From: Rafael J. Wysocki Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 09:24:33 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Merge branches 'acpi-bus', 'acpi-button', 'acpi-sysfs' and 'acpi-misc' X-Git-Url: http://git.lede-project.org./?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b65d56305c6f5c74b1b4fcaf55d48e949e49d67c;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fblogic.git Merge branches 'acpi-bus', 'acpi-button', 'acpi-sysfs' and 'acpi-misc' * acpi-bus: ACPI: bus: Fix NULL pointer check in acpi_bus_get_private_data() * acpi-button: ACPI: button: Add DMI quirk for Acer Switch 10 SW5-032 lid-switch * acpi-sysfs: ACPI: sysfs: Change ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX to 0x100 * acpi-misc: ACPI: Fix Kconfig indentation --- b65d56305c6f5c74b1b4fcaf55d48e949e49d67c diff --cc Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 122f2d2f3e96,122f2d2f3e96,a84a83f8881e,02724bd017cc,122f2d2f3e96..9c23934c28a9 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@@@@@ -4894,76 -4894,76 -4848,6 -4875,71 -4894,76 +4894,76 @@@@@@ interruptions from clocksource watchdog are not acceptable). + tsx= [X86] Control Transactional Synchronization + Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that + support TSX control. + + This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are: + + on - Enable TSX on the system. Although there are + mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities, + TSX has been known to be an accelerator for + several previous speculation-related CVEs, and + so there may be unknown security risks associated + with leaving it enabled. + + off - Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this + option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are + not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have + MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get + the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode + update. This new MSR allows for the reliable + deactivation of the TSX functionality.) + + auto - Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, + otherwise enable TSX on the system. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off. + + See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst + for more details. + + tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async + Abort (TAA) vulnerability. + + Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS) + certain CPUs that support Transactional + Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an + exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward + information to a disclosure gadget under certain + conditions. + + In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded + data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to + access data to which the attacker does not have direct + access. + + This parameter controls the TAA mitigation. The + options are: + + full - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs + if TSX is enabled. + + full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on + vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT + is not disabled because CPU is not + vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks. + off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation + ++ On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be ++ prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities ++ are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable ++ this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too. ++ + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected + and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not + required and doesn't provide any additional + mitigation. + + For details see: + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst + turbografx.map[2|3]= [HW,JOY] TurboGraFX parallel port interface Format: