(attrs[WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION]) != 1) ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ peer = wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(wg->peer_hashtable, ++ nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY])); ++ ret = 0; ++ if (!peer) { /* Peer doesn't exist yet. Add a new one. */ ++ if (flags & (WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME | WGPEER_F_UPDATE_ONLY)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* The peer is new, so there aren't allowed IPs to remove. */ ++ flags &= ~WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS; ++ ++ down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ if (wg->static_identity.has_identity && ++ !memcmp(nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY]), ++ wg->static_identity.static_public, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)) { ++ /* We silently ignore peers that have the same public ++ * key as the device. The reason we do it silently is ++ * that we'd like for people to be able to reuse the ++ * same set of API calls across peers. ++ */ ++ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ ret = 0; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ ++ peer = wg_peer_create(wg, public_key, preshared_key); ++ if (IS_ERR(peer)) { ++ /* Similar to the above, if the key is invalid, we skip ++ * it without fanfare, so that services don't need to ++ * worry about doing key validation themselves. ++ */ ++ ret = PTR_ERR(peer) == -EKEYREJECTED ? 0 : PTR_ERR(peer); ++ peer = NULL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* Take additional reference, as though we've just been ++ * looked up. ++ */ ++ wg_peer_get(peer); ++ } ++ ++ if (flags & WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME) { ++ wg_peer_remove(peer); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (preshared_key) { ++ down_write(&peer->handshake.lock); ++ memcpy(&peer->handshake.preshared_key, preshared_key, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ up_write(&peer->handshake.lock); ++ } ++ ++ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT]) { ++ struct sockaddr *addr = nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT]); ++ size_t len = nla_len(attrs[WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT]); ++ ++ if ((len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) && ++ addr->sa_family == AF_INET) || ++ (len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) && ++ addr->sa_family == AF_INET6)) { ++ struct endpoint endpoint = { { { 0 } } }; ++ ++ memcpy(&endpoint.addr, addr, len); ++ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(peer, &endpoint); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (flags & WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS) ++ wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(&wg->peer_allowedips, peer, ++ &wg->device_update_lock); ++ ++ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS]) { ++ struct nlattr *attr, *allowedip[WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX + 1]; ++ int rem; ++ ++ nla_for_each_nested(attr, attrs[WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS], rem) { ++ ret = nla_parse_nested(allowedip, WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX, ++ attr, allowedip_policy, NULL); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto out; ++ ret = set_allowedip(peer, allowedip); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL]) { ++ const u16 persistent_keepalive_interval = nla_get_u16( ++ attrs[WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL]); ++ const bool send_keepalive = ++ !peer->persistent_keepalive_interval && ++ persistent_keepalive_interval && ++ netif_running(wg->dev); ++ ++ peer->persistent_keepalive_interval = persistent_keepalive_interval; ++ if (send_keepalive) ++ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); ++ } ++ ++ if (netif_running(wg->dev)) ++ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); ++ ++out: ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ if (attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY]) ++ memzero_explicit(nla_data(attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY]), ++ nla_len(attrs[WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY])); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg = lookup_interface(info->attrs, skb); ++ u32 flags = 0; ++ int ret; ++ ++ if (IS_ERR(wg)) { ++ ret = PTR_ERR(wg); ++ goto out_nodev; ++ } ++ ++ rtnl_lock(); ++ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ ++ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS]) ++ flags = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS]); ++ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; ++ if (flags & ~__WGDEVICE_F_ALL) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ret = -EPERM; ++ if ((info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] || ++ info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]) && ++ !ns_capable(wg->creating_net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ++wg->device_update_gen; ++ ++ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]) { ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ ++ wg->fwmark = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]); ++ list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) ++ wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(peer); ++ } ++ ++ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT]) { ++ ret = set_port(wg, ++ nla_get_u16(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT])); ++ if (ret) ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (flags & WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS) ++ wg_peer_remove_all(wg); ++ ++ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY] && ++ nla_len(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY]) == ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) { ++ u8 *private_key = nla_data(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY]); ++ u8 public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ struct wg_peer *peer, *temp; ++ ++ if (!crypto_memneq(wg->static_identity.static_private, ++ private_key, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)) ++ goto skip_set_private_key; ++ ++ /* We remove before setting, to prevent race, which means doing ++ * two 25519-genpub ops. ++ */ ++ if (curve25519_generate_public(public_key, private_key)) { ++ peer = wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(wg->peer_hashtable, ++ public_key); ++ if (peer) { ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ wg_peer_remove(peer); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ down_write(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(&wg->static_identity, ++ private_key); ++ list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list, ++ peer_list) { ++ if (wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer)) ++ wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer); ++ else ++ wg_peer_remove(peer); ++ } ++ wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(&wg->cookie_checker); ++ up_write(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ } ++skip_set_private_key: ++ ++ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PEERS]) { ++ struct nlattr *attr, *peer[WGPEER_A_MAX + 1]; ++ int rem; ++ ++ nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PEERS], rem) { ++ ret = nla_parse_nested(peer, WGPEER_A_MAX, attr, ++ peer_policy, NULL); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto out; ++ ret = set_peer(wg, peer); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } ++ ret = 0; ++ ++out: ++ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ rtnl_unlock(); ++ dev_put(wg->dev); ++out_nodev: ++ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY]) ++ memzero_explicit(nla_data(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY]), ++ nla_len(info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY])); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static const struct genl_ops genl_ops[] = { ++ { ++ .cmd = WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE, ++ .start = wg_get_device_start, ++ .dumpit = wg_get_device_dump, ++ .done = wg_get_device_done, ++ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM ++ }, { ++ .cmd = WG_CMD_SET_DEVICE, ++ .doit = wg_set_device, ++ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM ++ } ++}; ++ ++static struct genl_family genl_family __ro_after_init = { ++ .ops = genl_ops, ++ .n_ops = ARRAY_SIZE(genl_ops), ++ .name = WG_GENL_NAME, ++ .version = WG_GENL_VERSION, ++ .maxattr = WGDEVICE_A_MAX, ++ .module = THIS_MODULE, ++ .policy = device_policy, ++ .netnsok = true ++}; ++ ++int __init wg_genetlink_init(void) ++{ ++ return genl_register_family(&genl_family); ++} ++ ++void __exit wg_genetlink_uninit(void) ++{ ++ genl_unregister_family(&genl_family); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.h +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_NETLINK_H ++#define _WG_NETLINK_H ++ ++int wg_genetlink_init(void); ++void wg_genetlink_uninit(void); ++ ++#endif /* _WG_NETLINK_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c +@@ -0,0 +1,828 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "noise.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "messages.h" ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "peerlookup.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* This implements Noise_IKpsk2: ++ * ++ * <- s ++ * ****** ++ * -> e, es, s, ss, {t} ++ * <- e, ee, se, psk, {} ++ */ ++ ++static const u8 handshake_name[37] = "Noise_IKpsk2_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s"; ++static const u8 identifier_name[34] = "WireGuard v1 zx2c4 Jason@zx2c4.com"; ++static u8 handshake_init_hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN] __ro_after_init; ++static u8 handshake_init_chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN] __ro_after_init; ++static atomic64_t keypair_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0); ++ ++void __init wg_noise_init(void) ++{ ++ struct blake2s_state blake; ++ ++ blake2s(handshake_init_chaining_key, handshake_name, NULL, ++ NOISE_HASH_LEN, sizeof(handshake_name), 0); ++ blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ blake2s_update(&blake, handshake_init_chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ blake2s_update(&blake, identifier_name, sizeof(identifier_name)); ++ blake2s_final(&blake, handshake_init_hash); ++} ++ ++/* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */ ++bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ bool ret = true; ++ ++ down_write(&peer->handshake.lock); ++ if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) ++ ret = curve25519( ++ peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, ++ peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private, ++ peer->handshake.remote_static); ++ else ++ memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ up_write(&peer->handshake.lock); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, ++ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, ++ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(*handshake)); ++ init_rwsem(&handshake->lock); ++ handshake->entry.type = INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE; ++ handshake->entry.peer = peer; ++ memcpy(handshake->remote_static, peer_public_key, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ if (peer_preshared_key) ++ memcpy(handshake->preshared_key, peer_preshared_key, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ handshake->static_identity = static_identity; ++ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED; ++ return wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer); ++} ++ ++static void handshake_zero(struct noise_handshake *handshake) ++{ ++ memset(&handshake->ephemeral_private, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memset(&handshake->remote_ephemeral, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memset(&handshake->hash, 0, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memset(&handshake->chaining_key, 0, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ handshake->remote_index = 0; ++ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED; ++} ++ ++void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake) ++{ ++ wg_index_hashtable_remove( ++ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, ++ &handshake->entry); ++ down_write(&handshake->lock); ++ handshake_zero(handshake); ++ up_write(&handshake->lock); ++ wg_index_hashtable_remove( ++ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, ++ &handshake->entry); ++} ++ ++static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair = kzalloc(sizeof(*keypair), GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!keypair)) ++ return NULL; ++ keypair->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&keypair_counter); ++ keypair->entry.type = INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR; ++ keypair->entry.peer = peer; ++ kref_init(&keypair->refcount); ++ return keypair; ++} ++ ++static void keypair_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) ++{ ++ kzfree(container_of(rcu, struct noise_keypair, rcu)); ++} ++ ++static void keypair_free_kref(struct kref *kref) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair = ++ container_of(kref, struct noise_keypair, refcount); ++ ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu destroyed for peer %llu\n", ++ keypair->entry.peer->device->dev->name, ++ keypair->internal_id, ++ keypair->entry.peer->internal_id); ++ wg_index_hashtable_remove(keypair->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, ++ &keypair->entry); ++ call_rcu(&keypair->rcu, keypair_free_rcu); ++} ++ ++void wg_noise_keypair_put(struct noise_keypair *keypair, bool unreference_now) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!keypair)) ++ return; ++ if (unlikely(unreference_now)) ++ wg_index_hashtable_remove( ++ keypair->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, ++ &keypair->entry); ++ kref_put(&keypair->refcount, keypair_free_kref); ++} ++ ++struct noise_keypair *wg_noise_keypair_get(struct noise_keypair *keypair) ++{ ++ RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_bh_held(), ++ "Taking noise keypair reference without holding the RCU BH read lock"); ++ if (unlikely(!keypair || !kref_get_unless_zero(&keypair->refcount))) ++ return NULL; ++ return keypair; ++} ++ ++void wg_noise_keypairs_clear(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *old; ++ ++ spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); ++ ++ /* We zero the next_keypair before zeroing the others, so that ++ * wg_noise_received_with_keypair returns early before subsequent ones ++ * are zeroed. ++ */ ++ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL); ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true); ++ ++ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->previous_keypair, NULL); ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true); ++ ++ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->current_keypair, NULL); ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true); ++ ++ spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); ++} ++ ++void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair; ++ ++ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake); ++ wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(&peer->last_sent_handshake); ++ ++ spin_lock_bh(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock); ++ keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(peer->keypairs.next_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock)); ++ if (keypair) ++ keypair->sending.is_valid = false; ++ keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(peer->keypairs.current_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock)); ++ if (keypair) ++ keypair->sending.is_valid = false; ++ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock); ++} ++ ++static void add_new_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, ++ struct noise_keypair *new_keypair) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *previous_keypair, *next_keypair, *current_keypair; ++ ++ spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); ++ previous_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); ++ next_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); ++ current_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); ++ if (new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator) { ++ /* If we're the initiator, it means we've sent a handshake, and ++ * received a confirmation response, which means this new ++ * keypair can now be used. ++ */ ++ if (next_keypair) { ++ /* If there already was a next keypair pending, we ++ * demote it to be the previous keypair, and free the ++ * existing current. Note that this means KCI can result ++ * in this transition. It would perhaps be more sound to ++ * always just get rid of the unused next keypair ++ * instead of putting it in the previous slot, but this ++ * might be a bit less robust. Something to think about ++ * for the future. ++ */ ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, ++ next_keypair); ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(current_keypair, true); ++ } else /* If there wasn't an existing next keypair, we replace ++ * the previous with the current one. ++ */ ++ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, ++ current_keypair); ++ /* At this point we can get rid of the old previous keypair, and ++ * set up the new keypair. ++ */ ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair, true); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->current_keypair, new_keypair); ++ } else { ++ /* If we're the responder, it means we can't use the new keypair ++ * until we receive confirmation via the first data packet, so ++ * we get rid of the existing previous one, the possibly ++ * existing next one, and slide in the new next one. ++ */ ++ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair, new_keypair); ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(next_keypair, true); ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->previous_keypair, NULL); ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair, true); ++ } ++ spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); ++} ++ ++bool wg_noise_received_with_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, ++ struct noise_keypair *received_keypair) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *old_keypair; ++ bool key_is_new; ++ ++ /* We first check without taking the spinlock. */ ++ key_is_new = received_keypair == ++ rcu_access_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair); ++ if (likely(!key_is_new)) ++ return false; ++ ++ spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); ++ /* After locking, we double check that things didn't change from ++ * beneath us. ++ */ ++ if (unlikely(received_keypair != ++ rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)))) { ++ spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); ++ return false; ++ } ++ ++ /* When we've finally received the confirmation, we slide the next ++ * into the current, the current into the previous, and get rid of ++ * the old previous. ++ */ ++ old_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, ++ rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, ++ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock))); ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(old_keypair, true); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->current_keypair, received_keypair); ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL); ++ ++ spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock); ++ return true; ++} ++ ++/* Must hold static_identity->lock */ ++void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key( ++ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, ++ const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ memcpy(static_identity->static_private, private_key, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ curve25519_clamp_secret(static_identity->static_private); ++ static_identity->has_identity = curve25519_generate_public( ++ static_identity->static_public, private_key); ++} ++ ++/* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF: ++ * - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf ++ * - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869 ++ */ ++static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data, ++ size_t first_len, size_t second_len, size_t third_len, ++ size_t data_len, const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) ++{ ++ u8 output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1]; ++ u8 secret[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; ++ ++ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && ++ (first_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || ++ second_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || ++ third_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || ++ ((second_len || second_dst || third_len || third_dst) && ++ (!first_len || !first_dst)) || ++ ((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst)))); ++ ++ /* Extract entropy from data into secret */ ++ blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ ++ if (!first_dst || !first_len) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */ ++ output[0] = 1; ++ blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); ++ memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len); ++ ++ if (!second_dst || !second_len) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */ ++ output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2; ++ blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, ++ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); ++ memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len); ++ ++ if (!third_dst || !third_len) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */ ++ output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3; ++ blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, ++ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); ++ memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len); ++ ++out: ++ /* Clear sensitive data from stack */ ++ memzero_explicit(secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); ++ memzero_explicit(output, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1); ++} ++ ++static void symmetric_key_init(struct noise_symmetric_key *key) ++{ ++ spin_lock_init(&key->counter.receive.lock); ++ atomic64_set(&key->counter.counter, 0); ++ memset(key->counter.receive.backtrack, 0, ++ sizeof(key->counter.receive.backtrack)); ++ key->birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ key->is_valid = true; ++} ++ ++static void derive_keys(struct noise_symmetric_key *first_dst, ++ struct noise_symmetric_key *second_dst, ++ const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) ++{ ++ kdf(first_dst->key, second_dst->key, NULL, NULL, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0, ++ chaining_key); ++ symmetric_key_init(first_dst); ++ symmetric_key_init(second_dst); ++} ++ ++static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], ++ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ u8 dh_calculation[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!curve25519(dh_calculation, private, public))) ++ return false; ++ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, dh_calculation, NOISE_HASH_LEN, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key); ++ memzero_explicit(dh_calculation, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ return true; ++} ++ ++static void mix_hash(u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const u8 *src, size_t src_len) ++{ ++ struct blake2s_state blake; ++ ++ blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ blake2s_update(&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ blake2s_update(&blake, src, src_len); ++ blake2s_final(&blake, hash); ++} ++ ++static void mix_psk(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], ++ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ u8 temp_hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; ++ ++ kdf(chaining_key, temp_hash, key, psk, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_HASH_LEN, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key); ++ mix_hash(hash, temp_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memzero_explicit(temp_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++} ++ ++static void handshake_init(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], ++ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], ++ const u8 remote_static[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ memcpy(hash, handshake_init_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memcpy(chaining_key, handshake_init_chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ mix_hash(hash, remote_static, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++} ++ ++static void message_encrypt(u8 *dst_ciphertext, const u8 *src_plaintext, ++ size_t src_len, u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) ++{ ++ chacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst_ciphertext, src_plaintext, src_len, hash, ++ NOISE_HASH_LEN, ++ 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key); ++ mix_hash(hash, dst_ciphertext, noise_encrypted_len(src_len)); ++} ++ ++static bool message_decrypt(u8 *dst_plaintext, const u8 *src_ciphertext, ++ size_t src_len, u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) ++{ ++ if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst_plaintext, src_ciphertext, src_len, ++ hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN, ++ 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key)) ++ return false; ++ mix_hash(hash, src_ciphertext, src_len); ++ return true; ++} ++ ++static void message_ephemeral(u8 ephemeral_dst[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 ephemeral_src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], ++ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) ++{ ++ if (ephemeral_dst != ephemeral_src) ++ memcpy(ephemeral_dst, ephemeral_src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ mix_hash(hash, ephemeral_src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ kdf(chaining_key, NULL, NULL, ephemeral_src, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0, 0, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key); ++} ++ ++static void tai64n_now(u8 output[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]) ++{ ++ struct timespec64 now; ++ ++ ktime_get_real_ts64(&now); ++ ++ /* In order to prevent some sort of infoleak from precise timers, we ++ * round down the nanoseconds part to the closest rounded-down power of ++ * two to the maximum initiations per second allowed anyway by the ++ * implementation. ++ */ ++ now.tv_nsec = ALIGN_DOWN(now.tv_nsec, ++ rounddown_pow_of_two(NSEC_PER_SEC / INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND)); ++ ++ /* https://cr.yp.to/libtai/tai64.html */ ++ *(__be64 *)output = cpu_to_be64(0x400000000000000aULL + now.tv_sec); ++ *(__be32 *)(output + sizeof(__be64)) = cpu_to_be32(now.tv_nsec); ++} ++ ++bool ++wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst, ++ struct noise_handshake *handshake) ++{ ++ u8 timestamp[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]; ++ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ bool ret = false; ++ ++ /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since ++ * curve25519_generate_secret uses get_random_bytes_wait. ++ */ ++ wait_for_random_bytes(); ++ ++ down_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock); ++ down_write(&handshake->lock); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!handshake->static_identity->has_identity)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION); ++ ++ handshake_init(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash, ++ handshake->remote_static); ++ ++ /* e */ ++ curve25519_generate_secret(handshake->ephemeral_private); ++ if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, ++ handshake->ephemeral_private)) ++ goto out; ++ message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, ++ dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key, ++ handshake->hash); ++ ++ /* es */ ++ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key, handshake->ephemeral_private, ++ handshake->remote_static)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* s */ ++ message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_static, ++ handshake->static_identity->static_public, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key, handshake->hash); ++ ++ /* ss */ ++ kdf(handshake->chaining_key, key, NULL, ++ handshake->precomputed_static_static, NOISE_HASH_LEN, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ++ handshake->chaining_key); ++ ++ /* {t} */ ++ tai64n_now(timestamp); ++ message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_timestamp, timestamp, ++ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN, key, handshake->hash); ++ ++ dst->sender_index = wg_index_hashtable_insert( ++ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, ++ &handshake->entry); ++ ++ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION; ++ ret = true; ++ ++out: ++ up_write(&handshake->lock); ++ up_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock); ++ memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++struct wg_peer * ++wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *src, ++ struct wg_device *wg) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL, *ret_peer = NULL; ++ struct noise_handshake *handshake; ++ bool replay_attack, flood_attack; ++ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; ++ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; ++ u8 s[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 t[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]; ++ u64 initiation_consumption; ++ ++ down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ if (unlikely(!wg->static_identity.has_identity)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ handshake_init(chaining_key, hash, wg->static_identity.static_public); ++ ++ /* e */ ++ message_ephemeral(e, src->unencrypted_ephemeral, chaining_key, hash); ++ ++ /* es */ ++ if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, key, wg->static_identity.static_private, e)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* s */ ++ if (!message_decrypt(s, src->encrypted_static, ++ sizeof(src->encrypted_static), key, hash)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Lookup which peer we're actually talking to */ ++ peer = wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(wg->peer_hashtable, s); ++ if (!peer) ++ goto out; ++ handshake = &peer->handshake; ++ ++ /* ss */ ++ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, handshake->precomputed_static_static, ++ NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ++ chaining_key); ++ ++ /* {t} */ ++ if (!message_decrypt(t, src->encrypted_timestamp, ++ sizeof(src->encrypted_timestamp), key, hash)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ down_read(&handshake->lock); ++ replay_attack = memcmp(t, handshake->latest_timestamp, ++ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) <= 0; ++ flood_attack = (s64)handshake->last_initiation_consumption + ++ NSEC_PER_SEC / INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND > ++ (s64)ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ up_read(&handshake->lock); ++ if (replay_attack || flood_attack) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Success! Copy everything to peer */ ++ down_write(&handshake->lock); ++ memcpy(handshake->remote_ephemeral, e, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ if (memcmp(t, handshake->latest_timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) > 0) ++ memcpy(handshake->latest_timestamp, t, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN); ++ memcpy(handshake->hash, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memcpy(handshake->chaining_key, chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index; ++ if ((s64)(handshake->last_initiation_consumption - ++ (initiation_consumption = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns())) < 0) ++ handshake->last_initiation_consumption = initiation_consumption; ++ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION; ++ up_write(&handshake->lock); ++ ret_peer = peer; ++ ++out: ++ memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memzero_explicit(hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memzero_explicit(chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ if (!ret_peer) ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ return ret_peer; ++} ++ ++bool wg_noise_handshake_create_response(struct message_handshake_response *dst, ++ struct noise_handshake *handshake) ++{ ++ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ bool ret = false; ++ ++ /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since ++ * curve25519_generate_secret uses get_random_bytes_wait. ++ */ ++ wait_for_random_bytes(); ++ ++ down_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock); ++ down_write(&handshake->lock); ++ ++ if (handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION) ++ goto out; ++ ++ dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE); ++ dst->receiver_index = handshake->remote_index; ++ ++ /* e */ ++ curve25519_generate_secret(handshake->ephemeral_private); ++ if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, ++ handshake->ephemeral_private)) ++ goto out; ++ message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, ++ dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key, ++ handshake->hash); ++ ++ /* ee */ ++ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, NULL, handshake->ephemeral_private, ++ handshake->remote_ephemeral)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* se */ ++ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, NULL, handshake->ephemeral_private, ++ handshake->remote_static)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* psk */ ++ mix_psk(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash, key, ++ handshake->preshared_key); ++ ++ /* {} */ ++ message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_nothing, NULL, 0, key, handshake->hash); ++ ++ dst->sender_index = wg_index_hashtable_insert( ++ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, ++ &handshake->entry); ++ ++ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE; ++ ret = true; ++ ++out: ++ up_write(&handshake->lock); ++ up_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock); ++ memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++struct wg_peer * ++wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src, ++ struct wg_device *wg) ++{ ++ enum noise_handshake_state state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED; ++ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL, *ret_peer = NULL; ++ struct noise_handshake *handshake; ++ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; ++ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; ++ u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 ephemeral_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 static_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ ++ down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!wg->static_identity.has_identity)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ handshake = (struct noise_handshake *)wg_index_hashtable_lookup( ++ wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE, ++ src->receiver_index, &peer); ++ if (unlikely(!handshake)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ down_read(&handshake->lock); ++ state = handshake->state; ++ memcpy(hash, handshake->hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memcpy(chaining_key, handshake->chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memcpy(ephemeral_private, handshake->ephemeral_private, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ up_read(&handshake->lock); ++ ++ if (state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* e */ ++ message_ephemeral(e, src->unencrypted_ephemeral, chaining_key, hash); ++ ++ /* ee */ ++ if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, NULL, ephemeral_private, e)) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* se */ ++ if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, NULL, wg->static_identity.static_private, e)) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* psk */ ++ mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, handshake->preshared_key); ++ ++ /* {} */ ++ if (!message_decrypt(NULL, src->encrypted_nothing, ++ sizeof(src->encrypted_nothing), key, hash)) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* Success! Copy everything to peer */ ++ down_write(&handshake->lock); ++ /* It's important to check that the state is still the same, while we ++ * have an exclusive lock. ++ */ ++ if (handshake->state != state) { ++ up_write(&handshake->lock); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ memcpy(handshake->remote_ephemeral, e, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memcpy(handshake->hash, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memcpy(handshake->chaining_key, chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index; ++ handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE; ++ up_write(&handshake->lock); ++ ret_peer = peer; ++ goto out; ++ ++fail: ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++out: ++ memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memzero_explicit(hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memzero_explicit(chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); ++ memzero_explicit(ephemeral_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memzero_explicit(static_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); ++ return ret_peer; ++} ++ ++bool wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake *handshake, ++ struct noise_keypairs *keypairs) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *new_keypair; ++ bool ret = false; ++ ++ down_write(&handshake->lock); ++ if (handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE && ++ handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE) ++ goto out; ++ ++ new_keypair = keypair_create(handshake->entry.peer); ++ if (!new_keypair) ++ goto out; ++ new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator = handshake->state == ++ HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE; ++ new_keypair->remote_index = handshake->remote_index; ++ ++ if (new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator) ++ derive_keys(&new_keypair->sending, &new_keypair->receiving, ++ handshake->chaining_key); ++ else ++ derive_keys(&new_keypair->receiving, &new_keypair->sending, ++ handshake->chaining_key); ++ ++ handshake_zero(handshake); ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ if (likely(!READ_ONCE(container_of(handshake, struct wg_peer, ++ handshake)->is_dead))) { ++ add_new_keypair(keypairs, new_keypair); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu created for peer %llu\n", ++ handshake->entry.peer->device->dev->name, ++ new_keypair->internal_id, ++ handshake->entry.peer->internal_id); ++ ret = wg_index_hashtable_replace( ++ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, ++ &handshake->entry, &new_keypair->entry); ++ } else { ++ kzfree(new_keypair); ++ } ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ ++out: ++ up_write(&handshake->lock); ++ return ret; ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h +@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++#ifndef _WG_NOISE_H ++#define _WG_NOISE_H ++ ++#include "messages.h" ++#include "peerlookup.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++union noise_counter { ++ struct { ++ u64 counter; ++ unsigned long backtrack[COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG]; ++ spinlock_t lock; ++ } receive; ++ atomic64_t counter; ++}; ++ ++struct noise_symmetric_key { ++ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ union noise_counter counter; ++ u64 birthdate; ++ bool is_valid; ++}; ++ ++struct noise_keypair { ++ struct index_hashtable_entry entry; ++ struct noise_symmetric_key sending; ++ struct noise_symmetric_key receiving; ++ __le32 remote_index; ++ bool i_am_the_initiator; ++ struct kref refcount; ++ struct rcu_head rcu; ++ u64 internal_id; ++}; ++ ++struct noise_keypairs { ++ struct noise_keypair __rcu *current_keypair; ++ struct noise_keypair __rcu *previous_keypair; ++ struct noise_keypair __rcu *next_keypair; ++ spinlock_t keypair_update_lock; ++}; ++ ++struct noise_static_identity { ++ u8 static_public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 static_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ struct rw_semaphore lock; ++ bool has_identity; ++}; ++ ++enum noise_handshake_state { ++ HANDSHAKE_ZEROED, ++ HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION, ++ HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION, ++ HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE, ++ HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE ++}; ++ ++struct noise_handshake { ++ struct index_hashtable_entry entry; ++ ++ enum noise_handshake_state state; ++ u64 last_initiation_consumption; ++ ++ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity; ++ ++ u8 ephemeral_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 remote_static[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 remote_ephemeral[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 precomputed_static_static[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ ++ u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ ++ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; ++ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]; ++ ++ u8 latest_timestamp[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]; ++ __le32 remote_index; ++ ++ /* Protects all members except the immutable (after noise_handshake_ ++ * init): remote_static, precomputed_static_static, static_identity. ++ */ ++ struct rw_semaphore lock; ++}; ++ ++struct wg_device; ++ ++void wg_noise_init(void); ++bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, ++ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, ++ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake); ++static inline void wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(atomic64_t *handshake_ns) ++{ ++ atomic64_set(handshake_ns, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns() - ++ (u64)(REKEY_TIMEOUT + 1) * NSEC_PER_SEC); ++} ++ ++void wg_noise_keypair_put(struct noise_keypair *keypair, bool unreference_now); ++struct noise_keypair *wg_noise_keypair_get(struct noise_keypair *keypair); ++void wg_noise_keypairs_clear(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs); ++bool wg_noise_received_with_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, ++ struct noise_keypair *received_keypair); ++void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(struct wg_peer *peer); ++ ++void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key( ++ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, ++ const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]); ++bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer); ++ ++bool ++wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst, ++ struct noise_handshake *handshake); ++struct wg_peer * ++wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *src, ++ struct wg_device *wg); ++ ++bool wg_noise_handshake_create_response(struct message_handshake_response *dst, ++ struct noise_handshake *handshake); ++struct wg_peer * ++wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src, ++ struct wg_device *wg); ++ ++bool wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake *handshake, ++ struct noise_keypairs *keypairs); ++ ++#endif /* _WG_NOISE_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c +@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "timers.h" ++#include "peerlookup.h" ++#include "noise.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static atomic64_t peer_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0); ++ ++struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg_device *wg, ++ const u8 public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ int ret = -ENOMEM; ++ ++ lockdep_assert_held(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ ++ if (wg->num_peers >= MAX_PEERS_PER_DEVICE) ++ return ERR_PTR(ret); ++ ++ peer = kzalloc(sizeof(*peer), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!peer)) ++ return ERR_PTR(ret); ++ peer->device = wg; ++ ++ if (!wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, ++ public_key, preshared_key, peer)) { ++ ret = -EKEYREJECTED; ++ goto err_1; ++ } ++ if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL)) ++ goto err_1; ++ if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue, wg_packet_tx_worker, false, ++ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) ++ goto err_2; ++ if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->rx_queue, NULL, false, ++ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) ++ goto err_3; ++ ++ peer->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&peer_counter); ++ peer->serial_work_cpu = nr_cpumask_bits; ++ wg_cookie_init(&peer->latest_cookie); ++ wg_timers_init(peer); ++ wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(peer); ++ spin_lock_init(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock); ++ INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_handshake_work, ++ wg_packet_handshake_send_worker); ++ rwlock_init(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++ kref_init(&peer->refcount); ++ skb_queue_head_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue); ++ wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(&peer->last_sent_handshake); ++ set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NO_BUSY_POLL, &peer->napi.state); ++ netif_napi_add(wg->dev, &peer->napi, wg_packet_rx_poll, ++ NAPI_POLL_WEIGHT); ++ napi_enable(&peer->napi); ++ list_add_tail(&peer->peer_list, &wg->peer_list); ++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&peer->allowedips_list); ++ wg_pubkey_hashtable_add(wg->peer_hashtable, peer); ++ ++wg->num_peers; ++ pr_debug("%s: Peer %llu created\n", wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id); ++ return peer; ++ ++err_3: ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false); ++err_2: ++ dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache); ++err_1: ++ kfree(peer); ++ return ERR_PTR(ret); ++} ++ ++struct wg_peer *wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_bh_held(), ++ "Taking peer reference without holding the RCU read lock"); ++ if (unlikely(!peer || !kref_get_unless_zero(&peer->refcount))) ++ return NULL; ++ return peer; ++} ++ ++static void peer_make_dead(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ /* Remove from configuration-time lookup structures. */ ++ list_del_init(&peer->peer_list); ++ wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(&peer->device->peer_allowedips, peer, ++ &peer->device->device_update_lock); ++ wg_pubkey_hashtable_remove(peer->device->peer_hashtable, peer); ++ ++ /* Mark as dead, so that we don't allow jumping contexts after. */ ++ WRITE_ONCE(peer->is_dead, true); ++ ++ /* The caller must now synchronize_rcu() for this to take effect. */ ++} ++ ++static void peer_remove_after_dead(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ WARN_ON(!peer->is_dead); ++ ++ /* No more keypairs can be created for this peer, since is_dead protects ++ * add_new_keypair, so we can now destroy existing ones. ++ */ ++ wg_noise_keypairs_clear(&peer->keypairs); ++ ++ /* Destroy all ongoing timers that were in-flight at the beginning of ++ * this function. ++ */ ++ wg_timers_stop(peer); ++ ++ /* The transition between packet encryption/decryption queues isn't ++ * guarded by is_dead, but each reference's life is strictly bounded by ++ * two generations: once for parallel crypto and once for serial ++ * ingestion, so we can simply flush twice, and be sure that we no ++ * longer have references inside these queues. ++ */ ++ ++ /* a) For encrypt/decrypt. */ ++ flush_workqueue(peer->device->packet_crypt_wq); ++ /* b.1) For send (but not receive, since that's napi). */ ++ flush_workqueue(peer->device->packet_crypt_wq); ++ /* b.2.1) For receive (but not send, since that's wq). */ ++ napi_disable(&peer->napi); ++ /* b.2.1) It's now safe to remove the napi struct, which must be done ++ * here from process context. ++ */ ++ netif_napi_del(&peer->napi); ++ ++ /* Ensure any workstructs we own (like transmit_handshake_work or ++ * clear_peer_work) no longer are in use. ++ */ ++ flush_workqueue(peer->device->handshake_send_wq); ++ ++ /* After the above flushes, a peer might still be active in a few ++ * different contexts: 1) from xmit(), before hitting is_dead and ++ * returning, 2) from wg_packet_consume_data(), before hitting is_dead ++ * and returning, 3) from wg_receive_handshake_packet() after a point ++ * where it has processed an incoming handshake packet, but where ++ * all calls to pass it off to timers fails because of is_dead. We won't ++ * have new references in (1) eventually, because we're removed from ++ * allowedips; we won't have new references in (2) eventually, because ++ * wg_index_hashtable_lookup will always return NULL, since we removed ++ * all existing keypairs and no more can be created; we won't have new ++ * references in (3) eventually, because we're removed from the pubkey ++ * hash table, which allows for a maximum of one handshake response, ++ * via the still-uncleared index hashtable entry, but not more than one, ++ * and in wg_cookie_message_consume, the lookup eventually gets a peer ++ * with a refcount of zero, so no new reference is taken. ++ */ ++ ++ --peer->device->num_peers; ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++} ++ ++/* We have a separate "remove" function make sure that all active places where ++ * a peer is currently operating will eventually come to an end and not pass ++ * their reference onto another context. ++ */ ++void wg_peer_remove(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!peer)) ++ return; ++ lockdep_assert_held(&peer->device->device_update_lock); ++ ++ peer_make_dead(peer); ++ synchronize_rcu(); ++ peer_remove_after_dead(peer); ++} ++ ++void wg_peer_remove_all(struct wg_device *wg) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer, *temp; ++ LIST_HEAD(dead_peers); ++ ++ lockdep_assert_held(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ ++ /* Avoid having to traverse individually for each one. */ ++ wg_allowedips_free(&wg->peer_allowedips, &wg->device_update_lock); ++ ++ list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { ++ peer_make_dead(peer); ++ list_add_tail(&peer->peer_list, &dead_peers); ++ } ++ synchronize_rcu(); ++ list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &dead_peers, peer_list) ++ peer_remove_after_dead(peer); ++} ++ ++static void rcu_release(struct rcu_head *rcu) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(rcu, struct wg_peer, rcu); ++ ++ dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache); ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->rx_queue, false); ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false); ++ ++ /* The final zeroing takes care of clearing any remaining handshake key ++ * material and other potentially sensitive information. ++ */ ++ kzfree(peer); ++} ++ ++static void kref_release(struct kref *refcount) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(refcount, struct wg_peer, refcount); ++ ++ pr_debug("%s: Peer %llu (%pISpfsc) destroyed\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ ++ /* Remove ourself from dynamic runtime lookup structures, now that the ++ * last reference is gone. ++ */ ++ wg_index_hashtable_remove(peer->device->index_hashtable, ++ &peer->handshake.entry); ++ ++ /* Remove any lingering packets that didn't have a chance to be ++ * transmitted. ++ */ ++ wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(peer); ++ ++ /* Free the memory used. */ ++ call_rcu(&peer->rcu, rcu_release); ++} ++ ++void wg_peer_put(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!peer)) ++ return; ++ kref_put(&peer->refcount, kref_release); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h +@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_PEER_H ++#define _WG_PEER_H ++ ++#include "device.h" ++#include "noise.h" ++#include "cookie.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++struct wg_device; ++ ++struct endpoint { ++ union { ++ struct sockaddr addr; ++ struct sockaddr_in addr4; ++ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6; ++ }; ++ union { ++ struct { ++ struct in_addr src4; ++ /* Essentially the same as addr6->scope_id */ ++ int src_if4; ++ }; ++ struct in6_addr src6; ++ }; ++}; ++ ++struct wg_peer { ++ struct wg_device *device; ++ struct crypt_queue tx_queue, rx_queue; ++ struct sk_buff_head staged_packet_queue; ++ int serial_work_cpu; ++ struct noise_keypairs keypairs; ++ struct endpoint endpoint; ++ struct dst_cache endpoint_cache; ++ rwlock_t endpoint_lock; ++ struct noise_handshake handshake; ++ atomic64_t last_sent_handshake; ++ struct work_struct transmit_handshake_work, clear_peer_work; ++ struct cookie latest_cookie; ++ struct hlist_node pubkey_hash; ++ u64 rx_bytes, tx_bytes; ++ struct timer_list timer_retransmit_handshake, timer_send_keepalive; ++ struct timer_list timer_new_handshake, timer_zero_key_material; ++ struct timer_list timer_persistent_keepalive; ++ unsigned int timer_handshake_attempts; ++ u16 persistent_keepalive_interval; ++ bool timer_need_another_keepalive; ++ bool sent_lastminute_handshake; ++ struct timespec64 walltime_last_handshake; ++ struct kref refcount; ++ struct rcu_head rcu; ++ struct list_head peer_list; ++ struct list_head allowedips_list; ++ u64 internal_id; ++ struct napi_struct napi; ++ bool is_dead; ++}; ++ ++struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg_device *wg, ++ const u8 public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]); ++ ++struct wg_peer *__must_check wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(struct wg_peer *peer); ++static inline struct wg_peer *wg_peer_get(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ kref_get(&peer->refcount); ++ return peer; ++} ++void wg_peer_put(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_peer_remove(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_peer_remove_all(struct wg_device *wg); ++ ++#endif /* _WG_PEER_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c +@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "peerlookup.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "noise.h" ++ ++static struct hlist_head *pubkey_bucket(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, ++ const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ /* siphash gives us a secure 64bit number based on a random key. Since ++ * the bits are uniformly distributed, we can then mask off to get the ++ * bits we need. ++ */ ++ const u64 hash = siphash(pubkey, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, &table->key); ++ ++ return &table->hashtable[hash & (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)]; ++} ++ ++struct pubkey_hashtable *wg_pubkey_hashtable_alloc(void) ++{ ++ struct pubkey_hashtable *table = kvmalloc(sizeof(*table), GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (!table) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ get_random_bytes(&table->key, sizeof(table->key)); ++ hash_init(table->hashtable); ++ mutex_init(&table->lock); ++ return table; ++} ++ ++void wg_pubkey_hashtable_add(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, ++ struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ mutex_lock(&table->lock); ++ hlist_add_head_rcu(&peer->pubkey_hash, ++ pubkey_bucket(table, peer->handshake.remote_static)); ++ mutex_unlock(&table->lock); ++} ++ ++void wg_pubkey_hashtable_remove(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, ++ struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ mutex_lock(&table->lock); ++ hlist_del_init_rcu(&peer->pubkey_hash); ++ mutex_unlock(&table->lock); ++} ++ ++/* Returns a strong reference to a peer */ ++struct wg_peer * ++wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, ++ const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *iter_peer, *peer = NULL; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(iter_peer, pubkey_bucket(table, pubkey), ++ pubkey_hash) { ++ if (!memcmp(pubkey, iter_peer->handshake.remote_static, ++ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)) { ++ peer = iter_peer; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ peer = wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(peer); ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ return peer; ++} ++ ++static struct hlist_head *index_bucket(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ const __le32 index) ++{ ++ /* Since the indices are random and thus all bits are uniformly ++ * distributed, we can find its bucket simply by masking. ++ */ ++ return &table->hashtable[(__force u32)index & ++ (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)]; ++} ++ ++struct index_hashtable *wg_index_hashtable_alloc(void) ++{ ++ struct index_hashtable *table = kvmalloc(sizeof(*table), GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (!table) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ hash_init(table->hashtable); ++ spin_lock_init(&table->lock); ++ return table; ++} ++ ++/* At the moment, we limit ourselves to 2^20 total peers, which generally might ++ * amount to 2^20*3 items in this hashtable. The algorithm below works by ++ * picking a random number and testing it. We can see that these limits mean we ++ * usually succeed pretty quickly: ++ * ++ * >>> def calculation(tries, size): ++ * ... return (size / 2**32)**(tries - 1) * (1 - (size / 2**32)) ++ * ... ++ * >>> calculation(1, 2**20 * 3) ++ * 0.999267578125 ++ * >>> calculation(2, 2**20 * 3) ++ * 0.0007318854331970215 ++ * >>> calculation(3, 2**20 * 3) ++ * 5.360489012673497e-07 ++ * >>> calculation(4, 2**20 * 3) ++ * 3.9261394135792216e-10 ++ * ++ * At the moment, we don't do any masking, so this algorithm isn't exactly ++ * constant time in either the random guessing or in the hash list lookup. We ++ * could require a minimum of 3 tries, which would successfully mask the ++ * guessing. this would not, however, help with the growing hash lengths, which ++ * is another thing to consider moving forward. ++ */ ++ ++__le32 wg_index_hashtable_insert(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *entry) ++{ ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *existing_entry; ++ ++ spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); ++ hlist_del_init_rcu(&entry->index_hash); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ ++search_unused_slot: ++ /* First we try to find an unused slot, randomly, while unlocked. */ ++ entry->index = (__force __le32)get_random_u32(); ++ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(existing_entry, ++ index_bucket(table, entry->index), ++ index_hash) { ++ if (existing_entry->index == entry->index) ++ /* If it's already in use, we continue searching. */ ++ goto search_unused_slot; ++ } ++ ++ /* Once we've found an unused slot, we lock it, and then double-check ++ * that nobody else stole it from us. ++ */ ++ spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); ++ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(existing_entry, ++ index_bucket(table, entry->index), ++ index_hash) { ++ if (existing_entry->index == entry->index) { ++ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); ++ /* If it was stolen, we start over. */ ++ goto search_unused_slot; ++ } ++ } ++ /* Otherwise, we know we have it exclusively (since we're locked), ++ * so we insert. ++ */ ++ hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->index_hash, ++ index_bucket(table, entry->index)); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); ++ ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ ++ return entry->index; ++} ++ ++bool wg_index_hashtable_replace(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *old, ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *new) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash))) ++ return false; ++ spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); ++ new->index = old->index; ++ hlist_replace_rcu(&old->index_hash, &new->index_hash); ++ ++ /* Calling init here NULLs out index_hash, and in fact after this ++ * function returns, it's theoretically possible for this to get ++ * reinserted elsewhere. That means the RCU lookup below might either ++ * terminate early or jump between buckets, in which case the packet ++ * simply gets dropped, which isn't terrible. ++ */ ++ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&old->index_hash); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); ++ return true; ++} ++ ++void wg_index_hashtable_remove(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *entry) ++{ ++ spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); ++ hlist_del_init_rcu(&entry->index_hash); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); ++} ++ ++/* Returns a strong reference to a entry->peer */ ++struct index_hashtable_entry * ++wg_index_hashtable_lookup(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ const enum index_hashtable_type type_mask, ++ const __le32 index, struct wg_peer **peer) ++{ ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *iter_entry, *entry = NULL; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(iter_entry, index_bucket(table, index), ++ index_hash) { ++ if (iter_entry->index == index) { ++ if (likely(iter_entry->type & type_mask)) ++ entry = iter_entry; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ if (likely(entry)) { ++ entry->peer = wg_peer_get_maybe_zero(entry->peer); ++ if (likely(entry->peer)) ++ *peer = entry->peer; ++ else ++ entry = NULL; ++ } ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ return entry; ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.h +@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_PEERLOOKUP_H ++#define _WG_PEERLOOKUP_H ++ ++#include "messages.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++struct wg_peer; ++ ++struct pubkey_hashtable { ++ /* TODO: move to rhashtable */ ++ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 11); ++ siphash_key_t key; ++ struct mutex lock; ++}; ++ ++struct pubkey_hashtable *wg_pubkey_hashtable_alloc(void); ++void wg_pubkey_hashtable_add(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, ++ struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_pubkey_hashtable_remove(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, ++ struct wg_peer *peer); ++struct wg_peer * ++wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(struct pubkey_hashtable *table, ++ const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]); ++ ++struct index_hashtable { ++ /* TODO: move to rhashtable */ ++ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 13); ++ spinlock_t lock; ++}; ++ ++enum index_hashtable_type { ++ INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE = 1U << 0, ++ INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR = 1U << 1 ++}; ++ ++struct index_hashtable_entry { ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ struct hlist_node index_hash; ++ enum index_hashtable_type type; ++ __le32 index; ++}; ++ ++struct index_hashtable *wg_index_hashtable_alloc(void); ++__le32 wg_index_hashtable_insert(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *entry); ++bool wg_index_hashtable_replace(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *old, ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *new); ++void wg_index_hashtable_remove(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ struct index_hashtable_entry *entry); ++struct index_hashtable_entry * ++wg_index_hashtable_lookup(struct index_hashtable *table, ++ const enum index_hashtable_type type_mask, ++ const __le32 index, struct wg_peer **peer); ++ ++#endif /* _WG_PEERLOOKUP_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c +@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "queueing.h" ++ ++struct multicore_worker __percpu * ++wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr) ++{ ++ int cpu; ++ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker = ++ alloc_percpu(struct multicore_worker); ++ ++ if (!worker) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { ++ per_cpu_ptr(worker, cpu)->ptr = ptr; ++ INIT_WORK(&per_cpu_ptr(worker, cpu)->work, function); ++ } ++ return worker; ++} ++ ++int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function, ++ bool multicore, unsigned int len) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ ++ memset(queue, 0, sizeof(*queue)); ++ ret = ptr_ring_init(&queue->ring, len, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ if (function) { ++ if (multicore) { ++ queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( ++ function, queue); ++ if (!queue->worker) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } else { ++ INIT_WORK(&queue->work, function); ++ } ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore) ++{ ++ if (multicore) ++ free_percpu(queue->worker); ++ WARN_ON(!__ptr_ring_empty(&queue->ring)); ++ ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h +@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_QUEUEING_H ++#define _WG_QUEUEING_H ++ ++#include "peer.h" ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++struct wg_device; ++struct wg_peer; ++struct multicore_worker; ++struct crypt_queue; ++struct sk_buff; ++ ++/* queueing.c APIs: */ ++int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function, ++ bool multicore, unsigned int len); ++void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore); ++struct multicore_worker __percpu * ++wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr); ++ ++/* receive.c APIs: */ ++void wg_packet_receive(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb); ++void wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker(struct work_struct *work); ++/* NAPI poll function: */ ++int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget); ++/* Workqueue worker: */ ++void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work); ++ ++/* send.c APIs: */ ++void wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer, ++ bool is_retry); ++void wg_packet_send_handshake_response(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(struct wg_device *wg, ++ struct sk_buff *initiating_skb, ++ __le32 sender_index); ++void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer); ++/* Workqueue workers: */ ++void wg_packet_handshake_send_worker(struct work_struct *work); ++void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work); ++void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work); ++ ++enum packet_state { ++ PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED, ++ PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED, ++ PACKET_STATE_DEAD ++}; ++ ++struct packet_cb { ++ u64 nonce; ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair; ++ atomic_t state; ++ u32 mtu; ++ u8 ds; ++}; ++ ++#define PACKET_CB(skb) ((struct packet_cb *)((skb)->cb)) ++#define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer) ++ ++/* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */ ++static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && ++ (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <= ++ skb_tail_pointer(skb) && ++ ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) ++ return htons(ETH_P_IP); ++ if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && ++ (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) <= ++ skb_tail_pointer(skb) && ++ ipv6_hdr(skb)->version == 6) ++ return htons(ETH_P_IPV6); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ const int pfmemalloc = skb->pfmemalloc; ++ ++ skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); ++ memset(&skb->headers_start, 0, ++ offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) - ++ offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start)); ++ skb->pfmemalloc = pfmemalloc; ++ skb->queue_mapping = 0; ++ skb->nohdr = 0; ++ skb->peeked = 0; ++ skb->mac_len = 0; ++ skb->dev = NULL; ++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED ++ skb->tc_index = 0; ++#endif ++ skb_reset_redirect(skb); ++ skb->hdr_len = skb_headroom(skb); ++ skb_reset_mac_header(skb); ++ skb_reset_network_header(skb); ++ skb_reset_transport_header(skb); ++ skb_probe_transport_header(skb); ++ skb_reset_inner_headers(skb); ++} ++ ++static inline int wg_cpumask_choose_online(int *stored_cpu, unsigned int id) ++{ ++ unsigned int cpu = *stored_cpu, cpu_index, i; ++ ++ if (unlikely(cpu == nr_cpumask_bits || ++ !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_online_mask))) { ++ cpu_index = id % cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask); ++ cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask); ++ for (i = 0; i < cpu_index; ++i) ++ cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_online_mask); ++ *stored_cpu = cpu; ++ } ++ return cpu; ++} ++ ++/* This function is racy, in the sense that next is unlocked, so it could return ++ * the same CPU twice. A race-free version of this would be to instead store an ++ * atomic sequence number, do an increment-and-return, and then iterate through ++ * every possible CPU until we get to that index -- choose_cpu. However that's ++ * a bit slower, and it doesn't seem like this potential race actually ++ * introduces any performance loss, so we live with it. ++ */ ++static inline int wg_cpumask_next_online(int *next) ++{ ++ int cpu = *next; ++ ++ while (unlikely(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_online_mask))) ++ cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_online_mask) % nr_cpumask_bits; ++ *next = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_online_mask) % nr_cpumask_bits; ++ return cpu; ++} ++ ++static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer( ++ struct crypt_queue *device_queue, struct crypt_queue *peer_queue, ++ struct sk_buff *skb, struct workqueue_struct *wq, int *next_cpu) ++{ ++ int cpu; ++ ++ atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED); ++ /* We first queue this up for the peer ingestion, but the consumer ++ * will wait for the state to change to CRYPTED or DEAD before. ++ */ ++ if (unlikely(ptr_ring_produce_bh(&peer_queue->ring, skb))) ++ return -ENOSPC; ++ /* Then we queue it up in the device queue, which consumes the ++ * packet as soon as it can. ++ */ ++ cpu = wg_cpumask_next_online(next_cpu); ++ if (unlikely(ptr_ring_produce_bh(&device_queue->ring, skb))) ++ return -EPIPE; ++ queue_work_on(cpu, wq, &per_cpu_ptr(device_queue->worker, cpu)->work); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(struct crypt_queue *queue, ++ struct sk_buff *skb, ++ enum packet_state state) ++{ ++ /* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the ++ * peer can be freed from below us. ++ */ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = wg_peer_get(PACKET_PEER(skb)); ++ ++ atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, state); ++ queue_work_on(wg_cpumask_choose_online(&peer->serial_work_cpu, ++ peer->internal_id), ++ peer->device->packet_crypt_wq, &queue->work); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++} ++ ++static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(struct sk_buff *skb, ++ enum packet_state state) ++{ ++ /* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the ++ * peer can be freed from below us. ++ */ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = wg_peer_get(PACKET_PEER(skb)); ++ ++ atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, state); ++ napi_schedule(&peer->napi); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++} ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++bool wg_packet_counter_selftest(void); ++#endif ++ ++#endif /* _WG_QUEUEING_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.c +@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "ratelimiter.h" ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static struct kmem_cache *entry_cache; ++static hsiphash_key_t key; ++static spinlock_t table_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED("ratelimiter_table_lock"); ++static DEFINE_MUTEX(init_lock); ++static u64 init_refcnt; /* Protected by init_lock, hence not atomic. */ ++static atomic_t total_entries = ATOMIC_INIT(0); ++static unsigned int max_entries, table_size; ++static void wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(struct work_struct *); ++static DECLARE_DEFERRABLE_WORK(gc_work, wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries); ++static struct hlist_head *table_v4; ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++static struct hlist_head *table_v6; ++#endif ++ ++struct ratelimiter_entry { ++ u64 last_time_ns, tokens, ip; ++ void *net; ++ spinlock_t lock; ++ struct hlist_node hash; ++ struct rcu_head rcu; ++}; ++ ++enum { ++ PACKETS_PER_SECOND = 20, ++ PACKETS_BURSTABLE = 5, ++ PACKET_COST = NSEC_PER_SEC / PACKETS_PER_SECOND, ++ TOKEN_MAX = PACKET_COST * PACKETS_BURSTABLE ++}; ++ ++static void entry_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) ++{ ++ kmem_cache_free(entry_cache, ++ container_of(rcu, struct ratelimiter_entry, rcu)); ++ atomic_dec(&total_entries); ++} ++ ++static void entry_uninit(struct ratelimiter_entry *entry) ++{ ++ hlist_del_rcu(&entry->hash); ++ call_rcu(&entry->rcu, entry_free); ++} ++ ++/* Calling this function with a NULL work uninits all entries. */ ++static void wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(struct work_struct *work) ++{ ++ const u64 now = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ struct ratelimiter_entry *entry; ++ struct hlist_node *temp; ++ unsigned int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < table_size; ++i) { ++ spin_lock(&table_lock); ++ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, temp, &table_v4[i], hash) { ++ if (unlikely(!work) || ++ now - entry->last_time_ns > NSEC_PER_SEC) ++ entry_uninit(entry); ++ } ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, temp, &table_v6[i], hash) { ++ if (unlikely(!work) || ++ now - entry->last_time_ns > NSEC_PER_SEC) ++ entry_uninit(entry); ++ } ++#endif ++ spin_unlock(&table_lock); ++ if (likely(work)) ++ cond_resched(); ++ } ++ if (likely(work)) ++ queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq, &gc_work, HZ); ++} ++ ++bool wg_ratelimiter_allow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net) ++{ ++ /* We only take the bottom half of the net pointer, so that we can hash ++ * 3 words in the end. This way, siphash's len param fits into the final ++ * u32, and we don't incur an extra round. ++ */ ++ const u32 net_word = (unsigned long)net; ++ struct ratelimiter_entry *entry; ++ struct hlist_head *bucket; ++ u64 ip; ++ ++ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { ++ ip = (u64 __force)ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; ++ bucket = &table_v4[hsiphash_2u32(net_word, ip, &key) & ++ (table_size - 1)]; ++ } ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { ++ /* Only use 64 bits, so as to ratelimit the whole /64. */ ++ memcpy(&ip, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, sizeof(ip)); ++ bucket = &table_v6[hsiphash_3u32(net_word, ip >> 32, ip, &key) & ++ (table_size - 1)]; ++ } ++#endif ++ else ++ return false; ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, bucket, hash) { ++ if (entry->net == net && entry->ip == ip) { ++ u64 now, tokens; ++ bool ret; ++ /* Quasi-inspired by nft_limit.c, but this is actually a ++ * slightly different algorithm. Namely, we incorporate ++ * the burst as part of the maximum tokens, rather than ++ * as part of the rate. ++ */ ++ spin_lock(&entry->lock); ++ now = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ tokens = min_t(u64, TOKEN_MAX, ++ entry->tokens + now - ++ entry->last_time_ns); ++ entry->last_time_ns = now; ++ ret = tokens >= PACKET_COST; ++ entry->tokens = ret ? tokens - PACKET_COST : tokens; ++ spin_unlock(&entry->lock); ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ } ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ ++ if (atomic_inc_return(&total_entries) > max_entries) ++ goto err_oom; ++ ++ entry = kmem_cache_alloc(entry_cache, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!entry)) ++ goto err_oom; ++ ++ entry->net = net; ++ entry->ip = ip; ++ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&entry->hash); ++ spin_lock_init(&entry->lock); ++ entry->last_time_ns = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ entry->tokens = TOKEN_MAX - PACKET_COST; ++ spin_lock(&table_lock); ++ hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->hash, bucket); ++ spin_unlock(&table_lock); ++ return true; ++ ++err_oom: ++ atomic_dec(&total_entries); ++ return false; ++} ++ ++int wg_ratelimiter_init(void) ++{ ++ mutex_lock(&init_lock); ++ if (++init_refcnt != 1) ++ goto out; ++ ++ entry_cache = KMEM_CACHE(ratelimiter_entry, 0); ++ if (!entry_cache) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* xt_hashlimit.c uses a slightly different algorithm for ratelimiting, ++ * but what it shares in common is that it uses a massive hashtable. So, ++ * we borrow their wisdom about good table sizes on different systems ++ * dependent on RAM. This calculation here comes from there. ++ */ ++ table_size = (totalram_pages() > (1U << 30) / PAGE_SIZE) ? 8192 : ++ max_t(unsigned long, 16, roundup_pow_of_two( ++ (totalram_pages() << PAGE_SHIFT) / ++ (1U << 14) / sizeof(struct hlist_head))); ++ max_entries = table_size * 8; ++ ++ table_v4 = kvzalloc(table_size * sizeof(*table_v4), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!table_v4)) ++ goto err_kmemcache; ++ ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ table_v6 = kvzalloc(table_size * sizeof(*table_v6), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!table_v6)) { ++ kvfree(table_v4); ++ goto err_kmemcache; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq, &gc_work, HZ); ++ get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key)); ++out: ++ mutex_unlock(&init_lock); ++ return 0; ++ ++err_kmemcache: ++ kmem_cache_destroy(entry_cache); ++err: ++ --init_refcnt; ++ mutex_unlock(&init_lock); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++} ++ ++void wg_ratelimiter_uninit(void) ++{ ++ mutex_lock(&init_lock); ++ if (!init_refcnt || --init_refcnt) ++ goto out; ++ ++ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&gc_work); ++ wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(NULL); ++ rcu_barrier(); ++ kvfree(table_v4); ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ kvfree(table_v6); ++#endif ++ kmem_cache_destroy(entry_cache); ++out: ++ mutex_unlock(&init_lock); ++} ++ ++#include "selftest/ratelimiter.c" +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.h +@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_RATELIMITER_H ++#define _WG_RATELIMITER_H ++ ++#include ++ ++int wg_ratelimiter_init(void); ++void wg_ratelimiter_uninit(void); ++bool wg_ratelimiter_allow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net); ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++bool wg_ratelimiter_selftest(void); ++#endif ++ ++#endif /* _WG_RATELIMITER_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "timers.h" ++#include "messages.h" ++#include "cookie.h" ++#include "socket.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* Must be called with bh disabled. */ ++static void update_rx_stats(struct wg_peer *peer, size_t len) ++{ ++ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = ++ get_cpu_ptr(peer->device->dev->tstats); ++ ++ u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp); ++ ++tstats->rx_packets; ++ tstats->rx_bytes += len; ++ peer->rx_bytes += len; ++ u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp); ++ put_cpu_ptr(tstats); ++} ++ ++#define SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) (((struct message_header *)(skb)->data)->type) ++ ++static size_t validate_header_len(struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof(struct message_header))) ++ return 0; ++ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_DATA) && ++ skb->len >= MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH) ++ return sizeof(struct message_data); ++ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION) && ++ skb->len == sizeof(struct message_handshake_initiation)) ++ return sizeof(struct message_handshake_initiation); ++ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE) && ++ skb->len == sizeof(struct message_handshake_response)) ++ return sizeof(struct message_handshake_response); ++ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE) && ++ skb->len == sizeof(struct message_handshake_cookie)) ++ return sizeof(struct message_handshake_cookie); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int prepare_skb_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wg_device *wg) ++{ ++ size_t data_offset, data_len, header_len; ++ struct udphdr *udp; ++ ++ if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol || ++ skb_transport_header(skb) < skb->head || ++ (skb_transport_header(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)) > ++ skb_tail_pointer(skb))) ++ return -EINVAL; /* Bogus IP header */ ++ udp = udp_hdr(skb); ++ data_offset = (u8 *)udp - skb->data; ++ if (unlikely(data_offset > U16_MAX || ++ data_offset + sizeof(struct udphdr) > skb->len)) ++ /* Packet has offset at impossible location or isn't big enough ++ * to have UDP fields. ++ */ ++ return -EINVAL; ++ data_len = ntohs(udp->len); ++ if (unlikely(data_len < sizeof(struct udphdr) || ++ data_len > skb->len - data_offset)) ++ /* UDP packet is reporting too small of a size or lying about ++ * its size. ++ */ ++ return -EINVAL; ++ data_len -= sizeof(struct udphdr); ++ data_offset = (u8 *)udp + sizeof(struct udphdr) - skb->data; ++ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, ++ data_offset + sizeof(struct message_header)) || ++ pskb_trim(skb, data_len + data_offset) < 0)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ skb_pull(skb, data_offset); ++ if (unlikely(skb->len != data_len)) ++ /* Final len does not agree with calculated len */ ++ return -EINVAL; ++ header_len = validate_header_len(skb); ++ if (unlikely(!header_len)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ __skb_push(skb, data_offset); ++ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, data_offset + header_len))) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ __skb_pull(skb, data_offset); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static void wg_receive_handshake_packet(struct wg_device *wg, ++ struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ enum cookie_mac_state mac_state; ++ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; ++ /* This is global, so that our load calculation applies to the whole ++ * system. We don't care about races with it at all. ++ */ ++ static u64 last_under_load; ++ bool packet_needs_cookie; ++ bool under_load; ++ ++ if (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb) == cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE)) { ++ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Receiving cookie response from %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, skb); ++ wg_cookie_message_consume( ++ (struct message_handshake_cookie *)skb->data, wg); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ under_load = skb_queue_len(&wg->incoming_handshakes) >= ++ MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES / 8; ++ if (under_load) ++ last_under_load = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ else if (last_under_load) ++ under_load = !wg_birthdate_has_expired(last_under_load, 1); ++ mac_state = wg_cookie_validate_packet(&wg->cookie_checker, skb, ++ under_load); ++ if ((under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE) || ++ (!under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_BUT_NO_COOKIE)) { ++ packet_needs_cookie = false; ++ } else if (under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_BUT_NO_COOKIE) { ++ packet_needs_cookie = true; ++ } else { ++ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid MAC of handshake, dropping packet from %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, skb); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ switch (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb)) { ++ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION): { ++ struct message_handshake_initiation *message = ++ (struct message_handshake_initiation *)skb->data; ++ ++ if (packet_needs_cookie) { ++ wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(wg, skb, ++ message->sender_index); ++ return; ++ } ++ peer = wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(message, wg); ++ if (unlikely(!peer)) { ++ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid handshake initiation from %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, skb); ++ return; ++ } ++ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint_from_skb(peer, skb); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Receiving handshake initiation from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ wg_packet_send_handshake_response(peer); ++ break; ++ } ++ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE): { ++ struct message_handshake_response *message = ++ (struct message_handshake_response *)skb->data; ++ ++ if (packet_needs_cookie) { ++ wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(wg, skb, ++ message->sender_index); ++ return; ++ } ++ peer = wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(message, wg); ++ if (unlikely(!peer)) { ++ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid handshake response from %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, skb); ++ return; ++ } ++ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint_from_skb(peer, skb); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Receiving handshake response from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ if (wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(&peer->handshake, ++ &peer->keypairs)) { ++ wg_timers_session_derived(peer); ++ wg_timers_handshake_complete(peer); ++ /* Calling this function will either send any existing ++ * packets in the queue and not send a keepalive, which ++ * is the best case, Or, if there's nothing in the ++ * queue, it will send a keepalive, in order to give ++ * immediate confirmation of the session. ++ */ ++ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); ++ } ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely(!peer)) { ++ WARN(1, "Somehow a wrong type of packet wound up in the handshake queue!\n"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ local_bh_disable(); ++ update_rx_stats(peer, skb->len); ++ local_bh_enable(); ++ ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received(peer); ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker(struct work_struct *work) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg = container_of(work, struct multicore_worker, ++ work)->ptr; ++ struct sk_buff *skb; ++ ++ while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&wg->incoming_handshakes)) != NULL) { ++ wg_receive_handshake_packet(wg, skb); ++ dev_kfree_skb(skb); ++ cond_resched(); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair; ++ bool send = false; ++ ++ if (peer->sent_lastminute_handshake) ++ return; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); ++ if (likely(keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)) && ++ keypair->i_am_the_initiator && ++ unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, ++ REJECT_AFTER_TIME - KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT - REKEY_TIMEOUT))) ++ send = true; ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ ++ if (send) { ++ peer->sent_lastminute_handshake = true; ++ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); ++ } ++} ++ ++static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_symmetric_key *key) ++{ ++ struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8]; ++ struct sk_buff *trailer; ++ unsigned int offset; ++ int num_frags; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!key)) ++ return false; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid) || ++ wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || ++ key->counter.receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { ++ WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false); ++ return false; ++ } ++ ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce = ++ le64_to_cpu(((struct message_data *)skb->data)->counter); ++ ++ /* We ensure that the network header is part of the packet before we ++ * call skb_cow_data, so that there's no chance that data is removed ++ * from the skb, so that later we can extract the original endpoint. ++ */ ++ offset = skb->data - skb_network_header(skb); ++ skb_push(skb, offset); ++ num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); ++ offset += sizeof(struct message_data); ++ skb_pull(skb, offset); ++ if (unlikely(num_frags < 0 || num_frags > ARRAY_SIZE(sg))) ++ return false; ++ ++ sg_init_table(sg, num_frags); ++ if (skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len) <= 0) ++ return false; ++ ++ if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace(sg, skb->len, NULL, 0, ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, ++ key->key)) ++ return false; ++ ++ /* Another ugly situation of pushing and pulling the header so as to ++ * keep endpoint information intact. ++ */ ++ skb_push(skb, offset); ++ if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - noise_encrypted_len(0))) ++ return false; ++ skb_pull(skb, offset); ++ ++ return true; ++} ++ ++/* This is RFC6479, a replay detection bitmap algorithm that avoids bitshifts */ ++static bool counter_validate(union noise_counter *counter, u64 their_counter) ++{ ++ unsigned long index, index_current, top, i; ++ bool ret = false; ++ ++ spin_lock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); ++ ++ if (unlikely(counter->receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 || ++ their_counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ++their_counter; ++ ++ if (unlikely((COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + their_counter) < ++ counter->receive.counter)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ index = their_counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); ++ ++ if (likely(their_counter > counter->receive.counter)) { ++ index_current = counter->receive.counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); ++ top = min_t(unsigned long, index - index_current, ++ COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG); ++ for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) ++ counter->receive.backtrack[(i + index_current) & ++ ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; ++ counter->receive.counter = their_counter; ++ } ++ ++ index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; ++ ret = !test_and_set_bit(their_counter & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1), ++ &counter->receive.backtrack[index]); ++ ++out: ++ spin_unlock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++#include "selftest/counter.c" ++ ++static void wg_packet_consume_data_done(struct wg_peer *peer, ++ struct sk_buff *skb, ++ struct endpoint *endpoint) ++{ ++ struct net_device *dev = peer->device->dev; ++ unsigned int len, len_before_trim; ++ struct wg_peer *routed_peer; ++ ++ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(peer, endpoint); ++ ++ if (unlikely(wg_noise_received_with_keypair(&peer->keypairs, ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair))) { ++ wg_timers_handshake_complete(peer); ++ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); ++ } ++ ++ keep_key_fresh(peer); ++ ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received(peer); ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); ++ ++ /* A packet with length 0 is a keepalive packet */ ++ if (unlikely(!skb->len)) { ++ update_rx_stats(peer, message_data_len(0)); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Receiving keepalive packet from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ goto packet_processed; ++ } ++ ++ wg_timers_data_received(peer); ++ ++ if (unlikely(skb_network_header(skb) < skb->head)) ++ goto dishonest_packet_size; ++ if (unlikely(!(pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) && ++ (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4 || ++ (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 6 && ++ pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))))))) ++ goto dishonest_packet_type; ++ ++ skb->dev = dev; ++ /* We've already verified the Poly1305 auth tag, which means this packet ++ * was not modified in transit. We can therefore tell the networking ++ * stack that all checksums of every layer of encapsulation have already ++ * been checked "by the hardware" and therefore is unneccessary to check ++ * again in software. ++ */ ++ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; ++ skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */ ++ skb->protocol = wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb); ++ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { ++ len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); ++ if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) ++ goto dishonest_packet_size; ++ if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds)) ++ IP_ECN_set_ce(ip_hdr(skb)); ++ } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { ++ len = ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) + ++ sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); ++ if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds)) ++ IP6_ECN_set_ce(skb, ipv6_hdr(skb)); ++ } else { ++ goto dishonest_packet_type; ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely(len > skb->len)) ++ goto dishonest_packet_size; ++ len_before_trim = skb->len; ++ if (unlikely(pskb_trim(skb, len))) ++ goto packet_processed; ++ ++ routed_peer = wg_allowedips_lookup_src(&peer->device->peer_allowedips, ++ skb); ++ wg_peer_put(routed_peer); /* We don't need the extra reference. */ ++ ++ if (unlikely(routed_peer != peer)) ++ goto dishonest_packet_peer; ++ ++ if (unlikely(napi_gro_receive(&peer->napi, skb) == GRO_DROP)) { ++ ++dev->stats.rx_dropped; ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Failed to give packet to userspace from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ } else { ++ update_rx_stats(peer, message_data_len(len_before_trim)); ++ } ++ return; ++ ++dishonest_packet_peer: ++ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Packet has unallowed src IP (%pISc) from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ dev->name, skb, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ ++dev->stats.rx_errors; ++ ++dev->stats.rx_frame_errors; ++ goto packet_processed; ++dishonest_packet_type: ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet is neither ipv4 nor ipv6 from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ dev->name, peer->internal_id, &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ ++dev->stats.rx_errors; ++ ++dev->stats.rx_frame_errors; ++ goto packet_processed; ++dishonest_packet_size: ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has incorrect size from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ dev->name, peer->internal_id, &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ ++dev->stats.rx_errors; ++ ++dev->stats.rx_length_errors; ++ goto packet_processed; ++packet_processed: ++ dev_kfree_skb(skb); ++} ++ ++int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(napi, struct wg_peer, napi); ++ struct crypt_queue *queue = &peer->rx_queue; ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair; ++ struct endpoint endpoint; ++ enum packet_state state; ++ struct sk_buff *skb; ++ int work_done = 0; ++ bool free; ++ ++ if (unlikely(budget <= 0)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ while ((skb = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL && ++ (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state)) != ++ PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { ++ __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring); ++ peer = PACKET_PEER(skb); ++ keypair = PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair; ++ free = true; ++ ++ if (unlikely(state != PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) ++ goto next; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!counter_validate(&keypair->receiving.counter, ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce))) { ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, ++ keypair->receiving.counter.receive.counter); ++ goto next; ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely(wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, skb))) ++ goto next; ++ ++ wg_reset_packet(skb); ++ wg_packet_consume_data_done(peer, skb, &endpoint); ++ free = false; ++ ++next: ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ if (unlikely(free)) ++ dev_kfree_skb(skb); ++ ++ if (++work_done >= budget) ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (work_done < budget) ++ napi_complete_done(napi, work_done); ++ ++ return work_done; ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work) ++{ ++ struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct multicore_worker, ++ work)->ptr; ++ struct sk_buff *skb; ++ ++ while ((skb = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) { ++ enum packet_state state = likely(decrypt_packet(skb, ++ &PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->receiving)) ? ++ PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD; ++ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void wg_packet_consume_data(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ __le32 idx = ((struct message_data *)skb->data)->key_idx; ++ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL; ++ int ret; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair = ++ (struct noise_keypair *)wg_index_hashtable_lookup( ++ wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR, idx, ++ &peer); ++ if (unlikely(!wg_noise_keypair_get(PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair))) ++ goto err_keypair; ++ ++ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) ++ goto err; ++ ++ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->decrypt_queue, ++ &peer->rx_queue, skb, ++ wg->packet_crypt_wq, ++ &wg->decrypt_queue.last_cpu); ++ if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) ++ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); ++ if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) { ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ return; ++ } ++err: ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair, false); ++err_keypair: ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ dev_kfree_skb(skb); ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_receive(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(prepare_skb_header(skb, wg) < 0)) ++ goto err; ++ switch (SKB_TYPE_LE32(skb)) { ++ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION): ++ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE): ++ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE): { ++ int cpu; ++ ++ if (skb_queue_len(&wg->incoming_handshakes) > ++ MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES || ++ unlikely(!rng_is_initialized())) { ++ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Dropping handshake packet from %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, skb); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ skb_queue_tail(&wg->incoming_handshakes, skb); ++ /* Queues up a call to packet_process_queued_handshake_ ++ * packets(skb): ++ */ ++ cpu = wg_cpumask_next_online(&wg->incoming_handshake_cpu); ++ queue_work_on(cpu, wg->handshake_receive_wq, ++ &per_cpu_ptr(wg->incoming_handshakes_worker, cpu)->work); ++ break; ++ } ++ case cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_DATA): ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_get_dsfield(ip_hdr(skb), skb); ++ wg_packet_consume_data(wg, skb); ++ break; ++ default: ++ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid packet from %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, skb); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ return; ++ ++err: ++ dev_kfree_skb(skb); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/allowedips.c +@@ -0,0 +1,683 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ * ++ * This contains some basic static unit tests for the allowedips data structure. ++ * It also has two additional modes that are disabled and meant to be used by ++ * folks directly playing with this file. If you define the macro ++ * DEBUG_PRINT_TRIE_GRAPHVIZ to be 1, then every time there's a full tree in ++ * memory, it will be printed out as KERN_DEBUG in a format that can be passed ++ * to graphviz (the dot command) to visualize it. If you define the macro ++ * DEBUG_RANDOM_TRIE to be 1, then there will be an extremely costly set of ++ * randomized tests done against a trivial implementation, which may take ++ * upwards of a half-hour to complete. There's no set of users who should be ++ * enabling these, and the only developers that should go anywhere near these ++ * nobs are the ones who are reading this comment. ++ */ ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ ++#include ++ ++static __init void swap_endian_and_apply_cidr(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, u8 bits, ++ u8 cidr) ++{ ++ swap_endian(dst, src, bits); ++ memset(dst + (cidr + 7) / 8, 0, bits / 8 - (cidr + 7) / 8); ++ if (cidr) ++ dst[(cidr + 7) / 8 - 1] &= ~0U << ((8 - (cidr % 8)) % 8); ++} ++ ++static __init void print_node(struct allowedips_node *node, u8 bits) ++{ ++ char *fmt_connection = KERN_DEBUG "\t\"%p/%d\" -> \"%p/%d\";\n"; ++ char *fmt_declaration = KERN_DEBUG ++ "\t\"%p/%d\"[style=%s, color=\"#%06x\"];\n"; ++ char *style = "dotted"; ++ u8 ip1[16], ip2[16]; ++ u32 color = 0; ++ ++ if (bits == 32) { ++ fmt_connection = KERN_DEBUG "\t\"%pI4/%d\" -> \"%pI4/%d\";\n"; ++ fmt_declaration = KERN_DEBUG ++ "\t\"%pI4/%d\"[style=%s, color=\"#%06x\"];\n"; ++ } else if (bits == 128) { ++ fmt_connection = KERN_DEBUG "\t\"%pI6/%d\" -> \"%pI6/%d\";\n"; ++ fmt_declaration = KERN_DEBUG ++ "\t\"%pI6/%d\"[style=%s, color=\"#%06x\"];\n"; ++ } ++ if (node->peer) { ++ hsiphash_key_t key = { { 0 } }; ++ ++ memcpy(&key, &node->peer, sizeof(node->peer)); ++ color = hsiphash_1u32(0xdeadbeef, &key) % 200 << 16 | ++ hsiphash_1u32(0xbabecafe, &key) % 200 << 8 | ++ hsiphash_1u32(0xabad1dea, &key) % 200; ++ style = "bold"; ++ } ++ swap_endian_and_apply_cidr(ip1, node->bits, bits, node->cidr); ++ printk(fmt_declaration, ip1, node->cidr, style, color); ++ if (node->bit[0]) { ++ swap_endian_and_apply_cidr(ip2, ++ rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[0])->bits, bits, ++ node->cidr); ++ printk(fmt_connection, ip1, node->cidr, ip2, ++ rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[0])->cidr); ++ print_node(rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[0]), bits); ++ } ++ if (node->bit[1]) { ++ swap_endian_and_apply_cidr(ip2, ++ rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[1])->bits, ++ bits, node->cidr); ++ printk(fmt_connection, ip1, node->cidr, ip2, ++ rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[1])->cidr); ++ print_node(rcu_dereference_raw(node->bit[1]), bits); ++ } ++} ++ ++static __init void print_tree(struct allowedips_node __rcu *top, u8 bits) ++{ ++ printk(KERN_DEBUG "digraph trie {\n"); ++ print_node(rcu_dereference_raw(top), bits); ++ printk(KERN_DEBUG "}\n"); ++} ++ ++enum { ++ NUM_PEERS = 2000, ++ NUM_RAND_ROUTES = 400, ++ NUM_MUTATED_ROUTES = 100, ++ NUM_QUERIES = NUM_RAND_ROUTES * NUM_MUTATED_ROUTES * 30 ++}; ++ ++struct horrible_allowedips { ++ struct hlist_head head; ++}; ++ ++struct horrible_allowedips_node { ++ struct hlist_node table; ++ union nf_inet_addr ip; ++ union nf_inet_addr mask; ++ u8 ip_version; ++ void *value; ++}; ++ ++static __init void horrible_allowedips_init(struct horrible_allowedips *table) ++{ ++ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&table->head); ++} ++ ++static __init void horrible_allowedips_free(struct horrible_allowedips *table) ++{ ++ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node; ++ struct hlist_node *h; ++ ++ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(node, h, &table->head, table) { ++ hlist_del(&node->table); ++ kfree(node); ++ } ++} ++ ++static __init inline union nf_inet_addr horrible_cidr_to_mask(u8 cidr) ++{ ++ union nf_inet_addr mask; ++ ++ memset(&mask, 0x00, 128 / 8); ++ memset(&mask, 0xff, cidr / 8); ++ if (cidr % 32) ++ mask.all[cidr / 32] = (__force u32)htonl( ++ (0xFFFFFFFFUL << (32 - (cidr % 32))) & 0xFFFFFFFFUL); ++ return mask; ++} ++ ++static __init inline u8 horrible_mask_to_cidr(union nf_inet_addr subnet) ++{ ++ return hweight32(subnet.all[0]) + hweight32(subnet.all[1]) + ++ hweight32(subnet.all[2]) + hweight32(subnet.all[3]); ++} ++ ++static __init inline void ++horrible_mask_self(struct horrible_allowedips_node *node) ++{ ++ if (node->ip_version == 4) { ++ node->ip.ip &= node->mask.ip; ++ } else if (node->ip_version == 6) { ++ node->ip.ip6[0] &= node->mask.ip6[0]; ++ node->ip.ip6[1] &= node->mask.ip6[1]; ++ node->ip.ip6[2] &= node->mask.ip6[2]; ++ node->ip.ip6[3] &= node->mask.ip6[3]; ++ } ++} ++ ++static __init inline bool ++horrible_match_v4(const struct horrible_allowedips_node *node, ++ struct in_addr *ip) ++{ ++ return (ip->s_addr & node->mask.ip) == node->ip.ip; ++} ++ ++static __init inline bool ++horrible_match_v6(const struct horrible_allowedips_node *node, ++ struct in6_addr *ip) ++{ ++ return (ip->in6_u.u6_addr32[0] & node->mask.ip6[0]) == ++ node->ip.ip6[0] && ++ (ip->in6_u.u6_addr32[1] & node->mask.ip6[1]) == ++ node->ip.ip6[1] && ++ (ip->in6_u.u6_addr32[2] & node->mask.ip6[2]) == ++ node->ip.ip6[2] && ++ (ip->in6_u.u6_addr32[3] & node->mask.ip6[3]) == node->ip.ip6[3]; ++} ++ ++static __init void ++horrible_insert_ordered(struct horrible_allowedips *table, ++ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node) ++{ ++ struct horrible_allowedips_node *other = NULL, *where = NULL; ++ u8 my_cidr = horrible_mask_to_cidr(node->mask); ++ ++ hlist_for_each_entry(other, &table->head, table) { ++ if (!memcmp(&other->mask, &node->mask, ++ sizeof(union nf_inet_addr)) && ++ !memcmp(&other->ip, &node->ip, ++ sizeof(union nf_inet_addr)) && ++ other->ip_version == node->ip_version) { ++ other->value = node->value; ++ kfree(node); ++ return; ++ } ++ where = other; ++ if (horrible_mask_to_cidr(other->mask) <= my_cidr) ++ break; ++ } ++ if (!other && !where) ++ hlist_add_head(&node->table, &table->head); ++ else if (!other) ++ hlist_add_behind(&node->table, &where->table); ++ else ++ hlist_add_before(&node->table, &where->table); ++} ++ ++static __init int ++horrible_allowedips_insert_v4(struct horrible_allowedips *table, ++ struct in_addr *ip, u8 cidr, void *value) ++{ ++ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), ++ GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!node)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ node->ip.in = *ip; ++ node->mask = horrible_cidr_to_mask(cidr); ++ node->ip_version = 4; ++ node->value = value; ++ horrible_mask_self(node); ++ horrible_insert_ordered(table, node); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static __init int ++horrible_allowedips_insert_v6(struct horrible_allowedips *table, ++ struct in6_addr *ip, u8 cidr, void *value) ++{ ++ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), ++ GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!node)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ node->ip.in6 = *ip; ++ node->mask = horrible_cidr_to_mask(cidr); ++ node->ip_version = 6; ++ node->value = value; ++ horrible_mask_self(node); ++ horrible_insert_ordered(table, node); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static __init void * ++horrible_allowedips_lookup_v4(struct horrible_allowedips *table, ++ struct in_addr *ip) ++{ ++ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node; ++ void *ret = NULL; ++ ++ hlist_for_each_entry(node, &table->head, table) { ++ if (node->ip_version != 4) ++ continue; ++ if (horrible_match_v4(node, ip)) { ++ ret = node->value; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static __init void * ++horrible_allowedips_lookup_v6(struct horrible_allowedips *table, ++ struct in6_addr *ip) ++{ ++ struct horrible_allowedips_node *node; ++ void *ret = NULL; ++ ++ hlist_for_each_entry(node, &table->head, table) { ++ if (node->ip_version != 6) ++ continue; ++ if (horrible_match_v6(node, ip)) { ++ ret = node->value; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static __init bool randomized_test(void) ++{ ++ unsigned int i, j, k, mutate_amount, cidr; ++ u8 ip[16], mutate_mask[16], mutated[16]; ++ struct wg_peer **peers, *peer; ++ struct horrible_allowedips h; ++ DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); ++ struct allowedips t; ++ bool ret = false; ++ ++ mutex_init(&mutex); ++ ++ wg_allowedips_init(&t); ++ horrible_allowedips_init(&h); ++ ++ peers = kcalloc(NUM_PEERS, sizeof(*peers), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!peers)) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free; ++ } ++ for (i = 0; i < NUM_PEERS; ++i) { ++ peers[i] = kzalloc(sizeof(*peers[i]), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!peers[i])) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free; ++ } ++ kref_init(&peers[i]->refcount); ++ } ++ ++ mutex_lock(&mutex); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RAND_ROUTES; ++i) { ++ prandom_bytes(ip, 4); ++ cidr = prandom_u32_max(32) + 1; ++ peer = peers[prandom_u32_max(NUM_PEERS)]; ++ if (wg_allowedips_insert_v4(&t, (struct in_addr *)ip, cidr, ++ peer, &mutex) < 0) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free_locked; ++ } ++ if (horrible_allowedips_insert_v4(&h, (struct in_addr *)ip, ++ cidr, peer) < 0) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free_locked; ++ } ++ for (j = 0; j < NUM_MUTATED_ROUTES; ++j) { ++ memcpy(mutated, ip, 4); ++ prandom_bytes(mutate_mask, 4); ++ mutate_amount = prandom_u32_max(32); ++ for (k = 0; k < mutate_amount / 8; ++k) ++ mutate_mask[k] = 0xff; ++ mutate_mask[k] = 0xff ++ << ((8 - (mutate_amount % 8)) % 8); ++ for (; k < 4; ++k) ++ mutate_mask[k] = 0; ++ for (k = 0; k < 4; ++k) ++ mutated[k] = (mutated[k] & mutate_mask[k]) | ++ (~mutate_mask[k] & ++ prandom_u32_max(256)); ++ cidr = prandom_u32_max(32) + 1; ++ peer = peers[prandom_u32_max(NUM_PEERS)]; ++ if (wg_allowedips_insert_v4(&t, ++ (struct in_addr *)mutated, ++ cidr, peer, &mutex) < 0) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free_locked; ++ } ++ if (horrible_allowedips_insert_v4(&h, ++ (struct in_addr *)mutated, cidr, peer)) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free_locked; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RAND_ROUTES; ++i) { ++ prandom_bytes(ip, 16); ++ cidr = prandom_u32_max(128) + 1; ++ peer = peers[prandom_u32_max(NUM_PEERS)]; ++ if (wg_allowedips_insert_v6(&t, (struct in6_addr *)ip, cidr, ++ peer, &mutex) < 0) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free_locked; ++ } ++ if (horrible_allowedips_insert_v6(&h, (struct in6_addr *)ip, ++ cidr, peer) < 0) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free_locked; ++ } ++ for (j = 0; j < NUM_MUTATED_ROUTES; ++j) { ++ memcpy(mutated, ip, 16); ++ prandom_bytes(mutate_mask, 16); ++ mutate_amount = prandom_u32_max(128); ++ for (k = 0; k < mutate_amount / 8; ++k) ++ mutate_mask[k] = 0xff; ++ mutate_mask[k] = 0xff ++ << ((8 - (mutate_amount % 8)) % 8); ++ for (; k < 4; ++k) ++ mutate_mask[k] = 0; ++ for (k = 0; k < 4; ++k) ++ mutated[k] = (mutated[k] & mutate_mask[k]) | ++ (~mutate_mask[k] & ++ prandom_u32_max(256)); ++ cidr = prandom_u32_max(128) + 1; ++ peer = peers[prandom_u32_max(NUM_PEERS)]; ++ if (wg_allowedips_insert_v6(&t, ++ (struct in6_addr *)mutated, ++ cidr, peer, &mutex) < 0) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free_locked; ++ } ++ if (horrible_allowedips_insert_v6( ++ &h, (struct in6_addr *)mutated, cidr, ++ peer)) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free_locked; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ mutex_unlock(&mutex); ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(DEBUG_PRINT_TRIE_GRAPHVIZ)) { ++ print_tree(t.root4, 32); ++ print_tree(t.root6, 128); ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < NUM_QUERIES; ++i) { ++ prandom_bytes(ip, 4); ++ if (lookup(t.root4, 32, ip) != ++ horrible_allowedips_lookup_v4(&h, (struct in_addr *)ip)) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < NUM_QUERIES; ++i) { ++ prandom_bytes(ip, 16); ++ if (lookup(t.root6, 128, ip) != ++ horrible_allowedips_lookup_v6(&h, (struct in6_addr *)ip)) { ++ pr_err("allowedips random self-test: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free; ++ } ++ } ++ ret = true; ++ ++free: ++ mutex_lock(&mutex); ++free_locked: ++ wg_allowedips_free(&t, &mutex); ++ mutex_unlock(&mutex); ++ horrible_allowedips_free(&h); ++ if (peers) { ++ for (i = 0; i < NUM_PEERS; ++i) ++ kfree(peers[i]); ++ } ++ kfree(peers); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static __init inline struct in_addr *ip4(u8 a, u8 b, u8 c, u8 d) ++{ ++ static struct in_addr ip; ++ u8 *split = (u8 *)&ip; ++ ++ split[0] = a; ++ split[1] = b; ++ split[2] = c; ++ split[3] = d; ++ return &ip; ++} ++ ++static __init inline struct in6_addr *ip6(u32 a, u32 b, u32 c, u32 d) ++{ ++ static struct in6_addr ip; ++ __be32 *split = (__be32 *)&ip; ++ ++ split[0] = cpu_to_be32(a); ++ split[1] = cpu_to_be32(b); ++ split[2] = cpu_to_be32(c); ++ split[3] = cpu_to_be32(d); ++ return &ip; ++} ++ ++static __init struct wg_peer *init_peer(void) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = kzalloc(sizeof(*peer), GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (!peer) ++ return NULL; ++ kref_init(&peer->refcount); ++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&peer->allowedips_list); ++ return peer; ++} ++ ++#define insert(version, mem, ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd, cidr) \ ++ wg_allowedips_insert_v##version(&t, ip##version(ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd), \ ++ cidr, mem, &mutex) ++ ++#define maybe_fail() do { \ ++ ++i; \ ++ if (!_s) { \ ++ pr_info("allowedips self-test %zu: FAIL\n", i); \ ++ success = false; \ ++ } \ ++ } while (0) ++ ++#define test(version, mem, ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd) do { \ ++ bool _s = lookup(t.root##version, (version) == 4 ? 32 : 128, \ ++ ip##version(ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd)) == (mem); \ ++ maybe_fail(); \ ++ } while (0) ++ ++#define test_negative(version, mem, ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd) do { \ ++ bool _s = lookup(t.root##version, (version) == 4 ? 32 : 128, \ ++ ip##version(ipa, ipb, ipc, ipd)) != (mem); \ ++ maybe_fail(); \ ++ } while (0) ++ ++#define test_boolean(cond) do { \ ++ bool _s = (cond); \ ++ maybe_fail(); \ ++ } while (0) ++ ++bool __init wg_allowedips_selftest(void) ++{ ++ bool found_a = false, found_b = false, found_c = false, found_d = false, ++ found_e = false, found_other = false; ++ struct wg_peer *a = init_peer(), *b = init_peer(), *c = init_peer(), ++ *d = init_peer(), *e = init_peer(), *f = init_peer(), ++ *g = init_peer(), *h = init_peer(); ++ struct allowedips_node *iter_node; ++ bool success = false; ++ struct allowedips t; ++ DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); ++ struct in6_addr ip; ++ size_t i = 0, count = 0; ++ __be64 part; ++ ++ mutex_init(&mutex); ++ mutex_lock(&mutex); ++ wg_allowedips_init(&t); ++ ++ if (!a || !b || !c || !d || !e || !f || !g || !h) { ++ pr_err("allowedips self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ goto free; ++ } ++ ++ insert(4, a, 192, 168, 4, 0, 24); ++ insert(4, b, 192, 168, 4, 4, 32); ++ insert(4, c, 192, 168, 0, 0, 16); ++ insert(4, d, 192, 95, 5, 64, 27); ++ /* replaces previous entry, and maskself is required */ ++ insert(4, c, 192, 95, 5, 65, 27); ++ insert(6, d, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc05f0543, 128); ++ insert(6, c, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0, 64); ++ insert(4, e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ++ insert(6, e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ++ /* replaces previous entry */ ++ insert(6, f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ++ insert(6, g, 0x24046800, 0, 0, 0, 32); ++ /* maskself is required */ ++ insert(6, h, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0xdeadbeef, 0xdeadbeef, 64); ++ insert(6, a, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0xdeadbeef, 0xdeadbeef, 128); ++ insert(6, c, 0x24446800, 0x40e40800, 0xdeaebeef, 0xdefbeef, 128); ++ insert(6, b, 0x24446800, 0xf0e40800, 0xeeaebeef, 0, 98); ++ insert(4, g, 64, 15, 112, 0, 20); ++ /* maskself is required */ ++ insert(4, h, 64, 15, 123, 211, 25); ++ insert(4, a, 10, 0, 0, 0, 25); ++ insert(4, b, 10, 0, 0, 128, 25); ++ insert(4, a, 10, 1, 0, 0, 30); ++ insert(4, b, 10, 1, 0, 4, 30); ++ insert(4, c, 10, 1, 0, 8, 29); ++ insert(4, d, 10, 1, 0, 16, 29); ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(DEBUG_PRINT_TRIE_GRAPHVIZ)) { ++ print_tree(t.root4, 32); ++ print_tree(t.root6, 128); ++ } ++ ++ success = true; ++ ++ test(4, a, 192, 168, 4, 20); ++ test(4, a, 192, 168, 4, 0); ++ test(4, b, 192, 168, 4, 4); ++ test(4, c, 192, 168, 200, 182); ++ test(4, c, 192, 95, 5, 68); ++ test(4, e, 192, 95, 5, 96); ++ test(6, d, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc05f0543); ++ test(6, c, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc02e01ee); ++ test(6, f, 0x26075300, 0x60006b01, 0, 0); ++ test(6, g, 0x24046800, 0x40040806, 0, 0x1006); ++ test(6, g, 0x24046800, 0x40040806, 0x1234, 0x5678); ++ test(6, f, 0x240467ff, 0x40040806, 0x1234, 0x5678); ++ test(6, f, 0x24046801, 0x40040806, 0x1234, 0x5678); ++ test(6, h, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0x1234, 0x5678); ++ test(6, h, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0, 0); ++ test(6, h, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0x10101010, 0x10101010); ++ test(6, a, 0x24046800, 0x40040800, 0xdeadbeef, 0xdeadbeef); ++ test(4, g, 64, 15, 116, 26); ++ test(4, g, 64, 15, 127, 3); ++ test(4, g, 64, 15, 123, 1); ++ test(4, h, 64, 15, 123, 128); ++ test(4, h, 64, 15, 123, 129); ++ test(4, a, 10, 0, 0, 52); ++ test(4, b, 10, 0, 0, 220); ++ test(4, a, 10, 1, 0, 2); ++ test(4, b, 10, 1, 0, 6); ++ test(4, c, 10, 1, 0, 10); ++ test(4, d, 10, 1, 0, 20); ++ ++ insert(4, a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 32); ++ insert(4, a, 64, 0, 0, 0, 32); ++ insert(4, a, 128, 0, 0, 0, 32); ++ insert(4, a, 192, 0, 0, 0, 32); ++ insert(4, a, 255, 0, 0, 0, 32); ++ wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(&t, a, &mutex); ++ test_negative(4, a, 1, 0, 0, 0); ++ test_negative(4, a, 64, 0, 0, 0); ++ test_negative(4, a, 128, 0, 0, 0); ++ test_negative(4, a, 192, 0, 0, 0); ++ test_negative(4, a, 255, 0, 0, 0); ++ ++ wg_allowedips_free(&t, &mutex); ++ wg_allowedips_init(&t); ++ insert(4, a, 192, 168, 0, 0, 16); ++ insert(4, a, 192, 168, 0, 0, 24); ++ wg_allowedips_remove_by_peer(&t, a, &mutex); ++ test_negative(4, a, 192, 168, 0, 1); ++ ++ /* These will hit the WARN_ON(len >= 128) in free_node if something ++ * goes wrong. ++ */ ++ for (i = 0; i < 128; ++i) { ++ part = cpu_to_be64(~(1LLU << (i % 64))); ++ memset(&ip, 0xff, 16); ++ memcpy((u8 *)&ip + (i < 64) * 8, &part, 8); ++ wg_allowedips_insert_v6(&t, &ip, 128, a, &mutex); ++ } ++ ++ wg_allowedips_free(&t, &mutex); ++ ++ wg_allowedips_init(&t); ++ insert(4, a, 192, 95, 5, 93, 27); ++ insert(6, a, 0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc05f0543, 128); ++ insert(4, a, 10, 1, 0, 20, 29); ++ insert(6, a, 0x26075300, 0x6d8a6bf8, 0xdab1f1df, 0xc05f1523, 83); ++ insert(6, a, 0x26075300, 0x6d8a6bf8, 0xdab1f1df, 0xc05f1523, 21); ++ list_for_each_entry(iter_node, &a->allowedips_list, peer_list) { ++ u8 cidr, ip[16] __aligned(__alignof(u64)); ++ int family = wg_allowedips_read_node(iter_node, ip, &cidr); ++ ++ count++; ++ ++ if (cidr == 27 && family == AF_INET && ++ !memcmp(ip, ip4(192, 95, 5, 64), sizeof(struct in_addr))) ++ found_a = true; ++ else if (cidr == 128 && family == AF_INET6 && ++ !memcmp(ip, ip6(0x26075300, 0x60006b00, 0, 0xc05f0543), ++ sizeof(struct in6_addr))) ++ found_b = true; ++ else if (cidr == 29 && family == AF_INET && ++ !memcmp(ip, ip4(10, 1, 0, 16), sizeof(struct in_addr))) ++ found_c = true; ++ else if (cidr == 83 && family == AF_INET6 && ++ !memcmp(ip, ip6(0x26075300, 0x6d8a6bf8, 0xdab1e000, 0), ++ sizeof(struct in6_addr))) ++ found_d = true; ++ else if (cidr == 21 && family == AF_INET6 && ++ !memcmp(ip, ip6(0x26075000, 0, 0, 0), ++ sizeof(struct in6_addr))) ++ found_e = true; ++ else ++ found_other = true; ++ } ++ test_boolean(count == 5); ++ test_boolean(found_a); ++ test_boolean(found_b); ++ test_boolean(found_c); ++ test_boolean(found_d); ++ test_boolean(found_e); ++ test_boolean(!found_other); ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(DEBUG_RANDOM_TRIE) && success) ++ success = randomized_test(); ++ ++ if (success) ++ pr_info("allowedips self-tests: pass\n"); ++ ++free: ++ wg_allowedips_free(&t, &mutex); ++ kfree(a); ++ kfree(b); ++ kfree(c); ++ kfree(d); ++ kfree(e); ++ kfree(f); ++ kfree(g); ++ kfree(h); ++ mutex_unlock(&mutex); ++ ++ return success; ++} ++ ++#undef test_negative ++#undef test ++#undef remove ++#undef insert ++#undef init_peer ++ ++#endif +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c +@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++bool __init wg_packet_counter_selftest(void) ++{ ++ unsigned int test_num = 0, i; ++ union noise_counter counter; ++ bool success = true; ++ ++#define T_INIT do { \ ++ memset(&counter, 0, sizeof(union noise_counter)); \ ++ spin_lock_init(&counter.receive.lock); \ ++ } while (0) ++#define T_LIM (COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1) ++#define T(n, v) do { \ ++ ++test_num; \ ++ if (counter_validate(&counter, n) != (v)) { \ ++ pr_err("nonce counter self-test %u: FAIL\n", \ ++ test_num); \ ++ success = false; \ ++ } \ ++ } while (0) ++ ++ T_INIT; ++ /* 1 */ T(0, true); ++ /* 2 */ T(1, true); ++ /* 3 */ T(1, false); ++ /* 4 */ T(9, true); ++ /* 5 */ T(8, true); ++ /* 6 */ T(7, true); ++ /* 7 */ T(7, false); ++ /* 8 */ T(T_LIM, true); ++ /* 9 */ T(T_LIM - 1, true); ++ /* 10 */ T(T_LIM - 1, false); ++ /* 11 */ T(T_LIM - 2, true); ++ /* 12 */ T(2, true); ++ /* 13 */ T(2, false); ++ /* 14 */ T(T_LIM + 16, true); ++ /* 15 */ T(3, false); ++ /* 16 */ T(T_LIM + 16, false); ++ /* 17 */ T(T_LIM * 4, true); ++ /* 18 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM - 1), true); ++ /* 19 */ T(10, false); ++ /* 20 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - T_LIM, false); ++ /* 21 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM + 1), false); ++ /* 22 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM - 2), true); ++ /* 23 */ T(T_LIM * 4 + 1 - T_LIM, false); ++ /* 24 */ T(0, false); ++ /* 25 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES, false); ++ /* 26 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 1, true); ++ /* 27 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES, false); ++ /* 28 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 1, false); ++ /* 29 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 2, true); ++ /* 30 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1, false); ++ /* 31 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 2, false); ++ /* 32 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 2, false); ++ /* 33 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 3, true); ++ /* 34 */ T(0, false); ++ ++ T_INIT; ++ for (i = 1; i <= COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE; ++i) ++ T(i, true); ++ T(0, true); ++ T(0, false); ++ ++ T_INIT; ++ for (i = 2; i <= COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; ++i) ++ T(i, true); ++ T(1, true); ++ T(0, false); ++ ++ T_INIT; ++ for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 0;) ++ T(i, true); ++ ++ T_INIT; ++ for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 2; i-- > 1;) ++ T(i, true); ++ T(0, false); ++ ++ T_INIT; ++ for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 1;) ++ T(i, true); ++ T(COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1, true); ++ T(0, false); ++ ++ T_INIT; ++ for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 1;) ++ T(i, true); ++ T(0, true); ++ T(COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1, true); ++ ++#undef T ++#undef T_LIM ++#undef T_INIT ++ ++ if (success) ++ pr_info("nonce counter self-tests: pass\n"); ++ return success; ++} ++#endif +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c +@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ ++#include ++ ++static const struct { ++ bool result; ++ unsigned int msec_to_sleep_before; ++} expected_results[] __initconst = { ++ [0 ... PACKETS_BURSTABLE - 1] = { true, 0 }, ++ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE] = { false, 0 }, ++ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 1] = { true, MSEC_PER_SEC / PACKETS_PER_SECOND }, ++ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 2] = { false, 0 }, ++ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 3] = { true, (MSEC_PER_SEC / PACKETS_PER_SECOND) * 2 }, ++ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 4] = { true, 0 }, ++ [PACKETS_BURSTABLE + 5] = { false, 0 } ++}; ++ ++static __init unsigned int maximum_jiffies_at_index(int index) ++{ ++ unsigned int total_msecs = 2 * MSEC_PER_SEC / PACKETS_PER_SECOND / 3; ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i <= index; ++i) ++ total_msecs += expected_results[i].msec_to_sleep_before; ++ return msecs_to_jiffies(total_msecs); ++} ++ ++static __init int timings_test(struct sk_buff *skb4, struct iphdr *hdr4, ++ struct sk_buff *skb6, struct ipv6hdr *hdr6, ++ int *test) ++{ ++ unsigned long loop_start_time; ++ int i; ++ ++ wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(NULL); ++ rcu_barrier(); ++ loop_start_time = jiffies; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(expected_results); ++i) { ++ if (expected_results[i].msec_to_sleep_before) ++ msleep(expected_results[i].msec_to_sleep_before); ++ ++ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + ++ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) ++ return -ETIMEDOUT; ++ if (wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb4, &init_net) != ++ expected_results[i].result) ++ return -EXFULL; ++ ++(*test); ++ ++ hdr4->saddr = htonl(ntohl(hdr4->saddr) + i + 1); ++ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + ++ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) ++ return -ETIMEDOUT; ++ if (!wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb4, &init_net)) ++ return -EXFULL; ++ ++(*test); ++ ++ hdr4->saddr = htonl(ntohl(hdr4->saddr) - i - 1); ++ ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[2] = htonl(i); ++ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[3] = htonl(i); ++ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + ++ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) ++ return -ETIMEDOUT; ++ if (wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb6, &init_net) != ++ expected_results[i].result) ++ return -EXFULL; ++ ++(*test); ++ ++ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0] = ++ htonl(ntohl(hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0]) + i + 1); ++ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + ++ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) ++ return -ETIMEDOUT; ++ if (!wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb6, &init_net)) ++ return -EXFULL; ++ ++(*test); ++ ++ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0] = ++ htonl(ntohl(hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0]) - i - 1); ++ ++ if (time_is_before_jiffies(loop_start_time + ++ maximum_jiffies_at_index(i))) ++ return -ETIMEDOUT; ++#endif ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static __init int capacity_test(struct sk_buff *skb4, struct iphdr *hdr4, ++ int *test) ++{ ++ int i; ++ ++ wg_ratelimiter_gc_entries(NULL); ++ rcu_barrier(); ++ ++ if (atomic_read(&total_entries)) ++ return -EXFULL; ++ ++(*test); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i <= max_entries; ++i) { ++ hdr4->saddr = htonl(i); ++ if (wg_ratelimiter_allow(skb4, &init_net) != (i != max_entries)) ++ return -EXFULL; ++ ++(*test); ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++bool __init wg_ratelimiter_selftest(void) ++{ ++ enum { TRIALS_BEFORE_GIVING_UP = 5000 }; ++ bool success = false; ++ int test = 0, trials; ++ struct sk_buff *skb4, *skb6; ++ struct iphdr *hdr4; ++ struct ipv6hdr *hdr6; ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UBSAN)) ++ return true; ++ ++ BUILD_BUG_ON(MSEC_PER_SEC % PACKETS_PER_SECOND != 0); ++ ++ if (wg_ratelimiter_init()) ++ goto out; ++ ++test; ++ if (wg_ratelimiter_init()) { ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++test; ++ if (wg_ratelimiter_init()) { ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++test; ++ ++ skb4 = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct iphdr), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!skb4)) ++ goto err_nofree; ++ skb4->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); ++ hdr4 = (struct iphdr *)skb_put(skb4, sizeof(*hdr4)); ++ hdr4->saddr = htonl(8182); ++ skb_reset_network_header(skb4); ++ ++test; ++ ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ skb6 = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!skb6)) { ++ kfree_skb(skb4); ++ goto err_nofree; ++ } ++ skb6->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); ++ hdr6 = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_put(skb6, sizeof(*hdr6)); ++ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0] = htonl(1212); ++ hdr6->saddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[1] = htonl(289188); ++ skb_reset_network_header(skb6); ++ ++test; ++#endif ++ ++ for (trials = TRIALS_BEFORE_GIVING_UP;;) { ++ int test_count = 0, ret; ++ ++ ret = timings_test(skb4, hdr4, skb6, hdr6, &test_count); ++ if (ret == -ETIMEDOUT) { ++ if (!trials--) { ++ test += test_count; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ msleep(500); ++ continue; ++ } else if (ret < 0) { ++ test += test_count; ++ goto err; ++ } else { ++ test += test_count; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ for (trials = TRIALS_BEFORE_GIVING_UP;;) { ++ int test_count = 0; ++ ++ if (capacity_test(skb4, hdr4, &test_count) < 0) { ++ if (!trials--) { ++ test += test_count; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ msleep(50); ++ continue; ++ } ++ test += test_count; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ success = true; ++ ++err: ++ kfree_skb(skb4); ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ kfree_skb(skb6); ++#endif ++err_nofree: ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++ /* Uninit one extra time to check underflow detection. */ ++ wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); ++out: ++ if (success) ++ pr_info("ratelimiter self-tests: pass\n"); ++ else ++ pr_err("ratelimiter self-test %d: FAIL\n", test); ++ ++ return success; ++} ++#endif +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +@@ -0,0 +1,413 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "timers.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "socket.h" ++#include "messages.h" ++#include "cookie.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static void wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct message_handshake_initiation packet; ++ ++ if (!wg_birthdate_has_expired(atomic64_read(&peer->last_sent_handshake), ++ REKEY_TIMEOUT)) ++ return; /* This function is rate limited. */ ++ ++ atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending handshake initiation to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ ++ if (wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(&packet, &peer->handshake)) { ++ wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(&packet, sizeof(packet), peer); ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); ++ atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ++ ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); ++ wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(peer, &packet, sizeof(packet), ++ HANDSHAKE_DSCP); ++ wg_timers_handshake_initiated(peer); ++ } ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_handshake_send_worker(struct work_struct *work) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, ++ transmit_handshake_work); ++ ++ wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation(peer); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer, ++ bool is_retry) ++{ ++ if (!is_retry) ++ peer->timer_handshake_attempts = 0; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ /* We check last_sent_handshake here in addition to the actual function ++ * we're queueing up, so that we don't queue things if not strictly ++ * necessary: ++ */ ++ if (!wg_birthdate_has_expired(atomic64_read(&peer->last_sent_handshake), ++ REKEY_TIMEOUT) || ++ unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ wg_peer_get(peer); ++ /* Queues up calling packet_send_queued_handshakes(peer), where we do a ++ * peer_put(peer) after: ++ */ ++ if (!queue_work(peer->device->handshake_send_wq, ++ &peer->transmit_handshake_work)) ++ /* If the work was already queued, we want to drop the ++ * extra reference: ++ */ ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++out: ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_send_handshake_response(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct message_handshake_response packet; ++ ++ atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending handshake response to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ ++ if (wg_noise_handshake_create_response(&packet, &peer->handshake)) { ++ wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(&packet, sizeof(packet), peer); ++ if (wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(&peer->handshake, ++ &peer->keypairs)) { ++ wg_timers_session_derived(peer); ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); ++ atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ++ ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); ++ wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(peer, &packet, ++ sizeof(packet), ++ HANDSHAKE_DSCP); ++ } ++ } ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(struct wg_device *wg, ++ struct sk_buff *initiating_skb, ++ __le32 sender_index) ++{ ++ struct message_handshake_cookie packet; ++ ++ net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Sending cookie response for denied handshake message for %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, initiating_skb); ++ wg_cookie_message_create(&packet, initiating_skb, sender_index, ++ &wg->cookie_checker); ++ wg_socket_send_buffer_as_reply_to_skb(wg, initiating_skb, &packet, ++ sizeof(packet)); ++} ++ ++static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair; ++ bool send = false; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); ++ if (likely(keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)) && ++ (unlikely(atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > ++ REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES) || ++ (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && ++ unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, ++ REKEY_AFTER_TIME))))) ++ send = true; ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ ++ if (send) ++ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); ++} ++ ++static unsigned int calculate_skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ /* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking ++ * layer gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. In that case, we ++ * wouldn't want the final subtraction to overflow in the case of the ++ * padded_size being clamped. ++ */ ++ unsigned int last_unit = skb->len % PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; ++ unsigned int padded_size = ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE); ++ ++ if (padded_size > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu) ++ padded_size = PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; ++ return padded_size - last_unit; ++} ++ ++static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) ++{ ++ unsigned int padding_len, plaintext_len, trailer_len; ++ struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8]; ++ struct message_data *header; ++ struct sk_buff *trailer; ++ int num_frags; ++ ++ /* Calculate lengths. */ ++ padding_len = calculate_skb_padding(skb); ++ trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0); ++ plaintext_len = skb->len + padding_len; ++ ++ /* Expand data section to have room for padding and auth tag. */ ++ num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, trailer_len, &trailer); ++ if (unlikely(num_frags < 0 || num_frags > ARRAY_SIZE(sg))) ++ return false; ++ ++ /* Set the padding to zeros, and make sure it and the auth tag are part ++ * of the skb. ++ */ ++ memset(skb_tail_pointer(trailer), 0, padding_len); ++ ++ /* Expand head section to have room for our header and the network ++ * stack's headers. ++ */ ++ if (unlikely(skb_cow_head(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM) < 0)) ++ return false; ++ ++ /* Finalize checksum calculation for the inner packet, if required. */ ++ if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && ++ skb_checksum_help(skb))) ++ return false; ++ ++ /* Only after checksumming can we safely add on the padding at the end ++ * and the header. ++ */ ++ skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, 0); ++ header = (struct message_data *)skb_push(skb, sizeof(*header)); ++ header->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_DATA); ++ header->key_idx = keypair->remote_index; ++ header->counter = cpu_to_le64(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce); ++ pskb_put(skb, trailer, trailer_len); ++ ++ /* Now we can encrypt the scattergather segments */ ++ sg_init_table(sg, num_frags); ++ if (skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct message_data), ++ noise_encrypted_len(plaintext_len)) <= 0) ++ return false; ++ return chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg_inplace(sg, plaintext_len, NULL, 0, ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, ++ keypair->sending.key); ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct sk_buff *skb; ++ ++ if (skb_queue_empty(&peer->staged_packet_queue)) { ++ skb = alloc_skb(DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM + MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH, ++ GFP_ATOMIC); ++ if (unlikely(!skb)) ++ return; ++ skb_reserve(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM); ++ skb->dev = peer->device->dev; ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu = skb->dev->mtu; ++ skb_queue_tail(&peer->staged_packet_queue, skb); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending keepalive packet to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr); ++ } ++ ++ wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); ++} ++ ++static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct sk_buff *first, ++ struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct sk_buff *skb, *next; ++ bool is_keepalive, data_sent = false; ++ ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); ++ wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); ++ skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) { ++ is_keepalive = skb->len == message_data_len(0); ++ if (likely(!wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(peer, skb, ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->ds) && !is_keepalive)) ++ data_sent = true; ++ } ++ ++ if (likely(data_sent)) ++ wg_timers_data_sent(peer); ++ ++ keep_key_fresh(peer); ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work) ++{ ++ struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct crypt_queue, ++ work); ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair; ++ enum packet_state state; ++ struct sk_buff *first; ++ struct wg_peer *peer; ++ ++ while ((first = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL && ++ (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(first)->state)) != ++ PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { ++ __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring); ++ peer = PACKET_PEER(first); ++ keypair = PACKET_CB(first)->keypair; ++ ++ if (likely(state == PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) ++ wg_packet_create_data_done(first, peer); ++ else ++ kfree_skb_list(first); ++ ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ } ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work) ++{ ++ struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct multicore_worker, ++ work)->ptr; ++ struct sk_buff *first, *skb, *next; ++ ++ while ((first = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) { ++ enum packet_state state = PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED; ++ ++ skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) { ++ if (likely(encrypt_packet(skb, ++ PACKET_CB(first)->keypair))) { ++ wg_reset_packet(skb); ++ } else { ++ state = PACKET_STATE_DEAD; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first, ++ state); ++ ++ } ++} ++ ++static void wg_packet_create_data(struct sk_buff *first) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = PACKET_PEER(first); ++ struct wg_device *wg = peer->device; ++ int ret = -EINVAL; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) ++ goto err; ++ ++ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, ++ &peer->tx_queue, first, ++ wg->packet_crypt_wq, ++ &wg->encrypt_queue.last_cpu); ++ if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) ++ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&peer->tx_queue, first, ++ PACKET_STATE_DEAD); ++err: ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) ++ return; ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(PACKET_CB(first)->keypair, false); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ kfree_skb_list(first); ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); ++ peer->device->dev->stats.tx_dropped += peer->staged_packet_queue.qlen; ++ __skb_queue_purge(&peer->staged_packet_queue); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); ++} ++ ++void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ struct noise_symmetric_key *key; ++ struct noise_keypair *keypair; ++ struct sk_buff_head packets; ++ struct sk_buff *skb; ++ ++ /* Steal the current queue into our local one. */ ++ __skb_queue_head_init(&packets); ++ spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); ++ skb_queue_splice_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue, &packets); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); ++ if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&packets))) ++ return; ++ ++ /* First we make sure we have a valid reference to a valid key. */ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ keypair = wg_noise_keypair_get( ++ rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair)); ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ if (unlikely(!keypair)) ++ goto out_nokey; ++ key = &keypair->sending; ++ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid))) ++ goto out_nokey; ++ if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, ++ REJECT_AFTER_TIME))) ++ goto out_invalid; ++ ++ /* After we know we have a somewhat valid key, we now try to assign ++ * nonces to all of the packets in the queue. If we can't assign nonces ++ * for all of them, we just consider it a failure and wait for the next ++ * handshake. ++ */ ++ skb_queue_walk(&packets, skb) { ++ /* 0 for no outer TOS: no leak. TODO: at some later point, we ++ * might consider using flowi->tos as outer instead. ++ */ ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(0, ip_hdr(skb), skb); ++ PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce = ++ atomic64_inc_return(&key->counter.counter) - 1; ++ if (unlikely(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) ++ goto out_invalid; ++ } ++ ++ packets.prev->next = NULL; ++ wg_peer_get(keypair->entry.peer); ++ PACKET_CB(packets.next)->keypair = keypair; ++ wg_packet_create_data(packets.next); ++ return; ++ ++out_invalid: ++ WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false); ++out_nokey: ++ wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); ++ ++ /* We orphan the packets if we're waiting on a handshake, so that they ++ * don't block a socket's pool. ++ */ ++ skb_queue_walk(&packets, skb) ++ skb_orphan(skb); ++ /* Then we put them back on the top of the queue. We're not too ++ * concerned about accidentally getting things a little out of order if ++ * packets are being added really fast, because this queue is for before ++ * packets can even be sent and it's small anyway. ++ */ ++ spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); ++ skb_queue_splice(&packets, &peer->staged_packet_queue); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); ++ ++ /* If we're exiting because there's something wrong with the key, it ++ * means we should initiate a new handshake. ++ */ ++ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c +@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "device.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "socket.h" ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "messages.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb, ++ struct endpoint *endpoint, u8 ds, struct dst_cache *cache) ++{ ++ struct flowi4 fl = { ++ .saddr = endpoint->src4.s_addr, ++ .daddr = endpoint->addr4.sin_addr.s_addr, ++ .fl4_dport = endpoint->addr4.sin_port, ++ .flowi4_mark = wg->fwmark, ++ .flowi4_proto = IPPROTO_UDP ++ }; ++ struct rtable *rt = NULL; ++ struct sock *sock; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); ++ skb->dev = wg->dev; ++ skb->mark = wg->fwmark; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ sock = rcu_dereference_bh(wg->sock4); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!sock)) { ++ ret = -ENONET; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ fl.fl4_sport = inet_sk(sock)->inet_sport; ++ ++ if (cache) ++ rt = dst_cache_get_ip4(cache, &fl.saddr); ++ ++ if (!rt) { ++ security_sk_classify_flow(sock, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl)); ++ if (unlikely(!inet_confirm_addr(sock_net(sock), NULL, 0, ++ fl.saddr, RT_SCOPE_HOST))) { ++ endpoint->src4.s_addr = 0; ++ *(__force __be32 *)&endpoint->src_if4 = 0; ++ fl.saddr = 0; ++ if (cache) ++ dst_cache_reset(cache); ++ } ++ rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sock), &fl, sock); ++ if (unlikely(endpoint->src_if4 && ((IS_ERR(rt) && ++ PTR_ERR(rt) == -EINVAL) || (!IS_ERR(rt) && ++ rt->dst.dev->ifindex != endpoint->src_if4)))) { ++ endpoint->src4.s_addr = 0; ++ *(__force __be32 *)&endpoint->src_if4 = 0; ++ fl.saddr = 0; ++ if (cache) ++ dst_cache_reset(cache); ++ if (!IS_ERR(rt)) ++ ip_rt_put(rt); ++ rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sock), &fl, sock); ++ } ++ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(rt))) { ++ ret = PTR_ERR(rt); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", ++ wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); ++ goto err; ++ } else if (unlikely(rt->dst.dev == skb->dev)) { ++ ip_rt_put(rt); ++ ret = -ELOOP; ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (cache) ++ dst_cache_set_ip4(cache, &rt->dst, fl.saddr); ++ } ++ ++ skb->ignore_df = 1; ++ udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(rt, sock, skb, fl.saddr, fl.daddr, ds, ++ ip4_dst_hoplimit(&rt->dst), 0, fl.fl4_sport, ++ fl.fl4_dport, false, false); ++ goto out; ++ ++err: ++ kfree_skb(skb); ++out: ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static int send6(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb, ++ struct endpoint *endpoint, u8 ds, struct dst_cache *cache) ++{ ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ struct flowi6 fl = { ++ .saddr = endpoint->src6, ++ .daddr = endpoint->addr6.sin6_addr, ++ .fl6_dport = endpoint->addr6.sin6_port, ++ .flowi6_mark = wg->fwmark, ++ .flowi6_oif = endpoint->addr6.sin6_scope_id, ++ .flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_UDP ++ /* TODO: addr->sin6_flowinfo */ ++ }; ++ struct dst_entry *dst = NULL; ++ struct sock *sock; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); ++ skb->dev = wg->dev; ++ skb->mark = wg->fwmark; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ sock = rcu_dereference_bh(wg->sock6); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!sock)) { ++ ret = -ENONET; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ fl.fl6_sport = inet_sk(sock)->inet_sport; ++ ++ if (cache) ++ dst = dst_cache_get_ip6(cache, &fl.saddr); ++ ++ if (!dst) { ++ security_sk_classify_flow(sock, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl)); ++ if (unlikely(!ipv6_addr_any(&fl.saddr) && ++ !ipv6_chk_addr(sock_net(sock), &fl.saddr, NULL, 0))) { ++ endpoint->src6 = fl.saddr = in6addr_any; ++ if (cache) ++ dst_cache_reset(cache); ++ } ++ dst = ipv6_stub->ipv6_dst_lookup_flow(sock_net(sock), sock, &fl, ++ NULL); ++ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(dst))) { ++ ret = PTR_ERR(dst); ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", ++ wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); ++ goto err; ++ } else if (unlikely(dst->dev == skb->dev)) { ++ dst_release(dst); ++ ret = -ELOOP; ++ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n", ++ wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (cache) ++ dst_cache_set_ip6(cache, dst, &fl.saddr); ++ } ++ ++ skb->ignore_df = 1; ++ udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb(dst, sock, skb, skb->dev, &fl.saddr, &fl.daddr, ds, ++ ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst), 0, fl.fl6_sport, ++ fl.fl6_dport, false); ++ goto out; ++ ++err: ++ kfree_skb(skb); ++out: ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++ return ret; ++#else ++ return -EAFNOSUPPORT; ++#endif ++} ++ ++int wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 ds) ++{ ++ size_t skb_len = skb->len; ++ int ret = -EAFNOSUPPORT; ++ ++ read_lock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++ if (peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET) ++ ret = send4(peer->device, skb, &peer->endpoint, ds, ++ &peer->endpoint_cache); ++ else if (peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) ++ ret = send6(peer->device, skb, &peer->endpoint, ds, ++ &peer->endpoint_cache); ++ else ++ dev_kfree_skb(skb); ++ if (likely(!ret)) ++ peer->tx_bytes += skb_len; ++ read_unlock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++int wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, void *buffer, ++ size_t len, u8 ds) ++{ ++ struct sk_buff *skb = alloc_skb(len + SKB_HEADER_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!skb)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ skb_reserve(skb, SKB_HEADER_LEN); ++ skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, 0); ++ skb_put_data(skb, buffer, len); ++ return wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(peer, skb, ds); ++} ++ ++int wg_socket_send_buffer_as_reply_to_skb(struct wg_device *wg, ++ struct sk_buff *in_skb, void *buffer, ++ size_t len) ++{ ++ int ret = 0; ++ struct sk_buff *skb; ++ struct endpoint endpoint; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!in_skb)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ret = wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, in_skb); ++ if (unlikely(ret < 0)) ++ return ret; ++ ++ skb = alloc_skb(len + SKB_HEADER_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); ++ if (unlikely(!skb)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ skb_reserve(skb, SKB_HEADER_LEN); ++ skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, 0); ++ skb_put_data(skb, buffer, len); ++ ++ if (endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET) ++ ret = send4(wg, skb, &endpoint, 0, NULL); ++ else if (endpoint.addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) ++ ret = send6(wg, skb, &endpoint, 0, NULL); ++ /* No other possibilities if the endpoint is valid, which it is, ++ * as we checked above. ++ */ ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++int wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(struct endpoint *endpoint, ++ const struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ memset(endpoint, 0, sizeof(*endpoint)); ++ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { ++ endpoint->addr4.sin_family = AF_INET; ++ endpoint->addr4.sin_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source; ++ endpoint->addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; ++ endpoint->src4.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr; ++ endpoint->src_if4 = skb->skb_iif; ++ } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { ++ endpoint->addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; ++ endpoint->addr6.sin6_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source; ++ endpoint->addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; ++ endpoint->addr6.sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id( ++ &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, skb->skb_iif); ++ endpoint->src6 = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; ++ } else { ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static bool endpoint_eq(const struct endpoint *a, const struct endpoint *b) ++{ ++ return (a->addr.sa_family == AF_INET && b->addr.sa_family == AF_INET && ++ a->addr4.sin_port == b->addr4.sin_port && ++ a->addr4.sin_addr.s_addr == b->addr4.sin_addr.s_addr && ++ a->src4.s_addr == b->src4.s_addr && a->src_if4 == b->src_if4) || ++ (a->addr.sa_family == AF_INET6 && ++ b->addr.sa_family == AF_INET6 && ++ a->addr6.sin6_port == b->addr6.sin6_port && ++ ipv6_addr_equal(&a->addr6.sin6_addr, &b->addr6.sin6_addr) && ++ a->addr6.sin6_scope_id == b->addr6.sin6_scope_id && ++ ipv6_addr_equal(&a->src6, &b->src6)) || ++ unlikely(!a->addr.sa_family && !b->addr.sa_family); ++} ++ ++void wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(struct wg_peer *peer, ++ const struct endpoint *endpoint) ++{ ++ /* First we check unlocked, in order to optimize, since it's pretty rare ++ * that an endpoint will change. If we happen to be mid-write, and two ++ * CPUs wind up writing the same thing or something slightly different, ++ * it doesn't really matter much either. ++ */ ++ if (endpoint_eq(endpoint, &peer->endpoint)) ++ return; ++ write_lock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++ if (endpoint->addr.sa_family == AF_INET) { ++ peer->endpoint.addr4 = endpoint->addr4; ++ peer->endpoint.src4 = endpoint->src4; ++ peer->endpoint.src_if4 = endpoint->src_if4; ++ } else if (endpoint->addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) { ++ peer->endpoint.addr6 = endpoint->addr6; ++ peer->endpoint.src6 = endpoint->src6; ++ } else { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ dst_cache_reset(&peer->endpoint_cache); ++out: ++ write_unlock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++} ++ ++void wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint_from_skb(struct wg_peer *peer, ++ const struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ struct endpoint endpoint; ++ ++ if (!wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, skb)) ++ wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(peer, &endpoint); ++} ++ ++void wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ write_lock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++ memset(&peer->endpoint.src6, 0, sizeof(peer->endpoint.src6)); ++ dst_cache_reset(&peer->endpoint_cache); ++ write_unlock_bh(&peer->endpoint_lock); ++} ++ ++static int wg_receive(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ struct wg_device *wg; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!sk)) ++ goto err; ++ wg = sk->sk_user_data; ++ if (unlikely(!wg)) ++ goto err; ++ wg_packet_receive(wg, skb); ++ return 0; ++ ++err: ++ kfree_skb(skb); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static void sock_free(struct sock *sock) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!sock)) ++ return; ++ sk_clear_memalloc(sock); ++ udp_tunnel_sock_release(sock->sk_socket); ++} ++ ++static void set_sock_opts(struct socket *sock) ++{ ++ sock->sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC; ++ sock->sk->sk_sndbuf = INT_MAX; ++ sk_set_memalloc(sock->sk); ++} ++ ++int wg_socket_init(struct wg_device *wg, u16 port) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ struct udp_tunnel_sock_cfg cfg = { ++ .sk_user_data = wg, ++ .encap_type = 1, ++ .encap_rcv = wg_receive ++ }; ++ struct socket *new4 = NULL, *new6 = NULL; ++ struct udp_port_cfg port4 = { ++ .family = AF_INET, ++ .local_ip.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY), ++ .local_udp_port = htons(port), ++ .use_udp_checksums = true ++ }; ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ int retries = 0; ++ struct udp_port_cfg port6 = { ++ .family = AF_INET6, ++ .local_ip6 = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT, ++ .use_udp6_tx_checksums = true, ++ .use_udp6_rx_checksums = true, ++ .ipv6_v6only = true ++ }; ++#endif ++ ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++retry: ++#endif ++ ++ ret = udp_sock_create(wg->creating_net, &port4, &new4); ++ if (ret < 0) { ++ pr_err("%s: Could not create IPv4 socket\n", wg->dev->name); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ set_sock_opts(new4); ++ setup_udp_tunnel_sock(wg->creating_net, new4, &cfg); ++ ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ if (ipv6_mod_enabled()) { ++ port6.local_udp_port = inet_sk(new4->sk)->inet_sport; ++ ret = udp_sock_create(wg->creating_net, &port6, &new6); ++ if (ret < 0) { ++ udp_tunnel_sock_release(new4); ++ if (ret == -EADDRINUSE && !port && retries++ < 100) ++ goto retry; ++ pr_err("%s: Could not create IPv6 socket\n", ++ wg->dev->name); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ set_sock_opts(new6); ++ setup_udp_tunnel_sock(wg->creating_net, new6, &cfg); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ wg_socket_reinit(wg, new4->sk, new6 ? new6->sk : NULL); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device *wg, struct sock *new4, ++ struct sock *new6) ++{ ++ struct sock *old4, *old6; ++ ++ mutex_lock(&wg->socket_update_lock); ++ old4 = rcu_dereference_protected(wg->sock4, ++ lockdep_is_held(&wg->socket_update_lock)); ++ old6 = rcu_dereference_protected(wg->sock6, ++ lockdep_is_held(&wg->socket_update_lock)); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->sock4, new4); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->sock6, new6); ++ if (new4) ++ wg->incoming_port = ntohs(inet_sk(new4)->inet_sport); ++ mutex_unlock(&wg->socket_update_lock); ++ synchronize_rcu(); ++ synchronize_net(); ++ sock_free(old4); ++ sock_free(old6); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.h +@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_SOCKET_H ++#define _WG_SOCKET_H ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++int wg_socket_init(struct wg_device *wg, u16 port); ++void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device *wg, struct sock *new4, ++ struct sock *new6); ++int wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, void *data, ++ size_t len, u8 ds); ++int wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb, ++ u8 ds); ++int wg_socket_send_buffer_as_reply_to_skb(struct wg_device *wg, ++ struct sk_buff *in_skb, ++ void *out_buffer, size_t len); ++ ++int wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(struct endpoint *endpoint, ++ const struct sk_buff *skb); ++void wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint(struct wg_peer *peer, ++ const struct endpoint *endpoint); ++void wg_socket_set_peer_endpoint_from_skb(struct wg_peer *peer, ++ const struct sk_buff *skb); ++void wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(struct wg_peer *peer); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) || defined(DEBUG) ++#define net_dbg_skb_ratelimited(fmt, dev, skb, ...) do { \ ++ struct endpoint __endpoint; \ ++ wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&__endpoint, skb); \ ++ net_dbg_ratelimited(fmt, dev, &__endpoint.addr, \ ++ ##__VA_ARGS__); \ ++ } while (0) ++#else ++#define net_dbg_skb_ratelimited(fmt, skb, ...) ++#endif ++ ++#endif /* _WG_SOCKET_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/timers.c +@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#include "timers.h" ++#include "device.h" ++#include "peer.h" ++#include "queueing.h" ++#include "socket.h" ++ ++/* ++ * - Timer for retransmitting the handshake if we don't hear back after ++ * `REKEY_TIMEOUT + jitter` ms. ++ * ++ * - Timer for sending empty packet if we have received a packet but after have ++ * not sent one for `KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT` ms. ++ * ++ * - Timer for initiating new handshake if we have sent a packet but after have ++ * not received one (even empty) for `(KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT + REKEY_TIMEOUT) + ++ * jitter` ms. ++ * ++ * - Timer for zeroing out all ephemeral keys after `(REJECT_AFTER_TIME * 3)` ms ++ * if no new keys have been received. ++ * ++ * - Timer for, if enabled, sending an empty authenticated packet every user- ++ * specified seconds. ++ */ ++ ++static inline void mod_peer_timer(struct wg_peer *peer, ++ struct timer_list *timer, ++ unsigned long expires) ++{ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ if (likely(netif_running(peer->device->dev) && ++ !READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) ++ mod_timer(timer, expires); ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++} ++ ++static void wg_expired_retransmit_handshake(struct timer_list *timer) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, ++ timer_retransmit_handshake); ++ ++ if (peer->timer_handshake_attempts > MAX_TIMER_HANDSHAKES) { ++ pr_debug("%s: Handshake for peer %llu (%pISpfsc) did not complete after %d attempts, giving up\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr, MAX_TIMER_HANDSHAKES + 2); ++ ++ del_timer(&peer->timer_send_keepalive); ++ /* We drop all packets without a keypair and don't try again, ++ * if we try unsuccessfully for too long to make a handshake. ++ */ ++ wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(peer); ++ ++ /* We set a timer for destroying any residue that might be left ++ * of a partial exchange. ++ */ ++ if (!timer_pending(&peer->timer_zero_key_material)) ++ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_zero_key_material, ++ jiffies + REJECT_AFTER_TIME * 3 * HZ); ++ } else { ++ ++peer->timer_handshake_attempts; ++ pr_debug("%s: Handshake for peer %llu (%pISpfsc) did not complete after %d seconds, retrying (try %d)\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr, REKEY_TIMEOUT, ++ peer->timer_handshake_attempts + 1); ++ ++ /* We clear the endpoint address src address, in case this is ++ * the cause of trouble. ++ */ ++ wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(peer); ++ ++ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, true); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void wg_expired_send_keepalive(struct timer_list *timer) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, timer_send_keepalive); ++ ++ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); ++ if (peer->timer_need_another_keepalive) { ++ peer->timer_need_another_keepalive = false; ++ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_send_keepalive, ++ jiffies + KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT * HZ); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void wg_expired_new_handshake(struct timer_list *timer) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, timer_new_handshake); ++ ++ pr_debug("%s: Retrying handshake with peer %llu (%pISpfsc) because we stopped hearing back after %d seconds\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr, KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT + REKEY_TIMEOUT); ++ /* We clear the endpoint address src address, in case this is the cause ++ * of trouble. ++ */ ++ wg_socket_clear_peer_endpoint_src(peer); ++ wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); ++} ++ ++static void wg_expired_zero_key_material(struct timer_list *timer) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, timer_zero_key_material); ++ ++ rcu_read_lock_bh(); ++ if (!READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead)) { ++ wg_peer_get(peer); ++ if (!queue_work(peer->device->handshake_send_wq, ++ &peer->clear_peer_work)) ++ /* If the work was already on the queue, we want to drop ++ * the extra reference. ++ */ ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++ } ++ rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ++} ++ ++static void wg_queued_expired_zero_key_material(struct work_struct *work) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, ++ clear_peer_work); ++ ++ pr_debug("%s: Zeroing out all keys for peer %llu (%pISpfsc), since we haven't received a new one in %d seconds\n", ++ peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, ++ &peer->endpoint.addr, REJECT_AFTER_TIME * 3); ++ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake); ++ wg_noise_keypairs_clear(&peer->keypairs); ++ wg_peer_put(peer); ++} ++ ++static void wg_expired_send_persistent_keepalive(struct timer_list *timer) ++{ ++ struct wg_peer *peer = from_timer(peer, timer, ++ timer_persistent_keepalive); ++ ++ if (likely(peer->persistent_keepalive_interval)) ++ wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); ++} ++ ++/* Should be called after an authenticated data packet is sent. */ ++void wg_timers_data_sent(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ if (!timer_pending(&peer->timer_new_handshake)) ++ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_new_handshake, ++ jiffies + (KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT + REKEY_TIMEOUT) * HZ + ++ prandom_u32_max(REKEY_TIMEOUT_JITTER_MAX_JIFFIES)); ++} ++ ++/* Should be called after an authenticated data packet is received. */ ++void wg_timers_data_received(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ if (likely(netif_running(peer->device->dev))) { ++ if (!timer_pending(&peer->timer_send_keepalive)) ++ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_send_keepalive, ++ jiffies + KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT * HZ); ++ else ++ peer->timer_need_another_keepalive = true; ++ } ++} ++ ++/* Should be called after any type of authenticated packet is sent, whether ++ * keepalive, data, or handshake. ++ */ ++void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ del_timer(&peer->timer_send_keepalive); ++} ++ ++/* Should be called after any type of authenticated packet is received, whether ++ * keepalive, data, or handshake. ++ */ ++void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ del_timer(&peer->timer_new_handshake); ++} ++ ++/* Should be called after a handshake initiation message is sent. */ ++void wg_timers_handshake_initiated(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_retransmit_handshake, ++ jiffies + REKEY_TIMEOUT * HZ + ++ prandom_u32_max(REKEY_TIMEOUT_JITTER_MAX_JIFFIES)); ++} ++ ++/* Should be called after a handshake response message is received and processed ++ * or when getting key confirmation via the first data message. ++ */ ++void wg_timers_handshake_complete(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ del_timer(&peer->timer_retransmit_handshake); ++ peer->timer_handshake_attempts = 0; ++ peer->sent_lastminute_handshake = false; ++ ktime_get_real_ts64(&peer->walltime_last_handshake); ++} ++ ++/* Should be called after an ephemeral key is created, which is before sending a ++ * handshake response or after receiving a handshake response. ++ */ ++void wg_timers_session_derived(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_zero_key_material, ++ jiffies + REJECT_AFTER_TIME * 3 * HZ); ++} ++ ++/* Should be called before a packet with authentication, whether ++ * keepalive, data, or handshakem is sent, or after one is received. ++ */ ++void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ if (peer->persistent_keepalive_interval) ++ mod_peer_timer(peer, &peer->timer_persistent_keepalive, ++ jiffies + peer->persistent_keepalive_interval * HZ); ++} ++ ++void wg_timers_init(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ timer_setup(&peer->timer_retransmit_handshake, ++ wg_expired_retransmit_handshake, 0); ++ timer_setup(&peer->timer_send_keepalive, wg_expired_send_keepalive, 0); ++ timer_setup(&peer->timer_new_handshake, wg_expired_new_handshake, 0); ++ timer_setup(&peer->timer_zero_key_material, ++ wg_expired_zero_key_material, 0); ++ timer_setup(&peer->timer_persistent_keepalive, ++ wg_expired_send_persistent_keepalive, 0); ++ INIT_WORK(&peer->clear_peer_work, wg_queued_expired_zero_key_material); ++ peer->timer_handshake_attempts = 0; ++ peer->sent_lastminute_handshake = false; ++ peer->timer_need_another_keepalive = false; ++} ++ ++void wg_timers_stop(struct wg_peer *peer) ++{ ++ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_retransmit_handshake); ++ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_send_keepalive); ++ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_new_handshake); ++ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_zero_key_material); ++ del_timer_sync(&peer->timer_persistent_keepalive); ++ flush_work(&peer->clear_peer_work); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/timers.h +@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_TIMERS_H ++#define _WG_TIMERS_H ++ ++#include ++ ++struct wg_peer; ++ ++void wg_timers_init(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_stop(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_data_sent(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_data_received(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_handshake_initiated(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_handshake_complete(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_session_derived(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(struct wg_peer *peer); ++ ++static inline bool wg_birthdate_has_expired(u64 birthday_nanoseconds, ++ u64 expiration_seconds) ++{ ++ return (s64)(birthday_nanoseconds + expiration_seconds * NSEC_PER_SEC) ++ <= (s64)ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++} ++ ++#endif /* _WG_TIMERS_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/version.h +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++#define WIREGUARD_VERSION "1.0.0" +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h +@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ * ++ * Documentation ++ * ============= ++ * ++ * The below enums and macros are for interfacing with WireGuard, using generic ++ * netlink, with family WG_GENL_NAME and version WG_GENL_VERSION. It defines two ++ * methods: get and set. Note that while they share many common attributes, ++ * these two functions actually accept a slightly different set of inputs and ++ * outputs. ++ * ++ * WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE ++ * ----------------- ++ * ++ * May only be called via NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_DUMP. The command should contain ++ * one but not both of: ++ * ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 ++ * ++ * The kernel will then return several messages (NLM_F_MULTI) containing the ++ * following tree of nested items: ++ * ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN ++ * WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN ++ * WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT: NLA_U16 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK: NLA_U32 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_PEERS: NLA_NESTED ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN ++ * WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN ++ * WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT: NLA_MIN_LEN(struct sockaddr), struct sockaddr_in or struct sockaddr_in6 ++ * WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL: NLA_U16 ++ * WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME: NLA_EXACT_LEN, struct __kernel_timespec ++ * WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES: NLA_U64 ++ * WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES: NLA_U64 ++ * WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS: NLA_NESTED ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY: NLA_U16 ++ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR: NLA_MIN_LEN(struct in_addr), struct in_addr or struct in6_addr ++ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK: NLA_U8 ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * ... ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * ... ++ * ... ++ * WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION: NLA_U32 ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * ... ++ * ... ++ * ++ * It is possible that all of the allowed IPs of a single peer will not ++ * fit within a single netlink message. In that case, the same peer will ++ * be written in the following message, except it will only contain ++ * WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY and WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS. This may occur several ++ * times in a row for the same peer. It is then up to the receiver to ++ * coalesce adjacent peers. Likewise, it is possible that all peers will ++ * not fit within a single message. So, subsequent peers will be sent ++ * in following messages, except those will only contain WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME ++ * and WGDEVICE_A_PEERS. It is then up to the receiver to coalesce these ++ * messages to form the complete list of peers. ++ * ++ * Since this is an NLA_F_DUMP command, the final message will always be ++ * NLMSG_DONE, even if an error occurs. However, this NLMSG_DONE message ++ * contains an integer error code. It is either zero or a negative error ++ * code corresponding to the errno. ++ * ++ * WG_CMD_SET_DEVICE ++ * ----------------- ++ * ++ * May only be called via NLM_F_REQUEST. The command should contain the ++ * following tree of nested items, containing one but not both of ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX and WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: ++ * ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS: NLA_U32, 0 or WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS if all current ++ * peers should be removed prior to adding the list below. ++ * WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN, all zeros to remove ++ * WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT: NLA_U16, 0 to choose randomly ++ * WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK: NLA_U32, 0 to disable ++ * WGDEVICE_A_PEERS: NLA_NESTED ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN ++ * WGPEER_A_FLAGS: NLA_U32, 0 and/or WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME if the ++ * specified peer should not exist at the end of the ++ * operation, rather than added/updated and/or ++ * WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS if all current allowed ++ * IPs of this peer should be removed prior to adding ++ * the list below and/or WGPEER_F_UPDATE_ONLY if the ++ * peer should only be set if it already exists. ++ * WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN, all zeros to remove ++ * WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT: struct sockaddr_in or struct sockaddr_in6 ++ * WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL: NLA_U16, 0 to disable ++ * WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS: NLA_NESTED ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY: NLA_U16 ++ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR: struct in_addr or struct in6_addr ++ * WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK: NLA_U8 ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * ... ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * ... ++ * ... ++ * WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION: NLA_U32, should not be set or used at ++ * all by most users of this API, as the ++ * most recent protocol will be used when ++ * this is unset. Otherwise, must be set ++ * to 1. ++ * 0: NLA_NESTED ++ * ... ++ * ... ++ * ++ * It is possible that the amount of configuration data exceeds that of ++ * the maximum message length accepted by the kernel. In that case, several ++ * messages should be sent one after another, with each successive one ++ * filling in information not contained in the prior. Note that if ++ * WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS is specified in the first message, it probably ++ * should not be specified in fragments that come after, so that the list ++ * of peers is only cleared the first time but appened after. Likewise for ++ * peers, if WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS is specified in the first message ++ * of a peer, it likely should not be specified in subsequent fragments. ++ * ++ * If an error occurs, NLMSG_ERROR will reply containing an errno. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _WG_UAPI_WIREGUARD_H ++#define _WG_UAPI_WIREGUARD_H ++ ++#define WG_GENL_NAME "wireguard" ++#define WG_GENL_VERSION 1 ++ ++#define WG_KEY_LEN 32 ++ ++enum wg_cmd { ++ WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE, ++ WG_CMD_SET_DEVICE, ++ __WG_CMD_MAX ++}; ++#define WG_CMD_MAX (__WG_CMD_MAX - 1) ++ ++enum wgdevice_flag { ++ WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS = 1U << 0, ++ __WGDEVICE_F_ALL = WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS ++}; ++enum wgdevice_attribute { ++ WGDEVICE_A_UNSPEC, ++ WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX, ++ WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME, ++ WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY, ++ WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY, ++ WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS, ++ WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT, ++ WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK, ++ WGDEVICE_A_PEERS, ++ __WGDEVICE_A_LAST ++}; ++#define WGDEVICE_A_MAX (__WGDEVICE_A_LAST - 1) ++ ++enum wgpeer_flag { ++ WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME = 1U << 0, ++ WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS = 1U << 1, ++ WGPEER_F_UPDATE_ONLY = 1U << 2, ++ __WGPEER_F_ALL = WGPEER_F_REMOVE_ME | WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS | ++ WGPEER_F_UPDATE_ONLY ++}; ++enum wgpeer_attribute { ++ WGPEER_A_UNSPEC, ++ WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY, ++ WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY, ++ WGPEER_A_FLAGS, ++ WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT, ++ WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL, ++ WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME, ++ WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES, ++ WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES, ++ WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS, ++ WGPEER_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ++ __WGPEER_A_LAST ++}; ++#define WGPEER_A_MAX (__WGPEER_A_LAST - 1) ++ ++enum wgallowedip_attribute { ++ WGALLOWEDIP_A_UNSPEC, ++ WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY, ++ WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR, ++ WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK, ++ __WGALLOWEDIP_A_LAST ++}; ++#define WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX (__WGALLOWEDIP_A_LAST - 1) ++ ++#endif /* _WG_UAPI_WIREGUARD_H */ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@ ++#!/bin/bash ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++# ++# Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++# ++# This script tests the below topology: ++# ++# ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐ ++# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns0 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │ ++# │ │ │ │ │ │ ++# │┌────────┐ │ │ ┌────────┐ │ │ ┌────────┐│ ++# ││ wg0 │───────────┼───┼────────────│ lo │────────────┼───┼───────────│ wg0 ││ ++# │├────────┴──────────┐│ │ ┌───────┴────────┴────────┐ │ │┌──────────┴────────┤│ ++# ││192.168.241.1/24 ││ │ │(ns1) (ns2) │ │ ││192.168.241.2/24 ││ ++# ││fd00::1/24 ││ │ │127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2│ │ ││fd00::2/24 ││ ++# │└───────────────────┘│ │ │[::]:1 [::]:2 │ │ │└───────────────────┘│ ++# └─────────────────────┘ │ └─────────────────────────┘ │ └─────────────────────┘ ++# └──────────────────────────────────┘ ++# ++# After the topology is prepared we run a series of TCP/UDP iperf3 tests between the ++# wireguard peers in $ns1 and $ns2. Note that $ns0 is the endpoint for the wg0 ++# interfaces in $ns1 and $ns2. See https://www.wireguard.com/netns/ for further ++# details on how this is accomplished. ++set -e ++ ++exec 3>&1 ++export WG_HIDE_KEYS=never ++netns0="wg-test-$$-0" ++netns1="wg-test-$$-1" ++netns2="wg-test-$$-2" ++pretty() { echo -e "\x1b[32m\x1b[1m[+] ${1:+NS$1: }${2}\x1b[0m" >&3; } ++pp() { pretty "" "$*"; "$@"; } ++maybe_exec() { if [[ $BASHPID -eq $$ ]]; then "$@"; else exec "$@"; fi; } ++n0() { pretty 0 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns0 "$@"; } ++n1() { pretty 1 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns1 "$@"; } ++n2() { pretty 2 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns2 "$@"; } ++ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 "$@"; } ++ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; } ++ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; } ++sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 0 || true; } ++waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 5201') != *iperf3* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } ++waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } ++waitncattcp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for tcp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } ++waitiface() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for $2 to come up"; ip netns exec "$1" bash -c "while [[ \$(< \"/sys/class/net/$2/operstate\") != up ]]; do read -t .1 -N 0 || true; done;"; } ++ ++cleanup() { ++ set +e ++ exec 2>/dev/null ++ printf "$orig_message_cost" > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost ++ ip0 link del dev wg0 ++ ip1 link del dev wg0 ++ ip2 link del dev wg0 ++ local to_kill="$(ip netns pids $netns0) $(ip netns pids $netns1) $(ip netns pids $netns2)" ++ [[ -n $to_kill ]] && kill $to_kill ++ pp ip netns del $netns1 ++ pp ip netns del $netns2 ++ pp ip netns del $netns0 ++ exit ++} ++ ++orig_message_cost="$(< /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost)" ++trap cleanup EXIT ++printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost ++ ++ip netns del $netns0 2>/dev/null || true ++ip netns del $netns1 2>/dev/null || true ++ip netns del $netns2 2>/dev/null || true ++pp ip netns add $netns0 ++pp ip netns add $netns1 ++pp ip netns add $netns2 ++ip0 link set up dev lo ++ ++ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard ++ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns1 ++ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard ++ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns2 ++key1="$(pp wg genkey)" ++key2="$(pp wg genkey)" ++key3="$(pp wg genkey)" ++pub1="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key1")" ++pub2="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key2")" ++pub3="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key3")" ++psk="$(pp wg genpsk)" ++[[ -n $key1 && -n $key2 && -n $psk ]] ++ ++configure_peers() { ++ ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg0 ++ ip1 addr add fd00::1/24 dev wg0 ++ ++ ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg0 ++ ip2 addr add fd00::2/24 dev wg0 ++ ++ n1 wg set wg0 \ ++ private-key <(echo "$key1") \ ++ listen-port 1 \ ++ peer "$pub2" \ ++ preshared-key <(echo "$psk") \ ++ allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32,fd00::2/128 ++ n2 wg set wg0 \ ++ private-key <(echo "$key2") \ ++ listen-port 2 \ ++ peer "$pub1" \ ++ preshared-key <(echo "$psk") \ ++ allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32,fd00::1/128 ++ ++ ip1 link set up dev wg0 ++ ip2 link set up dev wg0 ++} ++configure_peers ++ ++tests() { ++ # Ping over IPv4 ++ n2 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.1 ++ n1 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.2 ++ ++ # Ping over IPv6 ++ n2 ping6 -c 10 -f -W 1 fd00::1 ++ n1 ping6 -c 10 -f -W 1 fd00::2 ++ ++ # TCP over IPv4 ++ n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.2 & ++ waitiperf $netns2 ++ n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c 192.168.241.2 ++ ++ # TCP over IPv6 ++ n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::1 & ++ waitiperf $netns1 ++ n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c fd00::1 ++ ++ # UDP over IPv4 ++ n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.1 & ++ waitiperf $netns1 ++ n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c 192.168.241.1 ++ ++ # UDP over IPv6 ++ n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::2 & ++ waitiperf $netns2 ++ n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c fd00::2 ++} ++ ++[[ $(ip1 link show dev wg0) =~ mtu\ ([0-9]+) ]] && orig_mtu="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" ++big_mtu=$(( 34816 - 1500 + $orig_mtu )) ++ ++# Test using IPv4 as outer transport ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 127.0.0.1:1 ++# Before calling tests, we first make sure that the stats counters and timestamper are working ++n2 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.1 ++{ read _; read _; read _; read rx_bytes _; read _; read tx_bytes _; } < <(ip2 -stats link show dev wg0) ++(( rx_bytes == 1372 && (tx_bytes == 1428 || tx_bytes == 1460) )) ++{ read _; read _; read _; read rx_bytes _; read _; read tx_bytes _; } < <(ip1 -stats link show dev wg0) ++(( tx_bytes == 1372 && (rx_bytes == 1428 || rx_bytes == 1460) )) ++read _ rx_bytes tx_bytes < <(n2 wg show wg0 transfer) ++(( rx_bytes == 1372 && (tx_bytes == 1428 || tx_bytes == 1460) )) ++read _ rx_bytes tx_bytes < <(n1 wg show wg0 transfer) ++(( tx_bytes == 1372 && (rx_bytes == 1428 || rx_bytes == 1460) )) ++read _ timestamp < <(n1 wg show wg0 latest-handshakes) ++(( timestamp != 0 )) ++ ++tests ++ip1 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu ++ip2 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu ++tests ++ ++ip1 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu ++ip2 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu ++ ++# Test using IPv6 as outer transport ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [::1]:2 ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [::1]:1 ++tests ++ip1 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu ++ip2 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu ++tests ++ ++# Test that route MTUs work with the padding ++ip1 link set wg0 mtu 1300 ++ip2 link set wg0 mtu 1300 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 127.0.0.1:1 ++n0 iptables -A INPUT -m length --length 1360 -j DROP ++n1 ip route add 192.168.241.2/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299 ++n2 ip route add 192.168.241.1/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299 ++n2 ping -c 1 -W 1 -s 1269 192.168.241.1 ++n2 ip route delete 192.168.241.1/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299 ++n1 ip route delete 192.168.241.2/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299 ++n0 iptables -F INPUT ++ ++ip1 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu ++ip2 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu ++ ++# Test using IPv4 that roaming works ++ip0 -4 addr del 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo ++ip0 -4 addr add 127.212.121.99/8 dev lo ++n1 wg set wg0 listen-port 9999 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 ++n1 ping6 -W 1 -c 1 fd00::2 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 127.212.121.99:9999" ]] ++ ++# Test using IPv6 that roaming works ++n1 wg set wg0 listen-port 9998 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [::1]:2 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [::1]:9998" ]] ++ ++# Test that crypto-RP filter works ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.241.0/24 ++exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111) ++ncat_pid=$! ++waitncatudp $netns1 ++n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X" ++read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 && [[ $out == "X" ]] ++kill $ncat_pid ++more_specific_key="$(pp wg genkey | pp wg pubkey)" ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key" allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32 ++n2 wg set wg0 listen-port 9997 ++exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111) ++ncat_pid=$! ++waitncatudp $netns1 ++n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X" ++! read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 || false ++kill $ncat_pid ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key" remove ++[[ $(n1 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub2 [::1]:9997" ]] ++ ++# Test that we can change private keys keys and immediately handshake ++n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32 endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 ++n2 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2") listen-port 2 peer "$pub1" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key3") ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32 peer "$pub1" remove ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++ ++ip1 link del wg0 ++ip2 link del wg0 ++ ++# Test using NAT. We now change the topology to this: ++# ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ++# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns0 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │ ++# │ │ │ │ │ │ ++# │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ │ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ │ │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ ++# │ │ wg0 │─────────────│vethc│───────────┼────┼────│vethrc│ │vethrs│──────────────┼─────┼──│veths│────────────│ wg0 │ │ ++# │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐│ │ ├──────┴─────────┐ ├──────┴────────────┐ │ │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐ │ ++# │ │192.168.241.1/24│ │192.168.1.100/24││ │ │192.168.1.1/24 │ │10.0.0.1/24 │ │ │ │10.0.0.100/24 │ │192.168.241.2/24│ │ ++# │ │fd00::1/24 │ │ ││ │ │ │ │SNAT:192.168.1.0/24│ │ │ │ │ │fd00::2/24 │ │ ++# │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘│ │ └────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ │ │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ ++# └────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────┘ ++ ++ip1 link add dev wg0 type wireguard ++ip2 link add dev wg0 type wireguard ++configure_peers ++ ++ip0 link add vethrc type veth peer name vethc ++ip0 link add vethrs type veth peer name veths ++ip0 link set vethc netns $netns1 ++ip0 link set veths netns $netns2 ++ip0 link set vethrc up ++ip0 link set vethrs up ++ip0 addr add 192.168.1.1/24 dev vethrc ++ip0 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev vethrs ++ip1 addr add 192.168.1.100/24 dev vethc ++ip1 link set vethc up ++ip1 route add default via 192.168.1.1 ++ip2 addr add 10.0.0.100/24 dev veths ++ip2 link set veths up ++waitiface $netns0 vethrc ++waitiface $netns0 vethrs ++waitiface $netns1 vethc ++waitiface $netns2 veths ++ ++n0 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward' ++n0 bash -c 'printf 2 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_udp_timeout' ++n0 bash -c 'printf 2 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_udp_timeout_stream' ++n0 iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.1.0/24 -d 10.0.0.0/24 -j SNAT --to 10.0.0.1 ++ ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.100:2 persistent-keepalive 1 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]] ++# Demonstrate n2 can still send packets to n1, since persistent-keepalive will prevent connection tracking entry from expiring (to see entries: `n0 conntrack -L`). ++pp sleep 3 ++n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" persistent-keepalive 0 ++ ++# Do a wg-quick(8)-style policy routing for the default route, making sure vethc has a v6 address to tease out bugs. ++ip1 -6 addr add fc00::9/96 dev vethc ++ip1 -6 route add default via fc00::1 ++ip2 -4 addr add 192.168.99.7/32 dev wg0 ++ip2 -6 addr add abab::1111/128 dev wg0 ++n1 wg set wg0 fwmark 51820 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.99.7,abab::1111 ++ip1 -6 route add default dev wg0 table 51820 ++ip1 -6 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820 ++ip1 -6 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0 ++ip1 -4 route add default dev wg0 table 51820 ++ip1 -4 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820 ++ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0 ++# suppress_prefixlength only got added in 3.12, and we want to support 3.10+. ++if [[ $(ip1 -4 rule show all) == *suppress_prefixlength* ]]; then ++ # Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs. ++ n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7 ++ n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111 ++fi ++ ++n0 iptables -t nat -F ++ip0 link del vethrc ++ip0 link del vethrs ++ip1 link del wg0 ++ip2 link del wg0 ++ ++# Test that saddr routing is sticky but not too sticky, changing to this topology: ++# ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ++# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │ ++# │ │ │ │ ++# │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ ++# │ │ wg0 │─────────────│veth1│───────────┼────┼──│veth2│────────────│ wg0 │ │ ++# │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐│ │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐ │ ++# │ │192.168.241.1/24│ │10.0.0.1/24 ││ │ │10.0.0.2/24 │ │192.168.241.2/24│ │ ++# │ │fd00::1/24 │ │fd00:aa::1/96 ││ │ │fd00:aa::2/96 │ │fd00::2/24 │ │ ++# │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘│ │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ ++# └────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────┘ ++ ++ip1 link add dev wg0 type wireguard ++ip2 link add dev wg0 type wireguard ++configure_peers ++ip1 link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ++ip1 link set veth2 netns $netns2 ++n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad' ++n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad' ++n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/veth1/accept_dad' ++n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/veth2/accept_dad' ++n1 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth1/promote_secondaries' ++ ++# First we check that we aren't overly sticky and can fall over to new IPs when old ones are removed ++ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1 ++ip1 addr add fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1 ++ip2 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth2 ++ip2 addr add fd00:aa::2/96 dev veth2 ++ip1 link set veth1 up ++ip2 link set veth2 up ++waitiface $netns1 veth1 ++waitiface $netns2 veth2 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.2:2 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++ip1 addr add 10.0.0.10/24 dev veth1 ++ip1 addr del 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [fd00:aa::2]:2 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++ip1 addr add fd00:aa::10/96 dev veth1 ++ip1 addr del fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++ ++# Now we show that we can successfully do reply to sender routing ++ip1 link set veth1 down ++ip2 link set veth2 down ++ip1 addr flush dev veth1 ++ip2 addr flush dev veth2 ++ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1 ++ip1 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth1 ++ip1 addr add fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1 ++ip1 addr add fd00:aa::2/96 dev veth1 ++ip2 addr add 10.0.0.3/24 dev veth2 ++ip2 addr add fd00:aa::3/96 dev veth2 ++ip1 link set veth1 up ++ip2 link set veth2 up ++waitiface $netns1 veth1 ++waitiface $netns2 veth2 ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.0.0.1:1 ++n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]] ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [fd00:aa::1]:1 ++n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [fd00:aa::1]:1" ]] ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.0.0.2:1 ++n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.2:1" ]] ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [fd00:aa::2]:1 ++n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [fd00:aa::2]:1" ]] ++ ++# What happens if the inbound destination address belongs to a different interface as the default route? ++ip1 link add dummy0 type dummy ++ip1 addr add 10.50.0.1/24 dev dummy0 ++ip1 link set dummy0 up ++ip2 route add 10.50.0.0/24 dev veth2 ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.50.0.1:1 ++n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.50.0.1:1" ]] ++ ++ip1 link del dummy0 ++ip1 addr flush dev veth1 ++ip2 addr flush dev veth2 ++ip1 route flush dev veth1 ++ip2 route flush dev veth2 ++ ++# Now we see what happens if another interface route takes precedence over an ongoing one ++ip1 link add veth3 type veth peer name veth4 ++ip1 link set veth4 netns $netns2 ++ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1 ++ip2 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth2 ++ip1 addr add 10.0.0.3/24 dev veth3 ++ip1 link set veth1 up ++ip2 link set veth2 up ++ip1 link set veth3 up ++ip2 link set veth4 up ++waitiface $netns1 veth1 ++waitiface $netns2 veth2 ++waitiface $netns1 veth3 ++waitiface $netns2 veth4 ++ip1 route flush dev veth1 ++ip1 route flush dev veth3 ++ip1 route add 10.0.0.0/24 dev veth1 src 10.0.0.1 metric 2 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.2:2 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]] ++ip1 route add 10.0.0.0/24 dev veth3 src 10.0.0.3 metric 1 ++n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth1/rp_filter' ++n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth4/rp_filter' ++n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter' ++n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter' ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.3:1" ]] ++ ++ip1 link del veth1 ++ip1 link del veth3 ++ip1 link del wg0 ++ip2 link del wg0 ++ ++# We test that Netlink/IPC is working properly by doing things that usually cause split responses ++ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard ++config=( "[Interface]" "PrivateKey=$(wg genkey)" "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" ) ++for a in {1..255}; do ++ for b in {0..255}; do ++ config+=( "AllowedIPs=$a.$b.0.0/16,$a::$b/128" ) ++ done ++done ++n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}") ++i=0 ++for ip in $(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips); do ++ ((++i)) ++done ++((i == 255*256*2+1)) ++ip0 link del wg0 ++ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard ++config=( "[Interface]" "PrivateKey=$(wg genkey)" ) ++for a in {1..40}; do ++ config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" ) ++ for b in {1..52}; do ++ config+=( "AllowedIPs=$a.$b.0.0/16" ) ++ done ++done ++n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}") ++i=0 ++while read -r line; do ++ j=0 ++ for ip in $line; do ++ ((++j)) ++ done ++ ((j == 53)) ++ ((++i)) ++done < <(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips) ++((i == 40)) ++ip0 link del wg0 ++ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard ++config=( ) ++for i in {1..29}; do ++ config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" ) ++done ++config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" "AllowedIPs=255.2.3.4/32,abcd::255/128" ) ++n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}") ++n0 wg showconf wg0 > /dev/null ++ip0 link del wg0 ++ ++allowedips=( ) ++for i in {1..197}; do ++ allowedips+=( abcd::$i ) ++done ++saved_ifs="$IFS" ++IFS=, ++allowedips="${allowedips[*]}" ++IFS="$saved_ifs" ++ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips "$allowedips" ++{ ++ read -r pub allowedips ++ [[ $pub == "$pub1" && $allowedips == "(none)" ]] ++ read -r pub allowedips ++ [[ $pub == "$pub2" ]] ++ i=0 ++ for _ in $allowedips; do ++ ((++i)) ++ done ++ ((i == 197)) ++} < <(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips) ++ip0 link del wg0 ++ ++! n0 wg show doesnotexist || false ++ ++ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard ++n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") ++[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "$key1" ]] ++[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 preshared-keys) == "$pub2 $psk" ]] ++n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null peer "$pub2" preshared-key /dev/null ++[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "(none)" ]] ++[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 preshared-keys) == "$pub2 (none)" ]] ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" ++n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2") ++[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 public-key) == "$pub2" ]] ++[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" ++[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] ++n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" ++[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) == "$pub2" ]] ++n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "/${key1:1}") ++[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "+${key1:1}" ]] ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0,10.0.0.0/8,100.0.0.0/10,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16 ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0 ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75 ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0 ++ip0 link del wg0 ++ ++declare -A objects ++while read -t 0.1 -r line 2>/dev/null || [[ $? -ne 142 ]]; do ++ [[ $line =~ .*(wg[0-9]+:\ [A-Z][a-z]+\ [0-9]+)\ .*(created|destroyed).* ]] || continue ++ objects["${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"]+="${BASH_REMATCH[2]}" ++done < /dev/kmsg ++alldeleted=1 ++for object in "${!objects[@]}"; do ++ if [[ ${objects["$object"]} != *createddestroyed ]]; then ++ echo "Error: $object: merely ${objects["$object"]}" >&3 ++ alldeleted=0 ++ fi ++done ++[[ $alldeleted -eq 1 ]] ++pretty "" "Objects that were created were also destroyed." diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0074-wireguard-selftests-import-harness-makefile-for-test.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0074-wireguard-selftests-import-harness-makefile-for-test.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 60ecebf50a..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0074-wireguard-selftests-import-harness-makefile-for-test.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1079 +0,0 @@ -From e333013ee167444adefd8a292e401b70e97dd4b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:00 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 074/124] wireguard: selftests: import harness makefile for - test suite - -commit 65d88d04114bca7d85faebd5fed61069cb2b632c upstream. - -WireGuard has been using this on build.wireguard.com for the last -several years with considerable success. It allows for very quick and -iterative development cycles, and supports several platforms. - -To run the test suite on your current platform in QEMU: - - $ make -C tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu -j$(nproc) - -To run it with KASAN and such turned on: - - $ DEBUG_KERNEL=yes make -C tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu -j$(nproc) - -To run it emulated for another platform in QEMU: - - $ ARCH=arm make -C tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu -j$(nproc) - -At the moment, we support aarch64_be, aarch64, arm, armeb, i686, m68k, -mips64, mips64el, mips, mipsel, powerpc64le, powerpc, and x86_64. - -The system supports incremental rebuilding, so it should be very fast to -change a single file and then test it out and have immediate feedback. - -This requires for the right toolchain and qemu to be installed prior. -I've had success with those from musl.cc. - -This is tailored for WireGuard at the moment, though later projects -might generalize it for other network testing. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/.gitignore | 2 + - .../testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 385 ++++++++++++++++++ - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64.config | 5 + - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64_be.config | 6 + - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/arm.config | 9 + - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/armeb.config | 10 + - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/i686.config | 5 + - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config | 9 + - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips.config | 11 + - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64.config | 14 + - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64el.config | 15 + - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/mipsel.config | 12 + - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc.config | 10 + - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config | 12 + - .../wireguard/qemu/arch/x86_64.config | 5 + - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/debug.config | 67 +++ - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c | 284 +++++++++++++ - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 86 ++++ - 18 files changed, 947 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/.gitignore - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64_be.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/arm.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/armeb.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/i686.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64el.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mipsel.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/x86_64.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/debug.config - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c - create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config - ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/.gitignore -@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ -+build/ -+distfiles/ ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile -@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ -+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+# -+# Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ -+PWD := $(shell pwd) -+ -+CHOST := $(shell gcc -dumpmachine) -+ifneq (,$(ARCH)) -+CBUILD := $(subst -gcc,,$(lastword $(subst /, ,$(firstword $(wildcard $(foreach bindir,$(subst :, ,$(PATH)),$(bindir)/$(ARCH)-*-gcc)))))) -+ifeq (,$(CBUILD)) -+$(error The toolchain for $(ARCH) is not installed) -+endif -+else -+CBUILD := $(CHOST) -+ARCH := $(firstword $(subst -, ,$(CBUILD))) -+endif -+ -+# Set these from the environment to override -+KERNEL_PATH ?= $(PWD)/../../../../.. -+BUILD_PATH ?= $(PWD)/build/$(ARCH) -+DISTFILES_PATH ?= $(PWD)/distfiles -+NR_CPUS ?= 4 -+ -+MIRROR := https://download.wireguard.com/qemu-test/distfiles/ -+ -+default: qemu -+ -+# variable name, tarball project name, version, tarball extension, default URI base -+define tar_download = -+$(1)_VERSION := $(3) -+$(1)_NAME := $(2)-$$($(1)_VERSION) -+$(1)_TAR := $(DISTFILES_PATH)/$$($(1)_NAME)$(4) -+$(1)_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/$$($(1)_NAME) -+$(call file_download,$$($(1)_NAME)$(4),$(5),$(6)) -+endef -+ -+define file_download = -+$(DISTFILES_PATH)/$(1): -+ mkdir -p $(DISTFILES_PATH) -+ flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -t inf --retry-on-http-error=404 -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp' -+ if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi -+endef -+ -+$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.20,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,44be8771d0e6c6b5f82dd15662eb2957c9a3173a19a8b49966ac0542bbd40d61)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,LIBMNL,libmnl,1.0.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libmnl/files/,171f89699f286a5854b72b91d06e8f8e3683064c5901fb09d954a9ab6f551f81)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.1.7,.tar.gz,http://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,a4ef73406fe92250602b8da2ae89ec53211f805df97a1d1d629db5a14043734f)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.1.0,.tar.gz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,9b43707d6075ecdca14803ca8ce0c8553848c49fa1586d12fd508d66577243f2)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.6.1,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,0fc2d7bd5d7be11311726466789d4c65fb4c8e096c9182b56ce97440864f0cf5)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.60,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,a8796ecc4fa6c38aad6139d9515dc8113023a82e9d787e5a5fb5fa1b05516f21)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20161105,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20161105.tar.gz/#,f813092f03d17294fd23544b129b95cdb87fe19f7970a51908a6b88509acad8a)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,WireGuard,0.0.20191212,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/WireGuard/snapshot/,b0d718380f7a8822b2f12d75e462fa4eafa3a77871002981f367cd4fe2a1b071)) -+ -+KERNEL_BUILD_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/kernel$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),-debug) -+rwildcard=$(foreach d,$(wildcard $1*),$(call rwildcard,$d/,$2) $(filter $(subst *,%,$2),$d)) -+WIREGUARD_SOURCES := $(call rwildcard,$(KERNEL_PATH)/drivers/net/wireguard/,*) -+ -+export CFLAGS ?= -O3 -pipe -+export LDFLAGS ?= -+export CPPFLAGS := -I$(BUILD_PATH)/include -+ -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --host=$(CHOST) -+NOPIE_GCC := gcc -fno-PIE -+CFLAGS += -march=native -+STRIP := strip -+else -+$(info Cross compilation: building for $(CBUILD) using $(CHOST)) -+CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --build=$(CBUILD) --host=$(CHOST) -+export CROSS_COMPILE=$(CBUILD)- -+NOPIE_GCC := $(CBUILD)-gcc -fno-PIE -+STRIP := $(CBUILD)-strip -+endif -+ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64) -+QEMU_ARCH := aarch64 -+KERNEL_ARCH := arm64 -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt -+CFLAGS += -march=armv8-a -mtune=cortex-a53 -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64_be) -+QEMU_ARCH := aarch64 -+KERNEL_ARCH := arm64 -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt -+CFLAGS += -march=armv8-a -mtune=cortex-a53 -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),arm) -+QEMU_ARCH := arm -+KERNEL_ARCH := arm -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt -+CFLAGS += -march=armv7-a -mtune=cortex-a15 -mabi=aapcs-linux -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),armeb) -+QEMU_ARCH := arm -+KERNEL_ARCH := arm -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt -+CFLAGS += -march=armv7-a -mabi=aapcs-linux # We don't pass -mtune=cortex-a15 due to a compiler bug on big endian. -+LDFLAGS += -Wl,--be8 -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64) -+QEMU_ARCH := x86_64 -+KERNEL_ARCH := x86_64 -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu Skylake-Server -machine q35 -+CFLAGS += -march=skylake-avx512 -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),i686) -+QEMU_ARCH := i386 -+KERNEL_ARCH := x86 -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage -+ifeq ($(subst i686,x86_64,$(CBUILD)),$(CHOST)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu coreduo -machine q35 -+CFLAGS += -march=prescott -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64) -+QEMU_ARCH := mips64 -+KERNEL_ARCH := mips -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm -+CFLAGS += -EB -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu MIPS64R2-generic -machine malta -smp 1 -+CFLAGS += -march=mips64r2 -EB -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64el) -+QEMU_ARCH := mips64el -+KERNEL_ARCH := mips -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm -+CFLAGS += -EL -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu MIPS64R2-generic -machine malta -smp 1 -+CFLAGS += -march=mips64r2 -EL -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips) -+QEMU_ARCH := mips -+KERNEL_ARCH := mips -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm -+CFLAGS += -EB -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu 24Kf -machine malta -smp 1 -+CFLAGS += -march=mips32r2 -EB -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),mipsel) -+QEMU_ARCH := mipsel -+KERNEL_ARCH := mips -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm -+CFLAGS += -EL -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu 24Kf -machine malta -smp 1 -+CFLAGS += -march=mips32r2 -EL -+endif -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc64le) -+QEMU_ARCH := ppc64 -+KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine pseries -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -machine pseries -+endif -+CFLAGS += -mcpu=powerpc64le -mlong-double-64 -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc) -+QEMU_ARCH := ppc -+KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/powerpc/boot/uImage -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine ppce500 -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -machine ppce500 -+endif -+CFLAGS += -mcpu=powerpc -mlong-double-64 -msecure-plt -+else ifeq ($(ARCH),m68k) -+QEMU_ARCH := m68k -+KERNEL_ARCH := m68k -+KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux -+ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine q800 -+else -+QEMU_MACHINE := -machine q800 -+endif -+else -+$(error I only build: x86_64, i686, arm, armeb, aarch64, aarch64_be, mips, mipsel, mips64, mips64el, powerpc64le, powerpc, m68k) -+endif -+ -+REAL_CC := $(CBUILD)-gcc -+MUSL_CC := $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc -+export CC := $(MUSL_CC) -+USERSPACE_DEPS := $(MUSL_CC) $(BUILD_PATH)/include/.installed $(BUILD_PATH)/include/linux/.installed -+ -+build: $(KERNEL_BZIMAGE) -+qemu: $(KERNEL_BZIMAGE) -+ rm -f $(BUILD_PATH)/result -+ timeout --foreground 20m qemu-system-$(QEMU_ARCH) \ -+ -nodefaults \ -+ -nographic \ -+ -smp $(NR_CPUS) \ -+ $(QEMU_MACHINE) \ -+ -m $$(grep -q CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK=y $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config && echo 1G || echo 256M) \ -+ -serial stdio \ -+ -serial file:$(BUILD_PATH)/result \ -+ -no-reboot \ -+ -monitor none \ -+ -kernel $< -+ grep -Fq success $(BUILD_PATH)/result -+ -+$(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt: -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ echo "file /init $(BUILD_PATH)/init 755 0 0" > $@ -+ echo "file /init.sh $(PWD)/../netns.sh 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "dir /dev 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "nod /dev/console 644 0 0 c 5 1" >> $@ -+ echo "dir /bin 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/iperf3 $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/wg $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/bash $(BASH_PATH)/bash 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/ip $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/ping $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/ncat $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/xtables-multi $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "slink /bin/iptables xtables-multi 777 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "slink /bin/ping6 ping 777 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "dir /lib 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /lib/libc.so $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "slink /lib/ld-linux.so.1 libc.so 777 0 0" >> $@ -+ -+$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config: kernel.config arch/$(ARCH).config -+ mkdir -p $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) -+ cp kernel.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config -+ printf 'CONFIG_NR_CPUS=$(NR_CPUS)\nCONFIG_INITRAMFS_SOURCE="$(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt"\n' >> $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config -+ cat arch/$(ARCH).config >> $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config -+ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) allnoconfig -+ cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config -+ $(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),cp debug.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config debug.config,) -+ -+$(KERNEL_BZIMAGE): $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping $(BASH_PATH)/bash $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg $(BUILD_PATH)/init ../netns.sh $(WIREGUARD_SOURCES) -+ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" -+ -+$(BUILD_PATH)/include/linux/.installed: | $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config -+ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) INSTALL_HDR_PATH=$(BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) headers_install -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so: $(MUSL_TAR) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ cd $(MUSL_PATH) && CC=$(REAL_CC) ./configure --prefix=/ --disable-static --build=$(CBUILD) -+ $(MAKE) -C $(MUSL_PATH) -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+$(BUILD_PATH)/include/.installed: $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so -+ $(MAKE) -C $(MUSL_PATH) DESTDIR=$(BUILD_PATH) install-headers -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(MUSL_CC): $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so -+ sh $(MUSL_PATH)/tools/musl-gcc.specs.sh $(BUILD_PATH)/include $(MUSL_PATH)/lib /lib/ld-linux.so.1 > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs -+ printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "$(REAL_CC)" --specs="$(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs" -fno-stack-protector -no-pie "$$@"\n' > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc -+ chmod +x $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc -+ -+$(IPERF_PATH)/.installed: $(IPERF_TAR) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ sed -i '1s/^/#include /' $(IPERF_PATH)/src/cjson.h $(IPERF_PATH)/src/timer.h -+ sed -i -r 's/-p?g//g' $(IPERF_PATH)/src/Makefile* -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3: | $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ cd $(IPERF_PATH) && CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared -+ $(MAKE) -C $(IPERF_PATH) -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+$(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed: $(LIBMNL_TAR) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a: | $(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ cd $(LIBMNL_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared -+ $(MAKE) -C $(LIBMNL_PATH) -+ sed -i 's:prefix=.*:prefix=$(LIBMNL_PATH):' $(LIBMNL_PATH)/libmnl.pc -+ -+$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed: $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_TAR) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+$(BUILD_PATH)/init: init.c | $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ $(MUSL_CC) -o $@ $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -std=gnu11 $< -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+$(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed: $(IPUTILS_TAR) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping: | $(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ $(MAKE) -C $(IPUTILS_PATH) USE_CAP=no USE_IDN=no USE_NETTLE=no USE_CRYPTO=no ping -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+$(BASH_PATH)/.installed: $(BASH_TAR) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(BASH_PATH)/bash: | $(BASH_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ cd $(BASH_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --without-bash-malloc --disable-debugger --disable-help-builtin --disable-history --disable-multibyte --disable-progcomp --disable-readline --disable-mem-scramble -+ $(MAKE) -C $(BASH_PATH) -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed: $(IPROUTE2_TAR) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ printf 'CC:=$(CC)\nPKG_CONFIG:=pkg-config\nTC_CONFIG_XT:=n\nTC_CONFIG_ATM:=n\nTC_CONFIG_IPSET:=n\nIP_CONFIG_SETNS:=y\nHAVE_ELF:=n\nHAVE_MNL:=y\nHAVE_BERKELEY_DB:=n\nHAVE_LATEX:=n\nHAVE_PDFLATEX:=n\nCFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SETNS -DHAVE_LIBMNL -I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include\nLDLIBS+=-lmnl' > $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/config.mk -+ printf 'lib: snapshot\n\t$$(MAKE) -C lib\nip/ip: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C ip ip\nmisc/ss: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C misc ss\n' >> $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/Makefile -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ ip/ip -+ $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip -+ -+$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ misc/ss -+ $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss -+ -+$(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_TAR) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ sed -i -e "/nfnetlink=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" -e "/nfconntrack=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" $(IPTABLES_PATH)/configure -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include -+ $(MAKE) -C $(IPTABLES_PATH) -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+$(NMAP_PATH)/.installed: $(NMAP_TAR) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -+ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -+ touch $@ -+ -+$(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat: | $(NMAP_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ cd $(NMAP_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --without-ndiff --without-zenmap --without-nping --with-libpcap=included --with-libpcre=included --with-libdnet=included --without-liblua --with-liblinear=included --without-nmap-update --without-openssl --with-pcap=linux -+ $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH) build-ncat -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+clean: -+ rm -rf $(BUILD_PATH) -+ -+distclean: clean -+ rm -rf $(DISTFILES_PATH) -+ -+menuconfig: $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config -+ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" menuconfig -+ -+.PHONY: qemu build clean distclean menuconfig -+.DELETE_ON_ERROR: ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64.config -@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ -+CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyAMA0 wg.success=ttyAMA1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64_be.config -@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ -+CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyAMA0 wg.success=ttyAMA1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/arm.config -@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ -+CONFIG_MMU=y -+CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V7=y -+CONFIG_ARCH_VIRT=y -+CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL=n -+CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyAMA0 wg.success=ttyAMA1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/armeb.config -@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ -+CONFIG_MMU=y -+CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V7=y -+CONFIG_ARCH_VIRT=y -+CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL=n -+CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyAMA0 wg.success=ttyAMA1" -+CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN=y -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/i686.config -@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config -@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ -+CONFIG_MMU=y -+CONFIG_M68040=y -+CONFIG_MAC=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_TTYS=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips.config -@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ -+CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R2=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_MALTA=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_CPS=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT=y -+CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y -+CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64.config -@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ -+CONFIG_64BIT=y -+CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R2=y -+CONFIG_MIPS32_N32=y -+CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_MALTA=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_CPS=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT=y -+CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y -+CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64el.config -@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ -+CONFIG_64BIT=y -+CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R2=y -+CONFIG_MIPS32_N32=y -+CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_MALTA=y -+CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_CPS=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT=y -+CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y -+CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mipsel.config -@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ -+CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R2=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_MALTA=y -+CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_CPS=y -+CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT=y -+CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y -+CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc.config -@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ -+CONFIG_PPC_QEMU_E500=y -+CONFIG_FSL_SOC_BOOKE=y -+CONFIG_PPC_85xx=y -+CONFIG_PHYS_64BIT=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config -@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ -+CONFIG_PPC64=y -+CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES=y -+CONFIG_ALTIVEC=y -+CONFIG_VSX=y -+CONFIG_PPC_OF_BOOT_TRAMPOLINE=y -+CONFIG_PPC_RADIX_MMU=y -+CONFIG_HVC_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=hvc0 wg.success=hvc1" -+CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY=y -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/x86_64.config -@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y -+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y -+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" -+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/debug.config -@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ -+CONFIG_LOCALVERSION="-debug" -+CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED=y -+CONFIG_ENABLE_MUST_CHECK=y -+CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y -+CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF4=y -+CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION=y -+CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_FREE=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_RCU_HEAD=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_PERCPU_COUNTER=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_ENABLE_DEFAULT=1 -+CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT=y -+CONFIG_HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW=y -+CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK=y -+CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KASAN=y -+CONFIG_KASAN=y -+CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y -+CONFIG_UBSAN=y -+CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y -+CONFIG_UBSAN_NO_ALIGNMENT=y -+CONFIG_UBSAN_NULL=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_EARLY_LOG_SIZE=8192 -+CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ=y -+CONFIG_WQ_WATCHDOG=y -+CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG=y -+CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y -+CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS=y -+CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_TIMEKEEPING=y -+CONFIG_TIMER_STATS=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC=y -+CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y -+CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y -+CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_PI_LIST=y -+CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y -+CONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER=y -+CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_TIMEOUT=21 -+CONFIG_RCU_TRACE=y -+CONFIG_RCU_EQS_DEBUG=y -+CONFIG_USER_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS=y -+CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT=y -+CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC_ENABLE_DEFAULT=y -+CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH=y ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c -@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ -+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. -+ */ -+ -+#define _GNU_SOURCE -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+__attribute__((noreturn)) static void poweroff(void) -+{ -+ fflush(stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ reboot(RB_AUTOBOOT); -+ sleep(30); -+ fprintf(stderr, "\x1b[37m\x1b[41m\x1b[1mFailed to power off!!!\x1b[0m\n"); -+ exit(1); -+} -+ -+static void panic(const char *what) -+{ -+ fprintf(stderr, "\n\n\x1b[37m\x1b[41m\x1b[1mSOMETHING WENT HORRIBLY WRONG\x1b[0m\n\n \x1b[31m\x1b[1m%s: %s\x1b[0m\n\n\x1b[37m\x1b[44m\x1b[1mPower off...\x1b[0m\n\n", what, strerror(errno)); -+ poweroff(); -+} -+ -+#define pretty_message(msg) puts("\x1b[32m\x1b[1m" msg "\x1b[0m") -+ -+static void print_banner(void) -+{ -+ struct utsname utsname; -+ int len; -+ -+ if (uname(&utsname) < 0) -+ panic("uname"); -+ -+ len = strlen(" WireGuard Test Suite on ") + strlen(utsname.sysname) + strlen(utsname.release) + strlen(utsname.machine); -+ printf("\x1b[45m\x1b[33m\x1b[1m%*.s\x1b[0m\n\x1b[45m\x1b[33m\x1b[1m WireGuard Test Suite on %s %s %s \x1b[0m\n\x1b[45m\x1b[33m\x1b[1m%*.s\x1b[0m\n\n", len, "", utsname.sysname, utsname.release, utsname.machine, len, ""); -+} -+ -+static void seed_rng(void) -+{ -+ int fd; -+ struct { -+ int entropy_count; -+ int buffer_size; -+ unsigned char buffer[256]; -+ } entropy = { -+ .entropy_count = sizeof(entropy.buffer) * 8, -+ .buffer_size = sizeof(entropy.buffer), -+ .buffer = "Adding real entropy is not actually important for these tests. Don't try this at home, kids!" -+ }; -+ -+ if (mknod("/dev/urandom", S_IFCHR | 0644, makedev(1, 9))) -+ panic("mknod(/dev/urandom)"); -+ fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_WRONLY); -+ if (fd < 0) -+ panic("open(urandom)"); -+ for (int i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { -+ if (ioctl(fd, RNDADDENTROPY, &entropy) < 0) -+ panic("ioctl(urandom)"); -+ } -+ close(fd); -+} -+ -+static void mount_filesystems(void) -+{ -+ pretty_message("[+] Mounting filesystems..."); -+ mkdir("/dev", 0755); -+ mkdir("/proc", 0755); -+ mkdir("/sys", 0755); -+ mkdir("/tmp", 0755); -+ mkdir("/run", 0755); -+ mkdir("/var", 0755); -+ if (mount("none", "/dev", "devtmpfs", 0, NULL)) -+ panic("devtmpfs mount"); -+ if (mount("none", "/proc", "proc", 0, NULL)) -+ panic("procfs mount"); -+ if (mount("none", "/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL)) -+ panic("sysfs mount"); -+ if (mount("none", "/tmp", "tmpfs", 0, NULL)) -+ panic("tmpfs mount"); -+ if (mount("none", "/run", "tmpfs", 0, NULL)) -+ panic("tmpfs mount"); -+ if (mount("none", "/sys/kernel/debug", "debugfs", 0, NULL)) -+ ; /* Not a problem if it fails.*/ -+ if (symlink("/run", "/var/run")) -+ panic("run symlink"); -+ if (symlink("/proc/self/fd", "/dev/fd")) -+ panic("fd symlink"); -+} -+ -+static void enable_logging(void) -+{ -+ int fd; -+ pretty_message("[+] Enabling logging..."); -+ fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/printk", O_WRONLY); -+ if (fd >= 0) { -+ if (write(fd, "9\n", 2) != 2) -+ panic("write(printk)"); -+ close(fd); -+ } -+ fd = open("/proc/sys/debug/exception-trace", O_WRONLY); -+ if (fd >= 0) { -+ if (write(fd, "1\n", 2) != 2) -+ panic("write(exception-trace)"); -+ close(fd); -+ } -+ fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn", O_WRONLY); -+ if (fd >= 0) { -+ if (write(fd, "1\n", 2) != 2) -+ panic("write(panic_on_warn)"); -+ close(fd); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void kmod_selftests(void) -+{ -+ FILE *file; -+ char line[2048], *start, *pass; -+ bool success = true; -+ pretty_message("[+] Module self-tests:"); -+ file = fopen("/proc/kmsg", "r"); -+ if (!file) -+ panic("fopen(kmsg)"); -+ if (fcntl(fileno(file), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) -+ panic("fcntl(kmsg, nonblock)"); -+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), file)) { -+ start = strstr(line, "wireguard: "); -+ if (!start) -+ continue; -+ start += 11; -+ *strchrnul(start, '\n') = '\0'; -+ if (strstr(start, "www.wireguard.com")) -+ break; -+ pass = strstr(start, ": pass"); -+ if (!pass || pass[6] != '\0') { -+ success = false; -+ printf(" \x1b[31m* %s\x1b[0m\n", start); -+ } else -+ printf(" \x1b[32m* %s\x1b[0m\n", start); -+ } -+ fclose(file); -+ if (!success) { -+ puts("\x1b[31m\x1b[1m[-] Tests failed! \u2639\x1b[0m"); -+ poweroff(); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void launch_tests(void) -+{ -+ char cmdline[4096], *success_dev; -+ int status, fd; -+ pid_t pid; -+ -+ pretty_message("[+] Launching tests..."); -+ pid = fork(); -+ if (pid == -1) -+ panic("fork"); -+ else if (pid == 0) { -+ execl("/init.sh", "init", NULL); -+ panic("exec"); -+ } -+ if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) -+ panic("waitpid"); -+ if (WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) { -+ pretty_message("[+] Tests successful! :-)"); -+ fd = open("/proc/cmdline", O_RDONLY); -+ if (fd < 0) -+ panic("open(/proc/cmdline)"); -+ if (read(fd, cmdline, sizeof(cmdline) - 1) <= 0) -+ panic("read(/proc/cmdline)"); -+ cmdline[sizeof(cmdline) - 1] = '\0'; -+ for (success_dev = strtok(cmdline, " \n"); success_dev; success_dev = strtok(NULL, " \n")) { -+ if (strncmp(success_dev, "wg.success=", 11)) -+ continue; -+ memcpy(success_dev + 11 - 5, "/dev/", 5); -+ success_dev += 11 - 5; -+ break; -+ } -+ if (!success_dev || !strlen(success_dev)) -+ panic("Unable to find success device"); -+ -+ fd = open(success_dev, O_WRONLY); -+ if (fd < 0) -+ panic("open(success_dev)"); -+ if (write(fd, "success\n", 8) != 8) -+ panic("write(success_dev)"); -+ close(fd); -+ } else { -+ const char *why = "unknown cause"; -+ int what = -1; -+ -+ if (WIFEXITED(status)) { -+ why = "exit code"; -+ what = WEXITSTATUS(status); -+ } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { -+ why = "signal"; -+ what = WTERMSIG(status); -+ } -+ printf("\x1b[31m\x1b[1m[-] Tests failed with %s %d! \u2639\x1b[0m\n", why, what); -+ } -+} -+ -+static void ensure_console(void) -+{ -+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 1000; ++i) { -+ int fd = open("/dev/console", O_RDWR); -+ if (fd < 0) { -+ usleep(50000); -+ continue; -+ } -+ dup2(fd, 0); -+ dup2(fd, 1); -+ dup2(fd, 2); -+ close(fd); -+ if (write(1, "\0\0\0\0\n", 5) == 5) -+ return; -+ } -+ panic("Unable to open console device"); -+} -+ -+static void clear_leaks(void) -+{ -+ int fd; -+ -+ fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak", O_WRONLY); -+ if (fd < 0) -+ return; -+ pretty_message("[+] Starting memory leak detection..."); -+ write(fd, "clear\n", 5); -+ close(fd); -+} -+ -+static void check_leaks(void) -+{ -+ int fd; -+ -+ fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak", O_WRONLY); -+ if (fd < 0) -+ return; -+ pretty_message("[+] Scanning for memory leaks..."); -+ sleep(2); /* Wait for any grace periods. */ -+ write(fd, "scan\n", 5); -+ close(fd); -+ -+ fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak", O_RDONLY); -+ if (fd < 0) -+ return; -+ if (sendfile(1, fd, NULL, 0x7ffff000) > 0) -+ panic("Memory leaks encountered"); -+ close(fd); -+} -+ -+int main(int argc, char *argv[]) -+{ -+ seed_rng(); -+ ensure_console(); -+ print_banner(); -+ mount_filesystems(); -+ kmod_selftests(); -+ enable_logging(); -+ clear_leaks(); -+ launch_tests(); -+ check_leaks(); -+ poweroff(); -+ return 1; -+} ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config -@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ -+CONFIG_LOCALVERSION="" -+CONFIG_NET=y -+CONFIG_NETDEVICES=y -+CONFIG_NET_CORE=y -+CONFIG_NET_IPIP=y -+CONFIG_DUMMY=y -+CONFIG_VETH=y -+CONFIG_MULTIUSER=y -+CONFIG_NAMESPACES=y -+CONFIG_NET_NS=y -+CONFIG_UNIX=y -+CONFIG_INET=y -+CONFIG_IPV6=y -+CONFIG_NETFILTER=y -+CONFIG_NETFILTER_ADVANCED=y -+CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK=y -+CONFIG_NF_NAT=y -+CONFIG_NETFILTER_XTABLES=y -+CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_NAT=y -+CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_LENGTH=y -+CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_IPV4=y -+CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4=y -+CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES=y -+CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER=y -+CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT=y -+CONFIG_IP_ADVANCED_ROUTER=y -+CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y -+CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y -+CONFIG_TTY=y -+CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF=y -+CONFIG_BINFMT_SCRIPT=y -+CONFIG_VDSO=y -+CONFIG_VIRTUALIZATION=y -+CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST=y -+CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y -+CONFIG_KVM_GUEST=y -+CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS=y -+CONFIG_PRINTK=y -+CONFIG_KALLSYMS=y -+CONFIG_BUG=y -+CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y -+CONFIG_EMBEDDED=n -+CONFIG_BASE_FULL=y -+CONFIG_FUTEX=y -+CONFIG_SHMEM=y -+CONFIG_SLUB=y -+CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP=y -+CONFIG_SMP=y -+CONFIG_SCHED_SMT=y -+CONFIG_SCHED_MC=y -+CONFIG_NUMA=y -+CONFIG_PREEMPT=y -+CONFIG_NO_HZ=y -+CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y -+CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n -+CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n -+CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y -+CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y -+CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y -+CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y -+CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y -+CONFIG_PROC_FS=y -+CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL=y -+CONFIG_SYSFS=y -+CONFIG_TMPFS=y -+CONFIG_CONSOLE_LOGLEVEL_DEFAULT=15 -+CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y -+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=y -+CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE=y -+CONFIG_KERNEL_GZIP=y -+CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y -+CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y -+CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR=y -+CONFIG_SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y -+CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y -+CONFIG_WQ_WATCHDOG=y -+CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y -+CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HARDLOCKUP_PANIC=y -+CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC=y -+CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC=y -+CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT=-1 -+CONFIG_STACKTRACE=y -+CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y -+CONFIG_GDB_SCRIPTS=y -+CONFIG_WIREGUARD=y -+CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG=y diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0075-wireguard-Kconfig-select-parent-dependency-for-crypt.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0075-wireguard-Kconfig-select-parent-dependency-for-crypt.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 75c483a330..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0075-wireguard-Kconfig-select-parent-dependency-for-crypt.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -From 87e4891e91a381de049a6c70690a295f44ae1f13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:01 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 075/124] wireguard: Kconfig: select parent dependency for - crypto - -commit d7c68a38bb4f9b7c1a2e4a772872c752ee5c44a6 upstream. - -This fixes the crypto selection submenu depenencies. Otherwise, we'd -wind up issuing warnings in which certain dependencies we also select -couldn't be satisfied. This condition was triggered by the addition of -the test suite autobuilder in the previous commit. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/Kconfig | 2 ++ - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) - ---- a/drivers/net/Kconfig -+++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig -@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ config WIREGUARD - select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT - select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT - select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86 if X86 && 64BIT -+ select ARM_CRYPTO if ARM -+ select ARM64_CRYPTO if ARM64 - select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if (ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON - select CRYPTO_POLY1305_NEON if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON - select CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM if ARM diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0075-wireguard-selftests-import-harness-makefile-for-test.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0075-wireguard-selftests-import-harness-makefile-for-test.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca3853aa19 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0075-wireguard-selftests-import-harness-makefile-for-test.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1078 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:00 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: import harness makefile for test suite + +commit 65d88d04114bca7d85faebd5fed61069cb2b632c upstream. + +WireGuard has been using this on build.wireguard.com for the last +several years with considerable success. It allows for very quick and +iterative development cycles, and supports several platforms. + +To run the test suite on your current platform in QEMU: + + $ make -C tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu -j$(nproc) + +To run it with KASAN and such turned on: + + $ DEBUG_KERNEL=yes make -C tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu -j$(nproc) + +To run it emulated for another platform in QEMU: + + $ ARCH=arm make -C tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu -j$(nproc) + +At the moment, we support aarch64_be, aarch64, arm, armeb, i686, m68k, +mips64, mips64el, mips, mipsel, powerpc64le, powerpc, and x86_64. + +The system supports incremental rebuilding, so it should be very fast to +change a single file and then test it out and have immediate feedback. + +This requires for the right toolchain and qemu to be installed prior. +I've had success with those from musl.cc. + +This is tailored for WireGuard at the moment, though later projects +might generalize it for other network testing. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/.gitignore | 2 + + .../testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 385 ++++++++++++++++++ + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64.config | 5 + + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64_be.config | 6 + + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/arm.config | 9 + + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/armeb.config | 10 + + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/i686.config | 5 + + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config | 9 + + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips.config | 11 + + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64.config | 14 + + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64el.config | 15 + + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/mipsel.config | 12 + + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc.config | 10 + + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config | 12 + + .../wireguard/qemu/arch/x86_64.config | 5 + + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/debug.config | 67 +++ + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c | 284 +++++++++++++ + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 86 ++++ + 18 files changed, 947 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/.gitignore + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64_be.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/arm.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/armeb.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/i686.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64el.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mipsel.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/x86_64.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/debug.config + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config + +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/.gitignore +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++build/ ++distfiles/ +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile +@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++# ++# Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ ++PWD := $(shell pwd) ++ ++CHOST := $(shell gcc -dumpmachine) ++ifneq (,$(ARCH)) ++CBUILD := $(subst -gcc,,$(lastword $(subst /, ,$(firstword $(wildcard $(foreach bindir,$(subst :, ,$(PATH)),$(bindir)/$(ARCH)-*-gcc)))))) ++ifeq (,$(CBUILD)) ++$(error The toolchain for $(ARCH) is not installed) ++endif ++else ++CBUILD := $(CHOST) ++ARCH := $(firstword $(subst -, ,$(CBUILD))) ++endif ++ ++# Set these from the environment to override ++KERNEL_PATH ?= $(PWD)/../../../../.. ++BUILD_PATH ?= $(PWD)/build/$(ARCH) ++DISTFILES_PATH ?= $(PWD)/distfiles ++NR_CPUS ?= 4 ++ ++MIRROR := https://download.wireguard.com/qemu-test/distfiles/ ++ ++default: qemu ++ ++# variable name, tarball project name, version, tarball extension, default URI base ++define tar_download = ++$(1)_VERSION := $(3) ++$(1)_NAME := $(2)-$$($(1)_VERSION) ++$(1)_TAR := $(DISTFILES_PATH)/$$($(1)_NAME)$(4) ++$(1)_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/$$($(1)_NAME) ++$(call file_download,$$($(1)_NAME)$(4),$(5),$(6)) ++endef ++ ++define file_download = ++$(DISTFILES_PATH)/$(1): ++ mkdir -p $(DISTFILES_PATH) ++ flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -t inf --retry-on-http-error=404 -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp' ++ if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi ++endef ++ ++$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.20,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,44be8771d0e6c6b5f82dd15662eb2957c9a3173a19a8b49966ac0542bbd40d61)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,LIBMNL,libmnl,1.0.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libmnl/files/,171f89699f286a5854b72b91d06e8f8e3683064c5901fb09d954a9ab6f551f81)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.1.7,.tar.gz,http://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,a4ef73406fe92250602b8da2ae89ec53211f805df97a1d1d629db5a14043734f)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.1.0,.tar.gz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,9b43707d6075ecdca14803ca8ce0c8553848c49fa1586d12fd508d66577243f2)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.6.1,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,0fc2d7bd5d7be11311726466789d4c65fb4c8e096c9182b56ce97440864f0cf5)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.60,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,a8796ecc4fa6c38aad6139d9515dc8113023a82e9d787e5a5fb5fa1b05516f21)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20161105,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20161105.tar.gz/#,f813092f03d17294fd23544b129b95cdb87fe19f7970a51908a6b88509acad8a)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,WireGuard,0.0.20191212,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/WireGuard/snapshot/,b0d718380f7a8822b2f12d75e462fa4eafa3a77871002981f367cd4fe2a1b071)) ++ ++KERNEL_BUILD_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/kernel$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),-debug) ++rwildcard=$(foreach d,$(wildcard $1*),$(call rwildcard,$d/,$2) $(filter $(subst *,%,$2),$d)) ++WIREGUARD_SOURCES := $(call rwildcard,$(KERNEL_PATH)/drivers/net/wireguard/,*) ++ ++export CFLAGS ?= -O3 -pipe ++export LDFLAGS ?= ++export CPPFLAGS := -I$(BUILD_PATH)/include ++ ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --host=$(CHOST) ++NOPIE_GCC := gcc -fno-PIE ++CFLAGS += -march=native ++STRIP := strip ++else ++$(info Cross compilation: building for $(CBUILD) using $(CHOST)) ++CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --build=$(CBUILD) --host=$(CHOST) ++export CROSS_COMPILE=$(CBUILD)- ++NOPIE_GCC := $(CBUILD)-gcc -fno-PIE ++STRIP := $(CBUILD)-strip ++endif ++ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64) ++QEMU_ARCH := aarch64 ++KERNEL_ARCH := arm64 ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt ++CFLAGS += -march=armv8-a -mtune=cortex-a53 ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64_be) ++QEMU_ARCH := aarch64 ++KERNEL_ARCH := arm64 ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt ++CFLAGS += -march=armv8-a -mtune=cortex-a53 ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),arm) ++QEMU_ARCH := arm ++KERNEL_ARCH := arm ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt ++CFLAGS += -march=armv7-a -mtune=cortex-a15 -mabi=aapcs-linux ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),armeb) ++QEMU_ARCH := arm ++KERNEL_ARCH := arm ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt ++CFLAGS += -march=armv7-a -mabi=aapcs-linux # We don't pass -mtune=cortex-a15 due to a compiler bug on big endian. ++LDFLAGS += -Wl,--be8 ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64) ++QEMU_ARCH := x86_64 ++KERNEL_ARCH := x86_64 ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu Skylake-Server -machine q35 ++CFLAGS += -march=skylake-avx512 ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),i686) ++QEMU_ARCH := i386 ++KERNEL_ARCH := x86 ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage ++ifeq ($(subst i686,x86_64,$(CBUILD)),$(CHOST)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu coreduo -machine q35 ++CFLAGS += -march=prescott ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64) ++QEMU_ARCH := mips64 ++KERNEL_ARCH := mips ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm ++CFLAGS += -EB ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu MIPS64R2-generic -machine malta -smp 1 ++CFLAGS += -march=mips64r2 -EB ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64el) ++QEMU_ARCH := mips64el ++KERNEL_ARCH := mips ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm ++CFLAGS += -EL ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu MIPS64R2-generic -machine malta -smp 1 ++CFLAGS += -march=mips64r2 -EL ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips) ++QEMU_ARCH := mips ++KERNEL_ARCH := mips ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm ++CFLAGS += -EB ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu 24Kf -machine malta -smp 1 ++CFLAGS += -march=mips32r2 -EB ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),mipsel) ++QEMU_ARCH := mipsel ++KERNEL_ARCH := mips ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm ++CFLAGS += -EL ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu 24Kf -machine malta -smp 1 ++CFLAGS += -march=mips32r2 -EL ++endif ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc64le) ++QEMU_ARCH := ppc64 ++KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine pseries ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -machine pseries ++endif ++CFLAGS += -mcpu=powerpc64le -mlong-double-64 ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc) ++QEMU_ARCH := ppc ++KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/powerpc/boot/uImage ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine ppce500 ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -machine ppce500 ++endif ++CFLAGS += -mcpu=powerpc -mlong-double-64 -msecure-plt ++else ifeq ($(ARCH),m68k) ++QEMU_ARCH := m68k ++KERNEL_ARCH := m68k ++KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux ++ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine q800 ++else ++QEMU_MACHINE := -machine q800 ++endif ++else ++$(error I only build: x86_64, i686, arm, armeb, aarch64, aarch64_be, mips, mipsel, mips64, mips64el, powerpc64le, powerpc, m68k) ++endif ++ ++REAL_CC := $(CBUILD)-gcc ++MUSL_CC := $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc ++export CC := $(MUSL_CC) ++USERSPACE_DEPS := $(MUSL_CC) $(BUILD_PATH)/include/.installed $(BUILD_PATH)/include/linux/.installed ++ ++build: $(KERNEL_BZIMAGE) ++qemu: $(KERNEL_BZIMAGE) ++ rm -f $(BUILD_PATH)/result ++ timeout --foreground 20m qemu-system-$(QEMU_ARCH) \ ++ -nodefaults \ ++ -nographic \ ++ -smp $(NR_CPUS) \ ++ $(QEMU_MACHINE) \ ++ -m $$(grep -q CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK=y $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config && echo 1G || echo 256M) \ ++ -serial stdio \ ++ -serial file:$(BUILD_PATH)/result \ ++ -no-reboot \ ++ -monitor none \ ++ -kernel $< ++ grep -Fq success $(BUILD_PATH)/result ++ ++$(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt: ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ echo "file /init $(BUILD_PATH)/init 755 0 0" > $@ ++ echo "file /init.sh $(PWD)/../netns.sh 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "dir /dev 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "nod /dev/console 644 0 0 c 5 1" >> $@ ++ echo "dir /bin 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/iperf3 $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/wg $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/bash $(BASH_PATH)/bash 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/ip $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/ping $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/ncat $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/xtables-multi $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "slink /bin/iptables xtables-multi 777 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "slink /bin/ping6 ping 777 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "dir /lib 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /lib/libc.so $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "slink /lib/ld-linux.so.1 libc.so 777 0 0" >> $@ ++ ++$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config: kernel.config arch/$(ARCH).config ++ mkdir -p $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ++ cp kernel.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config ++ printf 'CONFIG_NR_CPUS=$(NR_CPUS)\nCONFIG_INITRAMFS_SOURCE="$(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt"\n' >> $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config ++ cat arch/$(ARCH).config >> $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config ++ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) allnoconfig ++ cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config ++ $(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),cp debug.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config debug.config,) ++ ++$(KERNEL_BZIMAGE): $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping $(BASH_PATH)/bash $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg $(BUILD_PATH)/init ../netns.sh $(WIREGUARD_SOURCES) ++ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" ++ ++$(BUILD_PATH)/include/linux/.installed: | $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config ++ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) INSTALL_HDR_PATH=$(BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) headers_install ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so: $(MUSL_TAR) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ cd $(MUSL_PATH) && CC=$(REAL_CC) ./configure --prefix=/ --disable-static --build=$(CBUILD) ++ $(MAKE) -C $(MUSL_PATH) ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++$(BUILD_PATH)/include/.installed: $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so ++ $(MAKE) -C $(MUSL_PATH) DESTDIR=$(BUILD_PATH) install-headers ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(MUSL_CC): $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so ++ sh $(MUSL_PATH)/tools/musl-gcc.specs.sh $(BUILD_PATH)/include $(MUSL_PATH)/lib /lib/ld-linux.so.1 > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs ++ printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "$(REAL_CC)" --specs="$(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs" -fno-stack-protector -no-pie "$$@"\n' > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc ++ chmod +x $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc ++ ++$(IPERF_PATH)/.installed: $(IPERF_TAR) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ sed -i '1s/^/#include /' $(IPERF_PATH)/src/cjson.h $(IPERF_PATH)/src/timer.h ++ sed -i -r 's/-p?g//g' $(IPERF_PATH)/src/Makefile* ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3: | $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ cd $(IPERF_PATH) && CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared ++ $(MAKE) -C $(IPERF_PATH) ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++$(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed: $(LIBMNL_TAR) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a: | $(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ cd $(LIBMNL_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared ++ $(MAKE) -C $(LIBMNL_PATH) ++ sed -i 's:prefix=.*:prefix=$(LIBMNL_PATH):' $(LIBMNL_PATH)/libmnl.pc ++ ++$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed: $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_TAR) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++$(BUILD_PATH)/init: init.c | $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ $(MUSL_CC) -o $@ $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -std=gnu11 $< ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++$(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed: $(IPUTILS_TAR) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping: | $(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ $(MAKE) -C $(IPUTILS_PATH) USE_CAP=no USE_IDN=no USE_NETTLE=no USE_CRYPTO=no ping ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++$(BASH_PATH)/.installed: $(BASH_TAR) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(BASH_PATH)/bash: | $(BASH_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ cd $(BASH_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --without-bash-malloc --disable-debugger --disable-help-builtin --disable-history --disable-multibyte --disable-progcomp --disable-readline --disable-mem-scramble ++ $(MAKE) -C $(BASH_PATH) ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed: $(IPROUTE2_TAR) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ printf 'CC:=$(CC)\nPKG_CONFIG:=pkg-config\nTC_CONFIG_XT:=n\nTC_CONFIG_ATM:=n\nTC_CONFIG_IPSET:=n\nIP_CONFIG_SETNS:=y\nHAVE_ELF:=n\nHAVE_MNL:=y\nHAVE_BERKELEY_DB:=n\nHAVE_LATEX:=n\nHAVE_PDFLATEX:=n\nCFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SETNS -DHAVE_LIBMNL -I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include\nLDLIBS+=-lmnl' > $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/config.mk ++ printf 'lib: snapshot\n\t$$(MAKE) -C lib\nip/ip: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C ip ip\nmisc/ss: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C misc ss\n' >> $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/Makefile ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ ip/ip ++ $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip ++ ++$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ misc/ss ++ $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss ++ ++$(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_TAR) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ sed -i -e "/nfnetlink=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" -e "/nfconntrack=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" $(IPTABLES_PATH)/configure ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include ++ $(MAKE) -C $(IPTABLES_PATH) ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++$(NMAP_PATH)/.installed: $(NMAP_TAR) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) ++ flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< ++ touch $@ ++ ++$(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat: | $(NMAP_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ cd $(NMAP_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --without-ndiff --without-zenmap --without-nping --with-libpcap=included --with-libpcre=included --with-libdnet=included --without-liblua --with-liblinear=included --without-nmap-update --without-openssl --with-pcap=linux ++ $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH) build-ncat ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++clean: ++ rm -rf $(BUILD_PATH) ++ ++distclean: clean ++ rm -rf $(DISTFILES_PATH) ++ ++menuconfig: $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config ++ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" menuconfig ++ ++.PHONY: qemu build clean distclean menuconfig ++.DELETE_ON_ERROR: +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64.config +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyAMA0 wg.success=ttyAMA1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/aarch64_be.config +@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ ++CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyAMA0 wg.success=ttyAMA1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/arm.config +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++CONFIG_MMU=y ++CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V7=y ++CONFIG_ARCH_VIRT=y ++CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL=n ++CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyAMA0 wg.success=ttyAMA1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/armeb.config +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++CONFIG_MMU=y ++CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V7=y ++CONFIG_ARCH_VIRT=y ++CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL=n ++CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_AMBA_PL011_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyAMA0 wg.success=ttyAMA1" ++CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN=y ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/i686.config +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++CONFIG_MMU=y ++CONFIG_M68040=y ++CONFIG_MAC=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_TTYS=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips.config +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R2=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_MALTA=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_CPS=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT=y ++CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y ++CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64.config +@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ ++CONFIG_64BIT=y ++CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R2=y ++CONFIG_MIPS32_N32=y ++CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_MALTA=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_CPS=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT=y ++CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y ++CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mips64el.config +@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ ++CONFIG_64BIT=y ++CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R2=y ++CONFIG_MIPS32_N32=y ++CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_MALTA=y ++CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_CPS=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT=y ++CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y ++CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/mipsel.config +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R2=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_MALTA=y ++CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_CPS=y ++CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT=y ++CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y ++CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc.config +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++CONFIG_PPC_QEMU_E500=y ++CONFIG_FSL_SOC_BOOKE=y ++CONFIG_PPC_85xx=y ++CONFIG_PHYS_64BIT=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++CONFIG_PPC64=y ++CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES=y ++CONFIG_ALTIVEC=y ++CONFIG_VSX=y ++CONFIG_PPC_OF_BOOT_TRAMPOLINE=y ++CONFIG_PPC_RADIX_MMU=y ++CONFIG_HVC_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=hvc0 wg.success=hvc1" ++CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY=y ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/x86_64.config +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y ++CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y ++CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" ++CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/debug.config +@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ ++CONFIG_LOCALVERSION="-debug" ++CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED=y ++CONFIG_ENABLE_MUST_CHECK=y ++CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y ++CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF4=y ++CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION=y ++CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_FREE=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_RCU_HEAD=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_PERCPU_COUNTER=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_ENABLE_DEFAULT=1 ++CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT=y ++CONFIG_HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW=y ++CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK=y ++CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KASAN=y ++CONFIG_KASAN=y ++CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y ++CONFIG_UBSAN=y ++CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y ++CONFIG_UBSAN_NO_ALIGNMENT=y ++CONFIG_UBSAN_NULL=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_EARLY_LOG_SIZE=8192 ++CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ=y ++CONFIG_WQ_WATCHDOG=y ++CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG=y ++CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y ++CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS=y ++CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_TIMEKEEPING=y ++CONFIG_TIMER_STATS=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC=y ++CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y ++CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y ++CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_PI_LIST=y ++CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y ++CONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER=y ++CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_TIMEOUT=21 ++CONFIG_RCU_TRACE=y ++CONFIG_RCU_EQS_DEBUG=y ++CONFIG_USER_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS=y ++CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT=y ++CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC_ENABLE_DEFAULT=y ++CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH=y +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c +@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ */ ++ ++#define _GNU_SOURCE ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++__attribute__((noreturn)) static void poweroff(void) ++{ ++ fflush(stdout); ++ fflush(stderr); ++ reboot(RB_AUTOBOOT); ++ sleep(30); ++ fprintf(stderr, "\x1b[37m\x1b[41m\x1b[1mFailed to power off!!!\x1b[0m\n"); ++ exit(1); ++} ++ ++static void panic(const char *what) ++{ ++ fprintf(stderr, "\n\n\x1b[37m\x1b[41m\x1b[1mSOMETHING WENT HORRIBLY WRONG\x1b[0m\n\n \x1b[31m\x1b[1m%s: %s\x1b[0m\n\n\x1b[37m\x1b[44m\x1b[1mPower off...\x1b[0m\n\n", what, strerror(errno)); ++ poweroff(); ++} ++ ++#define pretty_message(msg) puts("\x1b[32m\x1b[1m" msg "\x1b[0m") ++ ++static void print_banner(void) ++{ ++ struct utsname utsname; ++ int len; ++ ++ if (uname(&utsname) < 0) ++ panic("uname"); ++ ++ len = strlen(" WireGuard Test Suite on ") + strlen(utsname.sysname) + strlen(utsname.release) + strlen(utsname.machine); ++ printf("\x1b[45m\x1b[33m\x1b[1m%*.s\x1b[0m\n\x1b[45m\x1b[33m\x1b[1m WireGuard Test Suite on %s %s %s \x1b[0m\n\x1b[45m\x1b[33m\x1b[1m%*.s\x1b[0m\n\n", len, "", utsname.sysname, utsname.release, utsname.machine, len, ""); ++} ++ ++static void seed_rng(void) ++{ ++ int fd; ++ struct { ++ int entropy_count; ++ int buffer_size; ++ unsigned char buffer[256]; ++ } entropy = { ++ .entropy_count = sizeof(entropy.buffer) * 8, ++ .buffer_size = sizeof(entropy.buffer), ++ .buffer = "Adding real entropy is not actually important for these tests. Don't try this at home, kids!" ++ }; ++ ++ if (mknod("/dev/urandom", S_IFCHR | 0644, makedev(1, 9))) ++ panic("mknod(/dev/urandom)"); ++ fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_WRONLY); ++ if (fd < 0) ++ panic("open(urandom)"); ++ for (int i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { ++ if (ioctl(fd, RNDADDENTROPY, &entropy) < 0) ++ panic("ioctl(urandom)"); ++ } ++ close(fd); ++} ++ ++static void mount_filesystems(void) ++{ ++ pretty_message("[+] Mounting filesystems..."); ++ mkdir("/dev", 0755); ++ mkdir("/proc", 0755); ++ mkdir("/sys", 0755); ++ mkdir("/tmp", 0755); ++ mkdir("/run", 0755); ++ mkdir("/var", 0755); ++ if (mount("none", "/dev", "devtmpfs", 0, NULL)) ++ panic("devtmpfs mount"); ++ if (mount("none", "/proc", "proc", 0, NULL)) ++ panic("procfs mount"); ++ if (mount("none", "/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL)) ++ panic("sysfs mount"); ++ if (mount("none", "/tmp", "tmpfs", 0, NULL)) ++ panic("tmpfs mount"); ++ if (mount("none", "/run", "tmpfs", 0, NULL)) ++ panic("tmpfs mount"); ++ if (mount("none", "/sys/kernel/debug", "debugfs", 0, NULL)) ++ ; /* Not a problem if it fails.*/ ++ if (symlink("/run", "/var/run")) ++ panic("run symlink"); ++ if (symlink("/proc/self/fd", "/dev/fd")) ++ panic("fd symlink"); ++} ++ ++static void enable_logging(void) ++{ ++ int fd; ++ pretty_message("[+] Enabling logging..."); ++ fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/printk", O_WRONLY); ++ if (fd >= 0) { ++ if (write(fd, "9\n", 2) != 2) ++ panic("write(printk)"); ++ close(fd); ++ } ++ fd = open("/proc/sys/debug/exception-trace", O_WRONLY); ++ if (fd >= 0) { ++ if (write(fd, "1\n", 2) != 2) ++ panic("write(exception-trace)"); ++ close(fd); ++ } ++ fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn", O_WRONLY); ++ if (fd >= 0) { ++ if (write(fd, "1\n", 2) != 2) ++ panic("write(panic_on_warn)"); ++ close(fd); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void kmod_selftests(void) ++{ ++ FILE *file; ++ char line[2048], *start, *pass; ++ bool success = true; ++ pretty_message("[+] Module self-tests:"); ++ file = fopen("/proc/kmsg", "r"); ++ if (!file) ++ panic("fopen(kmsg)"); ++ if (fcntl(fileno(file), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) ++ panic("fcntl(kmsg, nonblock)"); ++ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), file)) { ++ start = strstr(line, "wireguard: "); ++ if (!start) ++ continue; ++ start += 11; ++ *strchrnul(start, '\n') = '\0'; ++ if (strstr(start, "www.wireguard.com")) ++ break; ++ pass = strstr(start, ": pass"); ++ if (!pass || pass[6] != '\0') { ++ success = false; ++ printf(" \x1b[31m* %s\x1b[0m\n", start); ++ } else ++ printf(" \x1b[32m* %s\x1b[0m\n", start); ++ } ++ fclose(file); ++ if (!success) { ++ puts("\x1b[31m\x1b[1m[-] Tests failed! \u2639\x1b[0m"); ++ poweroff(); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void launch_tests(void) ++{ ++ char cmdline[4096], *success_dev; ++ int status, fd; ++ pid_t pid; ++ ++ pretty_message("[+] Launching tests..."); ++ pid = fork(); ++ if (pid == -1) ++ panic("fork"); ++ else if (pid == 0) { ++ execl("/init.sh", "init", NULL); ++ panic("exec"); ++ } ++ if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) ++ panic("waitpid"); ++ if (WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) { ++ pretty_message("[+] Tests successful! :-)"); ++ fd = open("/proc/cmdline", O_RDONLY); ++ if (fd < 0) ++ panic("open(/proc/cmdline)"); ++ if (read(fd, cmdline, sizeof(cmdline) - 1) <= 0) ++ panic("read(/proc/cmdline)"); ++ cmdline[sizeof(cmdline) - 1] = '\0'; ++ for (success_dev = strtok(cmdline, " \n"); success_dev; success_dev = strtok(NULL, " \n")) { ++ if (strncmp(success_dev, "wg.success=", 11)) ++ continue; ++ memcpy(success_dev + 11 - 5, "/dev/", 5); ++ success_dev += 11 - 5; ++ break; ++ } ++ if (!success_dev || !strlen(success_dev)) ++ panic("Unable to find success device"); ++ ++ fd = open(success_dev, O_WRONLY); ++ if (fd < 0) ++ panic("open(success_dev)"); ++ if (write(fd, "success\n", 8) != 8) ++ panic("write(success_dev)"); ++ close(fd); ++ } else { ++ const char *why = "unknown cause"; ++ int what = -1; ++ ++ if (WIFEXITED(status)) { ++ why = "exit code"; ++ what = WEXITSTATUS(status); ++ } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { ++ why = "signal"; ++ what = WTERMSIG(status); ++ } ++ printf("\x1b[31m\x1b[1m[-] Tests failed with %s %d! \u2639\x1b[0m\n", why, what); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void ensure_console(void) ++{ ++ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 1000; ++i) { ++ int fd = open("/dev/console", O_RDWR); ++ if (fd < 0) { ++ usleep(50000); ++ continue; ++ } ++ dup2(fd, 0); ++ dup2(fd, 1); ++ dup2(fd, 2); ++ close(fd); ++ if (write(1, "\0\0\0\0\n", 5) == 5) ++ return; ++ } ++ panic("Unable to open console device"); ++} ++ ++static void clear_leaks(void) ++{ ++ int fd; ++ ++ fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak", O_WRONLY); ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return; ++ pretty_message("[+] Starting memory leak detection..."); ++ write(fd, "clear\n", 5); ++ close(fd); ++} ++ ++static void check_leaks(void) ++{ ++ int fd; ++ ++ fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak", O_WRONLY); ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return; ++ pretty_message("[+] Scanning for memory leaks..."); ++ sleep(2); /* Wait for any grace periods. */ ++ write(fd, "scan\n", 5); ++ close(fd); ++ ++ fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak", O_RDONLY); ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return; ++ if (sendfile(1, fd, NULL, 0x7ffff000) > 0) ++ panic("Memory leaks encountered"); ++ close(fd); ++} ++ ++int main(int argc, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ seed_rng(); ++ ensure_console(); ++ print_banner(); ++ mount_filesystems(); ++ kmod_selftests(); ++ enable_logging(); ++ clear_leaks(); ++ launch_tests(); ++ check_leaks(); ++ poweroff(); ++ return 1; ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config +@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ ++CONFIG_LOCALVERSION="" ++CONFIG_NET=y ++CONFIG_NETDEVICES=y ++CONFIG_NET_CORE=y ++CONFIG_NET_IPIP=y ++CONFIG_DUMMY=y ++CONFIG_VETH=y ++CONFIG_MULTIUSER=y ++CONFIG_NAMESPACES=y ++CONFIG_NET_NS=y ++CONFIG_UNIX=y ++CONFIG_INET=y ++CONFIG_IPV6=y ++CONFIG_NETFILTER=y ++CONFIG_NETFILTER_ADVANCED=y ++CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK=y ++CONFIG_NF_NAT=y ++CONFIG_NETFILTER_XTABLES=y ++CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_NAT=y ++CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_LENGTH=y ++CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_IPV4=y ++CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4=y ++CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES=y ++CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER=y ++CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT=y ++CONFIG_IP_ADVANCED_ROUTER=y ++CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y ++CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y ++CONFIG_TTY=y ++CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF=y ++CONFIG_BINFMT_SCRIPT=y ++CONFIG_VDSO=y ++CONFIG_VIRTUALIZATION=y ++CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST=y ++CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y ++CONFIG_KVM_GUEST=y ++CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS=y ++CONFIG_PRINTK=y ++CONFIG_KALLSYMS=y ++CONFIG_BUG=y ++CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y ++CONFIG_EMBEDDED=n ++CONFIG_BASE_FULL=y ++CONFIG_FUTEX=y ++CONFIG_SHMEM=y ++CONFIG_SLUB=y ++CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP=y ++CONFIG_SMP=y ++CONFIG_SCHED_SMT=y ++CONFIG_SCHED_MC=y ++CONFIG_NUMA=y ++CONFIG_PREEMPT=y ++CONFIG_NO_HZ=y ++CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y ++CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n ++CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n ++CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y ++CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y ++CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y ++CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y ++CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y ++CONFIG_PROC_FS=y ++CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL=y ++CONFIG_SYSFS=y ++CONFIG_TMPFS=y ++CONFIG_CONSOLE_LOGLEVEL_DEFAULT=15 ++CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y ++CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=y ++CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE=y ++CONFIG_KERNEL_GZIP=y ++CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y ++CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y ++CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR=y ++CONFIG_SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y ++CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y ++CONFIG_WQ_WATCHDOG=y ++CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y ++CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HARDLOCKUP_PANIC=y ++CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC=y ++CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC=y ++CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT=-1 ++CONFIG_STACKTRACE=y ++CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y ++CONFIG_GDB_SCRIPTS=y ++CONFIG_WIREGUARD=y ++CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG=y diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0076-wireguard-Kconfig-select-parent-dependency-for-crypt.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0076-wireguard-Kconfig-select-parent-dependency-for-crypt.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c2f8f77f53 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0076-wireguard-Kconfig-select-parent-dependency-for-crypt.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: Kconfig: select parent dependency for crypto + +commit d7c68a38bb4f9b7c1a2e4a772872c752ee5c44a6 upstream. + +This fixes the crypto selection submenu depenencies. Otherwise, we'd +wind up issuing warnings in which certain dependencies we also select +couldn't be satisfied. This condition was triggered by the addition of +the test suite autobuilder in the previous commit. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/Kconfig | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/net/Kconfig ++++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig +@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ config WIREGUARD + select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT + select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT + select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86 if X86 && 64BIT ++ select ARM_CRYPTO if ARM ++ select ARM64_CRYPTO if ARM64 + select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if (ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON + select CRYPTO_POLY1305_NEON if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON + select CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM if ARM diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0076-wireguard-global-fix-spelling-mistakes-in-comments.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0076-wireguard-global-fix-spelling-mistakes-in-comments.patch deleted file mode 100644 index da9fd72bac..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0076-wireguard-global-fix-spelling-mistakes-in-comments.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -From 163383e1867a8eb7026d436627bbcd39ecdbd509 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Soref -Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:02 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 076/124] wireguard: global: fix spelling mistakes in comments - -commit a2ec8b5706944d228181c8b91d815f41d6dd8e7b upstream. - -This fixes two spelling errors in source code comments. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Soref -[Jason: rewrote commit message] -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 +- - include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h | 8 ++++---- - 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( - /* We've already verified the Poly1305 auth tag, which means this packet - * was not modified in transit. We can therefore tell the networking - * stack that all checksums of every layer of encapsulation have already -- * been checked "by the hardware" and therefore is unneccessary to check -+ * been checked "by the hardware" and therefore is unnecessary to check - * again in software. - */ - skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; ---- a/include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h -+++ b/include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h -@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ - * one but not both of: - * - * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 -- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1 - * - * The kernel will then return several messages (NLM_F_MULTI) containing the - * following tree of nested items: - * - * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 -- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1 - * WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN - * WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN - * WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT: NLA_U16 -@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ - * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX and WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: - * - * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 -- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 -+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1 - * WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS: NLA_U32, 0 or WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS if all current - * peers should be removed prior to adding the list below. - * WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN, all zeros to remove -@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ - * filling in information not contained in the prior. Note that if - * WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS is specified in the first message, it probably - * should not be specified in fragments that come after, so that the list -- * of peers is only cleared the first time but appened after. Likewise for -+ * of peers is only cleared the first time but appended after. Likewise for - * peers, if WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS is specified in the first message - * of a peer, it likely should not be specified in subsequent fragments. - * diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0077-wireguard-global-fix-spelling-mistakes-in-comments.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0077-wireguard-global-fix-spelling-mistakes-in-comments.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b34e663a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0077-wireguard-global-fix-spelling-mistakes-in-comments.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Soref +Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: global: fix spelling mistakes in comments + +commit a2ec8b5706944d228181c8b91d815f41d6dd8e7b upstream. + +This fixes two spelling errors in source code comments. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Soref +[Jason: rewrote commit message] +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 +- + include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h | 8 ++++---- + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( + /* We've already verified the Poly1305 auth tag, which means this packet + * was not modified in transit. We can therefore tell the networking + * stack that all checksums of every layer of encapsulation have already +- * been checked "by the hardware" and therefore is unneccessary to check ++ * been checked "by the hardware" and therefore is unnecessary to check + * again in software. + */ + skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; +--- a/include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h +@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ + * one but not both of: + * + * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 +- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1 + * + * The kernel will then return several messages (NLM_F_MULTI) containing the + * following tree of nested items: + * + * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 +- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1 + * WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN + * WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN + * WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT: NLA_U16 +@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ + * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX and WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: + * + * WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32 +- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1 ++ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1 + * WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS: NLA_U32, 0 or WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS if all current + * peers should be removed prior to adding the list below. + * WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN, all zeros to remove +@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ + * filling in information not contained in the prior. Note that if + * WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS is specified in the first message, it probably + * should not be specified in fragments that come after, so that the list +- * of peers is only cleared the first time but appened after. Likewise for ++ * of peers is only cleared the first time but appended after. Likewise for + * peers, if WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS is specified in the first message + * of a peer, it likely should not be specified in subsequent fragments. + * diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0077-wireguard-main-remove-unused-include-linux-version.h.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0077-wireguard-main-remove-unused-include-linux-version.h.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9f1070e542..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0077-wireguard-main-remove-unused-include-linux-version.h.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -From 27686282c4b34ad6db44cb3dbf58763e5bb8e96b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: YueHaibing -Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:03 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 077/124] wireguard: main: remove unused include - - -commit 43967b6ff91e53bcce5ae08c16a0588a475b53a1 upstream. - -Remove from the includes for main.c, which is unused. - -Signed-off-by: YueHaibing -[Jason: reworded commit message] -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/main.c | 1 - - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/main.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/main.c -@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ - - #include - --#include - #include - #include - #include diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0078-wireguard-allowedips-use-kfree_rcu-instead-of-call_r.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0078-wireguard-allowedips-use-kfree_rcu-instead-of-call_r.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 82581e9205..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0078-wireguard-allowedips-use-kfree_rcu-instead-of-call_r.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -From 17c33753f9b68288a2e8551b6161ca54f1809d37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Wei Yongjun -Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:04 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 078/124] wireguard: allowedips: use kfree_rcu() instead of - call_rcu() - -commit d89ee7d5c73af15c1c6f12b016cdf469742b5726 upstream. - -The callback function of call_rcu() just calls a kfree(), so we -can use kfree_rcu() instead of call_rcu() + callback function. - -Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 7 +------ - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c -@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ static void copy_and_assign_cidr(struct - #define CHOOSE_NODE(parent, key) \ - parent->bit[(key[parent->bit_at_a] >> parent->bit_at_b) & 1] - --static void node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) --{ -- kfree(container_of(rcu, struct allowedips_node, rcu)); --} -- - static void push_rcu(struct allowedips_node **stack, - struct allowedips_node __rcu *p, unsigned int *len) - { -@@ -112,7 +107,7 @@ static void walk_remove_by_peer(struct a - if (!node->bit[0] || !node->bit[1]) { - rcu_assign_pointer(*nptr, DEREF( - &node->bit[!REF(node->bit[0])])); -- call_rcu(&node->rcu, node_free_rcu); -+ kfree_rcu(node, rcu); - node = DEREF(nptr); - } - } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0078-wireguard-main-remove-unused-include-linux-version.h.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0078-wireguard-main-remove-unused-include-linux-version.h.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3cc0b56c3e --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0078-wireguard-main-remove-unused-include-linux-version.h.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: YueHaibing +Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:03 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: main: remove unused include + +commit 43967b6ff91e53bcce5ae08c16a0588a475b53a1 upstream. + +Remove from the includes for main.c, which is unused. + +Signed-off-by: YueHaibing +[Jason: reworded commit message] +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/main.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/main.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/main.c +@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ + + #include + +-#include + #include + #include + #include diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0079-wireguard-allowedips-use-kfree_rcu-instead-of-call_r.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0079-wireguard-allowedips-use-kfree_rcu-instead-of-call_r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..edd90484dd --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0079-wireguard-allowedips-use-kfree_rcu-instead-of-call_r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Wei Yongjun +Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:04 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: allowedips: use kfree_rcu() instead of call_rcu() + +commit d89ee7d5c73af15c1c6f12b016cdf469742b5726 upstream. + +The callback function of call_rcu() just calls a kfree(), so we +can use kfree_rcu() instead of call_rcu() + callback function. + +Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 7 +------ + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c +@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ static void copy_and_assign_cidr(struct + #define CHOOSE_NODE(parent, key) \ + parent->bit[(key[parent->bit_at_a] >> parent->bit_at_b) & 1] + +-static void node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) +-{ +- kfree(container_of(rcu, struct allowedips_node, rcu)); +-} +- + static void push_rcu(struct allowedips_node **stack, + struct allowedips_node __rcu *p, unsigned int *len) + { +@@ -112,7 +107,7 @@ static void walk_remove_by_peer(struct a + if (!node->bit[0] || !node->bit[1]) { + rcu_assign_pointer(*nptr, DEREF( + &node->bit[!REF(node->bit[0])])); +- call_rcu(&node->rcu, node_free_rcu); ++ kfree_rcu(node, rcu); + node = DEREF(nptr); + } + } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0079-wireguard-selftests-remove-ancient-kernel-compatibil.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0079-wireguard-selftests-remove-ancient-kernel-compatibil.patch deleted file mode 100644 index efc5500290..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0079-wireguard-selftests-remove-ancient-kernel-compatibil.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,373 +0,0 @@ -From df3289cf81503ef299450a67f5bf11e526fdb2d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:49 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 079/124] wireguard: selftests: remove ancient kernel - compatibility code - -commit 9a69a4c8802adf642bc4a13d471b5a86b44ed434 upstream. - -Quite a bit of the test suite was designed to work with ancient kernels. -Thankfully we no longer have to deal with this. This commit updates -things that we can finally update and removes things that we can finally -remove, to avoid the build-up of the last several years as a result of -having to support ancient kernels. We can finally rely on suppress_ -prefixlength being available. On the build side of things, the no-PIE -hack is no longer required, and we can bump some of the tools, repair -our m68k and i686-kvm support, and get better coverage of the static -branches used in the crypto lib and in udp_tunnel. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 11 +-- - .../testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 82 ++++++++++--------- - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config | 2 +- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c | 1 + - .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 2 + - 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ n2() { pretty 2 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netn - ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 "$@"; } - ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; } - ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; } --sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 0 || true; } -+sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; } - waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 5201') != *iperf3* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } - waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } - waitncattcp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for tcp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } -@@ -294,12 +294,9 @@ ip1 -6 rule add table main suppress_pref - ip1 -4 route add default dev wg0 table 51820 - ip1 -4 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820 - ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0 --# suppress_prefixlength only got added in 3.12, and we want to support 3.10+. --if [[ $(ip1 -4 rule show all) == *suppress_prefixlength* ]]; then -- # Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs. -- n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7 -- n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111 --fi -+# Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs. -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7 -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111 - - n0 iptables -t nat -F - ip0 link del vethrc ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile -@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ - PWD := $(shell pwd) - - CHOST := $(shell gcc -dumpmachine) -+HOST_ARCH := $(firstword $(subst -, ,$(CHOST))) - ifneq (,$(ARCH)) - CBUILD := $(subst -gcc,,$(lastword $(subst /, ,$(firstword $(wildcard $(foreach bindir,$(subst :, ,$(PATH)),$(bindir)/$(ARCH)-*-gcc)))))) - ifeq (,$(CBUILD)) -@@ -37,19 +38,19 @@ endef - define file_download = - $(DISTFILES_PATH)/$(1): - mkdir -p $(DISTFILES_PATH) -- flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -t inf --retry-on-http-error=404 -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp' -+ flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp' - if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi - endef - --$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.20,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,44be8771d0e6c6b5f82dd15662eb2957c9a3173a19a8b49966ac0542bbd40d61)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.24,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,1370c9a812b2cf2a7d92802510cca0058cc37e66a7bedd70051f0a34015022a3)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,LIBMNL,libmnl,1.0.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libmnl/files/,171f89699f286a5854b72b91d06e8f8e3683064c5901fb09d954a9ab6f551f81)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.1.7,.tar.gz,http://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,a4ef73406fe92250602b8da2ae89ec53211f805df97a1d1d629db5a14043734f)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.1.0,.tar.gz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,9b43707d6075ecdca14803ca8ce0c8553848c49fa1586d12fd508d66577243f2)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.6.1,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,0fc2d7bd5d7be11311726466789d4c65fb4c8e096c9182b56ce97440864f0cf5)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.60,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,a8796ecc4fa6c38aad6139d9515dc8113023a82e9d787e5a5fb5fa1b05516f21)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20161105,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20161105.tar.gz/#,f813092f03d17294fd23544b129b95cdb87fe19f7970a51908a6b88509acad8a)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,WireGuard,0.0.20191212,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/WireGuard/snapshot/,b0d718380f7a8822b2f12d75e462fa4eafa3a77871002981f367cd4fe2a1b071)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20191226,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,aa8af0fdc9872d369d8c890a84dbc2a2466b55795dccd5b47721b2d97644b04f)) - - KERNEL_BUILD_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/kernel$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),-debug) - rwildcard=$(foreach d,$(wildcard $1*),$(call rwildcard,$d/,$2) $(filter $(subst *,%,$2),$d)) -@@ -59,23 +60,21 @@ export CFLAGS ?= -O3 -pipe - export LDFLAGS ?= - export CPPFLAGS := -I$(BUILD_PATH)/include - --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --host=$(CHOST) --NOPIE_GCC := gcc -fno-PIE - CFLAGS += -march=native - STRIP := strip - else - $(info Cross compilation: building for $(CBUILD) using $(CHOST)) - CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --build=$(CBUILD) --host=$(CHOST) - export CROSS_COMPILE=$(CBUILD)- --NOPIE_GCC := $(CBUILD)-gcc -fno-PIE - STRIP := $(CBUILD)-strip - endif - ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64) - QEMU_ARCH := aarch64 - KERNEL_ARCH := arm64 - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm - else - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt -@@ -85,7 +84,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64_be) - QEMU_ARCH := aarch64 - KERNEL_ARCH := arm64 - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm - else - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt -@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),arm) - QEMU_ARCH := arm - KERNEL_ARCH := arm - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm - else - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt -@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),armeb) - QEMU_ARCH := arm - KERNEL_ARCH := arm - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm - else - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt -@@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64) - QEMU_ARCH := x86_64 - KERNEL_ARCH := x86_64 - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm - else - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu Skylake-Server -machine q35 -@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),i686) - QEMU_ARCH := i386 - KERNEL_ARCH := x86 - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage --ifeq ($(subst i686,x86_64,$(CBUILD)),$(CHOST)) -+ifeq ($(subst x86_64,i686,$(HOST_ARCH)),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm - else - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu coreduo -machine q35 -@@ -136,7 +135,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64) - QEMU_ARCH := mips64 - KERNEL_ARCH := mips - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm - CFLAGS += -EB - else -@@ -147,7 +146,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64el) - QEMU_ARCH := mips64el - KERNEL_ARCH := mips - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm - CFLAGS += -EL - else -@@ -158,7 +157,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips) - QEMU_ARCH := mips - KERNEL_ARCH := mips - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm - CFLAGS += -EB - else -@@ -169,7 +168,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mipsel) - QEMU_ARCH := mipsel - KERNEL_ARCH := mips - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm - CFLAGS += -EL - else -@@ -180,7 +179,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc64le) - QEMU_ARCH := ppc64 - KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine pseries - else - QEMU_MACHINE := -machine pseries -@@ -190,7 +189,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc) - QEMU_ARCH := ppc - KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/powerpc/boot/uImage --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) - QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine ppce500 - else - QEMU_MACHINE := -machine ppce500 -@@ -200,10 +199,11 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),m68k) - QEMU_ARCH := m68k - KERNEL_ARCH := m68k - KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux --ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) --QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine q800 -+KERNEL_CMDLINE := $(shell sed -n 's/CONFIG_CMDLINE=\(.*\)/\1/p' arch/m68k.config) -+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) -+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine q800 -smp 1 -append $(KERNEL_CMDLINE) - else --QEMU_MACHINE := -machine q800 -+QEMU_MACHINE := -machine q800 -smp 1 -append $(KERNEL_CMDLINE) - endif - else - $(error I only build: x86_64, i686, arm, armeb, aarch64, aarch64_be, mips, mipsel, mips64, mips64el, powerpc64le, powerpc, m68k) -@@ -238,14 +238,14 @@ $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt: - echo "nod /dev/console 644 0 0 c 5 1" >> $@ - echo "dir /bin 755 0 0" >> $@ - echo "file /bin/iperf3 $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 755 0 0" >> $@ -- echo "file /bin/wg $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/wg $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg 755 0 0" >> $@ - echo "file /bin/bash $(BASH_PATH)/bash 755 0 0" >> $@ - echo "file /bin/ip $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip 755 0 0" >> $@ - echo "file /bin/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss 755 0 0" >> $@ - echo "file /bin/ping $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping 755 0 0" >> $@ - echo "file /bin/ncat $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat 755 0 0" >> $@ -- echo "file /bin/xtables-multi $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi 755 0 0" >> $@ -- echo "slink /bin/iptables xtables-multi 777 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "file /bin/xtables-legacy-multi $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi 755 0 0" >> $@ -+ echo "slink /bin/iptables xtables-legacy-multi 777 0 0" >> $@ - echo "slink /bin/ping6 ping 777 0 0" >> $@ - echo "dir /lib 755 0 0" >> $@ - echo "file /lib/libc.so $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so 755 0 0" >> $@ -@@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config: kernel.con - cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config - $(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),cp debug.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config debug.config,) - --$(KERNEL_BZIMAGE): $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping $(BASH_PATH)/bash $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg $(BUILD_PATH)/init ../netns.sh $(WIREGUARD_SOURCES) -- $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" -+$(KERNEL_BZIMAGE): $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping $(BASH_PATH)/bash $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg $(BUILD_PATH)/init ../netns.sh $(WIREGUARD_SOURCES) -+ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) - - $(BUILD_PATH)/include/linux/.installed: | $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config - $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) INSTALL_HDR_PATH=$(BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) headers_install -@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ $(BUILD_PATH)/include/.installed: $(MUSL - - $(MUSL_CC): $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so - sh $(MUSL_PATH)/tools/musl-gcc.specs.sh $(BUILD_PATH)/include $(MUSL_PATH)/lib /lib/ld-linux.so.1 > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs -- printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "$(REAL_CC)" --specs="$(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs" -fno-stack-protector -no-pie "$$@"\n' > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc -+ printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "$(REAL_CC)" --specs="$(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs" "$$@"\n' > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc - chmod +x $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc - - $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed: $(IPERF_TAR) -@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed: $(IPERF_TAR) - touch $@ - - $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3: | $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- cd $(IPERF_PATH) && CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared -+ cd $(IPERF_PATH) && CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --with-openssl=no - $(MAKE) -C $(IPERF_PATH) - $(STRIP) -s $@ - -@@ -308,8 +308,8 @@ $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed: $(WI - flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< - touch $@ - --$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg -+$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg - $(STRIP) -s $@ - - $(BUILD_PATH)/init: init.c | $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -@@ -323,7 +323,8 @@ $(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed: $(IPUTILS_TA - touch $@ - - $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping: | $(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- $(MAKE) -C $(IPUTILS_PATH) USE_CAP=no USE_IDN=no USE_NETTLE=no USE_CRYPTO=no ping -+ sed -i /atexit/d $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping.c -+ cd $(IPUTILS_PATH) && $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -std=c99 -o $@ ping.c ping_common.c ping6_common.c iputils_common.c -D_GNU_SOURCE -D'IPUTILS_VERSION(f)=f' -lresolv $(LDFLAGS) - $(STRIP) -s $@ - - $(BASH_PATH)/.installed: $(BASH_TAR) -@@ -357,7 +358,7 @@ $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_ - sed -i -e "/nfnetlink=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" -e "/nfconntrack=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" $(IPTABLES_PATH)/configure - touch $@ - --$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) - cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include - $(MAKE) -C $(IPTABLES_PATH) - $(STRIP) -s $@ -@@ -368,8 +369,9 @@ $(NMAP_PATH)/.installed: $(NMAP_TAR) - touch $@ - - $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat: | $(NMAP_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- cd $(NMAP_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --without-ndiff --without-zenmap --without-nping --with-libpcap=included --with-libpcre=included --with-libdnet=included --without-liblua --with-liblinear=included --without-nmap-update --without-openssl --with-pcap=linux -- $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH) build-ncat -+ cd $(NMAP_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --without-ndiff --without-zenmap --without-nping --with-libpcap=included --with-libpcre=included --with-libdnet=included --without-liblua --with-liblinear=included --without-nmap-update --without-openssl --with-pcap=linux --without-libssh -+ $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH)/libpcap -+ $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat - $(STRIP) -s $@ - - clean: -@@ -379,7 +381,7 @@ distclean: clean - rm -rf $(DISTFILES_PATH) - - menuconfig: $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config -- $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" menuconfig -+ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) menuconfig - - .PHONY: qemu build clean distclean menuconfig - .DELETE_ON_ERROR: ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config -@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ - CONFIG_MMU=y -+CONFIG_M68KCLASSIC=y - CONFIG_M68040=y - CONFIG_MAC=y - CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG=y - CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_TTYS=y - CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_CONSOLE=y --CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y - CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" - CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c -@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - #include - #include - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config -@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ CONFIG_PRINTK=y - CONFIG_KALLSYMS=y - CONFIG_BUG=y - CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y -+CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL=y - CONFIG_EMBEDDED=n - CONFIG_BASE_FULL=y - CONFIG_FUTEX=y -@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y - CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n - CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n - CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y -+CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME=y - CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y - CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y - CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0080-wireguard-queueing-do-not-account-for-pfmemalloc-whe.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0080-wireguard-queueing-do-not-account-for-pfmemalloc-whe.patch deleted file mode 100644 index edbca28d21..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0080-wireguard-queueing-do-not-account-for-pfmemalloc-whe.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -From 2b7c5a4a57e1f5cc37877f838293173994e028c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:50 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 080/124] wireguard: queueing: do not account for pfmemalloc - when clearing skb header - -commit 04d2ea92a18417619182cbb79063f154892b0150 upstream. - -Before 8b7008620b84 ("net: Don't copy pfmemalloc flag in __copy_skb_ -header()"), the pfmemalloc flag used to be between headers_start and -headers_end, which is a region we clear when preparing the packet for -encryption/decryption. This is a parameter we certainly want to -preserve, which is why 8b7008620b84 moved it out of there. The code here -was written in a world before 8b7008620b84, though, where we had to -manually account for it. This commit brings things up to speed. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 3 --- - 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -@@ -83,13 +83,10 @@ static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untr - - static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb) - { -- const int pfmemalloc = skb->pfmemalloc; -- - skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); - memset(&skb->headers_start, 0, - offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) - - offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start)); -- skb->pfmemalloc = pfmemalloc; - skb->queue_mapping = 0; - skb->nohdr = 0; - skb->peeked = 0; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0080-wireguard-selftests-remove-ancient-kernel-compatibil.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0080-wireguard-selftests-remove-ancient-kernel-compatibil.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ff0dd9d10 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0080-wireguard-selftests-remove-ancient-kernel-compatibil.patch @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:49 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: remove ancient kernel compatibility + code + +commit 9a69a4c8802adf642bc4a13d471b5a86b44ed434 upstream. + +Quite a bit of the test suite was designed to work with ancient kernels. +Thankfully we no longer have to deal with this. This commit updates +things that we can finally update and removes things that we can finally +remove, to avoid the build-up of the last several years as a result of +having to support ancient kernels. We can finally rely on suppress_ +prefixlength being available. On the build side of things, the no-PIE +hack is no longer required, and we can bump some of the tools, repair +our m68k and i686-kvm support, and get better coverage of the static +branches used in the crypto lib and in udp_tunnel. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 11 +-- + .../testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 82 ++++++++++--------- + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config | 2 +- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c | 1 + + .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 2 + + 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ n2() { pretty 2 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netn + ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 "$@"; } + ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; } + ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; } +-sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 0 || true; } ++sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; } + waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 5201') != *iperf3* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } + waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } + waitncattcp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for tcp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } +@@ -294,12 +294,9 @@ ip1 -6 rule add table main suppress_pref + ip1 -4 route add default dev wg0 table 51820 + ip1 -4 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820 + ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0 +-# suppress_prefixlength only got added in 3.12, and we want to support 3.10+. +-if [[ $(ip1 -4 rule show all) == *suppress_prefixlength* ]]; then +- # Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs. +- n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7 +- n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111 +-fi ++# Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs. ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7 ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111 + + n0 iptables -t nat -F + ip0 link del vethrc +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile +@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ + PWD := $(shell pwd) + + CHOST := $(shell gcc -dumpmachine) ++HOST_ARCH := $(firstword $(subst -, ,$(CHOST))) + ifneq (,$(ARCH)) + CBUILD := $(subst -gcc,,$(lastword $(subst /, ,$(firstword $(wildcard $(foreach bindir,$(subst :, ,$(PATH)),$(bindir)/$(ARCH)-*-gcc)))))) + ifeq (,$(CBUILD)) +@@ -37,19 +38,19 @@ endef + define file_download = + $(DISTFILES_PATH)/$(1): + mkdir -p $(DISTFILES_PATH) +- flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -t inf --retry-on-http-error=404 -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp' ++ flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp' + if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi + endef + +-$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.20,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,44be8771d0e6c6b5f82dd15662eb2957c9a3173a19a8b49966ac0542bbd40d61)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.24,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,1370c9a812b2cf2a7d92802510cca0058cc37e66a7bedd70051f0a34015022a3)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,LIBMNL,libmnl,1.0.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libmnl/files/,171f89699f286a5854b72b91d06e8f8e3683064c5901fb09d954a9ab6f551f81)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.1.7,.tar.gz,http://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,a4ef73406fe92250602b8da2ae89ec53211f805df97a1d1d629db5a14043734f)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.1.0,.tar.gz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,9b43707d6075ecdca14803ca8ce0c8553848c49fa1586d12fd508d66577243f2)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.6.1,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,0fc2d7bd5d7be11311726466789d4c65fb4c8e096c9182b56ce97440864f0cf5)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.60,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,a8796ecc4fa6c38aad6139d9515dc8113023a82e9d787e5a5fb5fa1b05516f21)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20161105,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20161105.tar.gz/#,f813092f03d17294fd23544b129b95cdb87fe19f7970a51908a6b88509acad8a)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,WireGuard,0.0.20191212,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/WireGuard/snapshot/,b0d718380f7a8822b2f12d75e462fa4eafa3a77871002981f367cd4fe2a1b071)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20191226,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,aa8af0fdc9872d369d8c890a84dbc2a2466b55795dccd5b47721b2d97644b04f)) + + KERNEL_BUILD_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/kernel$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),-debug) + rwildcard=$(foreach d,$(wildcard $1*),$(call rwildcard,$d/,$2) $(filter $(subst *,%,$2),$d)) +@@ -59,23 +60,21 @@ export CFLAGS ?= -O3 -pipe + export LDFLAGS ?= + export CPPFLAGS := -I$(BUILD_PATH)/include + +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --host=$(CHOST) +-NOPIE_GCC := gcc -fno-PIE + CFLAGS += -march=native + STRIP := strip + else + $(info Cross compilation: building for $(CBUILD) using $(CHOST)) + CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --build=$(CBUILD) --host=$(CHOST) + export CROSS_COMPILE=$(CBUILD)- +-NOPIE_GCC := $(CBUILD)-gcc -fno-PIE + STRIP := $(CBUILD)-strip + endif + ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64) + QEMU_ARCH := aarch64 + KERNEL_ARCH := arm64 + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm + else + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt +@@ -85,7 +84,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64_be) + QEMU_ARCH := aarch64 + KERNEL_ARCH := arm64 + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm + else + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt +@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),arm) + QEMU_ARCH := arm + KERNEL_ARCH := arm + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm + else + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt +@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),armeb) + QEMU_ARCH := arm + KERNEL_ARCH := arm + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm + else + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt +@@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64) + QEMU_ARCH := x86_64 + KERNEL_ARCH := x86_64 + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm + else + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu Skylake-Server -machine q35 +@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),i686) + QEMU_ARCH := i386 + KERNEL_ARCH := x86 + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage +-ifeq ($(subst i686,x86_64,$(CBUILD)),$(CHOST)) ++ifeq ($(subst x86_64,i686,$(HOST_ARCH)),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm + else + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu coreduo -machine q35 +@@ -136,7 +135,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64) + QEMU_ARCH := mips64 + KERNEL_ARCH := mips + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm + CFLAGS += -EB + else +@@ -147,7 +146,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64el) + QEMU_ARCH := mips64el + KERNEL_ARCH := mips + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm + CFLAGS += -EL + else +@@ -158,7 +157,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips) + QEMU_ARCH := mips + KERNEL_ARCH := mips + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm + CFLAGS += -EB + else +@@ -169,7 +168,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mipsel) + QEMU_ARCH := mipsel + KERNEL_ARCH := mips + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm + CFLAGS += -EL + else +@@ -180,7 +179,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc64le) + QEMU_ARCH := ppc64 + KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine pseries + else + QEMU_MACHINE := -machine pseries +@@ -190,7 +189,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc) + QEMU_ARCH := ppc + KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/powerpc/boot/uImage +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) + QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine ppce500 + else + QEMU_MACHINE := -machine ppce500 +@@ -200,10 +199,11 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),m68k) + QEMU_ARCH := m68k + KERNEL_ARCH := m68k + KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux +-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD)) +-QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine q800 ++KERNEL_CMDLINE := $(shell sed -n 's/CONFIG_CMDLINE=\(.*\)/\1/p' arch/m68k.config) ++ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) ++QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine q800 -smp 1 -append $(KERNEL_CMDLINE) + else +-QEMU_MACHINE := -machine q800 ++QEMU_MACHINE := -machine q800 -smp 1 -append $(KERNEL_CMDLINE) + endif + else + $(error I only build: x86_64, i686, arm, armeb, aarch64, aarch64_be, mips, mipsel, mips64, mips64el, powerpc64le, powerpc, m68k) +@@ -238,14 +238,14 @@ $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt: + echo "nod /dev/console 644 0 0 c 5 1" >> $@ + echo "dir /bin 755 0 0" >> $@ + echo "file /bin/iperf3 $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 755 0 0" >> $@ +- echo "file /bin/wg $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/wg $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg 755 0 0" >> $@ + echo "file /bin/bash $(BASH_PATH)/bash 755 0 0" >> $@ + echo "file /bin/ip $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip 755 0 0" >> $@ + echo "file /bin/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss 755 0 0" >> $@ + echo "file /bin/ping $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping 755 0 0" >> $@ + echo "file /bin/ncat $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat 755 0 0" >> $@ +- echo "file /bin/xtables-multi $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi 755 0 0" >> $@ +- echo "slink /bin/iptables xtables-multi 777 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "file /bin/xtables-legacy-multi $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi 755 0 0" >> $@ ++ echo "slink /bin/iptables xtables-legacy-multi 777 0 0" >> $@ + echo "slink /bin/ping6 ping 777 0 0" >> $@ + echo "dir /lib 755 0 0" >> $@ + echo "file /lib/libc.so $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so 755 0 0" >> $@ +@@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config: kernel.con + cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config + $(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),cp debug.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config debug.config,) + +-$(KERNEL_BZIMAGE): $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping $(BASH_PATH)/bash $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg $(BUILD_PATH)/init ../netns.sh $(WIREGUARD_SOURCES) +- $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" ++$(KERNEL_BZIMAGE): $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping $(BASH_PATH)/bash $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg $(BUILD_PATH)/init ../netns.sh $(WIREGUARD_SOURCES) ++ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) + + $(BUILD_PATH)/include/linux/.installed: | $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config + $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) INSTALL_HDR_PATH=$(BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) headers_install +@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ $(BUILD_PATH)/include/.installed: $(MUSL + + $(MUSL_CC): $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so + sh $(MUSL_PATH)/tools/musl-gcc.specs.sh $(BUILD_PATH)/include $(MUSL_PATH)/lib /lib/ld-linux.so.1 > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs +- printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "$(REAL_CC)" --specs="$(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs" -fno-stack-protector -no-pie "$$@"\n' > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc ++ printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "$(REAL_CC)" --specs="$(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs" "$$@"\n' > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc + chmod +x $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc + + $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed: $(IPERF_TAR) +@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed: $(IPERF_TAR) + touch $@ + + $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3: | $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- cd $(IPERF_PATH) && CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared ++ cd $(IPERF_PATH) && CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --with-openssl=no + $(MAKE) -C $(IPERF_PATH) + $(STRIP) -s $@ + +@@ -308,8 +308,8 @@ $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed: $(WI + flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< + touch $@ + +-$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg ++$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg + $(STRIP) -s $@ + + $(BUILD_PATH)/init: init.c | $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +@@ -323,7 +323,8 @@ $(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed: $(IPUTILS_TA + touch $@ + + $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping: | $(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- $(MAKE) -C $(IPUTILS_PATH) USE_CAP=no USE_IDN=no USE_NETTLE=no USE_CRYPTO=no ping ++ sed -i /atexit/d $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping.c ++ cd $(IPUTILS_PATH) && $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -std=c99 -o $@ ping.c ping_common.c ping6_common.c iputils_common.c -D_GNU_SOURCE -D'IPUTILS_VERSION(f)=f' -lresolv $(LDFLAGS) + $(STRIP) -s $@ + + $(BASH_PATH)/.installed: $(BASH_TAR) +@@ -357,7 +358,7 @@ $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_ + sed -i -e "/nfnetlink=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" -e "/nfconntrack=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" $(IPTABLES_PATH)/configure + touch $@ + +-$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) + cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include + $(MAKE) -C $(IPTABLES_PATH) + $(STRIP) -s $@ +@@ -368,8 +369,9 @@ $(NMAP_PATH)/.installed: $(NMAP_TAR) + touch $@ + + $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat: | $(NMAP_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- cd $(NMAP_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --without-ndiff --without-zenmap --without-nping --with-libpcap=included --with-libpcre=included --with-libdnet=included --without-liblua --with-liblinear=included --without-nmap-update --without-openssl --with-pcap=linux +- $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH) build-ncat ++ cd $(NMAP_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --without-ndiff --without-zenmap --without-nping --with-libpcap=included --with-libpcre=included --with-libdnet=included --without-liblua --with-liblinear=included --without-nmap-update --without-openssl --with-pcap=linux --without-libssh ++ $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH)/libpcap ++ $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat + $(STRIP) -s $@ + + clean: +@@ -379,7 +381,7 @@ distclean: clean + rm -rf $(DISTFILES_PATH) + + menuconfig: $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config +- $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" menuconfig ++ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) menuconfig + + .PHONY: qemu build clean distclean menuconfig + .DELETE_ON_ERROR: +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config +@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ + CONFIG_MMU=y ++CONFIG_M68KCLASSIC=y + CONFIG_M68040=y + CONFIG_MAC=y + CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG=y + CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_TTYS=y + CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_CONSOLE=y +-CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y + CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1" + CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config +@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ CONFIG_PRINTK=y + CONFIG_KALLSYMS=y + CONFIG_BUG=y + CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y ++CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL=y + CONFIG_EMBEDDED=n + CONFIG_BASE_FULL=y + CONFIG_FUTEX=y +@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y + CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n + CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n + CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y ++CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME=y + CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y + CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y + CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0081-wireguard-queueing-do-not-account-for-pfmemalloc-whe.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0081-wireguard-queueing-do-not-account-for-pfmemalloc-whe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fb03b1b1a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0081-wireguard-queueing-do-not-account-for-pfmemalloc-whe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:50 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: do not account for pfmemalloc when + clearing skb header + +commit 04d2ea92a18417619182cbb79063f154892b0150 upstream. + +Before 8b7008620b84 ("net: Don't copy pfmemalloc flag in __copy_skb_ +header()"), the pfmemalloc flag used to be between headers_start and +headers_end, which is a region we clear when preparing the packet for +encryption/decryption. This is a parameter we certainly want to +preserve, which is why 8b7008620b84 moved it out of there. The code here +was written in a world before 8b7008620b84, though, where we had to +manually account for it. This commit brings things up to speed. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 3 --- + 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h +@@ -83,13 +83,10 @@ static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untr + + static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb) + { +- const int pfmemalloc = skb->pfmemalloc; +- + skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); + memset(&skb->headers_start, 0, + offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) - + offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start)); +- skb->pfmemalloc = pfmemalloc; + skb->queue_mapping = 0; + skb->nohdr = 0; + skb->peeked = 0; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0081-wireguard-socket-mark-skbs-as-not-on-list-when-recei.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0081-wireguard-socket-mark-skbs-as-not-on-list-when-recei.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a3472462ec..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0081-wireguard-socket-mark-skbs-as-not-on-list-when-recei.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -From 6d8e17ad1b4b019c61403a88377e731491de409c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:51 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 081/124] wireguard: socket: mark skbs as not on list when - receiving via gro - -commit 736775d06bac60d7a353e405398b48b2bd8b1e54 upstream. - -Certain drivers will pass gro skbs to udp, at which point the udp driver -simply iterates through them and passes them off to encap_rcv, which is -where we pick up. At the moment, we're not attempting to coalesce these -into bundles, but we also don't want to wind up having cascaded lists of -skbs treated separately. The right behavior here, then, is to just mark -each incoming one as not on a list. This can be seen in practice, for -example, with Qualcomm's rmnet_perf driver. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Tested-by: Yaroslav Furman -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static int wg_receive(struct sock *sk, s - wg = sk->sk_user_data; - if (unlikely(!wg)) - goto err; -+ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); - wg_packet_receive(wg, skb); - return 0; - diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0082-wireguard-allowedips-fix-use-after-free-in-root_remo.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0082-wireguard-allowedips-fix-use-after-free-in-root_remo.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f0275396d5..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0082-wireguard-allowedips-fix-use-after-free-in-root_remo.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@ -From 13696b0d3219c3ca9ff4ce6a580c53fab6284312 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Eric Dumazet -Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:25 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 082/124] wireguard: allowedips: fix use-after-free in - root_remove_peer_lists - -commit 9981159fc3b677b357f84e069a11de5a5ec8a2a8 upstream. - -In the unlikely case a new node could not be allocated, we need to -remove @newnode from @peer->allowedips_list before freeing it. - -syzbot reported: - -BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54 -Read of size 8 at addr ffff88809881a538 by task syz-executor.4/30133 - -CPU: 0 PID: 30133 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0 -Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 -Call Trace: - __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] - dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 - print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 - __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 - kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639 - __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135 - __list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54 - __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:132 [inline] - list_del include/linux/list.h:146 [inline] - root_remove_peer_lists+0x24f/0x4b0 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:65 - wg_allowedips_free+0x232/0x390 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:300 - wg_peer_remove_all+0xd5/0x620 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c:187 - wg_set_device+0xd01/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:542 - genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline] - genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline] - genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 - netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 - genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745 - netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] - netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 - netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 - sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] - sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 - ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 - ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 - __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 - __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] - __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] - __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 - do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 - entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -RIP: 0033:0x45b399 -Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 -RSP: 002b:00007f99a9bcdc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e -RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f99a9bce6d4 RCX: 000000000045b399 -RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001340 RDI: 0000000000000003 -RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 -R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 -R13: 00000000000009ba R14: 00000000004cb2b8 R15: 0000000000000009 - -Allocated by task 30103: - save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 - set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] - __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline] - __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486 - kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:527 - kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x790 mm/slab.c:3551 - kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline] - kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:670 [inline] - add+0x70a/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:236 - wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320 - set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline] - set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468 - wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591 - genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline] - genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline] - genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 - netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 - genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745 - netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] - netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 - netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 - sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] - sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 - ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 - ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 - __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 - __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] - __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] - __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 - do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 - entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe - -Freed by task 30103: - save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 - set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] - kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline] - __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474 - kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483 - __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] - kfree+0x10a/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3757 - add+0x12d2/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:266 - wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320 - set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline] - set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468 - wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591 - genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline] - genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline] - genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 - netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 - genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745 - netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] - netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 - netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 - sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] - sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 - ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 - ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 - __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 - __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] - __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] - __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 - do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 - entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe - -The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809881a500 - which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 -The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of - 64-byte region [ffff88809881a500, ffff88809881a540) -The buggy address belongs to the page: -page:ffffea0002620680 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400380 index:0x0 -raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea000250b748 ffffea000254bac8 ffff8880aa400380 -raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88809881a000 0000000100000020 0000000000000000 -page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected - -Memory state around the buggy address: - ffff88809881a400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc - ffff88809881a480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ->ffff88809881a500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc - ^ - ffff88809881a580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc - ffff88809881a600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc - -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet -Reported-by: syzbot -Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld -Cc: wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c -@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ static int add(struct allowedips_node __ - } else { - node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL); - if (unlikely(!node)) { -+ list_del(&newnode->peer_list); - kfree(newnode); - return -ENOMEM; - } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0082-wireguard-socket-mark-skbs-as-not-on-list-when-recei.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0082-wireguard-socket-mark-skbs-as-not-on-list-when-recei.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..779491c8db --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0082-wireguard-socket-mark-skbs-as-not-on-list-when-recei.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: socket: mark skbs as not on list when receiving + via gro + +commit 736775d06bac60d7a353e405398b48b2bd8b1e54 upstream. + +Certain drivers will pass gro skbs to udp, at which point the udp driver +simply iterates through them and passes them off to encap_rcv, which is +where we pick up. At the moment, we're not attempting to coalesce these +into bundles, but we also don't want to wind up having cascaded lists of +skbs treated separately. The right behavior here, then, is to just mark +each incoming one as not on a list. This can be seen in practice, for +example, with Qualcomm's rmnet_perf driver. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Tested-by: Yaroslav Furman +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c +@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static int wg_receive(struct sock *sk, s + wg = sk->sk_user_data; + if (unlikely(!wg)) + goto err; ++ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); + wg_packet_receive(wg, skb); + return 0; + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0083-wireguard-allowedips-fix-use-after-free-in-root_remo.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0083-wireguard-allowedips-fix-use-after-free-in-root_remo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e77ab5834a --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0083-wireguard-allowedips-fix-use-after-free-in-root_remo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: allowedips: fix use-after-free in + root_remove_peer_lists + +commit 9981159fc3b677b357f84e069a11de5a5ec8a2a8 upstream. + +In the unlikely case a new node could not be allocated, we need to +remove @newnode from @peer->allowedips_list before freeing it. + +syzbot reported: + +BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54 +Read of size 8 at addr ffff88809881a538 by task syz-executor.4/30133 + +CPU: 0 PID: 30133 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0 +Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 +Call Trace: + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] + dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 + print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 + __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 + kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639 + __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135 + __list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54 + __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:132 [inline] + list_del include/linux/list.h:146 [inline] + root_remove_peer_lists+0x24f/0x4b0 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:65 + wg_allowedips_free+0x232/0x390 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:300 + wg_peer_remove_all+0xd5/0x620 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c:187 + wg_set_device+0xd01/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:542 + genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline] + genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline] + genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 + netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 + genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745 + netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] + netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 + netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 + sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] + sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 + ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 + ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 + __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 + __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] + __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] + __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 + do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe +RIP: 0033:0x45b399 +Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 +RSP: 002b:00007f99a9bcdc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e +RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f99a9bce6d4 RCX: 000000000045b399 +RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001340 RDI: 0000000000000003 +RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 +R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 +R13: 00000000000009ba R14: 00000000004cb2b8 R15: 0000000000000009 + +Allocated by task 30103: + save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 + set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] + __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline] + __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486 + kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:527 + kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x790 mm/slab.c:3551 + kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline] + kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:670 [inline] + add+0x70a/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:236 + wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320 + set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline] + set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468 + wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591 + genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline] + genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline] + genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 + netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 + genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745 + netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] + netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 + netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 + sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] + sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 + ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 + ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 + __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 + __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] + __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] + __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 + do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe + +Freed by task 30103: + save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 + set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] + kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline] + __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474 + kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483 + __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] + kfree+0x10a/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3757 + add+0x12d2/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:266 + wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320 + set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline] + set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468 + wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591 + genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline] + genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline] + genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 + netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 + genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745 + netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] + netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 + netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 + sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] + sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 + ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 + ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 + __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 + __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] + __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] + __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 + do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe + +The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809881a500 + which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 +The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of + 64-byte region [ffff88809881a500, ffff88809881a540) +The buggy address belongs to the page: +page:ffffea0002620680 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400380 index:0x0 +raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea000250b748 ffffea000254bac8 ffff8880aa400380 +raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88809881a000 0000000100000020 0000000000000000 +page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected + +Memory state around the buggy address: + ffff88809881a400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc + ffff88809881a480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc +>ffff88809881a500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc + ^ + ffff88809881a580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc + ffff88809881a600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc + +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: syzbot +Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld +Cc: wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c +@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ static int add(struct allowedips_node __ + } else { + node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!node)) { ++ list_del(&newnode->peer_list); + kfree(newnode); + return -ENOMEM; + } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0083-wireguard-noise-reject-peers-with-low-order-public-k.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0083-wireguard-noise-reject-peers-with-low-order-public-k.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 113678d212..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0083-wireguard-noise-reject-peers-with-low-order-public-k.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,234 +0,0 @@ -From 1da05ad0bbc51cd226a2297e66b3cc8499803306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:26 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 083/124] wireguard: noise: reject peers with low order public - keys - -commit ec31c2676a10e064878927b243fada8c2fb0c03c upstream. - -Our static-static calculation returns a failure if the public key is of -low order. We check for this when peers are added, and don't allow them -to be added if they're low order, except in the case where we haven't -yet been given a private key. In that case, we would defer the removal -of the peer until we're given a private key, since at that point we're -doing new static-static calculations which incur failures we can act on. -This meant, however, that we wound up removing peers rather late in the -configuration flow. - -Syzkaller points out that peer_remove calls flush_workqueue, which in -turn might then wait for sending a handshake initiation to complete. -Since handshake initiation needs the static identity lock, holding the -static identity lock while calling peer_remove can result in a rare -deadlock. We have precisely this case in this situation of late-stage -peer removal based on an invalid public key. We can't drop the lock when -removing, because then incoming handshakes might interact with a bogus -static-static calculation. - -While the band-aid patch for this would involve breaking up the peer -removal into two steps like wg_peer_remove_all does, in order to solve -the locking issue, there's actually a much more elegant way of fixing -this: - -If the static-static calculation succeeds with one private key, it -*must* succeed with all others, because all 32-byte strings map to valid -private keys, thanks to clamping. That means we can get rid of this -silly dance and locking headaches of removing peers late in the -configuration flow, and instead just reject them early on, regardless of -whether the device has yet been assigned a private key. For the case -where the device doesn't yet have a private key, we safely use zeros -just for the purposes of checking for low order points by way of -checking the output of the calculation. - -The following PoC will trigger the deadlock: - -ip link add wg0 type wireguard -ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev wg0 -ip link set wg0 up -ping -f 10.0.0.2 & -while true; do - wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null peer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= allowed-ips 10.0.0.0/24 endpoint 10.0.0.3:1234 - wg set wg0 private-key <(echo AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=) -done - -[ 0.949105] ====================================================== -[ 0.949550] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected -[ 0.950143] 5.5.0-debug+ #18 Not tainted -[ 0.950431] ------------------------------------------------------ -[ 0.950959] wg/89 is trying to acquire lock: -[ 0.951252] ffff8880333e2128 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0 -[ 0.951865] -[ 0.951865] but task is already holding lock: -[ 0.952280] ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0 -[ 0.953011] -[ 0.953011] which lock already depends on the new lock. -[ 0.953011] -[ 0.953651] -[ 0.953651] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -[ 0.954292] -[ 0.954292] -> #2 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}: -[ 0.954804] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 -[ 0.955133] down_read+0x83/0x410 -[ 0.955428] wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation+0x97/0x700 -[ 0.955885] wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x13a/0x280 -[ 0.956401] wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x10/0x20 -[ 0.956841] process_one_work+0x806/0x1500 -[ 0.957167] worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0 -[ 0.957549] kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0 -[ 0.957792] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 -[ 0.958234] -[ 0.958234] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work)){+.+.}: -[ 0.958808] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 -[ 0.959075] process_one_work+0x7ab/0x1500 -[ 0.959369] worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0 -[ 0.959639] kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0 -[ 0.959896] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 -[ 0.960346] -[ 0.960346] -> #0 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}: -[ 0.960945] check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20 -[ 0.961351] __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170 -[ 0.961725] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 -[ 0.961990] flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0 -[ 0.962280] peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220 -[ 0.962600] wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0 -[ 0.962994] genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90 -[ 0.963298] netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320 -[ 0.963618] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 -[ 0.963853] netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610 -[ 0.964245] netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80 -[ 0.964586] __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0 -[ 0.964854] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0 -[ 0.965141] do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a -[ 0.965408] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -[ 0.965769] -[ 0.965769] other info that might help us debug this: -[ 0.965769] -[ 0.966337] Chain exists of: -[ 0.966337] (wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0 --> (work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work) --> &wg->static_identity.lock -[ 0.966337] -[ 0.967417] Possible unsafe locking scenario: -[ 0.967417] -[ 0.967836] CPU0 CPU1 -[ 0.968155] ---- ---- -[ 0.968497] lock(&wg->static_identity.lock); -[ 0.968779] lock((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work)); -[ 0.969345] lock(&wg->static_identity.lock); -[ 0.969809] lock((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0); -[ 0.970146] -[ 0.970146] *** DEADLOCK *** -[ 0.970146] -[ 0.970531] 5 locks held by wg/89: -[ 0.970908] #0: ffffffff827433c8 (cb_lock){++++}, at: genl_rcv+0x10/0x30 -[ 0.971400] #1: ffffffff82743480 (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x642/0xe90 -[ 0.971924] #2: ffffffff827160c0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0x9f/0xcc0 -[ 0.972488] #3: ffff888032819de0 (&wg->device_update_lock){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0xb0/0xcc0 -[ 0.973095] #4: ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0 -[ 0.973653] -[ 0.973653] stack backtrace: -[ 0.973932] CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: wg Not tainted 5.5.0-debug+ #18 -[ 0.974476] Call Trace: -[ 0.974638] dump_stack+0x97/0xe0 -[ 0.974869] check_noncircular+0x312/0x3e0 -[ 0.975132] ? print_circular_bug+0x1f0/0x1f0 -[ 0.975410] ? __kernel_text_address+0x9/0x30 -[ 0.975727] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x51/0x90 -[ 0.976024] check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20 -[ 0.976367] ? graph_lock+0x70/0x160 -[ 0.976682] __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170 -[ 0.976998] ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140 -[ 0.977323] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 -[ 0.977627] ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0 -[ 0.977890] flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0 -[ 0.978147] ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0 -[ 0.978410] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 -[ 0.978662] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 -[ 0.978919] ? queue_rcu_work+0x60/0x60 -[ 0.979166] ? netif_napi_del+0x151/0x3b0 -[ 0.979501] ? peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220 -[ 0.979871] peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220 -[ 0.980232] wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0 -[ 0.980516] ? deref_stack_reg+0x8e/0xc0 -[ 0.980801] ? set_peer+0xe10/0xe10 -[ 0.981040] ? __ww_mutex_check_waiters+0x150/0x150 -[ 0.981430] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x163/0x270 -[ 0.981719] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x13f/0x310 -[ 0.982078] genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90 -[ 0.982348] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310 -[ 0.982690] ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140 -[ 0.983049] netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320 -[ 0.983298] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310 -[ 0.983645] ? netlink_ack+0x880/0x880 -[ 0.983888] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 -[ 0.984168] netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610 -[ 0.984443] ? netlink_detachskb+0x60/0x60 -[ 0.984729] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 -[ 0.984976] netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80 -[ 0.985220] ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0xa60/0xa60 -[ 0.985533] __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0 -[ 0.985763] ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0 -[ 0.986039] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x17/0x160 -[ 0.986397] ? __sys_recvmsg+0x8c/0xf0 -[ 0.986711] ? __sys_recvmsg_sock+0xd0/0xd0 -[ 0.987018] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0 -[ 0.987283] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x39b/0x5a0 -[ 0.987666] do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a -[ 0.987903] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -[ 0.988223] RIP: 0033:0x7fe77c12003e -[ 0.988508] Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 4 -[ 0.989666] RSP: 002b:00007fffada2ed58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c -[ 0.990137] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe77c159d48 RCX: 00007fe77c12003e -[ 0.990583] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055fd1d38e020 RDI: 0000000000000004 -[ 0.991091] RBP: 000055fd1d38e020 R08: 000055fd1cb63358 R09: 000000000000000c -[ 0.991568] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000002c -[ 0.992014] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 000055fd1d38e020 R15: 0000000000000001 - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Reported-by: syzbot -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 6 ++---- - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 10 +++++++--- - 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -@@ -575,10 +575,8 @@ static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff - private_key); - list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list, - peer_list) { -- if (wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer)) -- wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer); -- else -- wg_peer_remove(peer); -+ BUG_ON(!wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer)); -+ wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer); - } - wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(&wg->cookie_checker); - up_write(&wg->static_identity.lock); ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -@@ -46,17 +46,21 @@ void __init wg_noise_init(void) - /* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */ - bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer) - { -- bool ret = true; -+ bool ret; - - down_write(&peer->handshake.lock); -- if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) -+ if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) { - ret = curve25519( - peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, - peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private, - peer->handshake.remote_static); -- else -+ } else { -+ u8 empty[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 }; -+ -+ ret = curve25519(empty, empty, peer->handshake.remote_static); - memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0, - NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ } - up_write(&peer->handshake.lock); - return ret; - } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0084-wireguard-noise-reject-peers-with-low-order-public-k.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0084-wireguard-noise-reject-peers-with-low-order-public-k.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..55bb276118 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0084-wireguard-noise-reject-peers-with-low-order-public-k.patch @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: noise: reject peers with low order public keys + +commit ec31c2676a10e064878927b243fada8c2fb0c03c upstream. + +Our static-static calculation returns a failure if the public key is of +low order. We check for this when peers are added, and don't allow them +to be added if they're low order, except in the case where we haven't +yet been given a private key. In that case, we would defer the removal +of the peer until we're given a private key, since at that point we're +doing new static-static calculations which incur failures we can act on. +This meant, however, that we wound up removing peers rather late in the +configuration flow. + +Syzkaller points out that peer_remove calls flush_workqueue, which in +turn might then wait for sending a handshake initiation to complete. +Since handshake initiation needs the static identity lock, holding the +static identity lock while calling peer_remove can result in a rare +deadlock. We have precisely this case in this situation of late-stage +peer removal based on an invalid public key. We can't drop the lock when +removing, because then incoming handshakes might interact with a bogus +static-static calculation. + +While the band-aid patch for this would involve breaking up the peer +removal into two steps like wg_peer_remove_all does, in order to solve +the locking issue, there's actually a much more elegant way of fixing +this: + +If the static-static calculation succeeds with one private key, it +*must* succeed with all others, because all 32-byte strings map to valid +private keys, thanks to clamping. That means we can get rid of this +silly dance and locking headaches of removing peers late in the +configuration flow, and instead just reject them early on, regardless of +whether the device has yet been assigned a private key. For the case +where the device doesn't yet have a private key, we safely use zeros +just for the purposes of checking for low order points by way of +checking the output of the calculation. + +The following PoC will trigger the deadlock: + +ip link add wg0 type wireguard +ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev wg0 +ip link set wg0 up +ping -f 10.0.0.2 & +while true; do + wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null peer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= allowed-ips 10.0.0.0/24 endpoint 10.0.0.3:1234 + wg set wg0 private-key <(echo AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=) +done + +[ 0.949105] ====================================================== +[ 0.949550] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected +[ 0.950143] 5.5.0-debug+ #18 Not tainted +[ 0.950431] ------------------------------------------------------ +[ 0.950959] wg/89 is trying to acquire lock: +[ 0.951252] ffff8880333e2128 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0 +[ 0.951865] +[ 0.951865] but task is already holding lock: +[ 0.952280] ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0 +[ 0.953011] +[ 0.953011] which lock already depends on the new lock. +[ 0.953011] +[ 0.953651] +[ 0.953651] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: +[ 0.954292] +[ 0.954292] -> #2 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}: +[ 0.954804] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 +[ 0.955133] down_read+0x83/0x410 +[ 0.955428] wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation+0x97/0x700 +[ 0.955885] wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x13a/0x280 +[ 0.956401] wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x10/0x20 +[ 0.956841] process_one_work+0x806/0x1500 +[ 0.957167] worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0 +[ 0.957549] kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0 +[ 0.957792] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 +[ 0.958234] +[ 0.958234] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work)){+.+.}: +[ 0.958808] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 +[ 0.959075] process_one_work+0x7ab/0x1500 +[ 0.959369] worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0 +[ 0.959639] kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0 +[ 0.959896] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 +[ 0.960346] +[ 0.960346] -> #0 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}: +[ 0.960945] check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20 +[ 0.961351] __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170 +[ 0.961725] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 +[ 0.961990] flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0 +[ 0.962280] peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220 +[ 0.962600] wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0 +[ 0.962994] genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90 +[ 0.963298] netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320 +[ 0.963618] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 +[ 0.963853] netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610 +[ 0.964245] netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80 +[ 0.964586] __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0 +[ 0.964854] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0 +[ 0.965141] do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a +[ 0.965408] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe +[ 0.965769] +[ 0.965769] other info that might help us debug this: +[ 0.965769] +[ 0.966337] Chain exists of: +[ 0.966337] (wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0 --> (work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work) --> &wg->static_identity.lock +[ 0.966337] +[ 0.967417] Possible unsafe locking scenario: +[ 0.967417] +[ 0.967836] CPU0 CPU1 +[ 0.968155] ---- ---- +[ 0.968497] lock(&wg->static_identity.lock); +[ 0.968779] lock((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work)); +[ 0.969345] lock(&wg->static_identity.lock); +[ 0.969809] lock((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0); +[ 0.970146] +[ 0.970146] *** DEADLOCK *** +[ 0.970146] +[ 0.970531] 5 locks held by wg/89: +[ 0.970908] #0: ffffffff827433c8 (cb_lock){++++}, at: genl_rcv+0x10/0x30 +[ 0.971400] #1: ffffffff82743480 (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x642/0xe90 +[ 0.971924] #2: ffffffff827160c0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0x9f/0xcc0 +[ 0.972488] #3: ffff888032819de0 (&wg->device_update_lock){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0xb0/0xcc0 +[ 0.973095] #4: ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0 +[ 0.973653] +[ 0.973653] stack backtrace: +[ 0.973932] CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: wg Not tainted 5.5.0-debug+ #18 +[ 0.974476] Call Trace: +[ 0.974638] dump_stack+0x97/0xe0 +[ 0.974869] check_noncircular+0x312/0x3e0 +[ 0.975132] ? print_circular_bug+0x1f0/0x1f0 +[ 0.975410] ? __kernel_text_address+0x9/0x30 +[ 0.975727] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x51/0x90 +[ 0.976024] check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20 +[ 0.976367] ? graph_lock+0x70/0x160 +[ 0.976682] __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170 +[ 0.976998] ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140 +[ 0.977323] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 +[ 0.977627] ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0 +[ 0.977890] flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0 +[ 0.978147] ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0 +[ 0.978410] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 +[ 0.978662] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 +[ 0.978919] ? queue_rcu_work+0x60/0x60 +[ 0.979166] ? netif_napi_del+0x151/0x3b0 +[ 0.979501] ? peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220 +[ 0.979871] peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220 +[ 0.980232] wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0 +[ 0.980516] ? deref_stack_reg+0x8e/0xc0 +[ 0.980801] ? set_peer+0xe10/0xe10 +[ 0.981040] ? __ww_mutex_check_waiters+0x150/0x150 +[ 0.981430] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x163/0x270 +[ 0.981719] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x13f/0x310 +[ 0.982078] genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90 +[ 0.982348] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310 +[ 0.982690] ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140 +[ 0.983049] netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320 +[ 0.983298] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310 +[ 0.983645] ? netlink_ack+0x880/0x880 +[ 0.983888] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 +[ 0.984168] netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610 +[ 0.984443] ? netlink_detachskb+0x60/0x60 +[ 0.984729] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 +[ 0.984976] netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80 +[ 0.985220] ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0xa60/0xa60 +[ 0.985533] __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0 +[ 0.985763] ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0 +[ 0.986039] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x17/0x160 +[ 0.986397] ? __sys_recvmsg+0x8c/0xf0 +[ 0.986711] ? __sys_recvmsg_sock+0xd0/0xd0 +[ 0.987018] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0 +[ 0.987283] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x39b/0x5a0 +[ 0.987666] do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a +[ 0.987903] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe +[ 0.988223] RIP: 0033:0x7fe77c12003e +[ 0.988508] Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 4 +[ 0.989666] RSP: 002b:00007fffada2ed58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c +[ 0.990137] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe77c159d48 RCX: 00007fe77c12003e +[ 0.990583] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055fd1d38e020 RDI: 0000000000000004 +[ 0.991091] RBP: 000055fd1d38e020 R08: 000055fd1cb63358 R09: 000000000000000c +[ 0.991568] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000002c +[ 0.992014] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 000055fd1d38e020 R15: 0000000000000001 + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 6 ++---- + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 10 +++++++--- + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c +@@ -575,10 +575,8 @@ static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff + private_key); + list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list, + peer_list) { +- if (wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer)) +- wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer); +- else +- wg_peer_remove(peer); ++ BUG_ON(!wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer)); ++ wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer); + } + wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(&wg->cookie_checker); + up_write(&wg->static_identity.lock); +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c +@@ -46,17 +46,21 @@ void __init wg_noise_init(void) + /* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */ + bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer) + { +- bool ret = true; ++ bool ret; + + down_write(&peer->handshake.lock); +- if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) ++ if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) { + ret = curve25519( + peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, + peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private, + peer->handshake.remote_static); +- else ++ } else { ++ u8 empty[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 }; ++ ++ ret = curve25519(empty, empty, peer->handshake.remote_static); + memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0, + NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ } + up_write(&peer->handshake.lock); + return ret; + } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0084-wireguard-selftests-ensure-non-addition-of-peers-wit.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0084-wireguard-selftests-ensure-non-addition-of-peers-wit.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d6ad3be309..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0084-wireguard-selftests-ensure-non-addition-of-peers-wit.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -From eb6a11e6d69912d8bb0b951b08f6871785cfe0e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:27 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 084/124] wireguard: selftests: ensure non-addition of peers - with failed precomputation - -commit f9398acba6a4ae9cb98bfe4d56414d376eff8d57 upstream. - -Ensure that peers with low order points are ignored, both in the case -where we already have a device private key and in the case where we do -not. This adds points that naturally give a zero output. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -516,6 +516,12 @@ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0 - n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0 - n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75 - n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0 -+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" remove -+low_order_points=( AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38= ) -+n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer } -+[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] -+n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer } -+[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] - ip0 link del wg0 - - declare -A objects diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0085-wireguard-selftests-ensure-non-addition-of-peers-wit.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0085-wireguard-selftests-ensure-non-addition-of-peers-wit.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..86877a6590 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0085-wireguard-selftests-ensure-non-addition-of-peers-wit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:27 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: ensure non-addition of peers with + failed precomputation + +commit f9398acba6a4ae9cb98bfe4d56414d376eff8d57 upstream. + +Ensure that peers with low order points are ignored, both in the case +where we already have a device private key and in the case where we do +not. This adds points that naturally give a zero output. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -516,6 +516,12 @@ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0 + n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0 + n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75 + n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0 ++n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" remove ++low_order_points=( AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38= ) ++n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer } ++[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] ++n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer } ++[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] + ip0 link del wg0 + + declare -A objects diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0085-wireguard-selftests-tie-socket-waiting-to-target-pid.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0085-wireguard-selftests-tie-socket-waiting-to-target-pid.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c891f8f64f..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0085-wireguard-selftests-tie-socket-waiting-to-target-pid.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,78 +0,0 @@ -From d95179eade4bc805455dd5e6617db5e387004d13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:29 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 085/124] wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target - pid - -commit 88f404a9b1d75388225b1c67b6dd327cb2182777 upstream. - -Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the -previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the -listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 17 ++++++++--------- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 - ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; } - ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; } - sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; } --waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 5201') != *iperf3* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } --waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } --waitncattcp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for tcp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } -+waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlpH 'sport = 5201') != *\"iperf3\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } -+waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulpH 'sport = 1111') != *\"ncat\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } - waitiface() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for $2 to come up"; ip netns exec "$1" bash -c "while [[ \$(< \"/sys/class/net/$2/operstate\") != up ]]; do read -t .1 -N 0 || true; done;"; } - - cleanup() { -@@ -119,22 +118,22 @@ tests() { - - # TCP over IPv4 - n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.2 & -- waitiperf $netns2 -+ waitiperf $netns2 $! - n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c 192.168.241.2 - - # TCP over IPv6 - n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::1 & -- waitiperf $netns1 -+ waitiperf $netns1 $! - n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c fd00::1 - - # UDP over IPv4 - n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.1 & -- waitiperf $netns1 -+ waitiperf $netns1 $! - n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c 192.168.241.1 - - # UDP over IPv6 - n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::2 & -- waitiperf $netns2 -+ waitiperf $netns2 $! - n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c fd00::2 - } - -@@ -207,7 +206,7 @@ n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 - n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.241.0/24 - exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111) - ncat_pid=$! --waitncatudp $netns1 -+waitncatudp $netns1 $ncat_pid - n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X" - read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 && [[ $out == "X" ]] - kill $ncat_pid -@@ -216,7 +215,7 @@ n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key" - n2 wg set wg0 listen-port 9997 - exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111) - ncat_pid=$! --waitncatudp $netns1 -+waitncatudp $netns1 $ncat_pid - n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X" - ! read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 || false - kill $ncat_pid diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0086-wireguard-device-use-icmp_ndo_send-helper.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0086-wireguard-device-use-icmp_ndo_send-helper.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 32bb799594..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0086-wireguard-device-use-icmp_ndo_send-helper.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -From a16efc93a9c12bbfbff6d50811332e687cc527a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 20:47:08 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 086/124] wireguard: device: use icmp_ndo_send helper - -commit a12d7f3cbdc72c7625881c8dc2660fc2c979fdf2 upstream. - -Because wireguard is calling icmp from network device context, it should -use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. This -commit adds a small test to the wireguard test suite to ensure that the -new functions continue doing the right thing in the context of -wireguard. It does this by setting up a condition that will definately -evoke an icmp error message from the driver, but along a nat'd path. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 4 ++-- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 11 +++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -203,9 +203,9 @@ err_peer: - err: - ++dev->stats.tx_errors; - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) -- icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0); -+ icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0); - else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) -- icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0); -+ icmpv6_ndo_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0); - kfree_skb(skb); - return ret; - } ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ - set -e - - exec 3>&1 -+export LANG=C - export WG_HIDE_KEYS=never - netns0="wg-test-$$-0" - netns1="wg-test-$$-1" -@@ -297,7 +298,17 @@ ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_pref - n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7 - n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111 - -+# Have ns2 NAT into wg0 packets from ns0, but return an icmp error along the right route. -+n2 iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 10.0.0.0/24 -d 192.168.241.0/24 -j SNAT --to 192.168.241.2 -+n0 iptables -t filter -A INPUT \! -s 10.0.0.0/24 -i vethrs -j DROP # Manual rpfilter just to be explicit. -+n2 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward' -+ip0 -4 route add 192.168.241.1 via 10.0.0.100 -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" remove -+[[ $(! n0 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 || false) == *"From 10.0.0.100 icmp_seq=1 Destination Host Unreachable"* ]] -+ - n0 iptables -t nat -F -+n0 iptables -t filter -F -+n2 iptables -t nat -F - ip0 link del vethrc - ip0 link del vethrs - ip1 link del wg0 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0086-wireguard-selftests-tie-socket-waiting-to-target-pid.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0086-wireguard-selftests-tie-socket-waiting-to-target-pid.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4530f0f49a --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0086-wireguard-selftests-tie-socket-waiting-to-target-pid.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:29 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target pid + +commit 88f404a9b1d75388225b1c67b6dd327cb2182777 upstream. + +Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the +previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the +listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 17 ++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 + ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; } + ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; } + sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; } +-waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 5201') != *iperf3* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } +-waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } +-waitncattcp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for tcp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } ++waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlpH 'sport = 5201') != *\"iperf3\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } ++waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulpH 'sport = 1111') != *\"ncat\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } + waitiface() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for $2 to come up"; ip netns exec "$1" bash -c "while [[ \$(< \"/sys/class/net/$2/operstate\") != up ]]; do read -t .1 -N 0 || true; done;"; } + + cleanup() { +@@ -119,22 +118,22 @@ tests() { + + # TCP over IPv4 + n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.2 & +- waitiperf $netns2 ++ waitiperf $netns2 $! + n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c 192.168.241.2 + + # TCP over IPv6 + n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::1 & +- waitiperf $netns1 ++ waitiperf $netns1 $! + n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c fd00::1 + + # UDP over IPv4 + n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.1 & +- waitiperf $netns1 ++ waitiperf $netns1 $! + n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c 192.168.241.1 + + # UDP over IPv6 + n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::2 & +- waitiperf $netns2 ++ waitiperf $netns2 $! + n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c fd00::2 + } + +@@ -207,7 +206,7 @@ n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 + n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.241.0/24 + exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111) + ncat_pid=$! +-waitncatudp $netns1 ++waitncatudp $netns1 $ncat_pid + n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X" + read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 && [[ $out == "X" ]] + kill $ncat_pid +@@ -216,7 +215,7 @@ n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key" + n2 wg set wg0 listen-port 9997 + exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111) + ncat_pid=$! +-waitncatudp $netns1 ++waitncatudp $netns1 $ncat_pid + n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X" + ! read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 || false + kill $ncat_pid diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0087-wireguard-device-use-icmp_ndo_send-helper.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0087-wireguard-device-use-icmp_ndo_send-helper.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..321db189e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0087-wireguard-device-use-icmp_ndo_send-helper.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 20:47:08 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: device: use icmp_ndo_send helper + +commit a12d7f3cbdc72c7625881c8dc2660fc2c979fdf2 upstream. + +Because wireguard is calling icmp from network device context, it should +use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. This +commit adds a small test to the wireguard test suite to ensure that the +new functions continue doing the right thing in the context of +wireguard. It does this by setting up a condition that will definately +evoke an icmp error message from the driver, but along a nat'd path. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 4 ++-- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 11 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -203,9 +203,9 @@ err_peer: + err: + ++dev->stats.tx_errors; + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) +- icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0); ++ icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0); + else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) +- icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0); ++ icmpv6_ndo_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0); + kfree_skb(skb); + return ret; + } +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + set -e + + exec 3>&1 ++export LANG=C + export WG_HIDE_KEYS=never + netns0="wg-test-$$-0" + netns1="wg-test-$$-1" +@@ -297,7 +298,17 @@ ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_pref + n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7 + n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111 + ++# Have ns2 NAT into wg0 packets from ns0, but return an icmp error along the right route. ++n2 iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 10.0.0.0/24 -d 192.168.241.0/24 -j SNAT --to 192.168.241.2 ++n0 iptables -t filter -A INPUT \! -s 10.0.0.0/24 -i vethrs -j DROP # Manual rpfilter just to be explicit. ++n2 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward' ++ip0 -4 route add 192.168.241.1 via 10.0.0.100 ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" remove ++[[ $(! n0 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 || false) == *"From 10.0.0.100 icmp_seq=1 Destination Host Unreachable"* ]] ++ + n0 iptables -t nat -F ++n0 iptables -t filter -F ++n2 iptables -t nat -F + ip0 link del vethrc + ip0 link del vethrs + ip1 link del wg0 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0087-wireguard-selftests-reduce-complexity-and-fix-make-r.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0087-wireguard-selftests-reduce-complexity-and-fix-make-r.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6ef752cf12..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0087-wireguard-selftests-reduce-complexity-and-fix-make-r.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,105 +0,0 @@ -From 871a6ff0cd8f9edad483b8f467c0abe6cff32390 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:20 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 087/124] wireguard: selftests: reduce complexity and fix make - races - -commit 04ddf1208f03e1dbc39a4619c40eba640051b950 upstream. - -This gives us fewer dependencies and shortens build time, fixes up some -hash checking race conditions, and also fixes missing directory creation -that caused issues on massively parallel builds. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - .../testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 38 +++++++------------ - 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile -@@ -38,19 +38,17 @@ endef - define file_download = - $(DISTFILES_PATH)/$(1): - mkdir -p $(DISTFILES_PATH) -- flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp' -- if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi -+ flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp; [ -f $$@.tmp ] || exit 1; if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi' - endef - - $(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.24,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,1370c9a812b2cf2a7d92802510cca0058cc37e66a7bedd70051f0a34015022a3)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,LIBMNL,libmnl,1.0.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libmnl/files/,171f89699f286a5854b72b91d06e8f8e3683064c5901fb09d954a9ab6f551f81)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20191226,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,aa8af0fdc9872d369d8c890a84dbc2a2466b55795dccd5b47721b2d97644b04f)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20200206,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,f5207248c6a3c3e3bfc9ab30b91c1897b00802ed861e1f9faaed873366078c64)) - - KERNEL_BUILD_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/kernel$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),-debug) - rwildcard=$(foreach d,$(wildcard $1*),$(call rwildcard,$d/,$2) $(filter $(subst *,%,$2),$d)) -@@ -295,21 +293,13 @@ $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3: | $(IPERF_PATH - $(MAKE) -C $(IPERF_PATH) - $(STRIP) -s $@ - --$(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed: $(LIBMNL_TAR) -- flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -- touch $@ -- --$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a: | $(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- cd $(LIBMNL_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared -- $(MAKE) -C $(LIBMNL_PATH) -- sed -i 's:prefix=.*:prefix=$(LIBMNL_PATH):' $(LIBMNL_PATH)/libmnl.pc -- - $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed: $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_TAR) -+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) - flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< - touch $@ - --$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg -+$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src wg - $(STRIP) -s $@ - - $(BUILD_PATH)/init: init.c | $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -@@ -340,17 +330,17 @@ $(BASH_PATH)/bash: | $(BASH_PATH)/.insta - $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed: $(IPROUTE2_TAR) - mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) - flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< -- printf 'CC:=$(CC)\nPKG_CONFIG:=pkg-config\nTC_CONFIG_XT:=n\nTC_CONFIG_ATM:=n\nTC_CONFIG_IPSET:=n\nIP_CONFIG_SETNS:=y\nHAVE_ELF:=n\nHAVE_MNL:=y\nHAVE_BERKELEY_DB:=n\nHAVE_LATEX:=n\nHAVE_PDFLATEX:=n\nCFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SETNS -DHAVE_LIBMNL -I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include\nLDLIBS+=-lmnl' > $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/config.mk -+ printf 'CC:=$(CC)\nPKG_CONFIG:=pkg-config\nTC_CONFIG_XT:=n\nTC_CONFIG_ATM:=n\nTC_CONFIG_IPSET:=n\nIP_CONFIG_SETNS:=y\nHAVE_ELF:=n\nHAVE_MNL:=n\nHAVE_BERKELEY_DB:=n\nHAVE_LATEX:=n\nHAVE_PDFLATEX:=n\nCFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SETNS\n' > $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/config.mk - printf 'lib: snapshot\n\t$$(MAKE) -C lib\nip/ip: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C ip ip\nmisc/ss: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C misc ss\n' >> $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/Makefile - touch $@ - --$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ ip/ip -- $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip -- --$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ misc/ss -- $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss -+$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ ip/ip -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ -+ -+$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ misc/ss -+ $(STRIP) -s $@ - - $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_TAR) - mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) -@@ -358,8 +348,8 @@ $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_ - sed -i -e "/nfnetlink=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" -e "/nfconntrack=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" $(IPTABLES_PATH)/configure - touch $@ - --$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -- cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include -+$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) -+ cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --disable-connlabel --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include - $(MAKE) -C $(IPTABLES_PATH) - $(STRIP) -s $@ - diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0088-wireguard-receive-reset-last_under_load-to-zero.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0088-wireguard-receive-reset-last_under_load-to-zero.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2f3e6a3c9a..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0088-wireguard-receive-reset-last_under_load-to-zero.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -From b3969f204f6f3e1b712d4892050abf35ad178ccc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:21 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 088/124] wireguard: receive: reset last_under_load to zero - -commit 2a8a4df36462aa85b0db87b7c5ea145ba67e34a8 upstream. - -This is a small optimization that prevents more expensive comparisons -from happening when they are no longer necessary, by clearing the -last_under_load variable whenever we wind up in a state where we were -under load but we no longer are. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Suggested-by: Matt Dunwoodie -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 7 +++++-- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -118,10 +118,13 @@ static void wg_receive_handshake_packet( - - under_load = skb_queue_len(&wg->incoming_handshakes) >= - MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES / 8; -- if (under_load) -+ if (under_load) { - last_under_load = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -- else if (last_under_load) -+ } else if (last_under_load) { - under_load = !wg_birthdate_has_expired(last_under_load, 1); -+ if (!under_load) -+ last_under_load = 0; -+ } - mac_state = wg_cookie_validate_packet(&wg->cookie_checker, skb, - under_load); - if ((under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE) || diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0088-wireguard-selftests-reduce-complexity-and-fix-make-r.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0088-wireguard-selftests-reduce-complexity-and-fix-make-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac292a8682 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0088-wireguard-selftests-reduce-complexity-and-fix-make-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:20 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: reduce complexity and fix make races + +commit 04ddf1208f03e1dbc39a4619c40eba640051b950 upstream. + +This gives us fewer dependencies and shortens build time, fixes up some +hash checking race conditions, and also fixes missing directory creation +that caused issues on massively parallel builds. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + .../testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 38 +++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile +@@ -38,19 +38,17 @@ endef + define file_download = + $(DISTFILES_PATH)/$(1): + mkdir -p $(DISTFILES_PATH) +- flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp' +- if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi ++ flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp; [ -f $$@.tmp ] || exit 1; if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi' + endef + + $(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.24,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,1370c9a812b2cf2a7d92802510cca0058cc37e66a7bedd70051f0a34015022a3)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,LIBMNL,libmnl,1.0.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libmnl/files/,171f89699f286a5854b72b91d06e8f8e3683064c5901fb09d954a9ab6f551f81)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20191226,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,aa8af0fdc9872d369d8c890a84dbc2a2466b55795dccd5b47721b2d97644b04f)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20200206,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,f5207248c6a3c3e3bfc9ab30b91c1897b00802ed861e1f9faaed873366078c64)) + + KERNEL_BUILD_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/kernel$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),-debug) + rwildcard=$(foreach d,$(wildcard $1*),$(call rwildcard,$d/,$2) $(filter $(subst *,%,$2),$d)) +@@ -295,21 +293,13 @@ $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3: | $(IPERF_PATH + $(MAKE) -C $(IPERF_PATH) + $(STRIP) -s $@ + +-$(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed: $(LIBMNL_TAR) +- flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< +- touch $@ +- +-$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a: | $(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- cd $(LIBMNL_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared +- $(MAKE) -C $(LIBMNL_PATH) +- sed -i 's:prefix=.*:prefix=$(LIBMNL_PATH):' $(LIBMNL_PATH)/libmnl.pc +- + $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed: $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_TAR) ++ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) + flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< + touch $@ + +-$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg ++$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src wg + $(STRIP) -s $@ + + $(BUILD_PATH)/init: init.c | $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +@@ -340,17 +330,17 @@ $(BASH_PATH)/bash: | $(BASH_PATH)/.insta + $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed: $(IPROUTE2_TAR) + mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) + flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $< +- printf 'CC:=$(CC)\nPKG_CONFIG:=pkg-config\nTC_CONFIG_XT:=n\nTC_CONFIG_ATM:=n\nTC_CONFIG_IPSET:=n\nIP_CONFIG_SETNS:=y\nHAVE_ELF:=n\nHAVE_MNL:=y\nHAVE_BERKELEY_DB:=n\nHAVE_LATEX:=n\nHAVE_PDFLATEX:=n\nCFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SETNS -DHAVE_LIBMNL -I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include\nLDLIBS+=-lmnl' > $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/config.mk ++ printf 'CC:=$(CC)\nPKG_CONFIG:=pkg-config\nTC_CONFIG_XT:=n\nTC_CONFIG_ATM:=n\nTC_CONFIG_IPSET:=n\nIP_CONFIG_SETNS:=y\nHAVE_ELF:=n\nHAVE_MNL:=n\nHAVE_BERKELEY_DB:=n\nHAVE_LATEX:=n\nHAVE_PDFLATEX:=n\nCFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SETNS\n' > $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/config.mk + printf 'lib: snapshot\n\t$$(MAKE) -C lib\nip/ip: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C ip ip\nmisc/ss: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C misc ss\n' >> $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/Makefile + touch $@ + +-$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ ip/ip +- $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip +- +-$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ misc/ss +- $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss ++$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ ip/ip ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ ++ ++$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ misc/ss ++ $(STRIP) -s $@ + + $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_TAR) + mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH) +@@ -358,8 +348,8 @@ $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_ + sed -i -e "/nfnetlink=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" -e "/nfconntrack=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" $(IPTABLES_PATH)/configure + touch $@ + +-$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS) +- cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include ++$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS) ++ cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --disable-connlabel --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include + $(MAKE) -C $(IPTABLES_PATH) + $(STRIP) -s $@ + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0089-wireguard-receive-reset-last_under_load-to-zero.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0089-wireguard-receive-reset-last_under_load-to-zero.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..193d28a83f --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0089-wireguard-receive-reset-last_under_load-to-zero.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: receive: reset last_under_load to zero + +commit 2a8a4df36462aa85b0db87b7c5ea145ba67e34a8 upstream. + +This is a small optimization that prevents more expensive comparisons +from happening when they are no longer necessary, by clearing the +last_under_load variable whenever we wind up in a state where we were +under load but we no longer are. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Suggested-by: Matt Dunwoodie +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 7 +++++-- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -118,10 +118,13 @@ static void wg_receive_handshake_packet( + + under_load = skb_queue_len(&wg->incoming_handshakes) >= + MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES / 8; +- if (under_load) ++ if (under_load) { + last_under_load = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); +- else if (last_under_load) ++ } else if (last_under_load) { + under_load = !wg_birthdate_has_expired(last_under_load, 1); ++ if (!under_load) ++ last_under_load = 0; ++ } + mac_state = wg_cookie_validate_packet(&wg->cookie_checker, skb, + under_load); + if ((under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE) || diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0089-wireguard-send-account-for-mtu-0-devices.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0089-wireguard-send-account-for-mtu-0-devices.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 012a6a1d76..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0089-wireguard-send-account-for-mtu-0-devices.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,95 +0,0 @@ -From 6e82ecb98d019209c77c73d0460535f1fcb3d8cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:22 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 089/124] wireguard: send: account for mtu=0 devices - -commit 175f1ca9a9ed8689d2028da1a7c624bb4fb4ff7e upstream. - -It turns out there's an easy way to get packets queued up while still -having an MTU of zero, and that's via persistent keep alive. This commit -makes sure that in whatever condition, we don't wind up dividing by -zero. Note that an MTU of zero for a wireguard interface is something -quasi-valid, so I don't think the correct fix is to limit it via -min_mtu. This can be reproduced easily with: - -ip link add wg0 type wireguard -ip link add wg1 type wireguard -ip link set wg0 up mtu 0 -ip link set wg1 up -wg set wg0 private-key <(wg genkey) -wg set wg1 listen-port 1 private-key <(wg genkey) peer $(wg show wg0 public-key) -wg set wg0 peer $(wg show wg1 public-key) persistent-keepalive 1 endpoint 127.0.0.1:1 - -However, while min_mtu=0 seems fine, it makes sense to restrict the -max_mtu. This commit also restricts the maximum MTU to the greatest -number for which rounding up to the padding multiple won't overflow a -signed integer. Packets this large were always rejected anyway -eventually, due to checks deeper in, but it seems more sound not to even -let the administrator configure something that won't work anyway. - -We use this opportunity to clean up this function a bit so that it's -clear which paths we're expecting. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Cc: Eric Dumazet -Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 7 ++++--- - drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 16 +++++++++++----- - 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -258,6 +258,8 @@ static void wg_setup(struct net_device * - enum { WG_NETDEV_FEATURES = NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM | - NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_GSO | - NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE | NETIF_F_HIGHDMA }; -+ const int overhead = MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH + sizeof(struct udphdr) + -+ max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr)); - - dev->netdev_ops = &netdev_ops; - dev->hard_header_len = 0; -@@ -271,9 +273,8 @@ static void wg_setup(struct net_device * - dev->features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; - dev->hw_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; - dev->hw_enc_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; -- dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH - -- sizeof(struct udphdr) - -- max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr)); -+ dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - overhead; -+ dev->max_mtu = round_down(INT_MAX, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE) - overhead; - - SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &device_type); - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -@@ -143,16 +143,22 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_pee - - static unsigned int calculate_skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb) - { -+ unsigned int padded_size, last_unit = skb->len; -+ -+ if (unlikely(!PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu)) -+ return ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE) - last_unit; -+ - /* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking - * layer gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. In that case, we - * wouldn't want the final subtraction to overflow in the case of the -- * padded_size being clamped. -+ * padded_size being clamped. Fortunately, that's very rarely the case, -+ * so we optimize for that not happening. - */ -- unsigned int last_unit = skb->len % PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; -- unsigned int padded_size = ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE); -+ if (unlikely(last_unit > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu)) -+ last_unit %= PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; - -- if (padded_size > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu) -- padded_size = PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; -+ padded_size = min(PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu, -+ ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE)); - return padded_size - last_unit; - } - diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0090-wireguard-send-account-for-mtu-0-devices.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0090-wireguard-send-account-for-mtu-0-devices.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d84efe20f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0090-wireguard-send-account-for-mtu-0-devices.patch @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:22 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: send: account for mtu=0 devices + +commit 175f1ca9a9ed8689d2028da1a7c624bb4fb4ff7e upstream. + +It turns out there's an easy way to get packets queued up while still +having an MTU of zero, and that's via persistent keep alive. This commit +makes sure that in whatever condition, we don't wind up dividing by +zero. Note that an MTU of zero for a wireguard interface is something +quasi-valid, so I don't think the correct fix is to limit it via +min_mtu. This can be reproduced easily with: + +ip link add wg0 type wireguard +ip link add wg1 type wireguard +ip link set wg0 up mtu 0 +ip link set wg1 up +wg set wg0 private-key <(wg genkey) +wg set wg1 listen-port 1 private-key <(wg genkey) peer $(wg show wg0 public-key) +wg set wg0 peer $(wg show wg1 public-key) persistent-keepalive 1 endpoint 127.0.0.1:1 + +However, while min_mtu=0 seems fine, it makes sense to restrict the +max_mtu. This commit also restricts the maximum MTU to the greatest +number for which rounding up to the padding multiple won't overflow a +signed integer. Packets this large were always rejected anyway +eventually, due to checks deeper in, but it seems more sound not to even +let the administrator configure something that won't work anyway. + +We use this opportunity to clean up this function a bit so that it's +clear which paths we're expecting. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Cc: Eric Dumazet +Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 7 ++++--- + drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 16 +++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -258,6 +258,8 @@ static void wg_setup(struct net_device * + enum { WG_NETDEV_FEATURES = NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM | + NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_GSO | + NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE | NETIF_F_HIGHDMA }; ++ const int overhead = MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH + sizeof(struct udphdr) + ++ max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr)); + + dev->netdev_ops = &netdev_ops; + dev->hard_header_len = 0; +@@ -271,9 +273,8 @@ static void wg_setup(struct net_device * + dev->features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; + dev->hw_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; + dev->hw_enc_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES; +- dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH - +- sizeof(struct udphdr) - +- max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr)); ++ dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - overhead; ++ dev->max_mtu = round_down(INT_MAX, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE) - overhead; + + SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &device_type); + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +@@ -143,16 +143,22 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_pee + + static unsigned int calculate_skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb) + { ++ unsigned int padded_size, last_unit = skb->len; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu)) ++ return ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE) - last_unit; ++ + /* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking + * layer gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. In that case, we + * wouldn't want the final subtraction to overflow in the case of the +- * padded_size being clamped. ++ * padded_size being clamped. Fortunately, that's very rarely the case, ++ * so we optimize for that not happening. + */ +- unsigned int last_unit = skb->len % PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; +- unsigned int padded_size = ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE); ++ if (unlikely(last_unit > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu)) ++ last_unit %= PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; + +- if (padded_size > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu) +- padded_size = PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; ++ padded_size = min(PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu, ++ ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE)); + return padded_size - last_unit; + } + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0090-wireguard-socket-remove-extra-call-to-synchronize_ne.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0090-wireguard-socket-remove-extra-call-to-synchronize_ne.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 542a9ca1fd..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0090-wireguard-socket-remove-extra-call-to-synchronize_ne.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -From ce6c6fa0d2dd4ca9c500e6240e4f22c48018a0ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:23 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 090/124] wireguard: socket: remove extra call to - synchronize_net - -commit 1fbc33b0a7feb6ca72bf7dc8a05d81485ee8ee2e upstream. - -synchronize_net() is a wrapper around synchronize_rcu(), so there's no -point in having synchronize_net and synchronize_rcu back to back, -despite the documentation comment suggesting maybe it's somewhat useful, -"Wait for packets currently being received to be done." This commit -removes the extra call. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet -Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 1 - - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -@@ -432,7 +432,6 @@ void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device * - wg->incoming_port = ntohs(inet_sk(new4)->inet_sport); - mutex_unlock(&wg->socket_update_lock); - synchronize_rcu(); -- synchronize_net(); - sock_free(old4); - sock_free(old6); - } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-selftests-remove-duplicated-include-sys-ty.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-selftests-remove-duplicated-include-sys-ty.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a7b2d70589..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-selftests-remove-duplicated-include-sys-ty.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -From 4c680d3ca400288018c9b9fff0c5df4dbed96e84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: YueHaibing -Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:43 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 091/124] wireguard: selftests: remove duplicated include - - -commit 166391159c5deb84795d2ff46e95f276177fa5fb upstream. - -This commit removes a duplicated include. - -Signed-off-by: YueHaibing -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c | 1 - - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c -@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ - #include - #include - #include --#include - #include - #include - #include diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-socket-remove-extra-call-to-synchronize_ne.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-socket-remove-extra-call-to-synchronize_ne.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..458e9d51e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-socket-remove-extra-call-to-synchronize_ne.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:23 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: socket: remove extra call to synchronize_net + +commit 1fbc33b0a7feb6ca72bf7dc8a05d81485ee8ee2e upstream. + +synchronize_net() is a wrapper around synchronize_rcu(), so there's no +point in having synchronize_net and synchronize_rcu back to back, +despite the documentation comment suggesting maybe it's somewhat useful, +"Wait for packets currently being received to be done." This commit +removes the extra call. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet +Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c +@@ -432,7 +432,6 @@ void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device * + wg->incoming_port = ntohs(inet_sk(new4)->inet_sport); + mutex_unlock(&wg->socket_update_lock); + synchronize_rcu(); +- synchronize_net(); + sock_free(old4); + sock_free(old6); + } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0092-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0092-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7826e34759..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0092-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -From db7e2e9ced3df1fb9286946914183f6a074a2b92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:45 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 092/124] wireguard: queueing: account for skb->protocol==0 - -commit a5588604af448664e796daf3c1d5a4523c60667b upstream. - -We carry out checks to the effect of: - - if (skb->protocol != wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb)) - goto err; - -By having wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr return 0 on failure, this -means that the check above still passes in the case where skb->protocol -is zero, which is possible to hit with AF_PACKET: - - struct sockaddr_pkt saddr = { .spkt_device = "wg0" }; - unsigned char buffer[5] = { 0 }; - sendto(socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, /* skb->protocol = */ 0), - buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr)); - -Additional checks mean that this isn't actually a problem in the code -base, but I could imagine it becoming a problem later if the function is -used more liberally. - -I would prefer to fix this by having wg_examine_packet_protocol return a -32-bit ~0 value on failure, which will never match any value of -skb->protocol, which would simply change the generated code from a mov -to a movzx. However, sparse complains, and adding __force casts doesn't -seem like a good idea, so instead we just add a simple helper function -to check for the zero return value. Since wg_examine_packet_protocol -itself gets inlined, this winds up not adding an additional branch to -the generated code, since the 0 return value already happens in a -mergable branch. - -Reported-by: Fabian Freyer -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 2 +- - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 8 +++++++- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 4 ++-- - 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf - u32 mtu; - int ret; - -- if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol)) { -+ if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb))) { - ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; - net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Invalid IP packet\n", dev->name); - goto err; ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct packet_cb { - #define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer) - - /* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */ --static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb) -+static inline __be16 wg_examine_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb) - { - if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && - (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <= -@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untr - return 0; - } - -+static inline bool wg_check_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ __be16 real_protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); -+ return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol; -+} -+ - static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb) - { - skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static int prepare_skb_header(struct sk_ - size_t data_offset, data_len, header_len; - struct udphdr *udp; - -- if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol || -+ if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb) || - skb_transport_header(skb) < skb->head || - (skb_transport_header(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)) > - skb_tail_pointer(skb))) -@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( - */ - skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; - skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */ -- skb->protocol = wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb); -+ skb->protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { - len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); - if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0092-wireguard-selftests-remove-duplicated-include-sys-ty.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0092-wireguard-selftests-remove-duplicated-include-sys-ty.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..93545e6760 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0092-wireguard-selftests-remove-duplicated-include-sys-ty.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: YueHaibing +Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:43 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: remove duplicated include + +commit 166391159c5deb84795d2ff46e95f276177fa5fb upstream. + +This commit removes a duplicated include. + +Signed-off-by: YueHaibing +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c +@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ + #include + #include + #include +-#include + #include + #include + #include diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0093-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0093-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a9ca655e74 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0093-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:45 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: account for skb->protocol==0 + +commit a5588604af448664e796daf3c1d5a4523c60667b upstream. + +We carry out checks to the effect of: + + if (skb->protocol != wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb)) + goto err; + +By having wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr return 0 on failure, this +means that the check above still passes in the case where skb->protocol +is zero, which is possible to hit with AF_PACKET: + + struct sockaddr_pkt saddr = { .spkt_device = "wg0" }; + unsigned char buffer[5] = { 0 }; + sendto(socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, /* skb->protocol = */ 0), + buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr)); + +Additional checks mean that this isn't actually a problem in the code +base, but I could imagine it becoming a problem later if the function is +used more liberally. + +I would prefer to fix this by having wg_examine_packet_protocol return a +32-bit ~0 value on failure, which will never match any value of +skb->protocol, which would simply change the generated code from a mov +to a movzx. However, sparse complains, and adding __force casts doesn't +seem like a good idea, so instead we just add a simple helper function +to check for the zero return value. Since wg_examine_packet_protocol +itself gets inlined, this winds up not adding an additional branch to +the generated code, since the 0 return value already happens in a +mergable branch. + +Reported-by: Fabian Freyer +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 2 +- + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 8 +++++++- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 4 ++-- + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf + u32 mtu; + int ret; + +- if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol)) { ++ if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb))) { + ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; + net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Invalid IP packet\n", dev->name); + goto err; +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h +@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct packet_cb { + #define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer) + + /* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */ +-static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb) ++static inline __be16 wg_examine_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb) + { + if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && + (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <= +@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untr + return 0; + } + ++static inline bool wg_check_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ __be16 real_protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); ++ return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol; ++} ++ + static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb) + { + skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static int prepare_skb_header(struct sk_ + size_t data_offset, data_len, header_len; + struct udphdr *udp; + +- if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol || ++ if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb) || + skb_transport_header(skb) < skb->head || + (skb_transport_header(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)) > + skb_tail_pointer(skb))) +@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( + */ + skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; + skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */ +- skb->protocol = wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb); ++ skb->protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { + len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); + if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0093-wireguard-receive-remove-dead-code-from-default-pack.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0093-wireguard-receive-remove-dead-code-from-default-pack.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ed4c4a017e..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0093-wireguard-receive-remove-dead-code-from-default-pack.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -From 827489b9186ac53ed1e162c7d9b0f7b19d1a5995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:46 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 093/124] wireguard: receive: remove dead code from default - packet type case - -commit 2b8765c52db24c0fbcc81bac9b5e8390f2c7d3c8 upstream. - -The situation in which we wind up hitting the default case here -indicates a major bug in earlier parsing code. It is not a usual thing -that should ever happen, which means a "friendly" message for it doesn't -make sense. Rather, replace this with a WARN_ON, just like we do earlier -in the file for a similar situation, so that somebody sends us a bug -report and we can fix it. - -Reported-by: Fabian Freyer -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 3 +-- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -587,8 +587,7 @@ void wg_packet_receive(struct wg_device - wg_packet_consume_data(wg, skb); - break; - default: -- net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid packet from %pISpfsc\n", -- wg->dev->name, skb); -+ WARN(1, "Non-exhaustive parsing of packet header lead to unknown packet type!\n"); - goto err; - } - return; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0094-wireguard-noise-error-out-precomputed-DH-during-hand.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0094-wireguard-noise-error-out-precomputed-DH-during-hand.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c014fc3a5f..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0094-wireguard-noise-error-out-precomputed-DH-during-hand.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,224 +0,0 @@ -From 3c5c9d96cea67a8dc381e6ca0f5a894f1ce099ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:47 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 094/124] wireguard: noise: error out precomputed DH during - handshake rather than config - -commit 11a7686aa99c7fe4b3f80f6dcccd54129817984d upstream. - -We precompute the static-static ECDH during configuration time, in order -to save an expensive computation later when receiving network packets. -However, not all ECDH computations yield a contributory result. Prior, -we were just not letting those peers be added to the interface. However, -this creates a strange inconsistency, since it was still possible to add -other weird points, like a valid public key plus a low-order point, and, -like points that result in zeros, a handshake would not complete. In -order to make the behavior more uniform and less surprising, simply -allow all peers to be added. Then, we'll error out later when doing the -crypto if there's an issue. This also adds more separation between the -crypto layer and the configuration layer. - -Discussed-with: Mathias Hall-Andersen -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 8 +--- - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 55 ++++++++++++---------- - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h | 12 ++--- - drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 7 +-- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 15 ++++-- - 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -@@ -417,11 +417,7 @@ static int set_peer(struct wg_device *wg - - peer = wg_peer_create(wg, public_key, preshared_key); - if (IS_ERR(peer)) { -- /* Similar to the above, if the key is invalid, we skip -- * it without fanfare, so that services don't need to -- * worry about doing key validation themselves. -- */ -- ret = PTR_ERR(peer) == -EKEYREJECTED ? 0 : PTR_ERR(peer); -+ ret = PTR_ERR(peer); - peer = NULL; - goto out; - } -@@ -575,7 +571,7 @@ static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff - private_key); - list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list, - peer_list) { -- BUG_ON(!wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer)); -+ wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer); - wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer); - } - wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(&wg->cookie_checker); ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -@@ -44,32 +44,23 @@ void __init wg_noise_init(void) - } - - /* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */ --bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer) -+void wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer) - { -- bool ret; -- - down_write(&peer->handshake.lock); -- if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) { -- ret = curve25519( -- peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, -+ if (!peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity || -+ !curve25519(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, - peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private, -- peer->handshake.remote_static); -- } else { -- u8 empty[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 }; -- -- ret = curve25519(empty, empty, peer->handshake.remote_static); -+ peer->handshake.remote_static)) - memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0, - NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -- } - up_write(&peer->handshake.lock); -- return ret; - } - --bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, -- struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, -- const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -- const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -- struct wg_peer *peer) -+void wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, -+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, -+ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ struct wg_peer *peer) - { - memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(*handshake)); - init_rwsem(&handshake->lock); -@@ -81,7 +72,7 @@ bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct nois - NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); - handshake->static_identity = static_identity; - handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED; -- return wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer); -+ wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer); - } - - static void handshake_zero(struct noise_handshake *handshake) -@@ -403,6 +394,19 @@ static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chain - return true; - } - -+static bool __must_check mix_precomputed_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], -+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 precomputed[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) -+{ -+ static u8 zero_point[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ if (unlikely(!crypto_memneq(precomputed, zero_point, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN))) -+ return false; -+ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, precomputed, NOISE_HASH_LEN, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, -+ chaining_key); -+ return true; -+} -+ - static void mix_hash(u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const u8 *src, size_t src_len) - { - struct blake2s_state blake; -@@ -531,10 +535,9 @@ wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(str - NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key, handshake->hash); - - /* ss */ -- kdf(handshake->chaining_key, key, NULL, -- handshake->precomputed_static_static, NOISE_HASH_LEN, -- NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, -- handshake->chaining_key); -+ if (!mix_precomputed_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key, -+ handshake->precomputed_static_static)) -+ goto out; - - /* {t} */ - tai64n_now(timestamp); -@@ -595,9 +598,9 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(st - handshake = &peer->handshake; - - /* ss */ -- kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, handshake->precomputed_static_static, -- NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, -- chaining_key); -+ if (!mix_precomputed_dh(chaining_key, key, -+ handshake->precomputed_static_static)) -+ goto out; - - /* {t} */ - if (!message_decrypt(t, src->encrypted_timestamp, ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h -@@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ struct noise_handshake { - struct wg_device; - - void wg_noise_init(void); --bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, -- struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, -- const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -- const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -- struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, -+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, -+ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], -+ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], -+ struct wg_peer *peer); - void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake); - static inline void wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(atomic64_t *handshake_ns) - { -@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypai - void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key( - struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, - const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]); --bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer); -+void wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer); - - bool - wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst, ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c -@@ -34,11 +34,8 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg - return ERR_PTR(ret); - peer->device = wg; - -- if (!wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, -- public_key, preshared_key, peer)) { -- ret = -EKEYREJECTED; -- goto err_1; -- } -+ wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, -+ public_key, preshared_key, peer); - if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL)) - goto err_1; - if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue, wg_packet_tx_worker, false, ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -527,11 +527,16 @@ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0 - n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75 - n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0 - n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" remove --low_order_points=( AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38= ) --n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer } --[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] --n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer } --[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] -+for low_order_point in AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38=; do -+ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$low_order_point" persistent-keepalive 1 endpoint 127.0.0.1:1111 -+done -+[[ -n $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] -+exec 4< <(n0 ncat -l -u -p 1111) -+ncat_pid=$! -+waitncatudp $netns0 $ncat_pid -+ip0 link set wg0 up -+! read -r -n 1 -t 2 <&4 || false -+kill $ncat_pid - ip0 link del wg0 - - declare -A objects diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0094-wireguard-receive-remove-dead-code-from-default-pack.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0094-wireguard-receive-remove-dead-code-from-default-pack.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bcd4fbfbc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0094-wireguard-receive-remove-dead-code-from-default-pack.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:46 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: receive: remove dead code from default packet type + case + +commit 2b8765c52db24c0fbcc81bac9b5e8390f2c7d3c8 upstream. + +The situation in which we wind up hitting the default case here +indicates a major bug in earlier parsing code. It is not a usual thing +that should ever happen, which means a "friendly" message for it doesn't +make sense. Rather, replace this with a WARN_ON, just like we do earlier +in the file for a similar situation, so that somebody sends us a bug +report and we can fix it. + +Reported-by: Fabian Freyer +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 3 +-- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -587,8 +587,7 @@ void wg_packet_receive(struct wg_device + wg_packet_consume_data(wg, skb); + break; + default: +- net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid packet from %pISpfsc\n", +- wg->dev->name, skb); ++ WARN(1, "Non-exhaustive parsing of packet header lead to unknown packet type!\n"); + goto err; + } + return; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0095-wireguard-noise-error-out-precomputed-DH-during-hand.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0095-wireguard-noise-error-out-precomputed-DH-during-hand.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dac3046e47 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0095-wireguard-noise-error-out-precomputed-DH-during-hand.patch @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:47 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: noise: error out precomputed DH during handshake + rather than config + +commit 11a7686aa99c7fe4b3f80f6dcccd54129817984d upstream. + +We precompute the static-static ECDH during configuration time, in order +to save an expensive computation later when receiving network packets. +However, not all ECDH computations yield a contributory result. Prior, +we were just not letting those peers be added to the interface. However, +this creates a strange inconsistency, since it was still possible to add +other weird points, like a valid public key plus a low-order point, and, +like points that result in zeros, a handshake would not complete. In +order to make the behavior more uniform and less surprising, simply +allow all peers to be added. Then, we'll error out later when doing the +crypto if there's an issue. This also adds more separation between the +crypto layer and the configuration layer. + +Discussed-with: Mathias Hall-Andersen +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 8 +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 55 ++++++++++++---------- + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h | 12 ++--- + drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 7 +-- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 15 ++++-- + 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c +@@ -417,11 +417,7 @@ static int set_peer(struct wg_device *wg + + peer = wg_peer_create(wg, public_key, preshared_key); + if (IS_ERR(peer)) { +- /* Similar to the above, if the key is invalid, we skip +- * it without fanfare, so that services don't need to +- * worry about doing key validation themselves. +- */ +- ret = PTR_ERR(peer) == -EKEYREJECTED ? 0 : PTR_ERR(peer); ++ ret = PTR_ERR(peer); + peer = NULL; + goto out; + } +@@ -575,7 +571,7 @@ static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff + private_key); + list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list, + peer_list) { +- BUG_ON(!wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer)); ++ wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer); + wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer); + } + wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(&wg->cookie_checker); +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c +@@ -44,32 +44,23 @@ void __init wg_noise_init(void) + } + + /* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */ +-bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer) ++void wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer) + { +- bool ret; +- + down_write(&peer->handshake.lock); +- if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) { +- ret = curve25519( +- peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, ++ if (!peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity || ++ !curve25519(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, + peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private, +- peer->handshake.remote_static); +- } else { +- u8 empty[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 }; +- +- ret = curve25519(empty, empty, peer->handshake.remote_static); ++ peer->handshake.remote_static)) + memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0, + NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); +- } + up_write(&peer->handshake.lock); +- return ret; + } + +-bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, +- struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, +- const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], +- const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], +- struct wg_peer *peer) ++void wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, ++ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, ++ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ struct wg_peer *peer) + { + memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(*handshake)); + init_rwsem(&handshake->lock); +@@ -81,7 +72,7 @@ bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct nois + NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); + handshake->static_identity = static_identity; + handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED; +- return wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer); ++ wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer); + } + + static void handshake_zero(struct noise_handshake *handshake) +@@ -403,6 +394,19 @@ static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chain + return true; + } + ++static bool __must_check mix_precomputed_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], ++ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 precomputed[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) ++{ ++ static u8 zero_point[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ if (unlikely(!crypto_memneq(precomputed, zero_point, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN))) ++ return false; ++ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, precomputed, NOISE_HASH_LEN, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ++ chaining_key); ++ return true; ++} ++ + static void mix_hash(u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const u8 *src, size_t src_len) + { + struct blake2s_state blake; +@@ -531,10 +535,9 @@ wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(str + NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key, handshake->hash); + + /* ss */ +- kdf(handshake->chaining_key, key, NULL, +- handshake->precomputed_static_static, NOISE_HASH_LEN, +- NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, +- handshake->chaining_key); ++ if (!mix_precomputed_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key, ++ handshake->precomputed_static_static)) ++ goto out; + + /* {t} */ + tai64n_now(timestamp); +@@ -595,9 +598,9 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(st + handshake = &peer->handshake; + + /* ss */ +- kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, handshake->precomputed_static_static, +- NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, +- chaining_key); ++ if (!mix_precomputed_dh(chaining_key, key, ++ handshake->precomputed_static_static)) ++ goto out; + + /* {t} */ + if (!message_decrypt(t, src->encrypted_timestamp, +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h +@@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ struct noise_handshake { + struct wg_device; + + void wg_noise_init(void); +-bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, +- struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, +- const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], +- const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], +- struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, ++ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, ++ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], ++ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], ++ struct wg_peer *peer); + void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake); + static inline void wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(atomic64_t *handshake_ns) + { +@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypai + void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key( + struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, + const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]); +-bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer); ++void wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer); + + bool + wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst, +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c +@@ -34,11 +34,8 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg + return ERR_PTR(ret); + peer->device = wg; + +- if (!wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, +- public_key, preshared_key, peer)) { +- ret = -EKEYREJECTED; +- goto err_1; +- } ++ wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, ++ public_key, preshared_key, peer); + if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL)) + goto err_1; + if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue, wg_packet_tx_worker, false, +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -527,11 +527,16 @@ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0 + n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75 + n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0 + n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" remove +-low_order_points=( AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38= ) +-n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer } +-[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] +-n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer } +-[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] ++for low_order_point in AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38=; do ++ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$low_order_point" persistent-keepalive 1 endpoint 127.0.0.1:1111 ++done ++[[ -n $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]] ++exec 4< <(n0 ncat -l -u -p 1111) ++ncat_pid=$! ++waitncatudp $netns0 $ncat_pid ++ip0 link set wg0 up ++! read -r -n 1 -t 2 <&4 || false ++kill $ncat_pid + ip0 link del wg0 + + declare -A objects diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0095-wireguard-send-remove-errant-newline-from-packet_enc.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0095-wireguard-send-remove-errant-newline-from-packet_enc.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d546cd6afc..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0095-wireguard-send-remove-errant-newline-from-packet_enc.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -From 271fd6b0c4c81b844b81bbf4dd49d9e1de2827c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Sultan Alsawaf -Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:20 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 095/124] wireguard: send: remove errant newline from - packet_encrypt_worker - -commit d6833e42786e050e7522d6a91a9361e54085897d upstream. - -This commit removes a useless newline at the end of a scope, which -doesn't add anything in the way of organization or readability. - -Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 1 - - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -@@ -304,7 +304,6 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor - } - wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first, - state); -- - } - } - diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0096-wireguard-queueing-cleanup-ptr_ring-in-error-path-of.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0096-wireguard-queueing-cleanup-ptr_ring-in-error-path-of.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 98ff785f39..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0096-wireguard-queueing-cleanup-ptr_ring-in-error-path-of.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -From 08d5c8fc96361389fdd982477aaf6d7c9311f5e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:21 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 096/124] wireguard: queueing: cleanup ptr_ring in error path - of packet_queue_init - -commit 130c58606171326c81841a49cc913cd354113dd9 upstream. - -Prior, if the alloc_percpu of packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc -failed, the previously allocated ptr_ring wouldn't be freed. This commit -adds the missing call to ptr_ring_cleanup in the error case. - -Reported-by: Sultan Alsawaf -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c | 4 +++- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c -@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_qu - if (multicore) { - queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( - function, queue); -- if (!queue->worker) -+ if (!queue->worker) { -+ ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); - return -ENOMEM; -+ } - } else { - INIT_WORK(&queue->work, function); - } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0096-wireguard-send-remove-errant-newline-from-packet_enc.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0096-wireguard-send-remove-errant-newline-from-packet_enc.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c92b6a784a --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0096-wireguard-send-remove-errant-newline-from-packet_enc.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sultan Alsawaf +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:20 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: send: remove errant newline from + packet_encrypt_worker + +commit d6833e42786e050e7522d6a91a9361e54085897d upstream. + +This commit removes a useless newline at the end of a scope, which +doesn't add anything in the way of organization or readability. + +Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +@@ -304,7 +304,6 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor + } + wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first, + state); +- + } + } + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0097-wireguard-queueing-cleanup-ptr_ring-in-error-path-of.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0097-wireguard-queueing-cleanup-ptr_ring-in-error-path-of.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a72c509894 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0097-wireguard-queueing-cleanup-ptr_ring-in-error-path-of.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:21 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: cleanup ptr_ring in error path of + packet_queue_init + +commit 130c58606171326c81841a49cc913cd354113dd9 upstream. + +Prior, if the alloc_percpu of packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc +failed, the previously allocated ptr_ring wouldn't be freed. This commit +adds the missing call to ptr_ring_cleanup in the error case. + +Reported-by: Sultan Alsawaf +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c +@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_qu + if (multicore) { + queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( + function, queue); +- if (!queue->worker) ++ if (!queue->worker) { ++ ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); + return -ENOMEM; ++ } + } else { + INIT_WORK(&queue->work, function); + } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0097-wireguard-receive-use-tunnel-helpers-for-decapsulati.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0097-wireguard-receive-use-tunnel-helpers-for-decapsulati.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 300cc01cc3..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0097-wireguard-receive-use-tunnel-helpers-for-decapsulati.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -From 274c356580ec1b077ad10212c59a05b6e0b90d97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Toke=20H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= -Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:22 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 097/124] wireguard: receive: use tunnel helpers for - decapsulating ECN markings -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -commit eebabcb26ea1e3295704477c6cd4e772c96a9559 upstream. - -WireGuard currently only propagates ECN markings on tunnel decap according -to the old RFC3168 specification. However, the spec has since been updated -in RFC6040 to recommend slightly different decapsulation semantics. This -was implemented in the kernel as a set of common helpers for ECN -decapsulation, so let's just switch over WireGuard to using those, so it -can benefit from this enhancement and any future tweaks. We do not drop -packets with invalid ECN marking combinations, because WireGuard is -frequently used to work around broken ISPs, which could be doing that. - -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Reported-by: Olivier Tilmans -Cc: Dave Taht -Cc: Rodney W. Grimes -Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 6 ++---- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -393,13 +393,11 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( - len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); - if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) - goto dishonest_packet_size; -- if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds)) -- IP_ECN_set_ce(ip_hdr(skb)); -+ INET_ECN_decapsulate(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->ds, ip_hdr(skb)->tos); - } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { - len = ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) + - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); -- if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds)) -- IP6_ECN_set_ce(skb, ipv6_hdr(skb)); -+ INET_ECN_decapsulate(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->ds, ipv6_get_dsfield(ipv6_hdr(skb))); - } else { - goto dishonest_packet_type; - } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0098-wireguard-receive-use-tunnel-helpers-for-decapsulati.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0098-wireguard-receive-use-tunnel-helpers-for-decapsulati.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a72358c302 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0098-wireguard-receive-use-tunnel-helpers-for-decapsulati.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Toke=20H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:22 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: receive: use tunnel helpers for decapsulating ECN + markings +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +commit eebabcb26ea1e3295704477c6cd4e772c96a9559 upstream. + +WireGuard currently only propagates ECN markings on tunnel decap according +to the old RFC3168 specification. However, the spec has since been updated +in RFC6040 to recommend slightly different decapsulation semantics. This +was implemented in the kernel as a set of common helpers for ECN +decapsulation, so let's just switch over WireGuard to using those, so it +can benefit from this enhancement and any future tweaks. We do not drop +packets with invalid ECN marking combinations, because WireGuard is +frequently used to work around broken ISPs, which could be doing that. + +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Reported-by: Olivier Tilmans +Cc: Dave Taht +Cc: Rodney W. Grimes +Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -393,13 +393,11 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( + len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); + if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) + goto dishonest_packet_size; +- if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds)) +- IP_ECN_set_ce(ip_hdr(skb)); ++ INET_ECN_decapsulate(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->ds, ip_hdr(skb)->tos); + } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + len = ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) + + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); +- if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds)) +- IP6_ECN_set_ce(skb, ipv6_hdr(skb)); ++ INET_ECN_decapsulate(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->ds, ipv6_get_dsfield(ipv6_hdr(skb))); + } else { + goto dishonest_packet_type; + } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0098-wireguard-selftests-use-normal-kernel-stack-size-on-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0098-wireguard-selftests-use-normal-kernel-stack-size-on-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6aa6c2ecc4..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0098-wireguard-selftests-use-normal-kernel-stack-size-on-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -From abf11efb5187c0aaa57c37f36db035c840c9c90d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:02 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 098/124] wireguard: selftests: use normal kernel stack size on - ppc64 - -commit a0fd7cc87a018df1a17f9d3f0bd994c1f22c6b34 upstream. - -While at some point it might have made sense to be running these tests -on ppc64 with 4k stacks, the kernel hasn't actually used 4k stacks on -64-bit powerpc in a long time, and more interesting things that we test -don't really work when we deviate from the default (16k). So, we stop -pushing our luck in this commit, and return to the default instead of -the minimum. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config -@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y - CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=hvc0 wg.success=hvc1" - CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY=y - CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 -+CONFIG_THREAD_SHIFT=14 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0099-wireguard-selftests-use-normal-kernel-stack-size-on-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0099-wireguard-selftests-use-normal-kernel-stack-size-on-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f4543d2568 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0099-wireguard-selftests-use-normal-kernel-stack-size-on-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:02 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: use normal kernel stack size on ppc64 + +commit a0fd7cc87a018df1a17f9d3f0bd994c1f22c6b34 upstream. + +While at some point it might have made sense to be running these tests +on ppc64 with 4k stacks, the kernel hasn't actually used 4k stacks on +64-bit powerpc in a long time, and more interesting things that we test +don't really work when we deviate from the default (16k). So, we stop +pushing our luck in this commit, and return to the default instead of +the minimum. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config +@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y + CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=hvc0 wg.success=hvc1" + CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY=y + CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280 ++CONFIG_THREAD_SHIFT=14 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0099-wireguard-socket-remove-errant-restriction-on-loopin.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0099-wireguard-socket-remove-errant-restriction-on-loopin.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 887cb5229e..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0099-wireguard-socket-remove-errant-restriction-on-loopin.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,162 +0,0 @@ -From 81676eb0adad9931279470559107f75741ba957c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:03 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 099/124] wireguard: socket: remove errant restriction on - looping to self - -commit b673e24aad36981f327a6570412ffa7754de8911 upstream. - -It's already possible to create two different interfaces and loop -packets between them. This has always been possible with tunnels in the -kernel, and isn't specific to wireguard. Therefore, the networking stack -already needs to deal with that. At the very least, the packet winds up -exceeding the MTU and is discarded at that point. So, since this is -already something that happens, there's no need to forbid the not very -exceptional case of routing a packet back to the same interface; this -loop is no different than others, and we shouldn't special case it, but -rather rely on generic handling of loops in general. This also makes it -easier to do interesting things with wireguard such as onion routing. - -At the same time, we add a selftest for this, ensuring that both onion -routing works and infinite routing loops do not crash the kernel. We -also add a test case for wireguard interfaces nesting packets and -sending traffic between each other, as well as the loop in this case -too. We make sure to send some throughput-heavy traffic for this use -case, to stress out any possible recursion issues with the locks around -workqueues. - -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 12 ----- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++-- - 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -@@ -76,12 +76,6 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s - net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", - wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); - goto err; -- } else if (unlikely(rt->dst.dev == skb->dev)) { -- ip_rt_put(rt); -- ret = -ELOOP; -- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n", -- wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr); -- goto err; - } - if (cache) - dst_cache_set_ip4(cache, &rt->dst, fl.saddr); -@@ -149,12 +143,6 @@ static int send6(struct wg_device *wg, s - net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", - wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); - goto err; -- } else if (unlikely(dst->dev == skb->dev)) { -- dst_release(dst); -- ret = -ELOOP; -- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n", -- wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr); -- goto err; - } - if (cache) - dst_cache_set_ip6(cache, dst, &fl.saddr); ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -48,8 +48,11 @@ cleanup() { - exec 2>/dev/null - printf "$orig_message_cost" > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost - ip0 link del dev wg0 -+ ip0 link del dev wg1 - ip1 link del dev wg0 -+ ip1 link del dev wg1 - ip2 link del dev wg0 -+ ip2 link del dev wg1 - local to_kill="$(ip netns pids $netns0) $(ip netns pids $netns1) $(ip netns pids $netns2)" - [[ -n $to_kill ]] && kill $to_kill - pp ip netns del $netns1 -@@ -77,18 +80,20 @@ ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns2 - key1="$(pp wg genkey)" - key2="$(pp wg genkey)" - key3="$(pp wg genkey)" -+key4="$(pp wg genkey)" - pub1="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key1")" - pub2="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key2")" - pub3="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key3")" -+pub4="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key4")" - psk="$(pp wg genpsk)" - [[ -n $key1 && -n $key2 && -n $psk ]] - - configure_peers() { - ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg0 -- ip1 addr add fd00::1/24 dev wg0 -+ ip1 addr add fd00::1/112 dev wg0 - - ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg0 -- ip2 addr add fd00::2/24 dev wg0 -+ ip2 addr add fd00::2/112 dev wg0 - - n1 wg set wg0 \ - private-key <(echo "$key1") \ -@@ -230,9 +235,38 @@ n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 - n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key3") - n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32 peer "$pub1" remove - n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" remove - --ip1 link del wg0 -+# Test that we can route wg through wg -+ip1 addr flush dev wg0 -+ip2 addr flush dev wg0 -+ip1 addr add fd00::5:1/112 dev wg0 -+ip2 addr add fd00::5:2/112 dev wg0 -+n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips fd00::5:2/128 endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 -+n2 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2") listen-port 2 peer "$pub1" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips fd00::5:1/128 endpoint 127.212.121.99:9998 -+ip1 link add wg1 type wireguard -+ip2 link add wg1 type wireguard -+ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg1 -+ip1 addr add fd00::1/112 dev wg1 -+ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg1 -+ip2 addr add fd00::2/112 dev wg1 -+ip1 link set mtu 1340 up dev wg1 -+ip2 link set mtu 1340 up dev wg1 -+n1 wg set wg1 listen-port 5 private-key <(echo "$key3") peer "$pub4" allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32,fd00::2/128 endpoint [fd00::5:2]:5 -+n2 wg set wg1 listen-port 5 private-key <(echo "$key4") peer "$pub3" allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32,fd00::1/128 endpoint [fd00::5:1]:5 -+tests -+# Try to set up a routing loop between the two namespaces -+ip1 link set netns $netns0 dev wg1 -+ip0 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg1 -+ip0 link set up dev wg1 -+n0 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 192.168.241.2:7 - ip2 link del wg0 -+ip2 link del wg1 -+! n0 ping -W 1 -c 10 -f 192.168.241.2 || false # Should not crash kernel -+ -+ip0 link del wg1 -+ip1 link del wg0 - - # Test using NAT. We now change the topology to this: - # ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ -@@ -282,6 +316,20 @@ pp sleep 3 - n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 - n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" persistent-keepalive 0 - -+# Test that onion routing works, even when it loops -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" allowed-ips 192.168.242.2/32 endpoint 192.168.241.2:5 -+ip1 addr add 192.168.242.1/24 dev wg0 -+ip2 link add wg1 type wireguard -+ip2 addr add 192.168.242.2/24 dev wg1 -+n2 wg set wg1 private-key <(echo "$key3") listen-port 5 peer "$pub1" allowed-ips 192.168.242.1/32 -+ip2 link set wg1 up -+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.242.2 -+ip2 link del wg1 -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" endpoint 192.168.242.2:5 -+! n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.242.2 || false # Should not crash kernel -+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" remove -+ip1 addr del 192.168.242.1/24 dev wg0 -+ - # Do a wg-quick(8)-style policy routing for the default route, making sure vethc has a v6 address to tease out bugs. - ip1 -6 addr add fc00::9/96 dev vethc - ip1 -6 route add default via fc00::1 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0100-wireguard-send-receive-cond_resched-when-processing-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0100-wireguard-send-receive-cond_resched-when-processing-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a87a383981..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0100-wireguard-send-receive-cond_resched-when-processing-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -From 3943211e0997b04f1e2ca1a6624391cc72a176bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:04 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 100/124] wireguard: send/receive: cond_resched() when - processing worker ringbuffers - -commit 4005f5c3c9d006157ba716594e0d70c88a235c5e upstream. - -Users with pathological hardware reported CPU stalls on CONFIG_ -PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY=y, because the ringbuffers would stay full, meaning -these workers would never terminate. That turned out not to be okay on -systems without forced preemption, which Sultan observed. This commit -adds a cond_resched() to the bottom of each loop iteration, so that -these workers don't hog the core. Note that we don't need this on the -napi poll worker, since that terminates after its budget is expended. - -Suggested-by: Sultan Alsawaf -Reported-by: Wang Jian -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 ++ - drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 4 ++++ - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -516,6 +516,8 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct wor - &PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->receiving)) ? - PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD; - wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state); -+ if (need_resched()) -+ cond_resched(); - } - } - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -@@ -281,6 +281,8 @@ void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_str - - wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); - wg_peer_put(peer); -+ if (need_resched()) -+ cond_resched(); - } - } - -@@ -304,6 +306,8 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor - } - wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first, - state); -+ if (need_resched()) -+ cond_resched(); - } - } - diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0100-wireguard-socket-remove-errant-restriction-on-loopin.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0100-wireguard-socket-remove-errant-restriction-on-loopin.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6dafa4781b --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0100-wireguard-socket-remove-errant-restriction-on-loopin.patch @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:03 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: socket: remove errant restriction on looping to + self + +commit b673e24aad36981f327a6570412ffa7754de8911 upstream. + +It's already possible to create two different interfaces and loop +packets between them. This has always been possible with tunnels in the +kernel, and isn't specific to wireguard. Therefore, the networking stack +already needs to deal with that. At the very least, the packet winds up +exceeding the MTU and is discarded at that point. So, since this is +already something that happens, there's no need to forbid the not very +exceptional case of routing a packet back to the same interface; this +loop is no different than others, and we shouldn't special case it, but +rather rely on generic handling of loops in general. This also makes it +easier to do interesting things with wireguard such as onion routing. + +At the same time, we add a selftest for this, ensuring that both onion +routing works and infinite routing loops do not crash the kernel. We +also add a test case for wireguard interfaces nesting packets and +sending traffic between each other, as well as the loop in this case +too. We make sure to send some throughput-heavy traffic for this use +case, to stress out any possible recursion issues with the locks around +workqueues. + +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 12 ----- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c +@@ -76,12 +76,6 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s + net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", + wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); + goto err; +- } else if (unlikely(rt->dst.dev == skb->dev)) { +- ip_rt_put(rt); +- ret = -ELOOP; +- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n", +- wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr); +- goto err; + } + if (cache) + dst_cache_set_ip4(cache, &rt->dst, fl.saddr); +@@ -149,12 +143,6 @@ static int send6(struct wg_device *wg, s + net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", + wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); + goto err; +- } else if (unlikely(dst->dev == skb->dev)) { +- dst_release(dst); +- ret = -ELOOP; +- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n", +- wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr); +- goto err; + } + if (cache) + dst_cache_set_ip6(cache, dst, &fl.saddr); +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -48,8 +48,11 @@ cleanup() { + exec 2>/dev/null + printf "$orig_message_cost" > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost + ip0 link del dev wg0 ++ ip0 link del dev wg1 + ip1 link del dev wg0 ++ ip1 link del dev wg1 + ip2 link del dev wg0 ++ ip2 link del dev wg1 + local to_kill="$(ip netns pids $netns0) $(ip netns pids $netns1) $(ip netns pids $netns2)" + [[ -n $to_kill ]] && kill $to_kill + pp ip netns del $netns1 +@@ -77,18 +80,20 @@ ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns2 + key1="$(pp wg genkey)" + key2="$(pp wg genkey)" + key3="$(pp wg genkey)" ++key4="$(pp wg genkey)" + pub1="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key1")" + pub2="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key2")" + pub3="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key3")" ++pub4="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key4")" + psk="$(pp wg genpsk)" + [[ -n $key1 && -n $key2 && -n $psk ]] + + configure_peers() { + ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg0 +- ip1 addr add fd00::1/24 dev wg0 ++ ip1 addr add fd00::1/112 dev wg0 + + ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg0 +- ip2 addr add fd00::2/24 dev wg0 ++ ip2 addr add fd00::2/112 dev wg0 + + n1 wg set wg0 \ + private-key <(echo "$key1") \ +@@ -230,9 +235,38 @@ n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 + n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key3") + n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32 peer "$pub1" remove + n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" remove + +-ip1 link del wg0 ++# Test that we can route wg through wg ++ip1 addr flush dev wg0 ++ip2 addr flush dev wg0 ++ip1 addr add fd00::5:1/112 dev wg0 ++ip2 addr add fd00::5:2/112 dev wg0 ++n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips fd00::5:2/128 endpoint 127.0.0.1:2 ++n2 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2") listen-port 2 peer "$pub1" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips fd00::5:1/128 endpoint 127.212.121.99:9998 ++ip1 link add wg1 type wireguard ++ip2 link add wg1 type wireguard ++ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg1 ++ip1 addr add fd00::1/112 dev wg1 ++ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg1 ++ip2 addr add fd00::2/112 dev wg1 ++ip1 link set mtu 1340 up dev wg1 ++ip2 link set mtu 1340 up dev wg1 ++n1 wg set wg1 listen-port 5 private-key <(echo "$key3") peer "$pub4" allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32,fd00::2/128 endpoint [fd00::5:2]:5 ++n2 wg set wg1 listen-port 5 private-key <(echo "$key4") peer "$pub3" allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32,fd00::1/128 endpoint [fd00::5:1]:5 ++tests ++# Try to set up a routing loop between the two namespaces ++ip1 link set netns $netns0 dev wg1 ++ip0 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg1 ++ip0 link set up dev wg1 ++n0 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 192.168.241.2:7 + ip2 link del wg0 ++ip2 link del wg1 ++! n0 ping -W 1 -c 10 -f 192.168.241.2 || false # Should not crash kernel ++ ++ip0 link del wg1 ++ip1 link del wg0 + + # Test using NAT. We now change the topology to this: + # ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ +@@ -282,6 +316,20 @@ pp sleep 3 + n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 + n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" persistent-keepalive 0 + ++# Test that onion routing works, even when it loops ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" allowed-ips 192.168.242.2/32 endpoint 192.168.241.2:5 ++ip1 addr add 192.168.242.1/24 dev wg0 ++ip2 link add wg1 type wireguard ++ip2 addr add 192.168.242.2/24 dev wg1 ++n2 wg set wg1 private-key <(echo "$key3") listen-port 5 peer "$pub1" allowed-ips 192.168.242.1/32 ++ip2 link set wg1 up ++n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.242.2 ++ip2 link del wg1 ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" endpoint 192.168.242.2:5 ++! n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.242.2 || false # Should not crash kernel ++n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" remove ++ip1 addr del 192.168.242.1/24 dev wg0 ++ + # Do a wg-quick(8)-style policy routing for the default route, making sure vethc has a v6 address to tease out bugs. + ip1 -6 addr add fc00::9/96 dev vethc + ip1 -6 route add default via fc00::1 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0101-wireguard-selftests-initalize-ipv6-members-to-NULL-t.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0101-wireguard-selftests-initalize-ipv6-members-to-NULL-t.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3d57857ae4..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0101-wireguard-selftests-initalize-ipv6-members-to-NULL-t.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -From 7b7da251149dd5fd070255dbf45f8e4f5c2110b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:05 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 101/124] wireguard: selftests: initalize ipv6 members to NULL - to squelch clang warning - -commit 4fed818ef54b08d4b29200e416cce65546ad5312 upstream. - -Without setting these to NULL, clang complains in certain -configurations that have CONFIG_IPV6=n: - -In file included from drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.c:223: -drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c:173:34: error: variable 'skb6' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized] - ret = timings_test(skb4, hdr4, skb6, hdr6, &test_count); - ^~~~ -drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c:123:29: note: initialize the variable 'skb6' to silence this warning - struct sk_buff *skb4, *skb6; - ^ - = NULL -drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c:173:40: error: variable 'hdr6' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized] - ret = timings_test(skb4, hdr4, skb6, hdr6, &test_count); - ^~~~ -drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c:125:22: note: initialize the variable 'hdr6' to silence this warning - struct ipv6hdr *hdr6; - ^ - -We silence this warning by setting the variables to NULL as the warning -suggests. - -Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c -@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ bool __init wg_ratelimiter_selftest(void - enum { TRIALS_BEFORE_GIVING_UP = 5000 }; - bool success = false; - int test = 0, trials; -- struct sk_buff *skb4, *skb6; -+ struct sk_buff *skb4, *skb6 = NULL; - struct iphdr *hdr4; -- struct ipv6hdr *hdr6; -+ struct ipv6hdr *hdr6 = NULL; - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UBSAN)) - return true; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0101-wireguard-send-receive-cond_resched-when-processing-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0101-wireguard-send-receive-cond_resched-when-processing-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..499b36bc5f --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0101-wireguard-send-receive-cond_resched-when-processing-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:04 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: send/receive: cond_resched() when processing + worker ringbuffers + +commit 4005f5c3c9d006157ba716594e0d70c88a235c5e upstream. + +Users with pathological hardware reported CPU stalls on CONFIG_ +PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY=y, because the ringbuffers would stay full, meaning +these workers would never terminate. That turned out not to be okay on +systems without forced preemption, which Sultan observed. This commit +adds a cond_resched() to the bottom of each loop iteration, so that +these workers don't hog the core. Note that we don't need this on the +napi poll worker, since that terminates after its budget is expended. + +Suggested-by: Sultan Alsawaf +Reported-by: Wang Jian +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 ++ + drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 4 ++++ + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -516,6 +516,8 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct wor + &PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->receiving)) ? + PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD; + wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state); ++ if (need_resched()) ++ cond_resched(); + } + } + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +@@ -281,6 +281,8 @@ void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_str + + wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); + wg_peer_put(peer); ++ if (need_resched()) ++ cond_resched(); + } + } + +@@ -304,6 +306,8 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor + } + wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first, + state); ++ if (need_resched()) ++ cond_resched(); + } + } + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0102-wireguard-selftests-initalize-ipv6-members-to-NULL-t.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0102-wireguard-selftests-initalize-ipv6-members-to-NULL-t.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1124be5ca --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0102-wireguard-selftests-initalize-ipv6-members-to-NULL-t.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:05 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: initalize ipv6 members to NULL to + squelch clang warning + +commit 4fed818ef54b08d4b29200e416cce65546ad5312 upstream. + +Without setting these to NULL, clang complains in certain +configurations that have CONFIG_IPV6=n: + +In file included from drivers/net/wireguard/ratelimiter.c:223: +drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c:173:34: error: variable 'skb6' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized] + ret = timings_test(skb4, hdr4, skb6, hdr6, &test_count); + ^~~~ +drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c:123:29: note: initialize the variable 'skb6' to silence this warning + struct sk_buff *skb4, *skb6; + ^ + = NULL +drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c:173:40: error: variable 'hdr6' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized] + ret = timings_test(skb4, hdr4, skb6, hdr6, &test_count); + ^~~~ +drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c:125:22: note: initialize the variable 'hdr6' to silence this warning + struct ipv6hdr *hdr6; + ^ + +We silence this warning by setting the variables to NULL as the warning +suggests. + +Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/ratelimiter.c +@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ bool __init wg_ratelimiter_selftest(void + enum { TRIALS_BEFORE_GIVING_UP = 5000 }; + bool success = false; + int test = 0, trials; +- struct sk_buff *skb4, *skb6; ++ struct sk_buff *skb4, *skb6 = NULL; + struct iphdr *hdr4; +- struct ipv6hdr *hdr6; ++ struct ipv6hdr *hdr6 = NULL; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UBSAN)) + return true; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0102-wireguard-send-receive-use-explicit-unlikely-branch-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0102-wireguard-send-receive-use-explicit-unlikely-branch-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d8ea8908b9..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0102-wireguard-send-receive-use-explicit-unlikely-branch-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -From 8df862b663b026d61b4c463caece77f1f127771f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:06 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 102/124] wireguard: send/receive: use explicit unlikely branch - instead of implicit coalescing - -commit 243f2148937adc72bcaaa590d482d599c936efde upstream. - -It's very unlikely that send will become true. It's nearly always false -between 0 and 120 seconds of a session, and in most cases becomes true -only between 120 and 121 seconds before becoming false again. So, -unlikely(send) is clearly the right option here. - -What happened before was that we had this complex boolean expression -with multiple likely and unlikely clauses nested. Since this is -evaluated left-to-right anyway, the whole thing got converted to -unlikely. So, we can clean this up to better represent what's going on. - -The generated code is the same. - -Suggested-by: Sultan Alsawaf -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 13 ++++++------- - drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 15 ++++++--------- - 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -226,21 +226,20 @@ void wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker( - static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) - { - struct noise_keypair *keypair; -- bool send = false; -+ bool send; - - if (peer->sent_lastminute_handshake) - return; - - rcu_read_lock_bh(); - keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); -- if (likely(keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)) && -- keypair->i_am_the_initiator && -- unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, -- REJECT_AFTER_TIME - KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT - REKEY_TIMEOUT))) -- send = true; -+ send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) && -+ keypair->i_am_the_initiator && -+ wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, -+ REJECT_AFTER_TIME - KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT - REKEY_TIMEOUT); - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - -- if (send) { -+ if (unlikely(send)) { - peer->sent_lastminute_handshake = true; - wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); - } ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -@@ -124,20 +124,17 @@ void wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(str - static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) - { - struct noise_keypair *keypair; -- bool send = false; -+ bool send; - - rcu_read_lock_bh(); - keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); -- if (likely(keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)) && -- (unlikely(atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > -- REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES) || -- (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && -- unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, -- REKEY_AFTER_TIME))))) -- send = true; -+ send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) && -+ (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES || -+ (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && -+ wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME))); - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - -- if (send) -+ if (unlikely(send)) - wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); - } - diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0103-wireguard-selftests-use-newer-iproute2-for-gcc-10.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0103-wireguard-selftests-use-newer-iproute2-for-gcc-10.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4a4d8e8987..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0103-wireguard-selftests-use-newer-iproute2-for-gcc-10.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -From 8c0f0162352081c875a7aa86d897e2bb50f6e46d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:49:27 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 103/124] wireguard: selftests: use newer iproute2 for gcc-10 - -commit ee3c1aa3f34b7842c1557cfe5d8c3f7b8c692de8 upstream. - -gcc-10 switched to defaulting to -fno-common, which broke iproute2-5.4. -This was fixed in iproute-5.6, so switch to that. Because we're after a -stable testing surface, we generally don't like to bump these -unnecessarily, but in this case, being able to actually build is a basic -necessity. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile -@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ endef - $(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.24,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,1370c9a812b2cf2a7d92802510cca0058cc37e66a7bedd70051f0a34015022a3)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d)) --$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae)) -+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.6.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,1b5b0e25ce6e23da7526ea1da044e814ad85ba761b10dd29c2b027c056b04692)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa)) - $(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a)) diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0103-wireguard-send-receive-use-explicit-unlikely-branch-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0103-wireguard-send-receive-use-explicit-unlikely-branch-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..900e2f2350 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0103-wireguard-send-receive-use-explicit-unlikely-branch-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:06 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: send/receive: use explicit unlikely branch instead + of implicit coalescing + +commit 243f2148937adc72bcaaa590d482d599c936efde upstream. + +It's very unlikely that send will become true. It's nearly always false +between 0 and 120 seconds of a session, and in most cases becomes true +only between 120 and 121 seconds before becoming false again. So, +unlikely(send) is clearly the right option here. + +What happened before was that we had this complex boolean expression +with multiple likely and unlikely clauses nested. Since this is +evaluated left-to-right anyway, the whole thing got converted to +unlikely. So, we can clean this up to better represent what's going on. + +The generated code is the same. + +Suggested-by: Sultan Alsawaf +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 13 ++++++------- + drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 15 ++++++--------- + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -226,21 +226,20 @@ void wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker( + static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) + { + struct noise_keypair *keypair; +- bool send = false; ++ bool send; + + if (peer->sent_lastminute_handshake) + return; + + rcu_read_lock_bh(); + keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); +- if (likely(keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)) && +- keypair->i_am_the_initiator && +- unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, +- REJECT_AFTER_TIME - KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT - REKEY_TIMEOUT))) +- send = true; ++ send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) && ++ keypair->i_am_the_initiator && ++ wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, ++ REJECT_AFTER_TIME - KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT - REKEY_TIMEOUT); + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); + +- if (send) { ++ if (unlikely(send)) { + peer->sent_lastminute_handshake = true; + wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); + } +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +@@ -124,20 +124,17 @@ void wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(str + static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) + { + struct noise_keypair *keypair; +- bool send = false; ++ bool send; + + rcu_read_lock_bh(); + keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); +- if (likely(keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)) && +- (unlikely(atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > +- REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES) || +- (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && +- unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, +- REKEY_AFTER_TIME))))) +- send = true; ++ send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) && ++ (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES || ++ (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && ++ wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME))); + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); + +- if (send) ++ if (unlikely(send)) + wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); + } + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0104-wireguard-noise-read-preshared-key-while-taking-lock.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0104-wireguard-noise-read-preshared-key-while-taking-lock.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 33ad677c9e..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0104-wireguard-noise-read-preshared-key-while-taking-lock.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -From 5e29ad069218c486737729f88d15e4fe0ca7eb45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:49:28 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 104/124] wireguard: noise: read preshared key while taking - lock - -commit bc67d371256f5c47d824e2eec51e46c8d62d022e upstream. - -Prior we read the preshared key after dropping the handshake lock, which -isn't an actual crypto issue if it races, but it's still not quite -correct. So copy that part of the state into a temporary like we do with -the rest of the handshake state variables. Then we can release the lock, -operate on the temporary, and zero it out at the end of the function. In -performance tests, the impact of this was entirely unnoticable, probably -because those bytes are coming from the same cacheline as other things -that are being copied out in the same manner. - -Reported-by: Matt Dunwoodie -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 6 +++++- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -@@ -715,6 +715,7 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(stru - u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; - u8 ephemeral_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; - u8 static_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; -+ u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; - - down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); - -@@ -733,6 +734,8 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(stru - memcpy(chaining_key, handshake->chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); - memcpy(ephemeral_private, handshake->ephemeral_private, - NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memcpy(preshared_key, handshake->preshared_key, -+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); - up_read(&handshake->lock); - - if (state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION) -@@ -750,7 +753,7 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(stru - goto fail; - - /* psk */ -- mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, handshake->preshared_key); -+ mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, preshared_key); - - /* {} */ - if (!message_decrypt(NULL, src->encrypted_nothing, -@@ -783,6 +786,7 @@ out: - memzero_explicit(chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); - memzero_explicit(ephemeral_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); - memzero_explicit(static_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); -+ memzero_explicit(preshared_key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); - up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); - return ret_peer; - } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0104-wireguard-selftests-use-newer-iproute2-for-gcc-10.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0104-wireguard-selftests-use-newer-iproute2-for-gcc-10.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d4efe37a49 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0104-wireguard-selftests-use-newer-iproute2-for-gcc-10.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:49:27 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: use newer iproute2 for gcc-10 + +commit ee3c1aa3f34b7842c1557cfe5d8c3f7b8c692de8 upstream. + +gcc-10 switched to defaulting to -fno-common, which broke iproute2-5.4. +This was fixed in iproute-5.6, so switch to that. Because we're after a +stable testing surface, we generally don't like to bump these +unnecessarily, but in this case, being able to actually build is a basic +necessity. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile +@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ endef + $(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.24,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,1370c9a812b2cf2a7d92802510cca0058cc37e66a7bedd70051f0a34015022a3)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d)) +-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae)) ++$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.6.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,1b5b0e25ce6e23da7526ea1da044e814ad85ba761b10dd29c2b027c056b04692)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa)) + $(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a)) diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0105-wireguard-noise-read-preshared-key-while-taking-lock.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0105-wireguard-noise-read-preshared-key-while-taking-lock.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2dac4b7064 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0105-wireguard-noise-read-preshared-key-while-taking-lock.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:49:28 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: noise: read preshared key while taking lock + +commit bc67d371256f5c47d824e2eec51e46c8d62d022e upstream. + +Prior we read the preshared key after dropping the handshake lock, which +isn't an actual crypto issue if it races, but it's still not quite +correct. So copy that part of the state into a temporary like we do with +the rest of the handshake state variables. Then we can release the lock, +operate on the temporary, and zero it out at the end of the function. In +performance tests, the impact of this was entirely unnoticable, probably +because those bytes are coming from the same cacheline as other things +that are being copied out in the same manner. + +Reported-by: Matt Dunwoodie +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 6 +++++- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c +@@ -715,6 +715,7 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(stru + u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; + u8 ephemeral_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; + u8 static_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]; ++ u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; + + down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); + +@@ -733,6 +734,8 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(stru + memcpy(chaining_key, handshake->chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); + memcpy(ephemeral_private, handshake->ephemeral_private, + NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memcpy(preshared_key, handshake->preshared_key, ++ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); + up_read(&handshake->lock); + + if (state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION) +@@ -750,7 +753,7 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(stru + goto fail; + + /* psk */ +- mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, handshake->preshared_key); ++ mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, preshared_key); + + /* {} */ + if (!message_decrypt(NULL, src->encrypted_nothing, +@@ -783,6 +786,7 @@ out: + memzero_explicit(chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); + memzero_explicit(ephemeral_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); + memzero_explicit(static_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); ++ memzero_explicit(preshared_key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN); + up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock); + return ret_peer; + } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0105-wireguard-queueing-preserve-flow-hash-across-packet-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0105-wireguard-queueing-preserve-flow-hash-across-packet-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5834425d12..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0105-wireguard-queueing-preserve-flow-hash-across-packet-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,116 +0,0 @@ -From a6fedb7ce9e487edae4c35b70e2d3a5bb2342fec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:49:29 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 105/124] wireguard: queueing: preserve flow hash across packet - scrubbing -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -commit c78a0b4a78839d572d8a80f6a62221c0d7843135 upstream. - -It's important that we clear most header fields during encapsulation and -decapsulation, because the packet is substantially changed, and we don't -want any info leak or logic bug due to an accidental correlation. But, -for encapsulation, it's wrong to clear skb->hash, since it's used by -fq_codel and flow dissection in general. Without it, classification does -not proceed as usual. This change might make it easier to estimate the -number of innerflows by examining clustering of out of order packets, -but this shouldn't open up anything that can't already be inferred -otherwise (e.g. syn packet size inference), and fq_codel can be disabled -anyway. - -Furthermore, it might be the case that the hash isn't used or queried at -all until after wireguard transmits the encrypted UDP packet, which -means skb->hash might still be zero at this point, and thus no hash -taken over the inner packet data. In order to address this situation, we -force a calculation of skb->hash before encrypting packet data. - -Of course this means that fq_codel might transmit packets slightly more -out of order than usual. Toke did some testing on beefy machines with -high quantities of parallel flows and found that increasing the -reply-attack counter to 8192 takes care of the most pathological cases -pretty well. - -Reported-by: Dave Taht -Reviewed-and-tested-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h | 2 +- - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 10 +++++++++- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 +- - drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 7 ++++++- - 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h -@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ enum cookie_values { - }; - - enum counter_values { -- COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL = 2048, -+ COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL = 8192, - COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS = BITS_PER_LONG, - COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE = COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL - COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS - }; ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -@@ -87,12 +87,20 @@ static inline bool wg_check_packet_proto - return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol; - } - --static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb) -+static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, bool encapsulating) - { -+ u8 l4_hash = skb->l4_hash; -+ u8 sw_hash = skb->sw_hash; -+ u32 hash = skb->hash; - skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); - memset(&skb->headers_start, 0, - offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) - - offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start)); -+ if (encapsulating) { -+ skb->l4_hash = l4_hash; -+ skb->sw_hash = sw_hash; -+ skb->hash = hash; -+ } - skb->queue_mapping = 0; - skb->nohdr = 0; - skb->peeked = 0; ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct - if (unlikely(wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, skb))) - goto next; - -- wg_reset_packet(skb); -+ wg_reset_packet(skb, false); - wg_packet_consume_data_done(peer, skb, &endpoint); - free = false; - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -@@ -167,6 +167,11 @@ static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buf - struct sk_buff *trailer; - int num_frags; - -+ /* Force hash calculation before encryption so that flow analysis is -+ * consistent over the inner packet. -+ */ -+ skb_get_hash(skb); -+ - /* Calculate lengths. */ - padding_len = calculate_skb_padding(skb); - trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0); -@@ -295,7 +300,7 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor - skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) { - if (likely(encrypt_packet(skb, - PACKET_CB(first)->keypair))) { -- wg_reset_packet(skb); -+ wg_reset_packet(skb, true); - } else { - state = PACKET_STATE_DEAD; - break; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0106-wireguard-noise-separate-receive-counter-from-send-c.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0106-wireguard-noise-separate-receive-counter-from-send-c.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d72e9f8218..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0106-wireguard-noise-separate-receive-counter-from-send-c.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,331 +0,0 @@ -From 044b98abbb08fabca5c2cff426023f1f52448efc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:49:30 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 106/124] wireguard: noise: separate receive counter from send - counter - -commit a9e90d9931f3a474f04bab782ccd9d77904941e9 upstream. - -In "wireguard: queueing: preserve flow hash across packet scrubbing", we -were required to slightly increase the size of the receive replay -counter to something still fairly small, but an increase nonetheless. -It turns out that we can recoup some of the additional memory overhead -by splitting up the prior union type into two distinct types. Before, we -used the same "noise_counter" union for both sending and receiving, with -sending just using a simple atomic64_t, while receiving used the full -replay counter checker. This meant that most of the memory being -allocated for the sending counter was being wasted. Since the old -"noise_counter" type increased in size in the prior commit, now is a -good time to split up that union type into a distinct "noise_replay_ -counter" for receiving and a boring atomic64_t for sending, each using -neither more nor less memory than required. - -Also, since sometimes the replay counter is accessed without -necessitating additional accesses to the bitmap, we can reduce cache -misses by hoisting the always-necessary lock above the bitmap in the -struct layout. We also change a "noise_replay_counter" stack allocation -to kmalloc in a -DDEBUG selftest so that KASAN doesn't trigger a stack -frame warning. - -All and all, removing a bit of abstraction in this commit makes the code -simpler and smaller, in addition to the motivating memory usage -recuperation. For example, passing around raw "noise_symmetric_key" -structs is something that really only makes sense within noise.c, in the -one place where the sending and receiving keys can safely be thought of -as the same type of object; subsequent to that, it's important that we -uniformly access these through keypair->{sending,receiving}, where their -distinct roles are always made explicit. So this patch allows us to draw -that distinction clearly as well. - -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 16 +++------ - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h | 14 ++++---- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 42 ++++++++++++------------ - drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c | 17 +++++++--- - drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 12 +++---- - 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ static struct noise_keypair *keypair_cre - - if (unlikely(!keypair)) - return NULL; -+ spin_lock_init(&keypair->receiving_counter.lock); - keypair->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&keypair_counter); - keypair->entry.type = INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR; - keypair->entry.peer = peer; -@@ -358,25 +359,16 @@ out: - memzero_explicit(output, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1); - } - --static void symmetric_key_init(struct noise_symmetric_key *key) --{ -- spin_lock_init(&key->counter.receive.lock); -- atomic64_set(&key->counter.counter, 0); -- memset(key->counter.receive.backtrack, 0, -- sizeof(key->counter.receive.backtrack)); -- key->birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -- key->is_valid = true; --} -- - static void derive_keys(struct noise_symmetric_key *first_dst, - struct noise_symmetric_key *second_dst, - const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) - { -+ u64 birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); - kdf(first_dst->key, second_dst->key, NULL, NULL, - NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0, - chaining_key); -- symmetric_key_init(first_dst); -- symmetric_key_init(second_dst); -+ first_dst->birthdate = second_dst->birthdate = birthdate; -+ first_dst->is_valid = second_dst->is_valid = true; - } - - static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h -@@ -15,18 +15,14 @@ - #include - #include - --union noise_counter { -- struct { -- u64 counter; -- unsigned long backtrack[COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG]; -- spinlock_t lock; -- } receive; -- atomic64_t counter; -+struct noise_replay_counter { -+ u64 counter; -+ spinlock_t lock; -+ unsigned long backtrack[COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG]; - }; - - struct noise_symmetric_key { - u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; -- union noise_counter counter; - u64 birthdate; - bool is_valid; - }; -@@ -34,7 +30,9 @@ struct noise_symmetric_key { - struct noise_keypair { - struct index_hashtable_entry entry; - struct noise_symmetric_key sending; -+ atomic64_t sending_counter; - struct noise_symmetric_key receiving; -+ struct noise_replay_counter receiving_counter; - __le32 remote_index; - bool i_am_the_initiator; - struct kref refcount; ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -245,20 +245,20 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_pee - } - } - --static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_symmetric_key *key) -+static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) - { - struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8]; - struct sk_buff *trailer; - unsigned int offset; - int num_frags; - -- if (unlikely(!key)) -+ if (unlikely(!keypair)) - return false; - -- if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid) || -- wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || -- key->counter.receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { -- WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false); -+ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid) || -+ wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->receiving.birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || -+ keypair->receiving_counter.