From: Christian Lachner Date: Sat, 19 May 2018 08:14:50 +0000 (+0200) Subject: haproxy: Update HAProxy to v1.8.9 X-Git-Url: http://git.lede-project.org./?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4ae1c3307adba7eeb5c9f90462cd326dd285e96b;p=feed%2Fpackages.git haproxy: Update HAProxy to v1.8.9 - Update haproxy download URL and hash - Removed all obsolete patches - Added logic to Makefile to only append the patch-version to the HA-Proxy version if we actually applied any patches (PKG_RELEASE!=00) Signed-off-by: Christian Lachner --- diff --git a/net/haproxy/Makefile b/net/haproxy/Makefile index fb213260ca..21a2d12606 100644 --- a/net/haproxy/Makefile +++ b/net/haproxy/Makefile @@ -9,17 +9,21 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=haproxy -PKG_VERSION:=1.8.8 -PKG_RELEASE:=05 +PKG_VERSION:=1.8.9 +PKG_RELEASE:=00 PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/ -PKG_HASH:=bcc05ab824bd2f89b8b21ac05459c0a0a0e02247b57ffe441d52cfe771daea92 +PKG_HASH:=436b77927cd85bcd4c2cb3cbf7fb539a5362d9686fdcfa34f37550ca1f5db102 PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(BUILD_VARIANT)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION) PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0 MAINTAINER:=Thomas Heil +ifneq ($(PKG_RELEASE),00) + BUILD_VERSION:=-patch$(PKG_RELEASE) +endif + include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk define Package/haproxy/Default @@ -143,7 +147,7 @@ define Build/Compile SMALL_OPTS="-DBUFSIZE=16384 -DMAXREWRITE=1030 -DSYSTEM_MAXCONN=165530 " \ USE_LINUX_TPROXY=1 USE_LINUX_SPLICE=1 USE_TFO=1 \ USE_ZLIB=yes USE_PCRE=1 USE_PCRE_JIT=1 USE_GETADDRINFO=1 \ - VERSION="$(PKG_VERSION)-patch$(PKG_RELEASE)" \ + VERSION="$(PKG_VERSION)$(BUILD_VERSION)" \ $(ADDON) \ CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS)" \ LD="$(TARGET_CC)" \ diff --git a/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh b/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh index b74107f211..98ce2c79b8 100755 --- a/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh +++ b/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/bash CLONEURL=http://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy-1.8.git -BASE_TAG=v1.8.8 +BASE_TAG=v1.8.9 TMP_REPODIR=tmprepo PATCHESDIR=patches diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0000-BUG-MINOR-pattern-Add-a-missing-HA_SPIN_INIT-in-pat_ref_newid.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0000-BUG-MINOR-pattern-Add-a-missing-HA_SPIN_INIT-in-pat_ref_newid.patch deleted file mode 100644 index eb3a18a108..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0000-BUG-MINOR-pattern-Add-a-missing-HA_SPIN_INIT-in-pat_ref_newid.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -commit 6c9efc8219e35f4eb17e94b364f4c371cfb56cca -Author: Aurélien Nephtali -Date: Thu Apr 19 16:56:07 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: pattern: Add a missing HA_SPIN_INIT() in pat_ref_newid() - - pat_ref_newid() is lacking a spinlock init. It was probably forgotten - in b5997f740b ("MAJOR: threads/map: Make acls/maps thread safe"). - - Signed-off-by: Aurélien Nephtali - (cherry picked from commit 564d15a71ecb3ae3372767866335cfbc068c4b48) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/pattern.c b/src/pattern.c -index fe672f12..2eb82650 100644 ---- a/src/pattern.c -+++ b/src/pattern.c -@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ struct pat_ref *pat_ref_newid(int unique_id, const char *display, unsigned int f - ref->unique_id = unique_id; - LIST_INIT(&ref->head); - LIST_INIT(&ref->pat); -- -+ HA_SPIN_INIT(&ref->lock); - LIST_ADDQ(&pattern_reference, &ref->list); - - return ref; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MAJOR-channel-Fix-crash-when-trying-to-read-from-a-closed-socket.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MAJOR-channel-Fix-crash-when-trying-to-read-from-a-closed-socket.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 606c3bf09b..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MAJOR-channel-Fix-crash-when-trying-to-read-from-a-closed-socket.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ -commit e0f6d4a4e8696140d1fcff812fb287d534d702e9 -Author: Tim Duesterhus -Date: Tue Apr 24 19:20:43 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MAJOR: channel: Fix crash when trying to read from a closed socket - - When haproxy is compiled using GCC <= 3.x or >= 5.x the `unlikely` - macro performs a comparison with zero: `(x) != 0`, thus returning - either 0 or 1. - - In `int co_getline_nc()` this macro was accidentally applied to - the variable `retcode` itself, instead of the result of the - comparison `retcode <= 0`. As a result any negative `retcode` - is converted to `1` for purposes of the comparison. - Thus never taking the branch (and exiting the function) for - negative values. - - This in turn leads to reads of uninitialized memory in the for-loop - below: - - ==12141== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s) - ==12141== at 0x4EB6B4: co_getline_nc (channel.c:346) - ==12141== by 0x421CA4: hlua_socket_receive_yield (hlua.c:1713) - ==12141== by 0x421F6F: hlua_socket_receive (hlua.c:1896) - ==12141== by 0x529B08F: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52A7EFC: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B497: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529711A: lua_pcallk (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52ABDF0: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B08F: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52A7EFC: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529A9F1: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B523: lua_resume (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== - ==12141== Use of uninitialised value of size 8 - ==12141== at 0x4EB6B9: co_getline_nc (channel.c:346) - ==12141== by 0x421CA4: hlua_socket_receive_yield (hlua.c:1713) - ==12141== by 0x421F6F: hlua_socket_receive (hlua.c:1896) - ==12141== by 0x529B08F: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52A7EFC: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B497: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529711A: lua_pcallk (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52ABDF0: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B08F: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52A7EFC: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529A9F1: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B523: lua_resume (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== - ==12141== Invalid read of size 1 - ==12141== at 0x4EB6B9: co_getline_nc (channel.c:346) - ==12141== by 0x421CA4: hlua_socket_receive_yield (hlua.c:1713) - ==12141== by 0x421F6F: hlua_socket_receive (hlua.c:1896) - ==12141== by 0x529B08F: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52A7EFC: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B497: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529711A: lua_pcallk (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52ABDF0: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B08F: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x52A7EFC: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529A9F1: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== by 0x529B523: lua_resume (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==12141== Address 0x8637171e928bb500 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd - - Fix this bug by correctly applying the `unlikely` macro to the result of the comparison. - - This bug exists as of commit ca16b038132444dea06e6d83953034128a812bce - which is the first commit adding this function. - - v1.6-dev1 is the first tag containing this commit, the fix should - be backported to haproxy 1.6 and newer. - - (cherry picked from commit 45be38c9c7ba2b20806f2b887876db4fb5b9457c) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/channel.c b/src/channel.c -index bd5c4de0..3770502c 100644 ---- a/src/channel.c -+++ b/src/channel.c -@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ int co_getline_nc(const struct channel *chn, - int l; - - retcode = co_getblk_nc(chn, blk1, len1, blk2, len2); -- if (unlikely(retcode) <= 0) -+ if (unlikely(retcode <= 0)) - return retcode; - - for (l = 0; l < *len1 && (*blk1)[l] != '\n'; l++); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0002-BUG-MINOR-log-t_idle-Ti-is-not-set-for-some-requests.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0002-BUG-MINOR-log-t_idle-Ti-is-not-set-for-some-requests.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9fffb95974..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0002-BUG-MINOR-log-t_idle-Ti-is-not-set-for-some-requests.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -commit 0e645ba57ddff9163a3d9b5626f189e974e671bd -Author: Rian McGuire -Date: Tue Apr 24 11:19:21 2018 -0300 - - BUG/MINOR: log: t_idle (%Ti) is not set for some requests - - If TCP content inspection is used, msg_state can be >= HTTP_MSG_ERROR - the first time http_wait_for_request is called. t_idle was being left - unset in that case. - - In the example below : - stick-table type string len 64 size 100k expire 60s - tcp-request inspect-delay 1s - tcp-request content track-sc1 hdr(X-Session) - - %Ti will always be -1, because the msg_state is already at HTTP_MSG_BODY - when http_wait_for_request is called for the first time. - - This patch should backported to 1.8 and 1.7. - - (cherry picked from commit 89fcb7d929283e904cabad58de495d62fc753da2) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c -index b38dd84f..4c18a27c 100644 ---- a/src/proto_http.c -+++ b/src/proto_http.c -@@ -1618,18 +1618,16 @@ int http_wait_for_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit) - /* we're speaking HTTP here, so let's speak HTTP to the client */ - s->srv_error = http_return_srv_error; - -+ /* If there is data available for analysis, log the end of the idle time. */ -+ if (buffer_not_empty(req->buf) && s->logs.t_idle == -1) -+ s->logs.t_idle = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now) - s->logs.t_handshake; -+ - /* There's a protected area at the end of the buffer for rewriting - * purposes. We don't want to start to parse the request if the - * protected area is affected, because we may have to move processed - * data later, which is much more complicated. - */ - if (buffer_not_empty(req->buf) && msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR) { -- -- /* This point is executed when some data is avalaible for analysis, -- * so we log the end of the idle time. */ -- if (s->logs.t_idle == -1) -- s->logs.t_idle = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now) - s->logs.t_handshake; -- - if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST) { - if (unlikely(!channel_is_rewritable(req))) { - if (req->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT)) diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-lua-Fix-segmentation-fault-if-a-Lua-task-exits.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-lua-Fix-segmentation-fault-if-a-Lua-task-exits.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2a52c7cbde..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-lua-Fix-segmentation-fault-if-a-Lua-task-exits.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -commit 17f3e16826e5b1a3f79b7421d69bb85be09a4ad9 -Author: Tim Duesterhus -Date: Tue Apr 24 13:56:01 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: lua: Fix segmentation fault if a Lua task exits - - PiBa-NL reported that haproxy crashes with a segmentation fault - if a function registered using `core.register_task` returns. - - An example Lua script that reproduces the bug is: - - mytask = function() - core.Info("Stopping task") - end - core.register_task(mytask) - - The Valgrind output is as follows: - - ==6759== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) - ==6759== Access not within mapped region at address 0x20 - ==6759== at 0x5B60AA9: lua_sethook (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblua5.3.so.0.0.0) - ==6759== by 0x430264: hlua_ctx_resume (hlua.c:1009) - ==6759== by 0x43BB68: hlua_process_task (hlua.c:5525) - ==6759== by 0x4FED0A: process_runnable_tasks (task.c:231) - ==6759== by 0x4B2256: run_poll_loop (haproxy.c:2397) - ==6759== by 0x4B2256: run_thread_poll_loop (haproxy.c:2459) - ==6759== by 0x41A7E4: main (haproxy.c:3049) - - Add the missing `task = NULL` for the `HLUA_E_OK` case. The error cases - have been fixed as of 253e53e661c49fb9723535319cf511152bf09bc7 which - first was included in haproxy v1.8-dev3. This bugfix should be backported - to haproxy 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit cd235c60425dbe66c9015a357369afacc4880211) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c -index 4e759c7c..d4b7ce91 100644 ---- a/src/hlua.c -+++ b/src/hlua.c -@@ -5528,6 +5528,7 @@ static struct task *hlua_process_task(struct task *task) - hlua_ctx_destroy(hlua); - task_delete(task); - task_free(task); -+ task = NULL; - break; - - case HLUA_E_AGAIN: /* co process or timeout wake me later. */ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0004-MINOR-h2-detect-presence-of-CONNECT-and-or-content-length.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0004-MINOR-h2-detect-presence-of-CONNECT-and-or-content-length.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4369ff04ac..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0004-MINOR-h2-detect-presence-of-CONNECT-and-or-content-length.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,147 +0,0 @@ -commit a8bcc7dd3fe5aa615f21e795375ff9225f004498 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Wed Apr 25 18:13:58 2018 +0200 - - MINOR: h2: detect presence of CONNECT and/or content-length - - We'll need this in order to support uploading chunks. The h2 to h1 - converter checks for the presence of the content-length header field - as well as the CONNECT method and returns these information to the - caller. The caller indicates whether or not a body is detected for - the message (presence of END_STREAM or not). No transfer-encoding - header is emitted yet. - - (cherry picked from commit 174b06a572ef141f15d8b7ea64eb6b34ec4c9af1) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/include/common/h2.h b/include/common/h2.h -index 65c5ab1c..576ed105 100644 ---- a/include/common/h2.h -+++ b/include/common/h2.h -@@ -145,9 +145,15 @@ enum h2_err { - "\x0d\x0a\x53\x4d\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a" - - -+/* some flags related to protocol parsing */ -+#define H2_MSGF_BODY 0x0001 // a body is present -+#define H2_MSGF_BODY_CL 0x0002 // content-length is present -+#define H2_MSGF_BODY_TUNNEL 0x0004 // a tunnel is in use (CONNECT) -+ -+ - /* various protocol processing functions */ - --int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize); -+int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize, unsigned int *msgf); - - /* - * Some helpful debugging functions. -diff --git a/src/h2.c b/src/h2.c -index 43ed7f3c..7d9ddd50 100644 ---- a/src/h2.c -+++ b/src/h2.c -@@ -36,9 +36,10 @@ - * stored in . indicates what was found so far. This should be - * called once at the detection of the first general header field or at the end - * of the request if no general header field was found yet. Returns 0 on success -- * or a negative error code on failure. -+ * or a negative error code on failure. Upon success, is updated with a -+ * few H2_MSGF_* flags indicating what was found while parsing. - */ --static int h2_prepare_h1_reqline(uint32_t fields, struct ist *phdr, char **ptr, char *end) -+static int h2_prepare_h1_reqline(uint32_t fields, struct ist *phdr, char **ptr, char *end, unsigned int *msgf) - { - char *out = *ptr; - int uri_idx = H2_PHDR_IDX_PATH; -@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ static int h2_prepare_h1_reqline(uint32_t fields, struct ist *phdr, char **ptr, - } - // otherwise OK ; let's use the authority instead of the URI - uri_idx = H2_PHDR_IDX_AUTH; -+ *msgf |= H2_MSGF_BODY_TUNNEL; - } - else if ((fields & (H2_PHDR_FND_METH|H2_PHDR_FND_SCHM|H2_PHDR_FND_PATH)) != - (H2_PHDR_FND_METH|H2_PHDR_FND_SCHM|H2_PHDR_FND_PATH)) { -@@ -113,6 +115,10 @@ static int h2_prepare_h1_reqline(uint32_t fields, struct ist *phdr, char **ptr, - * for a max of bytes, and the amount of bytes emitted is returned. In - * case of error, a negative error code is returned. - * -+ * Upon success, is filled with a few H2_MSGF_* flags indicating what -+ * was found while parsing. The caller must set it to zero in or H2_MSGF_BODY -+ * if a body is detected (!ES). -+ * - * The headers list must be composed of : - * - n.name != NULL, n.len > 0 : literal header name - * - n.name == NULL, n.len > 0 : indexed pseudo header name number -@@ -124,7 +130,7 @@ static int h2_prepare_h1_reqline(uint32_t fields, struct ist *phdr, char **ptr, - * The Cookie header will be reassembled at the end, and for this, the - * will be used to create a linked list, so its contents may be destroyed. - */ --int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize) -+int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize, unsigned int *msgf) - { - struct ist phdr_val[H2_PHDR_NUM_ENTRIES]; - char *out_end = out + osize; -@@ -176,7 +182,7 @@ int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize) - /* regular header field in (name,value) */ - if (!(fields & H2_PHDR_FND_NONE)) { - /* no more pseudo-headers, time to build the request line */ -- ret = h2_prepare_h1_reqline(fields, phdr_val, &out, out_end); -+ ret = h2_prepare_h1_reqline(fields, phdr_val, &out, out_end, msgf); - if (ret != 0) - goto leave; - fields |= H2_PHDR_FND_NONE; -@@ -185,6 +191,10 @@ int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize) - if (isteq(list[idx].n, ist("host"))) - fields |= H2_PHDR_FND_HOST; - -+ if ((*msgf & (H2_MSGF_BODY|H2_MSGF_BODY_TUNNEL|H2_MSGF_BODY_CL)) == H2_MSGF_BODY && -+ isteq(list[idx].n, ist("content-length"))) -+ *msgf |= H2_MSGF_BODY_CL; -+ - /* these ones are forbidden in requests (RFC7540#8.1.2.2) */ - if (isteq(list[idx].n, ist("connection")) || - isteq(list[idx].n, ist("proxy-connection")) || -@@ -232,7 +242,7 @@ int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize) - - /* Let's dump the request now if not yet emitted. */ - if (!(fields & H2_PHDR_FND_NONE)) { -- ret = h2_prepare_h1_reqline(fields, phdr_val, &out, out_end); -+ ret = h2_prepare_h1_reqline(fields, phdr_val, &out, out_end, msgf); - if (ret != 0) - goto leave; - } -diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c -index 4fde7fcc..82dd414a 100644 ---- a/src/mux_h2.c -+++ b/src/mux_h2.c -@@ -2626,6 +2626,7 @@ static int h2_frt_decode_headers(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf, int count) - struct chunk *tmp = get_trash_chunk(); - struct http_hdr list[MAX_HTTP_HDR * 2]; - struct chunk *copy = NULL; -+ unsigned int msgf; - int flen = h2c->dfl; - int outlen = 0; - int wrap; -@@ -2727,13 +2728,22 @@ static int h2_frt_decode_headers(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf, int count) - } - - /* OK now we have our header list in */ -- outlen = h2_make_h1_request(list, bi_end(buf), try); -+ msgf = (h2c->dff & H2_F_DATA_END_STREAM) ? 0 : H2_MSGF_BODY; -+ outlen = h2_make_h1_request(list, bi_end(buf), try, &msgf); - - if (outlen < 0) { - h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_COMPRESSION_ERROR); - goto fail; - } - -+ if (msgf & H2_MSGF_BODY) { -+ /* a payload is present */ -+ if (msgf & H2_MSGF_BODY_CL) -+ h2s->flags |= H2_SF_DATA_CLEN; -+ else if (!(msgf & H2_MSGF_BODY_TUNNEL)) -+ h2s->flags |= H2_SF_DATA_CHNK; -+ } -+ - /* now consume the input data */ - bi_del(h2c->dbuf, h2c->dfl); - h2c->st0 = H2_CS_FRAME_H; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-h2-implement-missing-support-for-chunked-encoded-uploads.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-h2-implement-missing-support-for-chunked-encoded-uploads.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f2dc3e6f38..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-h2-implement-missing-support-for-chunked-encoded-uploads.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@ -commit 05657bd24ebaf20e5c508a435be9a0830591f033 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Wed Apr 25 20:44:22 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: h2: implement missing support for chunked encoded uploads - - Upload requests not carrying a content-length nor tunnelling data must - be sent chunked-encoded over HTTP/1. The code was planned but for some - reason forgotten during the implementation, leading to such payloads to - be sent as tunnelled data. - - Browsers always emit a content length in uploads so this problem doesn't - happen for most sites. However some applications may send data frames - after a request without indicating it earlier. - - The only way to detect that a client will need to send data is that the - HEADERS frame doesn't hold the ES bit. In this case it's wise to look - for the content-length header. If it's not there, either we're in tunnel - (CONNECT method) or chunked-encoding (other methods). - - This patch implements this. - - The following request is sent using content-length : - - curl --http2 -sk https://127.0.0.1:4443/s2 -XPOST -T /large/file - - and these ones using chunked-encoding : - - curl --http2 -sk https://127.0.0.1:4443/s2 -XPUT -T /large/file - curl --http2 -sk https://127.0.0.1:4443/s2 -XPUT -T - < /dev/urandom - - Thanks to Robert Samuel Newson for raising this issue with details. - This fix must be backported to 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit eba10f24b7da27cde60d2db24aeb1147e1657579) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/h2.c b/src/h2.c -index 7d9ddd50..5c83d6b6 100644 ---- a/src/h2.c -+++ b/src/h2.c -@@ -262,6 +262,14 @@ int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize, unsigned int - *(out++) = '\n'; - } - -+ if ((*msgf & (H2_MSGF_BODY|H2_MSGF_BODY_TUNNEL|H2_MSGF_BODY_CL)) == H2_MSGF_BODY) { -+ /* add chunked encoding */ -+ if (out + 28 > out_end) -+ goto fail; -+ memcpy(out, "transfer-encoding: chunked\r\n", 28); -+ out += 28; -+ } -+ - /* now we may have to build a cookie list. We'll dump the values of all - * visited headers. - */ -diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c -index 82dd414a..5f1da0df 100644 ---- a/src/mux_h2.c -+++ b/src/mux_h2.c -@@ -2785,6 +2785,7 @@ static int h2_frt_transfer_data(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf, int count) - struct h2c *h2c = h2s->h2c; - int block1, block2; - unsigned int flen = h2c->dfl; -+ unsigned int chklen = 0; - - h2s->cs->flags &= ~CS_FL_RCV_MORE; - h2c->flags &= ~H2_CF_DEM_SFULL; -@@ -2820,14 +2821,35 @@ static int h2_frt_transfer_data(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf, int count) - return 0; - } - -+ /* chunked-encoding requires more room */ -+ if (h2s->flags & H2_SF_DATA_CHNK) { -+ chklen = MIN(flen, count); -+ chklen = (chklen < 16) ? 1 : (chklen < 256) ? 2 : -+ (chklen < 4096) ? 3 : (chklen < 65536) ? 4 : -+ (chklen < 1048576) ? 4 : 8; -+ chklen += 4; // CRLF, CRLF -+ } -+ - /* does it fit in output buffer or should we wait ? */ -- if (flen > count) { -- flen = count; -- if (!flen) { -- h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_SFULL; -- h2s->cs->flags |= CS_FL_RCV_MORE; -- return 0; -- } -+ if (flen + chklen > count) { -+ if (chklen >= count) -+ goto full; -+ flen = count - chklen; -+ } -+ -+ if (h2s->flags & H2_SF_DATA_CHNK) { -+ /* emit the chunk size */ -+ unsigned int chksz = flen; -+ char str[10]; -+ char *beg; -+ -+ beg = str + sizeof(str); -+ *--beg = '\n'; -+ *--beg = '\r'; -+ do { -+ *--beg = hextab[chksz & 0xF]; -+ } while (chksz >>= 4); -+ bi_putblk(buf, beg, str + sizeof(str) - beg); - } - - /* Block1 is the length of the first block before the buffer wraps, -@@ -2844,6 +2866,11 @@ static int h2_frt_transfer_data(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf, int count) - if (block2) - bi_putblk(buf, b_ptr(h2c->dbuf, block1), block2); - -+ if (h2s->flags & H2_SF_DATA_CHNK) { -+ /* emit the CRLF */ -+ bi_putblk(buf, "\r\n", 2); -+ } -+ - /* now mark the input data as consumed (will be deleted from the buffer - * by the caller when seeing FRAME_A after sending the window update). - */ -@@ -2854,15 +2881,22 @@ static int h2_frt_transfer_data(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf, int count) - - if (h2c->dfl > h2c->dpl) { - /* more data available, transfer stalled on stream full */ -- h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_SFULL; -- h2s->cs->flags |= CS_FL_RCV_MORE; -- return flen; -+ goto more; - } - - end_transfer: - /* here we're done with the frame, all the payload (except padding) was - * transferred. - */ -+ -+ if (h2c->dff & H2_F_DATA_END_STREAM && h2s->flags & H2_SF_DATA_CHNK) { -+ /* emit the trailing 0 CRLF CRLF */ -+ if (count < 5) -+ goto more; -+ chklen += 5; -+ bi_putblk(buf, "0\r\n\r\n", 5); -+ } -+ - h2c->rcvd_c += h2c->dpl; - h2c->rcvd_s += h2c->dpl; - h2c->dpl = 0; -@@ -2877,7 +2911,13 @@ static int h2_frt_transfer_data(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf, int count) - h2s->flags |= H2_SF_ES_RCVD; - } - -- return flen; -+ return flen + chklen; -+ full: -+ flen = chklen = 0; -+ more: -+ h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_SFULL; -+ h2s->cs->flags |= CS_FL_RCV_MORE; -+ return flen + chklen; - } - - /* diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0006-BUG-MINOR-lua-threads-Make-luas-tasks-sticky-to-the-current-thread.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0006-BUG-MINOR-lua-threads-Make-luas-tasks-sticky-to-the-current-thread.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f6f9d55e54..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0006-BUG-MINOR-lua-threads-Make-luas-tasks-sticky-to-the-current-thread.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -commit 8b8d55be7e94ee3d758d41a21fa86a036e91a264 -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Wed Apr 25 10:34:45 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: lua/threads: Make lua's tasks sticky to the current thread - - PiBa-NL reported a bug with tasks registered in lua when HAProxy is started with - serveral threads. These tasks have not specific affinity with threads so they - can be woken up on any threads. So, it is impossbile for these tasks to handled - cosockets or applets, because cosockets and applets are sticky on the thread - which created them. It is forbbiden to manipulate a cosocket from another - thread. - - So to fix the bug, tasks registered in lua are now sticky to the current - thread. Because these tasks can be registered before threads creation, the - affinity is set the first time a lua's task is processed. - - This patch must be backported in HAProxy 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 5bc9972ed836517924eea91954d255d317a53418) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c -index d4b7ce91..bd0b87e3 100644 ---- a/src/hlua.c -+++ b/src/hlua.c -@@ -5513,6 +5513,9 @@ static struct task *hlua_process_task(struct task *task) - struct hlua *hlua = task->context; - enum hlua_exec status; - -+ if (task->thread_mask == MAX_THREADS_MASK) -+ task_set_affinity(task, tid_bit); -+ - /* If it is the first call to the task, we must initialize the - * execution timeouts. - */ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0007-BUG-MINOR-config-disable-http-reuse-on-TCP-proxies.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0007-BUG-MINOR-config-disable-http-reuse-on-TCP-proxies.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fdca4ea078..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0007-BUG-MINOR-config-disable-http-reuse-on-TCP-proxies.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -commit 80e179128cfd78d95cdebf7195fd21299e7931b6 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Sat Apr 28 07:18:15 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: config: disable http-reuse on TCP proxies - - Louis Chanouha reported an inappropriate warning when http-reuse is - present in a defaults section while a TCP proxy accidently inherits - it and finds a conflict with other options like the use of the PROXY - protocol. To fix this patch removes the http-reuse option for TCP - proxies. - - This fix needs to be backported to 1.8, 1.7 and possibly 1.6. - - (cherry picked from commit 46deab6e64bfda7211b7c3199ad01f136141c86f) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c -index 5a460381..63d2de58 100644 ---- a/src/cfgparse.c -+++ b/src/cfgparse.c -@@ -8702,6 +8702,9 @@ out_uri_auth_compat: - } - #endif - -+ if ((curproxy->mode != PR_MODE_HTTP) && (curproxy->options & PR_O_REUSE_MASK) != PR_O_REUSE_NEVR) -+ curproxy->options &= ~PR_O_REUSE_MASK; -+ - if ((curproxy->options & PR_O_REUSE_MASK) != PR_O_REUSE_NEVR) { - if ((curproxy->conn_src.opts & CO_SRC_TPROXY_MASK) == CO_SRC_TPROXY_CLI || - (curproxy->conn_src.opts & CO_SRC_TPROXY_MASK) == CO_SRC_TPROXY_CIP || diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0008-BUG-MINOR-checks-Fix-check--health-computation-for-flapping-servers.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0008-BUG-MINOR-checks-Fix-check--health-computation-for-flapping-servers.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d2dd8d899a..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0008-BUG-MINOR-checks-Fix-check--health-computation-for-flapping-servers.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -commit edb5a1efd22eb9918574d962640cd2ae3bb45ad3 -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Wed May 2 12:12:45 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: checks: Fix check->health computation for flapping servers - - This patch fixes an old bug introduced in the commit 7b1d47ce ("MAJOR: checks: - move health checks changes to set_server_check_status()"). When a DOWN server is - flapping, everytime a check succeds, check->health is incremented. But when a - check fails, it is decremented only when it is higher than the rise value. So if - only one check succeds for a DOWN server, check->health will remain set to 1 for - all subsequent failing checks. - - So, at first glance, it seems not that terrible because the server remains - DOWN. But it is reported in the transitional state "DOWN server, going up". And - it will remain in this state until it is UP again. And there is also an - insidious side effect. If a DOWN server is flapping time to time, It will end to - be considered UP after a uniq successful check, , regardless the rise threshold, - because check->health will be increased slowly and never decreased. - - To fix the bug, we just need to reset check->health to 0 when a check fails for - a DOWN server. To do so, we just need to relax the condition to handle a failure - in the function set_server_check_status. - - This patch must be backported to haproxy 1.5 and newer. - - (cherry picked from commit b119a79fc336f2b6074de1c3113b1682c717985c) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c -index 80a9c70d..d07a82f8 100644 ---- a/src/checks.c -+++ b/src/checks.c -@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static void set_server_check_status(struct check *check, short status, const cha - */ - if ((!(check->state & CHK_ST_AGENT) || - (check->status >= HCHK_STATUS_L57DATA)) && -- (check->health >= check->rise)) { -+ (check->health > 0)) { - HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->counters.failed_checks, 1); - report = 1; - check->health--; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-threads-Fix-the-sync-point-for-more-than-32-threads.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-threads-Fix-the-sync-point-for-more-than-32-threads.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7574b69075..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-threads-Fix-the-sync-point-for-more-than-32-threads.