From: Jonas Gorski Date: Sun, 12 May 2013 10:55:12 +0000 (+0000) Subject: kernel: fix CVE-2013-1763 in older kernels X-Git-Tag: reboot~10458 X-Git-Url: http://git.lede-project.org./?a=commitdiff_plain;h=bbd02c6fb75cbe7b533deee2045a3ffaa60e9c8f;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fnoltari.git kernel: fix CVE-2013-1763 in older kernels Newer kernels were already fixed by upstream. Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski SVN-Revision: 36607 --- diff --git a/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch b/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c0c2236dd --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathias Krause +Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000 +Subject: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[] + +Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY +with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of +sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this +condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening +doors for a privilege escalation. + +Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause +Acked-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +--- +--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c ++++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c +@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk + if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) + return -EINVAL; + ++ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); + if (hndl == NULL) + err = -ENOENT; diff --git a/target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch b/target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8fe1884320 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathias Krause +Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000 +Subject: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[] + +Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY +with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of +sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this +condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening +doors for a privilege escalation. + +Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause +Acked-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +--- +--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c ++++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c +@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk + if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) + return -EINVAL; + ++ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); + if (hndl == NULL) + err = -ENOENT;