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { -+ WRITE_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid, false); - return false; - } - -@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buf - - if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace(sg, skb->len, NULL, 0, - PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, -- key->key)) -+ keypair->receiving.key)) - return false; - - /* Another ugly situation of pushing and pulling the header so as to -@@ -298,41 +298,41 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buf - } - - /* This is RFC6479, a replay detection bitmap algorithm that avoids bitshifts */ --static bool counter_validate(union noise_counter *counter, u64 their_counter) -+static bool counter_validate(struct noise_replay_counter *counter, u64 their_counter) - { - unsigned long index, index_current, top, i; - bool ret = false; - -- spin_lock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); -+ spin_lock_bh(&counter->lock); - -- if (unlikely(counter->receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 || -+ if (unlikely(counter->counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 || - their_counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) - goto out; - - ++their_counter; - - if (unlikely((COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + their_counter) < -- counter->receive.counter)) -+ counter->counter)) - goto out; - - index = their_counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); - -- if (likely(their_counter > counter->receive.counter)) { -- index_current = counter->receive.counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); -+ if (likely(their_counter > counter->counter)) { -+ index_current = counter->counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); - top = min_t(unsigned long, index - index_current, - COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG); - for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) -- counter->receive.backtrack[(i + index_current) & -+ counter->backtrack[(i + index_current) & - ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; -- counter->receive.counter = their_counter; -+ counter->counter = their_counter; - } - - index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; - ret = !test_and_set_bit(their_counter & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1), -- &counter->receive.backtrack[index]); -+ &counter->backtrack[index]); - - out: -- spin_unlock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); -+ spin_unlock_bh(&counter->lock); - return ret; - } - -@@ -472,12 +472,12 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct - if (unlikely(state != PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) - goto next; - -- if (unlikely(!counter_validate(&keypair->receiving.counter, -+ if (unlikely(!counter_validate(&keypair->receiving_counter, - PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce))) { - net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n", - peer->device->dev->name, - PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, -- keypair->receiving.counter.receive.counter); -+ keypair->receiving_counter.counter); - goto next; - } - -@@ -511,8 +511,8 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct wor - struct sk_buff *skb; - - while ((skb = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) { -- enum packet_state state = likely(decrypt_packet(skb, -- &PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->receiving)) ? -+ enum packet_state state = -+ likely(decrypt_packet(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair)) ? - PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD; - wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state); - if (need_resched()) ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c -@@ -6,18 +6,24 @@ - #ifdef DEBUG - bool __init wg_packet_counter_selftest(void) - { -+ struct noise_replay_counter *counter; - unsigned int test_num = 0, i; -- union noise_counter counter; - bool success = true; - --#define T_INIT do { \ -- memset(&counter, 0, sizeof(union noise_counter)); \ -- spin_lock_init(&counter.receive.lock); \ -+ counter = kmalloc(sizeof(*counter), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (unlikely(!counter)) { -+ pr_err("nonce counter self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); -+ return false; -+ } -+ -+#define T_INIT do { \ -+ memset(counter, 0, sizeof(*counter)); \ -+ spin_lock_init(&counter->lock); \ - } while (0) - #define T_LIM (COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1) - #define T(n, v) do { \ - ++test_num; \ -- if (counter_validate(&counter, n) != (v)) { \ -+ if (counter_validate(counter, n) != (v)) { \ - pr_err("nonce counter self-test %u: FAIL\n", \ - test_num); \ - success = false; \ -@@ -99,6 +105,7 @@ bool __init wg_packet_counter_selftest(v - - if (success) - pr_info("nonce counter self-tests: pass\n"); -+ kfree(counter); - return success; - } - #endif ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_pee - rcu_read_lock_bh(); - keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); - send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) && -- (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES || -+ (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending_counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES || - (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && - wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME))); - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); -@@ -349,7 +349,6 @@ void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(stru - - void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer) - { -- struct noise_symmetric_key *key; - struct noise_keypair *keypair; - struct sk_buff_head packets; - struct sk_buff *skb; -@@ -369,10 +368,9 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - if (unlikely(!keypair)) - goto out_nokey; -- key = &keypair->sending; -- if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid))) -+ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid))) - goto out_nokey; -- if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, -+ if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, - REJECT_AFTER_TIME))) - goto out_invalid; - -@@ -387,7 +385,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc - */ - PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(0, ip_hdr(skb), skb); - PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce = -- atomic64_inc_return(&key->counter.counter) - 1; -+ atomic64_inc_return(&keypair->sending_counter) - 1; - if (unlikely(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) - goto out_invalid; - } -@@ -399,7 +397,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc - return; - - out_invalid: -- WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false); -+ WRITE_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid, false); - out_nokey: - wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); - diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0106-wireguard-queueing-preserve-flow-hash-across-packet-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0106-wireguard-queueing-preserve-flow-hash-across-packet-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..31deadbfc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0106-wireguard-queueing-preserve-flow-hash-across-packet-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:49:29 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: preserve flow hash across packet + scrubbing +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +commit c78a0b4a78839d572d8a80f6a62221c0d7843135 upstream. + +It's important that we clear most header fields during encapsulation and +decapsulation, because the packet is substantially changed, and we don't +want any info leak or logic bug due to an accidental correlation. But, +for encapsulation, it's wrong to clear skb->hash, since it's used by +fq_codel and flow dissection in general. Without it, classification does +not proceed as usual. This change might make it easier to estimate the +number of innerflows by examining clustering of out of order packets, +but this shouldn't open up anything that can't already be inferred +otherwise (e.g. syn packet size inference), and fq_codel can be disabled +anyway. + +Furthermore, it might be the case that the hash isn't used or queried at +all until after wireguard transmits the encrypted UDP packet, which +means skb->hash might still be zero at this point, and thus no hash +taken over the inner packet data. In order to address this situation, we +force a calculation of skb->hash before encrypting packet data. + +Of course this means that fq_codel might transmit packets slightly more +out of order than usual. Toke did some testing on beefy machines with +high quantities of parallel flows and found that increasing the +reply-attack counter to 8192 takes care of the most pathological cases +pretty well. + +Reported-by: Dave Taht +Reviewed-and-tested-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h | 2 +- + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 10 +++++++++- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 +- + drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 7 ++++++- + 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h +@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ enum cookie_values { + }; + + enum counter_values { +- COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL = 2048, ++ COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL = 8192, + COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS = BITS_PER_LONG, + COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE = COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL - COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS + }; +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h +@@ -87,12 +87,20 @@ static inline bool wg_check_packet_proto + return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol; + } + +-static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb) ++static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, bool encapsulating) + { ++ u8 l4_hash = skb->l4_hash; ++ u8 sw_hash = skb->sw_hash; ++ u32 hash = skb->hash; + skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); + memset(&skb->headers_start, 0, + offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) - + offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start)); ++ if (encapsulating) { ++ skb->l4_hash = l4_hash; ++ skb->sw_hash = sw_hash; ++ skb->hash = hash; ++ } + skb->queue_mapping = 0; + skb->nohdr = 0; + skb->peeked = 0; +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct + if (unlikely(wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, skb))) + goto next; + +- wg_reset_packet(skb); ++ wg_reset_packet(skb, false); + wg_packet_consume_data_done(peer, skb, &endpoint); + free = false; + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +@@ -167,6 +167,11 @@ static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buf + struct sk_buff *trailer; + int num_frags; + ++ /* Force hash calculation before encryption so that flow analysis is ++ * consistent over the inner packet. ++ */ ++ skb_get_hash(skb); ++ + /* Calculate lengths. */ + padding_len = calculate_skb_padding(skb); + trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0); +@@ -295,7 +300,7 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor + skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) { + if (likely(encrypt_packet(skb, + PACKET_CB(first)->keypair))) { +- wg_reset_packet(skb); ++ wg_reset_packet(skb, true); + } else { + state = PACKET_STATE_DEAD; + break; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0107-wireguard-noise-do-not-assign-initiation-time-in-if-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0107-wireguard-noise-do-not-assign-initiation-time-in-if-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b549b32258..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0107-wireguard-noise-do-not-assign-initiation-time-in-if-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -From adb4079f56d1f6c7d4dc827d7eba14e3436512f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frank Werner-Krippendorf -Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 03:59:44 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 107/124] wireguard: noise: do not assign initiation time in if - condition - -commit 558b353c9c2a717509f291c066c6bd8f5f5e21be upstream. - -Fixes an error condition reported by checkpatch.pl which caused by -assigning a variable in an if condition in wg_noise_handshake_consume_ -initiation(). - -Signed-off-by: Frank Werner-Krippendorf -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -@@ -617,8 +617,8 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(st - memcpy(handshake->hash, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); - memcpy(handshake->chaining_key, chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); - handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index; -- if ((s64)(handshake->last_initiation_consumption - -- (initiation_consumption = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns())) < 0) -+ initiation_consumption = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); -+ if ((s64)(handshake->last_initiation_consumption - initiation_consumption) < 0) - handshake->last_initiation_consumption = initiation_consumption; - handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION; - up_write(&handshake->lock); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0107-wireguard-noise-separate-receive-counter-from-send-c.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0107-wireguard-noise-separate-receive-counter-from-send-c.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87d38d36fe --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0107-wireguard-noise-separate-receive-counter-from-send-c.patch @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:49:30 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: noise: separate receive counter from send counter + +commit a9e90d9931f3a474f04bab782ccd9d77904941e9 upstream. + +In "wireguard: queueing: preserve flow hash across packet scrubbing", we +were required to slightly increase the size of the receive replay +counter to something still fairly small, but an increase nonetheless. +It turns out that we can recoup some of the additional memory overhead +by splitting up the prior union type into two distinct types. Before, we +used the same "noise_counter" union for both sending and receiving, with +sending just using a simple atomic64_t, while receiving used the full +replay counter checker. This meant that most of the memory being +allocated for the sending counter was being wasted. Since the old +"noise_counter" type increased in size in the prior commit, now is a +good time to split up that union type into a distinct "noise_replay_ +counter" for receiving and a boring atomic64_t for sending, each using +neither more nor less memory than required. + +Also, since sometimes the replay counter is accessed without +necessitating additional accesses to the bitmap, we can reduce cache +misses by hoisting the always-necessary lock above the bitmap in the +struct layout. We also change a "noise_replay_counter" stack allocation +to kmalloc in a -DDEBUG selftest so that KASAN doesn't trigger a stack +frame warning. + +All and all, removing a bit of abstraction in this commit makes the code +simpler and smaller, in addition to the motivating memory usage +recuperation. For example, passing around raw "noise_symmetric_key" +structs is something that really only makes sense within noise.c, in the +one place where the sending and receiving keys can safely be thought of +as the same type of object; subsequent to that, it's important that we +uniformly access these through keypair->{sending,receiving}, where their +distinct roles are always made explicit. So this patch allows us to draw +that distinction clearly as well. + +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 16 +++------ + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h | 14 ++++---- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 42 ++++++++++++------------ + drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c | 17 +++++++--- + drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 12 +++---- + 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c +@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ static struct noise_keypair *keypair_cre + + if (unlikely(!keypair)) + return NULL; ++ spin_lock_init(&keypair->receiving_counter.lock); + keypair->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&keypair_counter); + keypair->entry.type = INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR; + keypair->entry.peer = peer; +@@ -358,25 +359,16 @@ out: + memzero_explicit(output, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1); + } + +-static void symmetric_key_init(struct noise_symmetric_key *key) +-{ +- spin_lock_init(&key->counter.receive.lock); +- atomic64_set(&key->counter.counter, 0); +- memset(key->counter.receive.backtrack, 0, +- sizeof(key->counter.receive.backtrack)); +- key->birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); +- key->is_valid = true; +-} +- + static void derive_keys(struct noise_symmetric_key *first_dst, + struct noise_symmetric_key *second_dst, + const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) + { ++ u64 birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); + kdf(first_dst->key, second_dst->key, NULL, NULL, + NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0, + chaining_key); +- symmetric_key_init(first_dst); +- symmetric_key_init(second_dst); ++ first_dst->birthdate = second_dst->birthdate = birthdate; ++ first_dst->is_valid = second_dst->is_valid = true; + } + + static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h +@@ -15,18 +15,14 @@ + #include + #include + +-union noise_counter { +- struct { +- u64 counter; +- unsigned long backtrack[COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG]; +- spinlock_t lock; +- } receive; +- atomic64_t counter; ++struct noise_replay_counter { ++ u64 counter; ++ spinlock_t lock; ++ unsigned long backtrack[COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG]; + }; + + struct noise_symmetric_key { + u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]; +- union noise_counter counter; + u64 birthdate; + bool is_valid; + }; +@@ -34,7 +30,9 @@ struct noise_symmetric_key { + struct noise_keypair { + struct index_hashtable_entry entry; + struct noise_symmetric_key sending; ++ atomic64_t sending_counter; + struct noise_symmetric_key receiving; ++ struct noise_replay_counter receiving_counter; + __le32 remote_index; + bool i_am_the_initiator; + struct kref refcount; +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -245,20 +245,20 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_pee + } + } + +-static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_symmetric_key *key) ++static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) + { + struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8]; + struct sk_buff *trailer; + unsigned int offset; + int num_frags; + +- if (unlikely(!key)) ++ if (unlikely(!keypair)) + return false; + +- if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid) || +- wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || +- key->counter.receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { +- WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false); ++ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid) || ++ wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->receiving.birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || ++ keypair->receiving_counter.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { ++ WRITE_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid, false); + return false; + } + +@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buf + + if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace(sg, skb->len, NULL, 0, + PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, +- key->key)) ++ keypair->receiving.key)) + return false; + + /* Another ugly situation of pushing and pulling the header so as to +@@ -298,41 +298,41 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buf + } + + /* This is RFC6479, a replay detection bitmap algorithm that avoids bitshifts */ +-static bool counter_validate(union noise_counter *counter, u64 their_counter) ++static bool counter_validate(struct noise_replay_counter *counter, u64 their_counter) + { + unsigned long index, index_current, top, i; + bool ret = false; + +- spin_lock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); ++ spin_lock_bh(&counter->lock); + +- if (unlikely(counter->receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 || ++ if (unlikely(counter->counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 || + their_counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) + goto out; + + ++their_counter; + + if (unlikely((COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + their_counter) < +- counter->receive.counter)) ++ counter->counter)) + goto out; + + index = their_counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); + +- if (likely(their_counter > counter->receive.counter)) { +- index_current = counter->receive.counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); ++ if (likely(their_counter > counter->counter)) { ++ index_current = counter->counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG); + top = min_t(unsigned long, index - index_current, + COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG); + for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) +- counter->receive.backtrack[(i + index_current) & ++ counter->backtrack[(i + index_current) & + ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; +- counter->receive.counter = their_counter; ++ counter->counter = their_counter; + } + + index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; + ret = !test_and_set_bit(their_counter & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1), +- &counter->receive.backtrack[index]); ++ &counter->backtrack[index]); + + out: +- spin_unlock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); ++ spin_unlock_bh(&counter->lock); + return ret; + } + +@@ -472,12 +472,12 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct + if (unlikely(state != PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) + goto next; + +- if (unlikely(!counter_validate(&keypair->receiving.counter, ++ if (unlikely(!counter_validate(&keypair->receiving_counter, + PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce))) { + net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n", + peer->device->dev->name, + PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, +- keypair->receiving.counter.receive.counter); ++ keypair->receiving_counter.counter); + goto next; + } + +@@ -511,8 +511,8 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct wor + struct sk_buff *skb; + + while ((skb = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) { +- enum packet_state state = likely(decrypt_packet(skb, +- &PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->receiving)) ? ++ enum packet_state state = ++ likely(decrypt_packet(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair)) ? + PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD; + wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state); + if (need_resched()) +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c +@@ -6,18 +6,24 @@ + #ifdef DEBUG + bool __init wg_packet_counter_selftest(void) + { ++ struct noise_replay_counter *counter; + unsigned int test_num = 0, i; +- union noise_counter counter; + bool success = true; + +-#define T_INIT do { \ +- memset(&counter, 0, sizeof(union noise_counter)); \ +- spin_lock_init(&counter.receive.lock); \ ++ counter = kmalloc(sizeof(*counter), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (unlikely(!counter)) { ++ pr_err("nonce counter self-test malloc: FAIL\n"); ++ return false; ++ } ++ ++#define T_INIT do { \ ++ memset(counter, 0, sizeof(*counter)); \ ++ spin_lock_init(&counter->lock); \ + } while (0) + #define T_LIM (COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1) + #define T(n, v) do { \ + ++test_num; \ +- if (counter_validate(&counter, n) != (v)) { \ ++ if (counter_validate(counter, n) != (v)) { \ + pr_err("nonce counter self-test %u: FAIL\n", \ + test_num); \ + success = false; \ +@@ -99,6 +105,7 @@ bool __init wg_packet_counter_selftest(v + + if (success) + pr_info("nonce counter self-tests: pass\n"); ++ kfree(counter); + return success; + } + #endif +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_pee + rcu_read_lock_bh(); + keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); + send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) && +- (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES || ++ (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending_counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES || + (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && + wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME))); + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); +@@ -349,7 +349,6 @@ void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(stru + + void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer) + { +- struct noise_symmetric_key *key; + struct noise_keypair *keypair; + struct sk_buff_head packets; + struct sk_buff *skb; +@@ -369,10 +368,9 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); + if (unlikely(!keypair)) + goto out_nokey; +- key = &keypair->sending; +- if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid))) ++ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid))) + goto out_nokey; +- if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, ++ if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, + REJECT_AFTER_TIME))) + goto out_invalid; + +@@ -387,7 +385,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc + */ + PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(0, ip_hdr(skb), skb); + PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce = +- atomic64_inc_return(&key->counter.counter) - 1; ++ atomic64_inc_return(&keypair->sending_counter) - 1; + if (unlikely(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) + goto out_invalid; + } +@@ -399,7 +397,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc + return; + + out_invalid: +- WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false); ++ WRITE_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid, false); + out_nokey: + wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0108-wireguard-device-avoid-circular-netns-references.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0108-wireguard-device-avoid-circular-netns-references.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8021b9bf23..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0108-wireguard-device-avoid-circular-netns-references.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,296 +0,0 @@ -From 40d881393cfc6953778691444ab27a29d51d24aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 03:59:45 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 108/124] wireguard: device: avoid circular netns references - -commit 900575aa33a3eaaef802b31de187a85c4a4b4bd0 upstream. - -Before, we took a reference to the creating netns if the new netns was -different. This caused issues with circular references, with two -wireguard interfaces swapping namespaces. The solution is to rather not -take any extra references at all, but instead simply invalidate the -creating netns pointer when that netns is deleted. - -In order to prevent this from happening again, this commit improves the -rough object leak tracking by allowing it to account for created and -destroyed interfaces, aside from just peers and keys. That then makes it -possible to check for the object leak when having two interfaces take a -reference to each others' namespaces. - -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 58 ++++++++++------------ - drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | 3 +- - drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 14 ++++-- - drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 25 +++++++--- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 13 ++++- - 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -45,17 +45,18 @@ static int wg_open(struct net_device *de - if (dev_v6) - dev_v6->cnf.addr_gen_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE; - -+ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); - ret = wg_socket_init(wg, wg->incoming_port); - if (ret < 0) -- return ret; -- mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ goto out; - list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { - wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); - if (peer->persistent_keepalive_interval) - wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); - } -+out: - mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); -- return 0; -+ return ret; - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP -@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ static void wg_destruct(struct net_devic - list_del(&wg->device_list); - rtnl_unlock(); - mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->creating_net, NULL); - wg->incoming_port = 0; - wg_socket_reinit(wg, NULL, NULL); - /* The final references are cleared in the below calls to destroy_workqueue. */ -@@ -240,13 +242,11 @@ static void wg_destruct(struct net_devic - skb_queue_purge(&wg->incoming_handshakes); - free_percpu(dev->tstats); - free_percpu(wg->incoming_handshakes_worker); -- if (wg->have_creating_net_ref) -- put_net(wg->creating_net); - kvfree(wg->index_hashtable); - kvfree(wg->peer_hashtable); - mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); - -- pr_debug("%s: Interface deleted\n", dev->name); -+ pr_debug("%s: Interface destroyed\n", dev->name); - free_netdev(dev); - } - -@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_ne - struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); - int ret = -ENOMEM; - -- wg->creating_net = src_net; -+ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->creating_net, src_net); - init_rwsem(&wg->static_identity.lock); - mutex_init(&wg->socket_update_lock); - mutex_init(&wg->device_update_lock); -@@ -393,30 +393,26 @@ static struct rtnl_link_ops link_ops __r - .newlink = wg_newlink, - }; - --static int wg_netdevice_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, -- unsigned long action, void *data) -+static void wg_netns_pre_exit(struct net *net) - { -- struct net_device *dev = ((struct netdev_notifier_info *)data)->dev; -- struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); -- -- ASSERT_RTNL(); -- -- if (action != NETDEV_REGISTER || dev->netdev_ops != &netdev_ops) -- return 0; -+ struct wg_device *wg; - -- if (dev_net(dev) == wg->creating_net && wg->have_creating_net_ref) { -- put_net(wg->creating_net); -- wg->have_creating_net_ref = false; -- } else if (dev_net(dev) != wg->creating_net && -- !wg->have_creating_net_ref) { -- wg->have_creating_net_ref = true; -- get_net(wg->creating_net); -+ rtnl_lock(); -+ list_for_each_entry(wg, &device_list, device_list) { -+ if (rcu_access_pointer(wg->creating_net) == net) { -+ pr_debug("%s: Creating namespace exiting\n", wg->dev->name); -+ netif_carrier_off(wg->dev); -+ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->creating_net, NULL); -+ wg_socket_reinit(wg, NULL, NULL); -+ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); -+ } - } -- return 0; -+ rtnl_unlock(); - } - --static struct notifier_block netdevice_notifier = { -- .notifier_call = wg_netdevice_notification -+static struct pernet_operations pernet_ops = { -+ .pre_exit = wg_netns_pre_exit - }; - - int __init wg_device_init(void) -@@ -429,18 +425,18 @@ int __init wg_device_init(void) - return ret; - #endif - -- ret = register_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); -+ ret = register_pernet_device(&pernet_ops); - if (ret) - goto error_pm; - - ret = rtnl_link_register(&link_ops); - if (ret) -- goto error_netdevice; -+ goto error_pernet; - - return 0; - --error_netdevice: -- unregister_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); -+error_pernet: -+ unregister_pernet_device(&pernet_ops); - error_pm: - #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP - unregister_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); -@@ -451,7 +447,7 @@ error_pm: - void wg_device_uninit(void) - { - rtnl_link_unregister(&link_ops); -- unregister_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); -+ unregister_pernet_device(&pernet_ops); - #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP - unregister_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); - #endif ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h -@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct wg_device { - struct net_device *dev; - struct crypt_queue encrypt_queue, decrypt_queue; - struct sock __rcu *sock4, *sock6; -- struct net *creating_net; -+ struct net __rcu *creating_net; - struct noise_static_identity static_identity; - struct workqueue_struct *handshake_receive_wq, *handshake_send_wq; - struct workqueue_struct *packet_crypt_wq; -@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ struct wg_device { - unsigned int num_peers, device_update_gen; - u32 fwmark; - u16 incoming_port; -- bool have_creating_net_ref; - }; - - int wg_device_init(void); ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -@@ -517,11 +517,15 @@ static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff - if (flags & ~__WGDEVICE_F_ALL) - goto out; - -- ret = -EPERM; -- if ((info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] || -- info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]) && -- !ns_capable(wg->creating_net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) -- goto out; -+ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] || info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]) { -+ struct net *net; -+ rcu_read_lock(); -+ net = rcu_dereference(wg->creating_net); -+ ret = !net || !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) ? -EPERM : 0; -+ rcu_read_unlock(); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ } - - ++wg->device_update_gen; - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ static void set_sock_opts(struct socket - - int wg_socket_init(struct wg_device *wg, u16 port) - { -+ struct net *net; - int ret; - struct udp_tunnel_sock_cfg cfg = { - .sk_user_data = wg, -@@ -371,37 +372,47 @@ int wg_socket_init(struct wg_device *wg, - }; - #endif - -+ rcu_read_lock(); -+ net = rcu_dereference(wg->creating_net); -+ net = net ? maybe_get_net(net) : NULL; -+ rcu_read_unlock(); -+ if (unlikely(!net)) -+ return -ENONET; -+ - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) - retry: - #endif - -- ret = udp_sock_create(wg->creating_net, &port4, &new4); -+ ret = udp_sock_create(net, &port4, &new4); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_err("%s: Could not create IPv4 socket\n", wg->dev->name); -- return ret; -+ goto out; - } - set_sock_opts(new4); -- setup_udp_tunnel_sock(wg->creating_net, new4, &cfg); -+ setup_udp_tunnel_sock(net, new4, &cfg); - - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) - if (ipv6_mod_enabled()) { - port6.local_udp_port = inet_sk(new4->sk)->inet_sport; -- ret = udp_sock_create(wg->creating_net, &port6, &new6); -+ ret = udp_sock_create(net, &port6, &new6); - if (ret < 0) { - udp_tunnel_sock_release(new4); - if (ret == -EADDRINUSE && !port && retries++ < 100) - goto retry; - pr_err("%s: Could not create IPv6 socket\n", - wg->dev->name); -- return ret; -+ goto out; - } - set_sock_opts(new6); -- setup_udp_tunnel_sock(wg->creating_net, new6, &cfg); -+ setup_udp_tunnel_sock(net, new6, &cfg); - } - #endif - - wg_socket_reinit(wg, new4->sk, new6 ? new6->sk : NULL); -- return 0; -+ ret = 0; -+out: -+ put_net(net); -+ return ret; - } - - void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device *wg, struct sock *new4, ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -587,9 +587,20 @@ ip0 link set wg0 up - kill $ncat_pid - ip0 link del wg0 - -+# Ensure there aren't circular reference loops -+ip1 link add wg1 type wireguard -+ip2 link add wg2 type wireguard -+ip1 link set wg1 netns $netns2 -+ip2 link set wg2 netns $netns1 -+pp ip netns delete $netns1 -+pp ip netns delete $netns2 -+pp ip netns add $netns1 -+pp ip netns add $netns2 -+ -+sleep 2 # Wait for cleanup and grace periods - declare -A objects - while read -t 0.1 -r line 2>/dev/null || [[ $? -ne 142 ]]; do -- [[ $line =~ .*(wg[0-9]+:\ [A-Z][a-z]+\ [0-9]+)\ .*(created|destroyed).* ]] || continue -+ [[ $line =~ .*(wg[0-9]+:\ [A-Z][a-z]+\ ?[0-9]*)\ .*(created|destroyed).* ]] || continue - objects["${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"]+="${BASH_REMATCH[2]}" - done < /dev/kmsg - alldeleted=1 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0108-wireguard-noise-do-not-assign-initiation-time-in-if-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0108-wireguard-noise-do-not-assign-initiation-time-in-if-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a53c764708 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0108-wireguard-noise-do-not-assign-initiation-time-in-if-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frank Werner-Krippendorf +Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 03:59:44 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: noise: do not assign initiation time in if + condition + +commit 558b353c9c2a717509f291c066c6bd8f5f5e21be upstream. + +Fixes an error condition reported by checkpatch.pl which caused by +assigning a variable in an if condition in wg_noise_handshake_consume_ +initiation(). + +Signed-off-by: Frank Werner-Krippendorf +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c +@@ -617,8 +617,8 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(st + memcpy(handshake->hash, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); + memcpy(handshake->chaining_key, chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN); + handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index; +- if ((s64)(handshake->last_initiation_consumption - +- (initiation_consumption = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns())) < 0) ++ initiation_consumption = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns(); ++ if ((s64)(handshake->last_initiation_consumption - initiation_consumption) < 0) + handshake->last_initiation_consumption = initiation_consumption; + handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION; + up_write(&handshake->lock); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0109-wireguard-device-avoid-circular-netns-references.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0109-wireguard-device-avoid-circular-netns-references.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..013023a3e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0109-wireguard-device-avoid-circular-netns-references.patch @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 03:59:45 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: device: avoid circular netns references + +commit 900575aa33a3eaaef802b31de187a85c4a4b4bd0 upstream. + +Before, we took a reference to the creating netns if the new netns was +different. This caused issues with circular references, with two +wireguard interfaces swapping namespaces. The solution is to rather not +take any extra references at all, but instead simply invalidate the +creating netns pointer when that netns is deleted. + +In order to prevent this from happening again, this commit improves the +rough object leak tracking by allowing it to account for created and +destroyed interfaces, aside from just peers and keys. That then makes it +possible to check for the object leak when having two interfaces take a +reference to each others' namespaces. + +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 58 ++++++++++------------ + drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | 3 +- + drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 14 ++++-- + drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 25 +++++++--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 13 ++++- + 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -45,17 +45,18 @@ static int wg_open(struct net_device *de + if (dev_v6) + dev_v6->cnf.addr_gen_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE; + ++ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); + ret = wg_socket_init(wg, wg->incoming_port); + if (ret < 0) +- return ret; +- mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ goto out; + list_for_each_entry(peer, &wg->peer_list, peer_list) { + wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); + if (peer->persistent_keepalive_interval) + wg_packet_send_keepalive(peer); + } ++out: + mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); +- return 0; ++ return ret; + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP +@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ static void wg_destruct(struct net_devic + list_del(&wg->device_list); + rtnl_unlock(); + mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->creating_net, NULL); + wg->incoming_port = 0; + wg_socket_reinit(wg, NULL, NULL); + /* The final references are cleared in the below calls to destroy_workqueue. */ +@@ -240,13 +242,11 @@ static void wg_destruct(struct net_devic + skb_queue_purge(&wg->incoming_handshakes); + free_percpu(dev->tstats); + free_percpu(wg->incoming_handshakes_worker); +- if (wg->have_creating_net_ref) +- put_net(wg->creating_net); + kvfree(wg->index_hashtable); + kvfree(wg->peer_hashtable); + mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); + +- pr_debug("%s: Interface deleted\n", dev->name); ++ pr_debug("%s: Interface destroyed\n", dev->name); + free_netdev(dev); + } + +@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_ne + struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); + int ret = -ENOMEM; + +- wg->creating_net = src_net; ++ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->creating_net, src_net); + init_rwsem(&wg->static_identity.lock); + mutex_init(&wg->socket_update_lock); + mutex_init(&wg->device_update_lock); +@@ -393,30 +393,26 @@ static struct rtnl_link_ops link_ops __r + .newlink = wg_newlink, + }; + +-static int wg_netdevice_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, +- unsigned long action, void *data) ++static void wg_netns_pre_exit(struct net *net) + { +- struct net_device *dev = ((struct netdev_notifier_info *)data)->dev; +- struct wg_device *wg = netdev_priv(dev); +- +- ASSERT_RTNL(); +- +- if (action != NETDEV_REGISTER || dev->netdev_ops != &netdev_ops) +- return 0; ++ struct wg_device *wg; + +- if (dev_net(dev) == wg->creating_net && wg->have_creating_net_ref) { +- put_net(wg->creating_net); +- wg->have_creating_net_ref = false; +- } else if (dev_net(dev) != wg->creating_net && +- !wg->have_creating_net_ref) { +- wg->have_creating_net_ref = true; +- get_net(wg->creating_net); ++ rtnl_lock(); ++ list_for_each_entry(wg, &device_list, device_list) { ++ if (rcu_access_pointer(wg->creating_net) == net) { ++ pr_debug("%s: Creating namespace exiting\n", wg->dev->name); ++ netif_carrier_off(wg->dev); ++ mutex_lock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ rcu_assign_pointer(wg->creating_net, NULL); ++ wg_socket_reinit(wg, NULL, NULL); ++ mutex_unlock(&wg->device_update_lock); ++ } + } +- return 0; ++ rtnl_unlock(); + } + +-static struct notifier_block netdevice_notifier = { +- .notifier_call = wg_netdevice_notification ++static struct pernet_operations pernet_ops = { ++ .pre_exit = wg_netns_pre_exit + }; + + int __init wg_device_init(void) +@@ -429,18 +425,18 @@ int __init wg_device_init(void) + return ret; + #endif + +- ret = register_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); ++ ret = register_pernet_device(&pernet_ops); + if (ret) + goto error_pm; + + ret = rtnl_link_register(&link_ops); + if (ret) +- goto error_netdevice; ++ goto error_pernet; + + return 0; + +-error_netdevice: +- unregister_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); ++error_pernet: ++ unregister_pernet_device(&pernet_ops); + error_pm: + #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP + unregister_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); +@@ -451,7 +447,7 @@ error_pm: + void wg_device_uninit(void) + { + rtnl_link_unregister(&link_ops); +- unregister_netdevice_notifier(&netdevice_notifier); ++ unregister_pernet_device(&pernet_ops); + #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP + unregister_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier); + #endif +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct wg_device { + struct net_device *dev; + struct crypt_queue encrypt_queue, decrypt_queue; + struct sock __rcu *sock4, *sock6; +- struct net *creating_net; ++ struct net __rcu *creating_net; + struct noise_static_identity static_identity; + struct workqueue_struct *handshake_receive_wq, *handshake_send_wq; + struct workqueue_struct *packet_crypt_wq; +@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ struct wg_device { + unsigned int num_peers, device_update_gen; + u32 fwmark; + u16 incoming_port; +- bool have_creating_net_ref; + }; + + int wg_device_init(void); +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c +@@ -517,11 +517,15 @@ static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff + if (flags & ~__WGDEVICE_F_ALL) + goto out; + +- ret = -EPERM; +- if ((info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] || +- info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]) && +- !ns_capable(wg->creating_net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) +- goto out; ++ if (info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] || info->attrs[WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK]) { ++ struct net *net; ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ net = rcu_dereference(wg->creating_net); ++ ret = !net || !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) ? -EPERM : 0; ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ if (ret) ++ goto out; ++ } + + ++wg->device_update_gen; + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c +@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ static void set_sock_opts(struct socket + + int wg_socket_init(struct wg_device *wg, u16 port) + { ++ struct net *net; + int ret; + struct udp_tunnel_sock_cfg cfg = { + .sk_user_data = wg, +@@ -371,37 +372,47 @@ int wg_socket_init(struct wg_device *wg, + }; + #endif + ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ net = rcu_dereference(wg->creating_net); ++ net = net ? maybe_get_net(net) : NULL; ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ if (unlikely(!net)) ++ return -ENONET; ++ + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + retry: + #endif + +- ret = udp_sock_create(wg->creating_net, &port4, &new4); ++ ret = udp_sock_create(net, &port4, &new4); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("%s: Could not create IPv4 socket\n", wg->dev->name); +- return ret; ++ goto out; + } + set_sock_opts(new4); +- setup_udp_tunnel_sock(wg->creating_net, new4, &cfg); ++ setup_udp_tunnel_sock(net, new4, &cfg); + + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + if (ipv6_mod_enabled()) { + port6.local_udp_port = inet_sk(new4->sk)->inet_sport; +- ret = udp_sock_create(wg->creating_net, &port6, &new6); ++ ret = udp_sock_create(net, &port6, &new6); + if (ret < 0) { + udp_tunnel_sock_release(new4); + if (ret == -EADDRINUSE && !port && retries++ < 100) + goto retry; + pr_err("%s: Could not create IPv6 socket\n", + wg->dev->name); +- return ret; ++ goto out; + } + set_sock_opts(new6); +- setup_udp_tunnel_sock(wg->creating_net, new6, &cfg); ++ setup_udp_tunnel_sock(net, new6, &cfg); + } + #endif + + wg_socket_reinit(wg, new4->sk, new6 ? new6->sk : NULL); +- return 0; ++ ret = 0; ++out: ++ put_net(net); ++ return ret; + } + + void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device *wg, struct sock *new4, +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -587,9 +587,20 @@ ip0 link set wg0 up + kill $ncat_pid + ip0 link del wg0 + ++# Ensure there aren't circular reference loops ++ip1 link add wg1 type wireguard ++ip2 link add wg2 type wireguard ++ip1 link set wg1 netns $netns2 ++ip2 link set wg2 netns $netns1 ++pp ip netns delete $netns1 ++pp ip netns delete $netns2 ++pp ip netns add $netns1 ++pp ip netns add $netns2 ++ ++sleep 2 # Wait for cleanup and grace periods + declare -A objects + while read -t 0.1 -r line 2>/dev/null || [[ $? -ne 142 ]]; do +- [[ $line =~ .*(wg[0-9]+:\ [A-Z][a-z]+\ [0-9]+)\ .*(created|destroyed).* ]] || continue ++ [[ $line =~ .*(wg[0-9]+:\ [A-Z][a-z]+\ ?[0-9]*)\ .*(created|destroyed).* ]] || continue + objects["${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"]+="${BASH_REMATCH[2]}" + done < /dev/kmsg + alldeleted=1 diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0109-wireguard-receive-account-for-napi_gro_receive-never.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0109-wireguard-receive-account-for-napi_gro_receive-never.patch deleted file mode 100644 index edcbc8a856..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0109-wireguard-receive-account-for-napi_gro_receive-never.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -From b7077a2f4d374d3f2108af9d0a1b94fd2c346ba7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 16:06:03 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 109/124] wireguard: receive: account for napi_gro_receive - never returning GRO_DROP - -commit df08126e3833e9dca19e2407db5f5860a7c194fb upstream. - -The napi_gro_receive function no longer returns GRO_DROP ever, making -handling GRO_DROP dead code. This commit removes that dead code. -Further, it's not even clear that device drivers have any business in -taking action after passing off received packets; that's arguably out of -their hands. - -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Fixes: 6570bc79c0df ("net: core: use listified Rx for GRO_NORMAL in napi_gro_receive()") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 10 ++-------- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -414,14 +414,8 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( - if (unlikely(routed_peer != peer)) - goto dishonest_packet_peer; - -- if (unlikely(napi_gro_receive(&peer->napi, skb) == GRO_DROP)) { -- ++dev->stats.rx_dropped; -- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Failed to give packet to userspace from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", -- dev->name, peer->internal_id, -- &peer->endpoint.addr); -- } else { -- update_rx_stats(peer, message_data_len(len_before_trim)); -- } -+ napi_gro_receive(&peer->napi, skb); -+ update_rx_stats(peer, message_data_len(len_before_trim)); - return; - - dishonest_packet_peer: diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0110-net-ip_tunnel-add-header_ops-for-layer-3-devices.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0110-net-ip_tunnel-add-header_ops-for-layer-3-devices.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4e925d7f99..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0110-net-ip_tunnel-add-header_ops-for-layer-3-devices.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -From 5effaa566cea8d862bf00ff81d2e3fa40521d296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 19:06:18 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 110/124] net: ip_tunnel: add header_ops for layer 3 devices - -commit 2606aff916854b61234bf85001be9777bab2d5f8 upstream. - -Some devices that take straight up layer 3 packets benefit from having a -shared header_ops so that AF_PACKET sockets can inject packets that are -recognized. This shared infrastructure will be used by other drivers -that currently can't inject packets using AF_PACKET. It also exposes the -parser function, as it is useful in standalone form too. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 3 +++ - net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) - ---- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h -+++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h -@@ -289,6 +289,9 @@ int ip_tunnel_newlink(struct net_device - struct ip_tunnel_parm *p, __u32 fwmark); - void ip_tunnel_setup(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int net_id); - -+extern const struct header_ops ip_tunnel_header_ops; -+__be16 ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(const struct sk_buff *skb); -+ - struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops { - size_t (*encap_hlen)(struct ip_tunnel_encap *e); - int (*build_header)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_tunnel_encap *e, ---- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c -+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c -@@ -446,3 +446,21 @@ void ip_tunnel_unneed_metadata(void) - static_branch_dec(&ip_tunnel_metadata_cnt); - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip_tunnel_unneed_metadata); -+ -+/* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */ -+__be16 ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(const struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && -+ (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <= skb_tail_pointer(skb) && -+ ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) -+ return htons(ETH_P_IP); -+ if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && -+ (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) <= skb_tail_pointer(skb) && -+ ipv6_hdr(skb)->version == 6) -+ return htons(ETH_P_IPV6); -+ return 0; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_tunnel_parse_protocol); -+ -+const struct header_ops ip_tunnel_header_ops = { .parse_protocol = ip_tunnel_parse_protocol }; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_tunnel_header_ops); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0110-wireguard-receive-account-for-napi_gro_receive-never.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0110-wireguard-receive-account-for-napi_gro_receive-never.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eceb0b9255 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0110-wireguard-receive-account-for-napi_gro_receive-never.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 16:06:03 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: receive: account for napi_gro_receive never + returning GRO_DROP + +commit df08126e3833e9dca19e2407db5f5860a7c194fb upstream. + +The napi_gro_receive function no longer returns GRO_DROP ever, making +handling GRO_DROP dead code. This commit removes that dead code. +Further, it's not even clear that device drivers have any business in +taking action after passing off received packets; that's arguably out of +their hands. + +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Fixes: 6570bc79c0df ("net: core: use listified Rx for GRO_NORMAL in napi_gro_receive()") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 10 ++-------- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -414,14 +414,8 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( + if (unlikely(routed_peer != peer)) + goto dishonest_packet_peer; + +- if (unlikely(napi_gro_receive(&peer->napi, skb) == GRO_DROP)) { +- ++dev->stats.rx_dropped; +- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Failed to give packet to userspace from peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", +- dev->name, peer->internal_id, +- &peer->endpoint.addr); +- } else { +- update_rx_stats(peer, message_data_len(len_before_trim)); +- } ++ napi_gro_receive(&peer->napi, skb); ++ update_rx_stats(peer, message_data_len(len_before_trim)); + return; + + dishonest_packet_peer: diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0111-net-ip_tunnel-add-header_ops-for-layer-3-devices.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0111-net-ip_tunnel-add-header_ops-for-layer-3-devices.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cfd6b1457c --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0111-net-ip_tunnel-add-header_ops-for-layer-3-devices.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 19:06:18 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] net: ip_tunnel: add header_ops for layer 3 devices + +commit 2606aff916854b61234bf85001be9777bab2d5f8 upstream. + +Some devices that take straight up layer 3 packets benefit from having a +shared header_ops so that AF_PACKET sockets can inject packets that are +recognized. This shared infrastructure will be used by other drivers +that currently can't inject packets using AF_PACKET. It also exposes the +parser function, as it is useful in standalone form too. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 3 +++ + net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) + +--- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h ++++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h +@@ -289,6 +289,9 @@ int ip_tunnel_newlink(struct net_device + struct ip_tunnel_parm *p, __u32 fwmark); + void ip_tunnel_setup(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int net_id); + ++extern const struct header_ops ip_tunnel_header_ops; ++__be16 ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(const struct sk_buff *skb); ++ + struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops { + size_t (*encap_hlen)(struct ip_tunnel_encap *e); + int (*build_header)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_tunnel_encap *e, +--- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c +@@ -446,3 +446,21 @@ void ip_tunnel_unneed_metadata(void) + static_branch_dec(&ip_tunnel_metadata_cnt); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip_tunnel_unneed_metadata); ++ ++/* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */ ++__be16 ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(const struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && ++ (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <= skb_tail_pointer(skb) && ++ ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) ++ return htons(ETH_P_IP); ++ if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && ++ (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) <= skb_tail_pointer(skb) && ++ ipv6_hdr(skb)->version == 6) ++ return htons(ETH_P_IPV6); ++ return 0; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_tunnel_parse_protocol); ++ ++const struct header_ops ip_tunnel_header_ops = { .parse_protocol = ip_tunnel_parse_protocol }; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_tunnel_header_ops); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0111-wireguard-implement-header_ops-parse_protocol-for-AF.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0111-wireguard-implement-header_ops-parse_protocol-for-AF.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4cc67a72a6..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0111-wireguard-implement-header_ops-parse_protocol-for-AF.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -From cf413ab742788eeb47e789934d492bb546aa4aa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 19:06:20 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 111/124] wireguard: implement header_ops->parse_protocol for - AF_PACKET - -commit 01a4967c71c004f8ecad4ab57021348636502fa9 upstream. - -WireGuard uses skb->protocol to determine packet type, and bails out if -it's not set or set to something it's not expecting. For AF_PACKET -injection, we need to support its call chain of: - - packet_sendmsg -> packet_snd -> packet_parse_headers -> - dev_parse_header_protocol -> parse_protocol - -Without a valid parse_protocol, this returns zero, and wireguard then -rejects the skb. So, this wires up the ip_tunnel handler for layer 3 -packets for that case. - -Reported-by: Hans Wippel -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ static void wg_setup(struct net_device * - max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr)); - - dev->netdev_ops = &netdev_ops; -+ dev->header_ops = &ip_tunnel_header_ops; - dev->hard_header_len = 0; - dev->addr_len = 0; - dev->needed_headroom = DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0112-wireguard-implement-header_ops-parse_protocol-for-AF.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0112-wireguard-implement-header_ops-parse_protocol-for-AF.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..415ecffeef --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0112-wireguard-implement-header_ops-parse_protocol-for-AF.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 19:06:20 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: implement header_ops->parse_protocol for AF_PACKET + +commit 01a4967c71c004f8ecad4ab57021348636502fa9 upstream. + +WireGuard uses skb->protocol to determine packet type, and bails out if +it's not set or set to something it's not expecting. For AF_PACKET +injection, we need to support its call chain of: + + packet_sendmsg -> packet_snd -> packet_parse_headers -> + dev_parse_header_protocol -> parse_protocol + +Without a valid parse_protocol, this returns zero, and wireguard then +rejects the skb. So, this wires up the ip_tunnel handler for layer 3 +packets for that case. + +Reported-by: Hans Wippel +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ static void wg_setup(struct net_device * + max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr)); + + dev->netdev_ops = &netdev_ops; ++ dev->header_ops = &ip_tunnel_header_ops; + dev->hard_header_len = 0; + dev->addr_len = 0; + dev->needed_headroom = DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0112-wireguard-queueing-make-use-of-ip_tunnel_parse_proto.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0112-wireguard-queueing-make-use-of-ip_tunnel_parse_proto.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1f8766c9e1..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0112-wireguard-queueing-make-use-of-ip_tunnel_parse_proto.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -From 83313326c87e7c1aacebce4f8411505e2b68bf25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 19:06:21 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 112/124] wireguard: queueing: make use of - ip_tunnel_parse_protocol - -commit 1a574074ae7d1d745c16f7710655f38a53174c27 upstream. - -Now that wg_examine_packet_protocol has been added for general -consumption as ip_tunnel_parse_protocol, it's possible to remove -wg_examine_packet_protocol and simply use the new -ip_tunnel_parse_protocol function directly. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 19 ++----------------- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 +- - 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - struct wg_device; - struct wg_peer; -@@ -65,25 +66,9 @@ struct packet_cb { - #define PACKET_CB(skb) ((struct packet_cb *)((skb)->cb)) - #define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer) - --/* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */ --static inline __be16 wg_examine_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb) --{ -- if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && -- (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <= -- skb_tail_pointer(skb) && -- ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) -- return htons(ETH_P_IP); -- if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && -- (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) <= -- skb_tail_pointer(skb) && -- ipv6_hdr(skb)->version == 6) -- return htons(ETH_P_IPV6); -- return 0; --} -- - static inline bool wg_check_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb) - { -- __be16 real_protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); -+ __be16 real_protocol = ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(skb); - return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol; - } - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( - */ - skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; - skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */ -- skb->protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); -+ skb->protocol = ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(skb); - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { - len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); - if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0113-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0113-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f343ed8f41..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0113-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -From 605843f571026155514f83127885ae81b83479ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Berg -Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 10:17:31 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 113/124] netlink: consistently use NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() - -commit 8140860c817f3e9f78bcd1e420b9777ddcbaa629 upstream. - -Change places that open-code NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() to -use the macro instead, giving us flexibility in how we -handle the details of the macro. - -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg -Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -[Jason: only picked the drivers/net/wireguard/* part] -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 10 +++++----- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ static struct genl_family genl_family; - static const struct nla_policy device_policy[WGDEVICE_A_MAX + 1] = { - [WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, - [WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING, .len = IFNAMSIZ - 1 }, -- [WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, -- [WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, -+ [WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), -+ [WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), - [WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, - [WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, - [WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, -@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy device_po - }; - - static const struct nla_policy peer_policy[WGPEER_A_MAX + 1] = { -- [WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, -- [WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN }, -+ [WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), -+ [WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN), - [WGPEER_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, - [WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct sockaddr) }, - [WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, -- [WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct __kernel_timespec) }, -+ [WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(sizeof(struct __kernel_timespec)), - [WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, - [WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, - [WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0113-wireguard-queueing-make-use-of-ip_tunnel_parse_proto.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0113-wireguard-queueing-make-use-of-ip_tunnel_parse_proto.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a777732ce7 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0113-wireguard-queueing-make-use-of-ip_tunnel_parse_proto.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 19:06:21 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: make use of ip_tunnel_parse_protocol + +commit 1a574074ae7d1d745c16f7710655f38a53174c27 upstream. + +Now that wg_examine_packet_protocol has been added for general +consumption as ip_tunnel_parse_protocol, it's possible to remove +wg_examine_packet_protocol and simply use the new +ip_tunnel_parse_protocol function directly. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 19 ++----------------- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h +@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + struct wg_device; + struct wg_peer; +@@ -65,25 +66,9 @@ struct packet_cb { + #define PACKET_CB(skb) ((struct packet_cb *)((skb)->cb)) + #define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer) + +-/* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */ +-static inline __be16 wg_examine_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb) +-{ +- if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && +- (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <= +- skb_tail_pointer(skb) && +- ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) +- return htons(ETH_P_IP); +- if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head && +- (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) <= +- skb_tail_pointer(skb) && +- ipv6_hdr(skb)->version == 6) +- return htons(ETH_P_IPV6); +- return 0; +-} +- + static inline bool wg_check_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb) + { +- __be16 real_protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); ++ __be16 real_protocol = ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(skb); + return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol; + } + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done( + */ + skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; + skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */ +- skb->protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); ++ skb->protocol = ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(skb); + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { + len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); + if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0114-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0114-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b2712bb2d --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0114-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Johannes Berg +Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 10:17:31 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] netlink: consistently use NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() + +commit 8140860c817f3e9f78bcd1e420b9777ddcbaa629 upstream. + +Change places that open-code NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() to +use the macro instead, giving us flexibility in how we +handle the details of the macro. + +Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg +Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +[Jason: only picked the drivers/net/wireguard/* part] +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c +@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ static struct genl_family genl_family; + static const struct nla_policy device_policy[WGDEVICE_A_MAX + 1] = { + [WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING, .len = IFNAMSIZ - 1 }, +- [WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, +- [WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, ++ [WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), ++ [WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), + [WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, + [WGDEVICE_A_FWMARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, +@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy device_po + }; + + static const struct nla_policy peer_policy[WGPEER_A_MAX + 1] = { +- [WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN }, +- [WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN }, ++ [WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), ++ [WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN), + [WGPEER_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct sockaddr) }, + [WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, +- [WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME] = { .type = NLA_EXACT_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct __kernel_timespec) }, ++ [WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(sizeof(struct __kernel_timespec)), + [WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, + [WGPEER_A_TX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, + [WGPEER_A_ALLOWEDIPS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0114-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0114-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a859e7c72b..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0114-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -From 2c778b2cd59a12f0dcba236e6441a318d1c6486c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Berg -Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 10:17:32 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 114/124] netlink: consistently use NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN() - -commit bc0435855041d7fff0b83dd992fc4be34aa11afb upstream. - -Change places that open-code NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN() to -use the macro instead, giving us flexibility in how we -handle the details of the macro. - -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -[Jason: only picked the drivers/net/wireguard/* part] -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c -@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy peer_poli - [WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), - [WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN), - [WGPEER_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, -- [WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct sockaddr) }, -+ [WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT] = NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN(sizeof(struct sockaddr)), - [WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, - [WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(sizeof(struct __kernel_timespec)), - [WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, -@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy peer_poli - - static const struct nla_policy allowedip_policy[WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX + 1] = { - [WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, -- [WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) }, -+ [WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR] = NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN(sizeof(struct in_addr)), - [WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U8 } - }; - diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0115-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0115-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b414bc309 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0115-netlink-consistently-use-NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Johannes Berg +Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 10:17:32 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] netlink: consistently use NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN() + +commit bc0435855041d7fff0b83dd992fc4be34aa11afb upstream. + +Change places that open-code NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN() to +use the macro instead, giving us flexibility in how we +handle the details of the macro. + +Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +[Jason: only picked the drivers/net/wireguard/* part] +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c +@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy peer_poli + [WGPEER_A_PUBLIC_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), + [WGPEER_A_PRESHARED_KEY] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN), + [WGPEER_A_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, +- [WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct sockaddr) }, ++ [WGPEER_A_ENDPOINT] = NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN(sizeof(struct sockaddr)), + [WGPEER_A_PERSISTENT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, + [WGPEER_A_LAST_HANDSHAKE_TIME] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(sizeof(struct __kernel_timespec)), + [WGPEER_A_RX_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, +@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy peer_poli + + static const struct nla_policy allowedip_policy[WGALLOWEDIP_A_MAX + 1] = { + [WGALLOWEDIP_A_FAMILY] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, +- [WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) }, ++ [WGALLOWEDIP_A_IPADDR] = NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN(sizeof(struct in_addr)), + [WGALLOWEDIP_A_CIDR_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U8 } + }; + diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0115-wireguard-noise-take-lock-when-removing-handshake-en.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0115-wireguard-noise-take-lock-when-removing-handshake-en.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 74448edfe0..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0115-wireguard-noise-take-lock-when-removing-handshake-en.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,127 +0,0 @@ -From 9d4c0f8cd4cca2c65c7927f839469d6c1bef088f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 13:58:14 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 115/124] wireguard: noise: take lock when removing handshake - entry from table - -commit 9179ba31367bcf481c3c79b5f028c94faad9f30a upstream. - -Eric reported that syzkaller found a race of this variety: - -CPU 1 CPU 2 --------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------- -wg_index_hashtable_replace(old, ...) | - if (hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash)) | - | wg_index_hashtable_remove(old) - | hlist_del_init_rcu(&old->index_hash) - | old->index_hash.pprev = NULL - hlist_replace_rcu(&old->index_hash, ...) | - *old->index_hash.pprev | - -Syzbot wasn't actually able to reproduce this more than once or create a -reproducer, because the race window between checking "hlist_unhashed" and -calling "hlist_replace_rcu" is just so small. Adding an mdelay(5) or -similar there helps make this demonstrable using this simple script: - - #!/bin/bash - set -ex - trap 'kill $pid1; kill $pid2; ip link del wg0; ip link del wg1' EXIT - ip link add wg0 type wireguard - ip link add wg1 type wireguard - wg set wg0 private-key <(wg genkey) listen-port 9999 - wg set wg1 private-key <(wg genkey) peer $(wg show wg0 public-key) endpoint 127.0.0.1:9999 persistent-keepalive 1 - wg set wg0 peer $(wg show wg1 public-key) - ip link set wg0 up - yes link set wg1 up | ip -force -batch - & - pid1=$! - yes link set wg1 down | ip -force -batch - & - pid2=$! - wait - -The fundumental underlying problem is that we permit calls to wg_index_ -hashtable_remove(handshake.entry) without requiring the caller to take -the handshake mutex that is intended to protect members of handshake -during mutations. This is consistently the case with calls to wg_index_ -hashtable_insert(handshake.entry) and wg_index_hashtable_replace( -handshake.entry), but it's missing from a pertinent callsite of wg_ -index_hashtable_remove(handshake.entry). So, this patch makes sure that -mutex is taken. - -The original code was a little bit funky though, in the form of: - - remove(handshake.entry) - lock(), memzero(handshake.some_members), unlock() - remove(handshake.entry) - -The original intention of that double removal pattern outside the lock -appears to be some attempt to prevent insertions that might happen while -locks are dropped during expensive crypto operations, but actually, all -callers of wg_index_hashtable_insert(handshake.entry) take the write -lock and then explicitly check handshake.state, as they should, which -the aforementioned memzero clears, which means an insertion should -already be impossible. And regardless, the original intention was -necessarily racy, since it wasn't guaranteed that something else would -run after the unlock() instead of after the remove(). So, from a -soundness perspective, it seems positive to remove what looks like a -hack at best. - -The crash from both syzbot and from the script above is as follows: - - general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN - KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] - CPU: 0 PID: 7395 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 - Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 - Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker - RIP: 0010:hlist_replace_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:505 [inline] - RIP: 0010:wg_index_hashtable_replace+0x176/0x330 drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c:174 - Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 80 3c 01 00 0f 85 44 01 00 00 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 45 10 48 89 c6 48 c1 ee 03 <80> 3c 0e 00 0f 85 06 01 00 00 48 85 d2 4c 89 28 74 47 e8 a3 4f b5 - RSP: 0018:ffffc90006a97bf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 - RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888050ffc4f8 RCX: dffffc0000000000 - RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808e04e010 - RBP: ffff88808e04e000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880543d0000 - R10: ffffed100a87a000 R11: 000000000000016e R12: ffff8880543d0000 - R13: ffff88808e04e008 R14: ffff888050ffc508 R15: ffff888050ffc500 - FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 - CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 - CR2: 00000000f5505db0 CR3: 0000000097cf7000 CR4: 00000000001526f0 - DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 - DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 - Call Trace: - wg_noise_handshake_begin_session+0x752/0xc9a drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c:820 - wg_receive_handshake_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:183 [inline] - wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker+0x33b/0x730 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:220 - process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 - worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 - kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292 - ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294 - -Reported-by: syzbot -Reported-by: Eric Dumazet -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/wireguard/20200908145911.4090480-1-edumazet@google.com/ -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 5 +---- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c -@@ -87,15 +87,12 @@ static void handshake_zero(struct noise_ - - void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake) - { -+ down_write(&handshake->lock); - wg_index_hashtable_remove( - handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, - &handshake->entry); -- down_write(&handshake->lock); - handshake_zero(handshake); - up_write(&handshake->lock); -- wg_index_hashtable_remove( -- handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, -- &handshake->entry); - } - - static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wg_peer *peer) diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0116-wireguard-noise-take-lock-when-removing-handshake-en.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0116-wireguard-noise-take-lock-when-removing-handshake-en.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e80528c91b --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0116-wireguard-noise-take-lock-when-removing-handshake-en.patch @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 13:58:14 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: noise: take lock when removing handshake entry + from table + +commit 9179ba31367bcf481c3c79b5f028c94faad9f30a upstream. + +Eric reported that syzkaller found a race of this variety: + +CPU 1 CPU 2 +-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------- +wg_index_hashtable_replace(old, ...) | + if (hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash)) | + | wg_index_hashtable_remove(old) + | hlist_del_init_rcu(&old->index_hash) + | old->index_hash.pprev = NULL + hlist_replace_rcu(&old->index_hash, ...) | + *old->index_hash.pprev | + +Syzbot wasn't actually able to reproduce this more than once or create a +reproducer, because the race window between checking "hlist_unhashed" and +calling "hlist_replace_rcu" is just so small. Adding an mdelay(5) or +similar there helps make this demonstrable using this simple script: + + #!/bin/bash + set -ex + trap 'kill $pid1; kill $pid2; ip link del wg0; ip link del wg1' EXIT + ip link add wg0 type wireguard + ip link add wg1 type wireguard + wg set wg0 private-key <(wg genkey) listen-port 9999 + wg set wg1 private-key <(wg genkey) peer $(wg show wg0 public-key) endpoint 127.0.0.1:9999 persistent-keepalive 1 + wg set wg0 peer $(wg show wg1 public-key) + ip link set wg0 up + yes link set wg1 up | ip -force -batch - & + pid1=$! + yes link set wg1 down | ip -force -batch - & + pid2=$! + wait + +The fundumental underlying problem is that we permit calls to wg_index_ +hashtable_remove(handshake.entry) without requiring the caller to take +the handshake mutex that is intended to protect members of handshake +during mutations. This is consistently the case with calls to wg_index_ +hashtable_insert(handshake.entry) and wg_index_hashtable_replace( +handshake.entry), but it's missing from a pertinent callsite of wg_ +index_hashtable_remove(handshake.entry). So, this patch makes sure that +mutex is taken. + +The original code was a little bit funky though, in the form of: + + remove(handshake.entry) + lock(), memzero(handshake.some_members), unlock() + remove(handshake.entry) + +The original intention of that double removal pattern outside the lock +appears to be some attempt to prevent insertions that might happen while +locks are dropped during expensive crypto operations, but actually, all +callers of wg_index_hashtable_insert(handshake.entry) take the write +lock and then explicitly check handshake.state, as they should, which +the aforementioned memzero clears, which means an insertion should +already be impossible. And regardless, the original intention was +necessarily racy, since it wasn't guaranteed that something else would +run after the unlock() instead of after the remove(). So, from a +soundness perspective, it seems positive to remove what looks like a +hack at best. + +The crash from both syzbot and from the script above is as follows: + + general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN + KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] + CPU: 0 PID: 7395 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 + Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 + Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker + RIP: 0010:hlist_replace_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:505 [inline] + RIP: 0010:wg_index_hashtable_replace+0x176/0x330 drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c:174 + Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 80 3c 01 00 0f 85 44 01 00 00 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 45 10 48 89 c6 48 c1 ee 03 <80> 3c 0e 00 0f 85 06 01 00 00 48 85 d2 4c 89 28 74 47 e8 a3 4f b5 + RSP: 0018:ffffc90006a97bf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 + RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888050ffc4f8 RCX: dffffc0000000000 + RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808e04e010 + RBP: ffff88808e04e000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880543d0000 + R10: ffffed100a87a000 R11: 000000000000016e R12: ffff8880543d0000 + R13: ffff88808e04e008 R14: ffff888050ffc508 R15: ffff888050ffc500 + FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 + CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 + CR2: 00000000f5505db0 CR3: 0000000097cf7000 CR4: 00000000001526f0 + DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 + DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 + Call Trace: + wg_noise_handshake_begin_session+0x752/0xc9a drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c:820 + wg_receive_handshake_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:183 [inline] + wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker+0x33b/0x730 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:220 + process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 + worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 + kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292 + ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294 + +Reported-by: syzbot +Reported-by: Eric Dumazet +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/wireguard/20200908145911.4090480-1-edumazet@google.com/ +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 5 +---- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c +@@ -87,15 +87,12 @@ static void handshake_zero(struct noise_ + + void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake) + { ++ down_write(&handshake->lock); + wg_index_hashtable_remove( + handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, + &handshake->entry); +- down_write(&handshake->lock); + handshake_zero(handshake); + up_write(&handshake->lock); +- wg_index_hashtable_remove( +- handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, +- &handshake->entry); + } + + static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wg_peer *peer) diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0116-wireguard-peerlookup-take-lock-before-checking-hash-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0116-wireguard-peerlookup-take-lock-before-checking-hash-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b329d41688..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0116-wireguard-peerlookup-take-lock-before-checking-hash-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -From 1f5495019fce5680d54f94204500ee59d43fa15a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 13:58:15 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 116/124] wireguard: peerlookup: take lock before checking hash - in replace operation - -commit 6147f7b1e90ff09bd52afc8b9206a7fcd133daf7 upstream. - -Eric's suggested fix for the previous commit's mentioned race condition -was to simply take the table->lock in wg_index_hashtable_replace(). The -table->lock of the hash table is supposed to protect the bucket heads, -not the entires, but actually, since all the mutator functions are -already taking it, it makes sense to take it too for the test to -hlist_unhashed, as a defense in depth measure, so that it no longer -races with deletions, regardless of what other locks are protecting -individual entries. This is sensible from a performance perspective -because, as Eric pointed out, the case of being unhashed is already the -unlikely case, so this won't add common contention. And comparing -instructions, this basically doesn't make much of a difference other -than pushing and popping %r13, used by the new `bool ret`. More -generally, I like the idea of locking consistency across table mutator -functions, and this might let me rest slightly easier at night. - -Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/wireguard/20200908145911.4090480-1-edumazet@google.com/ -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c | 11 ++++++++--- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c -@@ -167,9 +167,13 @@ bool wg_index_hashtable_replace(struct i - struct index_hashtable_entry *old, - struct index_hashtable_entry *new) - { -- if (unlikely(hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash))) -- return false; -+ bool ret; -+ - spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); -+ ret = !hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash); -+ if (unlikely(!ret)) -+ goto out; -+ - new->index = old->index; - hlist_replace_rcu(&old->index_hash, &new->index_hash); - -@@ -180,8 +184,9 @@ bool wg_index_hashtable_replace(struct i - * simply gets dropped, which isn't terrible. - */ - INIT_HLIST_NODE(&old->index_hash); -+out: - spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); -- return true; -+ return ret; - } - - void wg_index_hashtable_remove(struct index_hashtable *table, diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0117-wireguard-peerlookup-take-lock-before-checking-hash-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0117-wireguard-peerlookup-take-lock-before-checking-hash-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e7f46ddf9c --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0117-wireguard-peerlookup-take-lock-before-checking-hash-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 13:58:15 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: peerlookup: take lock before checking hash in + replace operation + +commit 6147f7b1e90ff09bd52afc8b9206a7fcd133daf7 upstream. + +Eric's suggested fix for the previous commit's mentioned race condition +was to simply take the table->lock in wg_index_hashtable_replace(). The +table->lock of the hash table is supposed to protect the bucket heads, +not the entires, but actually, since all the mutator functions are +already taking it, it makes sense to take it too for the test to +hlist_unhashed, as a defense in depth measure, so that it no longer +races with deletions, regardless of what other locks are protecting +individual entries. This is sensible from a performance perspective +because, as Eric pointed out, the case of being unhashed is already the +unlikely case, so this won't add common contention. And comparing +instructions, this basically doesn't make much of a difference other +than pushing and popping %r13, used by the new `bool ret`. More +generally, I like the idea of locking consistency across table mutator +functions, and this might let me rest slightly easier at night. + +Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/wireguard/20200908145911.4090480-1-edumazet@google.com/ +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c +@@ -167,9 +167,13 @@ bool wg_index_hashtable_replace(struct i + struct index_hashtable_entry *old, + struct index_hashtable_entry *new) + { +- if (unlikely(hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash))) +- return false; ++ bool ret; ++ + spin_lock_bh(&table->lock); ++ ret = !hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash); ++ if (unlikely(!ret)) ++ goto out; ++ + new->index = old->index; + hlist_replace_rcu(&old->index_hash, &new->index_hash); + +@@ -180,8 +184,9 @@ bool wg_index_hashtable_replace(struct i + * simply gets dropped, which isn't terrible. + */ + INIT_HLIST_NODE(&old->index_hash); ++out: + spin_unlock_bh(&table->lock); +- return true; ++ return ret; + } + + void wg_index_hashtable_remove(struct index_hashtable *table, diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0117-wireguard-selftests-check-that-route_me_harder-packe.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0117-wireguard-selftests-check-that-route_me_harder-packe.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8a6e75b56f..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0117-wireguard-selftests-check-that-route_me_harder-packe.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -From 7e687dff94e8acf478f787c75007d180c9c2dcc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 03:56:05 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 117/124] wireguard: selftests: check that route_me_harder - packets use the right sk - -commit af8afcf1fdd5f365f70e2386c2d8c7a1abd853d7 upstream. - -If netfilter changes the packet mark, the packet is rerouted. The -ip_route_me_harder family of functions fails to use the right sk, opting -to instead use skb->sk, resulting in a routing loop when used with -tunnels. With the next change fixing this issue in netfilter, test for -the relevant condition inside our test suite, since wireguard was where -the bug was discovered. - -Reported-by: Chen Minqiang -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 8 ++++++++ - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 2 ++ - 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -316,6 +316,14 @@ pp sleep 3 - n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 - n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" persistent-keepalive 0 - -+# Test that sk_bound_dev_if works -+n1 ping -I wg0 -c 1 -W 1 192.168.241.2 -+# What about when the mark changes and the packet must be rerouted? -+n1 iptables -t mangle -I OUTPUT -j MARK --set-xmark 1 -+n1 ping -c 1 -W 1 192.168.241.2 # First the boring case -+n1 ping -I wg0 -c 1 -W 1 192.168.241.2 # Then the sk_bound_dev_if case -+n1 iptables -t mangle -D OUTPUT -j MARK --set-xmark 1 -+ - # Test that onion routing works, even when it loops - n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" allowed-ips 192.168.242.2/32 endpoint 192.168.241.2:5 - ip1 addr add 192.168.242.1/24 dev wg0 ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config -@@ -18,10 +18,12 @@ CONFIG_NF_NAT=y - CONFIG_NETFILTER_XTABLES=y - CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_NAT=y - CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_LENGTH=y -+CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MARK=y - CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_IPV4=y - CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4=y - CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES=y - CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER=y -+CONFIG_IP_NF_MANGLE=y - CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT=y - CONFIG_IP_ADVANCED_ROUTER=y - CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0118-wireguard-avoid-double-unlikely-notation-when-using-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0118-wireguard-avoid-double-unlikely-notation-when-using-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b461b771dd..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0118-wireguard-avoid-double-unlikely-notation-when-using-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -From 6f5f2660a44325a75ff2ccbf799103c3613e78bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Antonio Quartulli -Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:43 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 118/124] wireguard: avoid double unlikely() notation when - using IS_ERR() - -commit 30ac4e2f54ec067b7b9ca0db27e75681581378d6 upstream. - -The definition of IS_ERR() already applies the unlikely() notation -when checking the error status of the passed pointer. For this -reason there is no need to have the same notation outside of -IS_ERR() itself. - -Clean up code by removing redundant notation. - -Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 2 +- - drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 4 ++-- - 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf - } else { - struct sk_buff *segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, 0); - -- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(segs))) { -+ if (IS_ERR(segs)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(segs); - goto err_peer; - } ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s - ip_rt_put(rt); - rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sock), &fl, sock); - } -- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(rt))) { -+ if (IS_ERR(rt)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(rt); - net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", - wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); -@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int send6(struct wg_device *wg, s - } - dst = ipv6_stub->ipv6_dst_lookup_flow(sock_net(sock), sock, &fl, - NULL); -- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(dst))) { -+ if (IS_ERR(dst)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(dst); - net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", - wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0118-wireguard-selftests-check-that-route_me_harder-packe.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0118-wireguard-selftests-check-that-route_me_harder-packe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..09c1b0b8f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0118-wireguard-selftests-check-that-route_me_harder-packe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 03:56:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: check that route_me_harder packets use + the right sk + +commit af8afcf1fdd5f365f70e2386c2d8c7a1abd853d7 upstream. + +If netfilter changes the packet mark, the packet is rerouted. The +ip_route_me_harder family of functions fails to use the right sk, opting +to instead use skb->sk, resulting in a routing loop when used with +tunnels. With the next change fixing this issue in netfilter, test for +the relevant condition inside our test suite, since wireguard was where +the bug was discovered. + +Reported-by: Chen Minqiang +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 8 ++++++++ + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -316,6 +316,14 @@ pp sleep 3 + n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 + n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" persistent-keepalive 0 + ++# Test that sk_bound_dev_if works ++n1 ping -I wg0 -c 1 -W 1 192.168.241.2 ++# What about when the mark changes and the packet must be rerouted? ++n1 iptables -t mangle -I OUTPUT -j MARK --set-xmark 1 ++n1 ping -c 1 -W 1 192.168.241.2 # First the boring case ++n1 ping -I wg0 -c 1 -W 1 192.168.241.2 # Then the sk_bound_dev_if case ++n1 iptables -t mangle -D OUTPUT -j MARK --set-xmark 1 ++ + # Test that onion routing works, even when it loops + n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" allowed-ips 192.168.242.2/32 endpoint 192.168.241.2:5 + ip1 addr add 192.168.242.1/24 dev wg0 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config +@@ -18,10 +18,12 @@ CONFIG_NF_NAT=y + CONFIG_NETFILTER_XTABLES=y + CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_NAT=y + CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_LENGTH=y ++CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MARK=y + CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_IPV4=y + CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4=y + CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES=y + CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER=y ++CONFIG_IP_NF_MANGLE=y + CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT=y + CONFIG_IP_ADVANCED_ROUTER=y + CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0119-wireguard-avoid-double-unlikely-notation-when-using-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0119-wireguard-avoid-double-unlikely-notation-when-using-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7dfc1bb919 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0119-wireguard-avoid-double-unlikely-notation-when-using-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Antonio Quartulli +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: avoid double unlikely() notation when using + IS_ERR() + +commit 30ac4e2f54ec067b7b9ca0db27e75681581378d6 upstream. + +The definition of IS_ERR() already applies the unlikely() notation +when checking the error status of the passed pointer. For this +reason there is no need to have the same notation outside of +IS_ERR() itself. + +Clean up code by removing redundant notation. + +Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 2 +- + drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf + } else { + struct sk_buff *segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, 0); + +- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(segs))) { ++ if (IS_ERR(segs)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(segs); + goto err_peer; + } +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c +@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s + ip_rt_put(rt); + rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sock), &fl, sock); + } +- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(rt))) { ++ if (IS_ERR(rt)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(rt); + net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", + wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); +@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int send6(struct wg_device *wg, s + } + dst = ipv6_stub->ipv6_dst_lookup_flow(sock_net(sock), sock, &fl, + NULL); +- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(dst))) { ++ if (IS_ERR(dst)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dst); + net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n", + wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0119-wireguard-socket-remove-bogus-__be32-annotation.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0119-wireguard-socket-remove-bogus-__be32-annotation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c497ce5719..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0119-wireguard-socket-remove-bogus-__be32-annotation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From 03928cbd7e0c7906c7ab2a490e31d89d6ae3965a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jann Horn -Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:44 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 119/124] wireguard: socket: remove bogus __be32 annotation - -commit 7f57bd8dc22de35ddd895294aa554003e4f19a72 upstream. - -The endpoint->src_if4 has nothing to do with fixed-endian numbers; remove -the bogus annotation. - -This was introduced in -https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-monolithic-historical/commit?id=14e7d0a499a676ec55176c0de2f9fcbd34074a82 -in the historical WireGuard repo because the old code used to -zero-initialize multiple members as follows: - - endpoint->src4.s_addr = endpoint->src_if4 = fl.saddr = 0; - -Because fl.saddr is fixed-endian and an assignment returns a value with the -type of its left operand, this meant that sparse detected an assignment -between values of different endianness. - -Since then, this assignment was already split up into separate statements; -just the cast survived. - -Signed-off-by: Jann Horn -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c -@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s - if (unlikely(!inet_confirm_addr(sock_net(sock), NULL, 0, - fl.saddr, RT_SCOPE_HOST))) { - endpoint->src4.s_addr = 0; -- *(__force __be32 *)&endpoint->src_if4 = 0; -+ endpoint->src_if4 = 0; - fl.saddr = 0; - if (cache) - dst_cache_reset(cache); -@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s - PTR_ERR(rt) == -EINVAL) || (!IS_ERR(rt) && - rt->dst.dev->ifindex != endpoint->src_if4)))) { - endpoint->src4.s_addr = 0; -- *(__force __be32 *)&endpoint->src_if4 = 0; -+ endpoint->src_if4 = 0; - fl.saddr = 0; - if (cache) - dst_cache_reset(cache); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0120-wireguard-selftests-test-multiple-parallel-streams.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0120-wireguard-selftests-test-multiple-parallel-streams.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 269f30f885..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0120-wireguard-selftests-test-multiple-parallel-streams.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From 5c4e6ed057bcaa6ece0386344ba787d88c8307d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 120/124] wireguard: selftests: test multiple parallel streams - -commit d5a49aa6c3e264a93a7d08485d66e346be0969dd upstream. - -In order to test ndo_start_xmit being called in parallel, explicitly add -separate tests, which should all run on different cores. This should -help tease out bugs associated with queueing up packets from different -cores in parallel. Currently, it hasn't found those types of bugs, but -given future planned work, this is a useful regression to avoid. - -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 15 ++++++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh -@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 - ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; } - ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; } - sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; } --waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlpH 'sport = 5201') != *\"iperf3\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } -+waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:${3:-5201} pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlpH "sport = ${3:-5201}") != *\"iperf3\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } - waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulpH 'sport = 1111') != *\"ncat\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } - waitiface() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for $2 to come up"; ip netns exec "$1" bash -c "while [[ \$(< \"/sys/class/net/$2/operstate\") != up ]]; do read -t .1 -N 0 || true; done;"; } - -@@ -141,6 +141,19 @@ tests() { - n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::2 & - waitiperf $netns2 $! - n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c fd00::2 -+ -+ # TCP over IPv4, in parallel -+ for max in 4 5 50; do -+ local pids=( ) -+ for ((i=0; i < max; ++i)) do -+ n2 iperf3 -p $(( 5200 + i )) -s -1 -B 192.168.241.2 & -+ pids+=( $! ); waitiperf $netns2 $! $(( 5200 + i )) -+ done -+ for ((i=0; i < max; ++i)) do -+ n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -p $(( 5200 + i )) -c 192.168.241.2 & -+ done -+ wait "${pids[@]}" -+ done - } - - [[ $(ip1 link show dev wg0) =~ mtu\ ([0-9]+) ]] && orig_mtu="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0120-wireguard-socket-remove-bogus-__be32-annotation.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0120-wireguard-socket-remove-bogus-__be32-annotation.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1796f54de9 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0120-wireguard-socket-remove-bogus-__be32-annotation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jann Horn +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:44 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: socket: remove bogus __be32 annotation + +commit 7f57bd8dc22de35ddd895294aa554003e4f19a72 upstream. + +The endpoint->src_if4 has nothing to do with fixed-endian numbers; remove +the bogus annotation. + +This was introduced in +https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-monolithic-historical/commit?id=14e7d0a499a676ec55176c0de2f9fcbd34074a82 +in the historical WireGuard repo because the old code used to +zero-initialize multiple members as follows: + + endpoint->src4.s_addr = endpoint->src_if4 = fl.saddr = 0; + +Because fl.saddr is fixed-endian and an assignment returns a value with the +type of its left operand, this meant that sparse detected an assignment +between values of different endianness. + +Since then, this assignment was already split up into separate statements; +just the cast survived. + +Signed-off-by: Jann Horn +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s + if (unlikely(!inet_confirm_addr(sock_net(sock), NULL, 0, + fl.saddr, RT_SCOPE_HOST))) { + endpoint->src4.s_addr = 0; +- *(__force __be32 *)&endpoint->src_if4 = 0; ++ endpoint->src_if4 = 0; + fl.saddr = 0; + if (cache) + dst_cache_reset(cache); +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s + PTR_ERR(rt) == -EINVAL) || (!IS_ERR(rt) && + rt->dst.dev->ifindex != endpoint->src_if4)))) { + endpoint->src4.s_addr = 0; +- *(__force __be32 *)&endpoint->src_if4 = 0; ++ endpoint->src_if4 = 0; + fl.saddr = 0; + if (cache) + dst_cache_reset(cache); diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0121-wireguard-peer-put-frequently-used-members-above-cac.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0121-wireguard-peer-put-frequently-used-members-above-cac.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bd4fd77380..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0121-wireguard-peer-put-frequently-used-members-above-cac.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -From a13827e9091c07e25cdeec9a402d74a27e2a1111 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 121/124] wireguard: peer: put frequently used members above - cache lines - -commit 5a0598695634a6bb4126818902dd9140cd9df8b6 upstream. - -The is_dead boolean is checked for every single packet, while the -internal_id member is used basically only for pr_debug messages. So it -makes sense to hoist up is_dead into some space formerly unused by a -struct hole, while demoting internal_api to below the lowest struct -cache line. - -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h -@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct wg_peer { - struct crypt_queue tx_queue, rx_queue; - struct sk_buff_head staged_packet_queue; - int serial_work_cpu; -+ bool is_dead; - struct noise_keypairs keypairs; - struct endpoint endpoint; - struct dst_cache endpoint_cache; -@@ -61,9 +62,8 @@ struct wg_peer { - struct rcu_head rcu; - struct list_head peer_list; - struct list_head allowedips_list; -- u64 internal_id; - struct napi_struct napi; -- bool is_dead; -+ u64 internal_id; - }; - - struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg_device *wg, diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0121-wireguard-selftests-test-multiple-parallel-streams.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0121-wireguard-selftests-test-multiple-parallel-streams.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3093de45f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0121-wireguard-selftests-test-multiple-parallel-streams.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: selftests: test multiple parallel streams + +commit d5a49aa6c3e264a93a7d08485d66e346be0969dd upstream. + +In order to test ndo_start_xmit being called in parallel, explicitly add +separate tests, which should all run on different cores. This should +help tease out bugs associated with queueing up packets from different +cores in parallel. Currently, it hasn't found those types of bugs, but +given future planned work, this is a useful regression to avoid. + +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 15 ++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh +@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 + ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; } + ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; } + sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; } +-waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlpH 'sport = 5201') != *\"iperf3\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } ++waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:${3:-5201} pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlpH "sport = ${3:-5201}") != *\"iperf3\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } + waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulpH 'sport = 1111') != *\"ncat\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; } + waitiface() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for $2 to come up"; ip netns exec "$1" bash -c "while [[ \$(< \"/sys/class/net/$2/operstate\") != up ]]; do read -t .1 -N 0 || true; done;"; } + +@@ -141,6 +141,19 @@ tests() { + n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::2 & + waitiperf $netns2 $! + n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c fd00::2 ++ ++ # TCP over IPv4, in parallel ++ for max in 4 5 50; do ++ local pids=( ) ++ for ((i=0; i < max; ++i)) do ++ n2 iperf3 -p $(( 5200 + i )) -s -1 -B 192.168.241.2 & ++ pids+=( $! ); waitiperf $netns2 $! $(( 5200 + i )) ++ done ++ for ((i=0; i < max; ++i)) do ++ n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -p $(( 5200 + i )) -c 192.168.241.2 & ++ done ++ wait "${pids[@]}" ++ done + } + + [[ $(ip1 link show dev wg0) =~ mtu\ ([0-9]+) ]] && orig_mtu="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0122-wireguard-device-do-not-generate-ICMP-for-non-IP-pac.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0122-wireguard-device-do-not-generate-ICMP-for-non-IP-pac.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 07a3662cd2..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0122-wireguard-device-do-not-generate-ICMP-for-non-IP-pac.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From 49da2a610d63cef849f0095e601821ad6edfbef7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:47 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 122/124] wireguard: device: do not generate ICMP for non-IP - packets - -commit 99fff5264e7ab06f45b0ad60243475be0a8d0559 upstream. - -If skb->protocol doesn't match the actual skb->data header, it's -probably not a good idea to pass it off to icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, which is -expecting to reply to a valid IP packet. So this commit has that early -mismatch case jump to a later error label. - -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 7 ++++--- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf - else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) - net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No peer has allowed IPs matching %pI6\n", - dev->name, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); -- goto err; -+ goto err_icmp; - } - - family = READ_ONCE(peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family); -@@ -201,12 +201,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf - - err_peer: - wg_peer_put(peer); --err: -- ++dev->stats.tx_errors; -+err_icmp: - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) - icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0); - else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) - icmpv6_ndo_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0); -+err: -+ ++dev->stats.tx_errors; - kfree_skb(skb); - return ret; - } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0122-wireguard-peer-put-frequently-used-members-above-cac.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0122-wireguard-peer-put-frequently-used-members-above-cac.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..69e76b96e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0122-wireguard-peer-put-frequently-used-members-above-cac.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: peer: put frequently used members above cache + lines + +commit 5a0598695634a6bb4126818902dd9140cd9df8b6 upstream. + +The is_dead boolean is checked for every single packet, while the +internal_id member is used basically only for pr_debug messages. So it +makes sense to hoist up is_dead into some space formerly unused by a +struct hole, while demoting internal_api to below the lowest struct +cache line. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h +@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct wg_peer { + struct crypt_queue tx_queue, rx_queue; + struct sk_buff_head staged_packet_queue; + int serial_work_cpu; ++ bool is_dead; + struct noise_keypairs keypairs; + struct endpoint endpoint; + struct dst_cache endpoint_cache; +@@ -61,9 +62,8 @@ struct wg_peer { + struct rcu_head rcu; + struct list_head peer_list; + struct list_head allowedips_list; +- u64 internal_id; + struct napi_struct napi; +- bool is_dead; ++ u64 internal_id; + }; + + struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg_device *wg, diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0123-wireguard-device-do-not-generate-ICMP-for-non-IP-pac.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0123-wireguard-device-do-not-generate-ICMP-for-non-IP-pac.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..073ee9b0d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0123-wireguard-device-do-not-generate-ICMP-for-non-IP-pac.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: device: do not generate ICMP for non-IP packets + +commit 99fff5264e7ab06f45b0ad60243475be0a8d0559 upstream. + +If skb->protocol doesn't match the actual skb->data header, it's +probably not a good idea to pass it off to icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, which is +expecting to reply to a valid IP packet. So this commit has that early +mismatch case jump to a later error label. + +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 7 ++++--- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf + else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) + net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No peer has allowed IPs matching %pI6\n", + dev->name, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); +- goto err; ++ goto err_icmp; + } + + family = READ_ONCE(peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family); +@@ -201,12 +201,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf + + err_peer: + wg_peer_put(peer); +-err: +- ++dev->stats.tx_errors; ++err_icmp: + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0); + else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) + icmpv6_ndo_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0); ++err: ++ ++dev->stats.tx_errors; + kfree_skb(skb); + return ret; + } diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0123-wireguard-queueing-get-rid-of-per-peer-ring-buffers.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0123-wireguard-queueing-get-rid-of-per-peer-ring-buffers.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 147c133919..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0123-wireguard-queueing-get-rid-of-per-peer-ring-buffers.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,560 +0,0 @@ -From 1771bbcc5bc99f569dd82ec9e1b7c397a2fb50ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:48 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 123/124] wireguard: queueing: get rid of per-peer ring buffers -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -commit 8b5553ace83cced775eefd0f3f18b5c6214ccf7a upstream. - -Having two ring buffers per-peer means that every peer results in two -massive ring allocations. On an 8-core x86_64 machine, this commit -reduces the per-peer allocation from 18,688 bytes to 1,856 bytes, which -is an 90% reduction. Ninety percent! With some single-machine -deployments approaching 500,000 peers, we're talking about a reduction -from 7 gigs of memory down to 700 megs of memory. - -In order to get rid of these per-peer allocations, this commit switches -to using a list-based queueing approach. Currently GSO fragments are -chained together using the skb->next pointer (the skb_list_* singly -linked list approach), so we form the per-peer queue around the unused -skb->prev pointer (which sort of makes sense because the links are -pointing backwards). Use of skb_queue_* is not possible here, because -that is based on doubly linked lists and spinlocks. Multiple cores can -write into the queue at any given time, because its writes occur in the -start_xmit path or in the udp_recv path. But reads happen in a single -workqueue item per-peer, amounting to a multi-producer, single-consumer -paradigm. - -The MPSC queue is implemented locklessly and never blocks. However, it -is not linearizable (though it is serializable), with a very tight and -unlikely race on writes, which, when hit (some tiny fraction of the -0.15% of partial adds on a fully loaded 16-core x86_64 system), causes -the queue reader to terminate early. However, because every packet sent -queues up the same workqueue item after it is fully added, the worker -resumes again, and stopping early isn't actually a problem, since at -that point the packet wouldn't have yet been added to the encryption -queue. These properties allow us to avoid disabling interrupts or -spinning. The design is based on Dmitry Vyukov's algorithm [1]. - -Performance-wise, ordinarily list-based queues aren't preferable to -ringbuffers, because of cache misses when following pointers around. -However, we *already* have to follow the adjacent pointers when working -through fragments, so there shouldn't actually be any change there. A -potential downside is that dequeueing is a bit more complicated, but the -ptr_ring structure used prior had a spinlock when dequeueing, so all and -all the difference appears to be a wash. - -Actually, from profiling, the biggest performance hit, by far, of this -commit winds up being atomic_add_unless(count, 1, max) and atomic_ -dec(count), which account for the majority of CPU time, according to -perf. In that sense, the previous ring buffer was superior in that it -could check if it was full by head==tail, which the list-based approach -cannot do. - -But all and all, this enables us to get massive memory savings, allowing -WireGuard to scale for real world deployments, without taking much of a -performance hit. - -[1] http://www.1024cores.net/home/lock-free-algorithms/queues/intrusive-mpsc-node-based-queue - -Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov -Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 12 ++--- - drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | 15 +++--- - drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 28 ++++------- - drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h | 4 +- - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- - drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 45 ++++++++++++----- - drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 16 +++--- - drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 31 ++++-------- - 8 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c -@@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ static void wg_destruct(struct net_devic - destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_receive_wq); - destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_send_wq); - destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq); -- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true); -- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true); -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue); -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue); - rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for all the peers to be actually freed. */ - wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); - memzero_explicit(&wg->static_identity, sizeof(wg->static_identity)); -@@ -338,12 +338,12 @@ static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_ne - goto err_destroy_handshake_send; - - ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->encrypt_queue, wg_packet_encrypt_worker, -- true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); -+ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_destroy_packet_crypt; - - ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->decrypt_queue, wg_packet_decrypt_worker, -- true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); -+ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_free_encrypt_queue; - -@@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_ne - err_uninit_ratelimiter: - wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); - err_free_decrypt_queue: -- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true); -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue); - err_free_encrypt_queue: -- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true); -+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue); - err_destroy_packet_crypt: - destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq); - err_destroy_handshake_send: ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h -@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@ struct multicore_worker { - - struct crypt_queue { - struct ptr_ring ring; -- union { -- struct { -- struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker; -- int last_cpu; -- }; -- struct work_struct work; -- }; -+ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker; -+ int last_cpu; -+}; -+ -+struct prev_queue { -+ struct sk_buff *head, *tail, *peeked; -+ struct { struct sk_buff *next, *prev; } empty; // Match first 2 members of struct sk_buff. -+ atomic_t count; - }; - - struct wg_device { ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c -@@ -32,27 +32,22 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg - peer = kzalloc(sizeof(*peer), GFP_KERNEL); - if (unlikely(!peer)) - return ERR_PTR(ret); -- peer->device = wg; -+ if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL)) -+ goto err; - -+ peer->device = wg; - wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, - public_key, preshared_key, peer); -- if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL)) -- goto err_1; -- if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue, wg_packet_tx_worker, false, -- MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) -- goto err_2; -- if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->rx_queue, NULL, false, -- MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) -- goto err_3; -- - peer->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&peer_counter); - peer->serial_work_cpu = nr_cpumask_bits; - wg_cookie_init(&peer->latest_cookie); - wg_timers_init(peer); - wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(peer); - spin_lock_init(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock); -- INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_handshake_work, -- wg_packet_handshake_send_worker); -+ INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_handshake_work, wg_packet_handshake_send_worker); -+ INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_packet_work, wg_packet_tx_worker); -+ wg_prev_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue); -+ wg_prev_queue_init(&peer->rx_queue); - rwlock_init(&peer->endpoint_lock); - kref_init(&peer->refcount); - skb_queue_head_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue); -@@ -68,11 +63,7 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg - pr_debug("%s: Peer %llu created\n", wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id); - return peer; - --err_3: -- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false); --err_2: -- dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache); --err_1: -+err: - kfree(peer); - return ERR_PTR(ret); - } -@@ -197,8 +188,7 @@ static void rcu_release(struct rcu_head - struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(rcu, struct wg_peer, rcu); - - dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache); -- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->rx_queue, false); -- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false); -+ WARN_ON(wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->tx_queue) || wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->rx_queue)); - - /* The final zeroing takes care of clearing any remaining handshake key - * material and other potentially sensitive information. ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h -@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct endpoint { - - struct wg_peer { - struct wg_device *device; -- struct crypt_queue tx_queue, rx_queue; -+ struct prev_queue tx_queue, rx_queue; - struct sk_buff_head staged_packet_queue; - int serial_work_cpu; - bool is_dead; -@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct wg_peer { - rwlock_t endpoint_lock; - struct noise_handshake handshake; - atomic64_t last_sent_handshake; -- struct work_struct transmit_handshake_work, clear_peer_work; -+ struct work_struct transmit_handshake_work, clear_peer_work, transmit_packet_work; - struct cookie latest_cookie; - struct hlist_node pubkey_hash; - u64 rx_bytes, tx_bytes; ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c -@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ struct multicore_worker __percpu * - wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr) - { - int cpu; -- struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker = -- alloc_percpu(struct multicore_worker); -+ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker = alloc_percpu(struct multicore_worker); - - if (!worker) - return NULL; -@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( - } - - int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function, -- bool multicore, unsigned int len) -+ unsigned int len) - { - int ret; - -@@ -31,25 +30,78 @@ int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_qu - ret = ptr_ring_init(&queue->ring, len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (ret) - return ret; -- if (function) { -- if (multicore) { -- queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( -- function, queue); -- if (!queue->worker) { -- ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); -- return -ENOMEM; -- } -- } else { -- INIT_WORK(&queue->work, function); -- } -+ queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(function, queue); -+ if (!queue->worker) { -+ ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); -+ return -ENOMEM; - } - return 0; - } - --void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore) -+void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue) - { -- if (multicore) -- free_percpu(queue->worker); -+ free_percpu(queue->worker); - WARN_ON(!__ptr_ring_empty(&queue->ring)); - ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); - } -+ -+#define NEXT(skb) ((skb)->prev) -+#define STUB(queue) ((struct sk_buff *)&queue->empty) -+ -+void wg_prev_queue_init(struct prev_queue *queue) -+{ -+ NEXT(STUB(queue)) = NULL; -+ queue->head = queue->tail = STUB(queue); -+ queue->peeked = NULL; -+ atomic_set(&queue->count, 0); -+ BUILD_BUG_ON( -+ offsetof(struct sk_buff, next) != offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty.next) - -+ offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty) || -+ offsetof(struct sk_buff, prev) != offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty.prev) - -+ offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty)); -+} -+ -+static void __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ WRITE_ONCE(NEXT(skb), NULL); -+ WRITE_ONCE(NEXT(xchg_release(&queue->head, skb)), skb); -+} -+ -+bool wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb) -+{ -+ if (!atomic_add_unless(&queue->count, 1, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) -+ return false; -+ __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(queue, skb); -+ return true; -+} -+ -+struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_dequeue(struct prev_queue *queue) -+{ -+ struct sk_buff *tail = queue->tail, *next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(tail)); -+ -+ if (tail == STUB(queue)) { -+ if (!next) -+ return NULL; -+ queue->tail = next; -+ tail = next; -+ next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(next)); -+ } -+ if (next) { -+ queue->tail = next; -+ atomic_dec(&queue->count); -+ return tail; -+ } -+ if (tail != READ_ONCE(queue->head)) -+ return NULL; -+ __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(queue, STUB(queue)); -+ next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(tail)); -+ if (next) { -+ queue->tail = next; -+ atomic_dec(&queue->count); -+ return tail; -+ } -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+#undef NEXT -+#undef STUB ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h -@@ -17,12 +17,13 @@ struct wg_device; - struct wg_peer; - struct multicore_worker; - struct crypt_queue; -+struct prev_queue; - struct sk_buff; - - /* queueing.c APIs: */ - int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function, -- bool multicore, unsigned int len); --void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore); -+ unsigned int len); -+void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue); - struct multicore_worker __percpu * - wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr); - -@@ -135,8 +136,31 @@ static inline int wg_cpumask_next_online - return cpu; - } - -+void wg_prev_queue_init(struct prev_queue *queue); -+ -+/* Multi producer */ -+bool wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb); -+ -+/* Single consumer */ -+struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_dequeue(struct prev_queue *queue); -+ -+/* Single consumer */ -+static inline struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_peek(struct prev_queue *queue) -+{ -+ if (queue->peeked) -+ return queue->peeked; -+ queue->peeked = wg_prev_queue_dequeue(queue); -+ return queue->peeked; -+} -+ -+/* Single consumer */ -+static inline void wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(struct prev_queue *queue) -+{ -+ queue->peeked = NULL; -+} -+ - static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer( -- struct crypt_queue *device_queue, struct crypt_queue *peer_queue, -+ struct crypt_queue *device_queue, struct prev_queue *peer_queue, - struct sk_buff *skb, struct workqueue_struct *wq, int *next_cpu) - { - int cpu; -@@ -145,8 +169,9 @@ static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_d - /* We first queue this up for the peer ingestion, but the consumer - * will wait for the state to change to CRYPTED or DEAD before. - */ -- if (unlikely(ptr_ring_produce_bh(&peer_queue->ring, skb))) -+ if (unlikely(!wg_prev_queue_enqueue(peer_queue, skb))) - return -ENOSPC; -+ - /* Then we queue it up in the device queue, which consumes the - * packet as soon as it can. - */ -@@ -157,9 +182,7 @@ static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_d - return 0; - } - --static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(struct crypt_queue *queue, -- struct sk_buff *skb, -- enum packet_state state) -+static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, enum packet_state state) - { - /* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the - * peer can be freed from below us. -@@ -167,14 +190,12 @@ static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_ - struct wg_peer *peer = wg_peer_get(PACKET_PEER(skb)); - - atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, state); -- queue_work_on(wg_cpumask_choose_online(&peer->serial_work_cpu, -- peer->internal_id), -- peer->device->packet_crypt_wq, &queue->work); -+ queue_work_on(wg_cpumask_choose_online(&peer->serial_work_cpu, peer->internal_id), -+ peer->device->packet_crypt_wq, &peer->transmit_packet_work); - wg_peer_put(peer); - } - --static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(struct sk_buff *skb, -- enum packet_state state) -+static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, enum packet_state state) - { - /* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the - * peer can be freed from below us. ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c -@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ packet_processed: - int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) - { - struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(napi, struct wg_peer, napi); -- struct crypt_queue *queue = &peer->rx_queue; - struct noise_keypair *keypair; - struct endpoint endpoint; - enum packet_state state; -@@ -455,11 +454,10 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct - if (unlikely(budget <= 0)) - return 0; - -- while ((skb = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL && -+ while ((skb = wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->rx_queue)) != NULL && - (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state)) != - PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { -- __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring); -- peer = PACKET_PEER(skb); -+ wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(&peer->rx_queue); - keypair = PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair; - free = true; - -@@ -508,7 +506,7 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct wor - enum packet_state state = - likely(decrypt_packet(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair)) ? - PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD; -- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state); -+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(skb, state); - if (need_resched()) - cond_resched(); - } -@@ -531,12 +529,10 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data(struc - if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) - goto err; - -- ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->decrypt_queue, -- &peer->rx_queue, skb, -- wg->packet_crypt_wq, -- &wg->decrypt_queue.last_cpu); -+ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->decrypt_queue, &peer->rx_queue, skb, -+ wg->packet_crypt_wq, &wg->decrypt_queue.last_cpu); - if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) -- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); -+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(skb, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); - if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) { - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - return; ---- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c -@@ -239,8 +239,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_ - wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); - } - --static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct sk_buff *first, -- struct wg_peer *peer) -+static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first) - { - struct sk_buff *skb, *next; - bool is_keepalive, data_sent = false; -@@ -262,22 +261,19 @@ static void wg_packet_create_data_done(s - - void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work) - { -- struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct crypt_queue, -- work); -+ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, transmit_packet_work); - struct noise_keypair *keypair; - enum packet_state state; - struct sk_buff *first; -- struct wg_peer *peer; - -- while ((first = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL && -+ while ((first = wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->tx_queue)) != NULL && - (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(first)->state)) != - PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { -- __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring); -- peer = PACKET_PEER(first); -+ wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(&peer->tx_queue); - keypair = PACKET_CB(first)->keypair; - - if (likely(state == PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) -- wg_packet_create_data_done(first, peer); -+ wg_packet_create_data_done(peer, first); - else - kfree_skb_list(first); - -@@ -306,16 +302,14 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor - break; - } - } -- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first, -- state); -+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, state); - if (need_resched()) - cond_resched(); - } - } - --static void wg_packet_create_data(struct sk_buff *first) -+static void wg_packet_create_data(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first) - { -- struct wg_peer *peer = PACKET_PEER(first); - struct wg_device *wg = peer->device; - int ret = -EINVAL; - -@@ -323,13 +317,10 @@ static void wg_packet_create_data(struct - if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) - goto err; - -- ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, -- &peer->tx_queue, first, -- wg->packet_crypt_wq, -- &wg->encrypt_queue.last_cpu); -+ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, &peer->tx_queue, first, -+ wg->packet_crypt_wq, &wg->encrypt_queue.last_cpu); - if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) -- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&peer->tx_queue, first, -- PACKET_STATE_DEAD); -+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); - err: - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) -@@ -393,7 +384,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc - packets.prev->next = NULL; - wg_peer_get(keypair->entry.peer); - PACKET_CB(packets.next)->keypair = keypair; -- wg_packet_create_data(packets.next); -+ wg_packet_create_data(peer, packets.next); - return; - - out_invalid: diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0124-wireguard-kconfig-use-arm-chacha-even-with-no-neon.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0124-wireguard-kconfig-use-arm-chacha-even-with-no-neon.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3c62dc6c56..0000000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0124-wireguard-kconfig-use-arm-chacha-even-with-no-neon.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -From 514091206bc055a159348ae8575276dc925aea24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" -Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:49 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 124/124] wireguard: kconfig: use arm chacha even with no neon - -commit bce2473927af8de12ad131a743f55d69d358c0b9 upstream. - -The condition here was incorrect: a non-neon fallback implementation is -available on arm32 when NEON is not supported. - -Reported-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy -Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld -Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski -Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld ---- - drivers/net/Kconfig | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/Kconfig -+++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig -@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ config WIREGUARD - select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86 if X86 && 64BIT - select ARM_CRYPTO if ARM - select ARM64_CRYPTO if ARM64 -- select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if (ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON -+ select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if ARM || (ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON) - select CRYPTO_POLY1305_NEON if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON - select CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM if ARM - select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_NEON if ARM && KERNEL_MODE_NEON diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0124-wireguard-queueing-get-rid-of-per-peer-ring-buffers.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0124-wireguard-queueing-get-rid-of-per-peer-ring-buffers.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9dc7ddae7f --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0124-wireguard-queueing-get-rid-of-per-peer-ring-buffers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,560 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:48 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: get rid of per-peer ring buffers +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +commit 8b5553ace83cced775eefd0f3f18b5c6214ccf7a upstream. + +Having two ring buffers per-peer means that every peer results in two +massive ring allocations. On an 8-core x86_64 machine, this commit +reduces the per-peer allocation from 18,688 bytes to 1,856 bytes, which +is an 90% reduction. Ninety percent! With some single-machine +deployments approaching 500,000 peers, we're talking about a reduction +from 7 gigs of memory down to 700 megs of memory. + +In order to get rid of these per-peer allocations, this commit switches +to using a list-based queueing approach. Currently GSO fragments are +chained together using the skb->next pointer (the skb_list_* singly +linked list approach), so we form the per-peer queue around the unused +skb->prev pointer (which sort of makes sense because the links are +pointing backwards). Use of skb_queue_* is not possible here, because +that is based on doubly linked lists and spinlocks. Multiple cores can +write into the queue at any given time, because its writes occur in the +start_xmit path or in the udp_recv path. But reads happen in a single +workqueue item per-peer, amounting to a multi-producer, single-consumer +paradigm. + +The MPSC queue is implemented locklessly and never blocks. However, it +is not linearizable (though it is serializable), with a very tight and +unlikely race on writes, which, when hit (some tiny fraction of the +0.15% of partial adds on a fully loaded 16-core x86_64 system), causes +the queue reader to terminate early. However, because every packet sent +queues up the same workqueue item after it is fully added, the worker +resumes again, and stopping early isn't actually a problem, since at +that point the packet wouldn't have yet been added to the encryption +queue. These properties allow us to avoid disabling interrupts or +spinning. The design is based on Dmitry Vyukov's algorithm [1]. + +Performance-wise, ordinarily list-based queues aren't preferable to +ringbuffers, because of cache misses when following pointers around. +However, we *already* have to follow the adjacent pointers when working +through fragments, so there shouldn't actually be any change there. A +potential downside is that dequeueing is a bit more complicated, but the +ptr_ring structure used prior had a spinlock when dequeueing, so all and +all the difference appears to be a wash. + +Actually, from profiling, the biggest performance hit, by far, of this +commit winds up being atomic_add_unless(count, 1, max) and atomic_ +dec(count), which account for the majority of CPU time, according to +perf. In that sense, the previous ring buffer was superior in that it +could check if it was full by head==tail, which the list-based approach +cannot do. + +But all and all, this enables us to get massive memory savings, allowing +WireGuard to scale for real world deployments, without taking much of a +performance hit. + +[1] http://www.1024cores.net/home/lock-free-algorithms/queues/intrusive-mpsc-node-based-queue + +Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov +Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 12 ++--- + drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | 15 +++--- + drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 28 ++++------- + drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h | 4 +- + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- + drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 45 ++++++++++++----- + drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 16 +++--- + drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 31 ++++-------- + 8 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c +@@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ static void wg_destruct(struct net_devic + destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_receive_wq); + destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_send_wq); + destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq); +- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true); +- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true); ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue); ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue); + rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for all the peers to be actually freed. */ + wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); + memzero_explicit(&wg->static_identity, sizeof(wg->static_identity)); +@@ -338,12 +338,12 @@ static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_ne + goto err_destroy_handshake_send; + + ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->encrypt_queue, wg_packet_encrypt_worker, +- true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); ++ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_destroy_packet_crypt; + + ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->decrypt_queue, wg_packet_decrypt_worker, +- true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); ++ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_free_encrypt_queue; + +@@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_ne + err_uninit_ratelimiter: + wg_ratelimiter_uninit(); + err_free_decrypt_queue: +- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true); ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue); + err_free_encrypt_queue: +- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true); ++ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue); + err_destroy_packet_crypt: + destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq); + err_destroy_handshake_send: +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h +@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@ struct multicore_worker { + + struct crypt_queue { + struct ptr_ring ring; +- union { +- struct { +- struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker; +- int last_cpu; +- }; +- struct work_struct work; +- }; ++ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker; ++ int last_cpu; ++}; ++ ++struct prev_queue { ++ struct sk_buff *head, *tail, *peeked; ++ struct { struct sk_buff *next, *prev; } empty; // Match first 2 members of struct sk_buff. ++ atomic_t count; + }; + + struct wg_device { +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c +@@ -32,27 +32,22 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg + peer = kzalloc(sizeof(*peer), GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!peer)) + return ERR_PTR(ret); +- peer->device = wg; ++ if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL)) ++ goto err; + ++ peer->device = wg; + wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, + public_key, preshared_key, peer); +- if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL)) +- goto err_1; +- if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue, wg_packet_tx_worker, false, +- MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) +- goto err_2; +- if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->rx_queue, NULL, false, +- MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) +- goto err_3; +- + peer->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&peer_counter); + peer->serial_work_cpu = nr_cpumask_bits; + wg_cookie_init(&peer->latest_cookie); + wg_timers_init(peer); + wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(peer); + spin_lock_init(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock); +- INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_handshake_work, +- wg_packet_handshake_send_worker); ++ INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_handshake_work, wg_packet_handshake_send_worker); ++ INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_packet_work, wg_packet_tx_worker); ++ wg_prev_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue); ++ wg_prev_queue_init(&peer->rx_queue); + rwlock_init(&peer->endpoint_lock); + kref_init(&peer->refcount); + skb_queue_head_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue); +@@ -68,11 +63,7 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg + pr_debug("%s: Peer %llu created\n", wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id); + return peer; + +-err_3: +- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false); +-err_2: +- dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache); +-err_1: ++err: + kfree(peer); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } +@@ -197,8 +188,7 @@ static void rcu_release(struct rcu_head + struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(rcu, struct wg_peer, rcu); + + dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache); +- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->rx_queue, false); +- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false); ++ WARN_ON(wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->tx_queue) || wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->rx_queue)); + + /* The final zeroing takes care of clearing any remaining handshake key + * material and other potentially sensitive information. +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h +@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct endpoint { + + struct wg_peer { + struct wg_device *device; +- struct crypt_queue tx_queue, rx_queue; ++ struct prev_queue tx_queue, rx_queue; + struct sk_buff_head staged_packet_queue; + int serial_work_cpu; + bool is_dead; +@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct wg_peer { + rwlock_t endpoint_lock; + struct noise_handshake handshake; + atomic64_t last_sent_handshake; +- struct work_struct transmit_handshake_work, clear_peer_work; ++ struct work_struct transmit_handshake_work, clear_peer_work, transmit_packet_work; + struct cookie latest_cookie; + struct hlist_node pubkey_hash; + u64 rx_bytes, tx_bytes; +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c +@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ struct multicore_worker __percpu * + wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr) + { + int cpu; +- struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker = +- alloc_percpu(struct multicore_worker); ++ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker = alloc_percpu(struct multicore_worker); + + if (!worker) + return NULL; +@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( + } + + int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function, +- bool multicore, unsigned int len) ++ unsigned int len) + { + int ret; + +@@ -31,25 +30,78 @@ int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_qu + ret = ptr_ring_init(&queue->ring, len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret) + return ret; +- if (function) { +- if (multicore) { +- queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc( +- function, queue); +- if (!queue->worker) { +- ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); +- return -ENOMEM; +- } +- } else { +- INIT_WORK(&queue->work, function); +- } ++ queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(function, queue); ++ if (!queue->worker) { ++ ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); ++ return -ENOMEM; + } + return 0; + } + +-void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore) ++void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue) + { +- if (multicore) +- free_percpu(queue->worker); ++ free_percpu(queue->worker); + WARN_ON(!__ptr_ring_empty(&queue->ring)); + ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL); + } ++ ++#define NEXT(skb) ((skb)->prev) ++#define STUB(queue) ((struct sk_buff *)&queue->empty) ++ ++void wg_prev_queue_init(struct prev_queue *queue) ++{ ++ NEXT(STUB(queue)) = NULL; ++ queue->head = queue->tail = STUB(queue); ++ queue->peeked = NULL; ++ atomic_set(&queue->count, 0); ++ BUILD_BUG_ON( ++ offsetof(struct sk_buff, next) != offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty.next) - ++ offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty) || ++ offsetof(struct sk_buff, prev) != offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty.prev) - ++ offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty)); ++} ++ ++static void __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ WRITE_ONCE(NEXT(skb), NULL); ++ WRITE_ONCE(NEXT(xchg_release(&queue->head, skb)), skb); ++} ++ ++bool wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ if (!atomic_add_unless(&queue->count, 1, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS)) ++ return false; ++ __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(queue, skb); ++ return true; ++} ++ ++struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_dequeue(struct prev_queue *queue) ++{ ++ struct sk_buff *tail = queue->tail, *next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(tail)); ++ ++ if (tail == STUB(queue)) { ++ if (!next) ++ return NULL; ++ queue->tail = next; ++ tail = next; ++ next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(next)); ++ } ++ if (next) { ++ queue->tail = next; ++ atomic_dec(&queue->count); ++ return tail; ++ } ++ if (tail != READ_ONCE(queue->head)) ++ return NULL; ++ __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(queue, STUB(queue)); ++ next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(tail)); ++ if (next) { ++ queue->tail = next; ++ atomic_dec(&queue->count); ++ return tail; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++#undef NEXT ++#undef STUB +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h +@@ -17,12 +17,13 @@ struct wg_device; + struct wg_peer; + struct multicore_worker; + struct crypt_queue; ++struct prev_queue; + struct sk_buff; + + /* queueing.c APIs: */ + int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function, +- bool multicore, unsigned int len); +-void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore); ++ unsigned int len); ++void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue); + struct multicore_worker __percpu * + wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr); + +@@ -135,8 +136,31 @@ static inline int wg_cpumask_next_online + return cpu; + } + ++void wg_prev_queue_init(struct prev_queue *queue); ++ ++/* Multi producer */ ++bool wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb); ++ ++/* Single consumer */ ++struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_dequeue(struct prev_queue *queue); ++ ++/* Single consumer */ ++static inline struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_peek(struct prev_queue *queue) ++{ ++ if (queue->peeked) ++ return queue->peeked; ++ queue->peeked = wg_prev_queue_dequeue(queue); ++ return queue->peeked; ++} ++ ++/* Single consumer */ ++static inline void wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(struct prev_queue *queue) ++{ ++ queue->peeked = NULL; ++} ++ + static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer( +- struct crypt_queue *device_queue, struct crypt_queue *peer_queue, ++ struct crypt_queue *device_queue, struct prev_queue *peer_queue, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct workqueue_struct *wq, int *next_cpu) + { + int cpu; +@@ -145,8 +169,9 @@ static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_d + /* We first queue this up for the peer ingestion, but the consumer + * will wait for the state to change to CRYPTED or DEAD before. + */ +- if (unlikely(ptr_ring_produce_bh(&peer_queue->ring, skb))) ++ if (unlikely(!wg_prev_queue_enqueue(peer_queue, skb))) + return -ENOSPC; ++ + /* Then we queue it up in the device queue, which consumes the + * packet as soon as it can. + */ +@@ -157,9 +182,7 @@ static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_d + return 0; + } + +-static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(struct crypt_queue *queue, +- struct sk_buff *skb, +- enum packet_state state) ++static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, enum packet_state state) + { + /* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the + * peer can be freed from below us. +@@ -167,14 +190,12 @@ static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_ + struct wg_peer *peer = wg_peer_get(PACKET_PEER(skb)); + + atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, state); +- queue_work_on(wg_cpumask_choose_online(&peer->serial_work_cpu, +- peer->internal_id), +- peer->device->packet_crypt_wq, &queue->work); ++ queue_work_on(wg_cpumask_choose_online(&peer->serial_work_cpu, peer->internal_id), ++ peer->device->packet_crypt_wq, &peer->transmit_packet_work); + wg_peer_put(peer); + } + +-static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(struct sk_buff *skb, +- enum packet_state state) ++static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, enum packet_state state) + { + /* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the + * peer can be freed from below us. +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ packet_processed: + int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) + { + struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(napi, struct wg_peer, napi); +- struct crypt_queue *queue = &peer->rx_queue; + struct noise_keypair *keypair; + struct endpoint endpoint; + enum packet_state state; +@@ -455,11 +454,10 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct + if (unlikely(budget <= 0)) + return 0; + +- while ((skb = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL && ++ while ((skb = wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->rx_queue)) != NULL && + (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state)) != + PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { +- __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring); +- peer = PACKET_PEER(skb); ++ wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(&peer->rx_queue); + keypair = PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair; + free = true; + +@@ -508,7 +506,7 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct wor + enum packet_state state = + likely(decrypt_packet(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair)) ? + PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD; +- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state); ++ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(skb, state); + if (need_resched()) + cond_resched(); + } +@@ -531,12 +529,10 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data(struc + if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) + goto err; + +- ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->decrypt_queue, +- &peer->rx_queue, skb, +- wg->packet_crypt_wq, +- &wg->decrypt_queue.last_cpu); ++ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->decrypt_queue, &peer->rx_queue, skb, ++ wg->packet_crypt_wq, &wg->decrypt_queue.last_cpu); + if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) +- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); ++ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(skb, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); + if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) { + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); + return; +--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +@@ -239,8 +239,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_ + wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); + } + +-static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct sk_buff *first, +- struct wg_peer *peer) ++static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first) + { + struct sk_buff *skb, *next; + bool is_keepalive, data_sent = false; +@@ -262,22 +261,19 @@ static void wg_packet_create_data_done(s + + void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work) + { +- struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct crypt_queue, +- work); ++ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, transmit_packet_work); + struct noise_keypair *keypair; + enum packet_state state; + struct sk_buff *first; +- struct wg_peer *peer; + +- while ((first = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL && ++ while ((first = wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->tx_queue)) != NULL && + (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(first)->state)) != + PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { +- __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring); +- peer = PACKET_PEER(first); ++ wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(&peer->tx_queue); + keypair = PACKET_CB(first)->keypair; + + if (likely(state == PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) +- wg_packet_create_data_done(first, peer); ++ wg_packet_create_data_done(peer, first); + else + kfree_skb_list(first); + +@@ -306,16 +302,14 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor + break; + } + } +- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first, +- state); ++ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, state); + if (need_resched()) + cond_resched(); + } + } + +-static void wg_packet_create_data(struct sk_buff *first) ++static void wg_packet_create_data(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first) + { +- struct wg_peer *peer = PACKET_PEER(first); + struct wg_device *wg = peer->device; + int ret = -EINVAL; + +@@ -323,13 +317,10 @@ static void wg_packet_create_data(struct + if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) + goto err; + +- ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, +- &peer->tx_queue, first, +- wg->packet_crypt_wq, +- &wg->encrypt_queue.last_cpu); ++ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, &peer->tx_queue, first, ++ wg->packet_crypt_wq, &wg->encrypt_queue.last_cpu); + if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) +- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&peer->tx_queue, first, +- PACKET_STATE_DEAD); ++ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); + err: + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); + if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) +@@ -393,7 +384,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc + packets.prev->next = NULL; + wg_peer_get(keypair->entry.peer); + PACKET_CB(packets.next)->keypair = keypair; +- wg_packet_create_data(packets.next); ++ wg_packet_create_data(peer, packets.next); + return; + + out_invalid: diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0125-wireguard-kconfig-use-arm-chacha-even-with-no-neon.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0125-wireguard-kconfig-use-arm-chacha-even-with-no-neon.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a251492c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0125-wireguard-kconfig-use-arm-chacha-even-with-no-neon.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:49 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: kconfig: use arm chacha even with no neon + +commit bce2473927af8de12ad131a743f55d69d358c0b9 upstream. + +The condition here was incorrect: a non-neon fallback implementation is +available on arm32 when NEON is not supported. + +Reported-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy +Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +--- + drivers/net/Kconfig | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/Kconfig ++++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig +@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ config WIREGUARD + select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86 if X86 && 64BIT + select ARM_CRYPTO if ARM + select ARM64_CRYPTO if ARM64 +- select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if (ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON ++ select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if ARM || (ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON) + select CRYPTO_POLY1305_NEON if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON + select CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM if ARM + select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_NEON if ARM && KERNEL_MODE_NEON diff --git a/target/linux/generic/pending-5.4/300-mips_expose_boot_raw.patch b/target/linux/generic/pending-5.4/300-mips_expose_boot_raw.patch index a4f003ec37..476ae501d6 100644 --- a/target/linux/generic/pending-5.4/300-mips_expose_boot_raw.patch +++ b/target/linux/generic/pending-5.4/300-mips_expose_boot_raw.patch @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Acked-by: Rob Landley config CEVT_BCM1480 bool -@@ -3042,6 +3039,18 @@ choice +@@ -3043,6 +3040,18 @@ choice bool "Extend builtin kernel arguments with bootloader arguments" endchoice