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -commit 830324444e57c042666b17ac4584352cca85dafd -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Wed May 2 16:58:40 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: threads: Fix the sync point for more than 32 threads - - In the sync point, to know if a thread has requested a synchronization, we call - the function thread_need_sync(). It should return 1 if yes, otherwise it should - return 0. It is intended to return a signed integer. - - But internally, instead of returning 0 or 1, it returns 0 or tid_bit - (threads_want_sync & tid_bit). So, tid_bit is casted in integer. For the first - 32 threads, it's ok, because we always check if thread_need_sync() returns - something else than 0. But this is a problem if HAProxy is started with more - than 32 threads, because for threads 33 to 64 (so for tid 32 to 63), their - tid_bit casted to integer are evaluated to 0. So the sync point does not work for - more than 32 threads. - - Now, the function thread_need_sync() respects its contract, returning 0 or - 1. the function thread_no_sync() has also been updated to avoid any ambiguities. - - This patch must be backported in HAProxy 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 148b16e1ceb819dfcef4c45828121d9cd7474b35) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/src/hathreads.c b/src/hathreads.c -index daf226ce..944a0d5b 100644 ---- a/src/hathreads.c -+++ b/src/hathreads.c -@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ void thread_want_sync() - /* Returns 1 if no thread has requested a sync. Otherwise, it returns 0. */ - int thread_no_sync() - { -- return (threads_want_sync == 0); -+ return (threads_want_sync == 0UL); - } - - /* Returns 1 if the current thread has requested a sync. Otherwise, it returns -@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int thread_no_sync() - */ - int thread_need_sync() - { -- return (threads_want_sync & tid_bit); -+ return ((threads_want_sync & tid_bit) != 0UL); - } - - /* Thread barrier. Synchronizes all threads at the barrier referenced by diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0010-BUG-MINOR-lua-Put-tasks-to-sleep-when-waiting-for-data.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0010-BUG-MINOR-lua-Put-tasks-to-sleep-when-waiting-for-data.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3b298f9630..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0010-BUG-MINOR-lua-Put-tasks-to-sleep-when-waiting-for-data.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -commit 335bc7b74eee84f0a3bcb615cadd23fe01d1336c -Author: PiBa-NL -Date: Wed May 2 22:27:14 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: lua: Put tasks to sleep when waiting for data - - If a lua socket is waiting for data it currently spins at 100% cpu usage. - This because the TICK_ETERNITY returned by the socket is ignored when - setting the 'expire' time of the task. - - Fixed by removing the check for yields that return TICK_ETERNITY. - - This should be backported to at least 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit fe971b35aeca9994f3823112c783aa796e74075a) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c -index bd0b87e3..0100e7cf 100644 ---- a/src/hlua.c -+++ b/src/hlua.c -@@ -5536,8 +5536,7 @@ static struct task *hlua_process_task(struct task *task) - - case HLUA_E_AGAIN: /* co process or timeout wake me later. */ - notification_gc(&hlua->com); -- if (hlua->wake_time != TICK_ETERNITY) -- task->expire = hlua->wake_time; -+ task->expire = hlua->wake_time; - break; - - /* finished with error. */ diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0011-DOC-MINOR-clean-up-LUA-documentation-re-servers-array-table.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0011-DOC-MINOR-clean-up-LUA-documentation-re-servers-array-table.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7f210e5332..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0011-DOC-MINOR-clean-up-LUA-documentation-re-servers-array-table.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,252 +0,0 @@ -commit 016feef5483397491af3242162934d9e9dbc6263 -Author: Patrick Hemmer -Date: Tue May 1 21:30:41 2018 -0400 - - DOC/MINOR: clean up LUA documentation re: servers & array/table. - - * A few typos - * Fix definitions of values which are tables, not arrays. - * Consistent US English naming for "server" instead of "serveur". - - [tfo: should be backported to 1.6 and higher] - - (cherry picked from commit c6a1d711a4d47d68611aa28adecdadba96221bde) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/doc/lua-api/index.rst b/doc/lua-api/index.rst -index e7aa425d..2d210945 100644 ---- a/doc/lua-api/index.rst -+++ b/doc/lua-api/index.rst -@@ -169,9 +169,9 @@ Core class - - **context**: task, action, sample-fetch, converter - -- This attribute is an array of declared proxies (frontend and backends). Each -- proxy give an access to his list of listeners and servers. Each entry is of -- type :ref:`proxy_class` -+ This attribute is a table of declared proxies (frontend and backends). Each -+ proxy give an access to his list of listeners and servers. The table is -+ indexed by proxy name, and each entry is of type :ref:`proxy_class`. - - Warning, if you are declared frontend and backend with the same name, only one - of these are listed. -@@ -183,12 +183,9 @@ Core class - - **context**: task, action, sample-fetch, converter - -- This attribute is an array of declared proxies with backend capability. Each -- proxy give an access to his list of listeners and servers. Each entry is of -- type :ref:`proxy_class` -- -- Warning, if you are declared frontend and backend with the same name, only one -- of these are listed. -+ This attribute is a table of declared proxies with backend capability. Each -+ proxy give an access to his list of listeners and servers. The table is -+ indexed by the backend name, and each entry is of type :ref:`proxy_class`. - - :see: :js:attr:`core.proxies` - :see: :js:attr:`core.frontends` -@@ -197,12 +194,9 @@ Core class - - **context**: task, action, sample-fetch, converter - -- This attribute is an array of declared proxies with frontend capability. Each -- proxy give an access to his list of listeners and servers. Each entry is of -- type :ref:`proxy_class` -- -- Warning, if you are declared frontend and backend with the same name, only one -- of these are listed. -+ This attribute is a table of declared proxies with frontend capability. Each -+ proxy give an access to his list of listeners and servers. The table is -+ indexed by the frontend name, and each entry is of type :ref:`proxy_class`. - - :see: :js:attr:`core.proxies` - :see: :js:attr:`core.backends` -@@ -336,7 +330,7 @@ Core class - Lua execution or resume, so two consecutive call to the function "now" will - probably returns the same result. - -- :returns: an array which contains two entries "sec" and "usec". "sec" -+ :returns: a table which contains two entries "sec" and "usec". "sec" - contains the current at the epoch format, and "usec" contains the - current microseconds. - -@@ -439,9 +433,12 @@ Core class - - **context**: body, init, task, action, sample-fetch, converter - -- proxies is an array containing the list of all proxies declared in the -- configuration file. Each entry of the proxies array is an object of type -- :ref:`proxy_class` -+ proxies is a table containing the list of all proxies declared in the -+ configuration file. The table is indexed by the proxy name, and each entry -+ of the proxies table is an object of type :ref:`proxy_class`. -+ -+ Warning, if you have declared a frontend and backend with the same name, only -+ one of these are listed. - - .. js:function:: core.register_action(name, actions, func [, nb_args]) - -@@ -852,13 +849,14 @@ Proxy class - - .. js:attribute:: Proxy.servers - -- Contain an array with the attached servers. Each server entry is an object of -- type :ref:`server_class`. -+ Contain a table with the attached servers. The table is indexed by server -+ name, and each server entry is an object of type :ref:`server_class`. - - .. js:attribute:: Proxy.listeners - -- Contain an array with the attached listeners. Each listeners entry is an -- object of type :ref:`listener_class`. -+ Contain a table with the attached listeners. The table is indexed by listener -+ name, and each each listeners entry is an object of type -+ :ref:`listener_class`. - - .. js:function:: Proxy.pause(px) - -@@ -908,21 +906,25 @@ Proxy class - - .. js:function:: Proxy.get_stats(px) - -- Returns an array containg the proxy statistics. The statistics returned are -+ Returns a table containg the proxy statistics. The statistics returned are - not the same if the proxy is frontend or a backend. - - :param class_proxy px: A :ref:`proxy_class` which indicates the manipulated - proxy. -- :returns: a key/value array containing stats -+ :returns: a key/value table containing stats - - .. _server_class: - - Server class - ============ - -+.. js:class:: Server -+ -+ This class provides a way for manipulating servers and retrieving information. -+ - .. js:function:: Server.is_draining(sv) - -- Return true if the server is currently draining stiky connections. -+ Return true if the server is currently draining sticky connections. - - :param class_server sv: A :ref:`server_class` which indicates the manipulated - server. -@@ -930,7 +932,7 @@ Server class - - .. js:function:: Server.set_weight(sv, weight) - -- Dynamically change the weight of the serveur. See the management socket -+ Dynamically change the weight of the server. See the management socket - documentation for more information about the format of the string. - - :param class_server sv: A :ref:`server_class` which indicates the manipulated -@@ -939,7 +941,7 @@ Server class - - .. js:function:: Server.get_weight(sv) - -- This function returns an integer representing the serveur weight. -+ This function returns an integer representing the server weight. - - :param class_server sv: A :ref:`server_class` which indicates the manipulated - server. -@@ -947,16 +949,16 @@ Server class - - .. js:function:: Server.set_addr(sv, addr) - -- Dynamically change the address of the serveur. See the management socket -+ Dynamically change the address of the server. See the management socket - documentation for more information about the format of the string. - - :param class_server sv: A :ref:`server_class` which indicates the manipulated - server. -- :param string weight: A string describing the server address. -+ :param string addr: A string describing the server address. - - .. js:function:: Server.get_addr(sv) - -- Returns a string describing the address of the serveur. -+ Returns a string describing the address of the server. - - :param class_server sv: A :ref:`server_class` which indicates the manipulated - server. -@@ -968,7 +970,7 @@ Server class - - :param class_server sv: A :ref:`server_class` which indicates the manipulated - server. -- :returns: a key/value array containing stats -+ :returns: a key/value table containing stats - - .. js:function:: Server.shut_sess(sv) - -@@ -1085,7 +1087,7 @@ Listener class - - :param class_listener ls: A :ref:`listener_class` which indicates the - manipulated listener. -- :returns: a key/value array containing stats -+ :returns: a key/value table containing stats - - .. _concat_class: - -@@ -1169,7 +1171,7 @@ Fetches class - usage. they are the chapters 7.3.2 to 7.3.6. - - **warning** some sample fetches are not available in some context. These -- limitations are specified in this documentation when theire useful. -+ limitations are specified in this documentation when they're useful. - - :see: :js:attr:`TXN.f` - :see: :js:attr:`TXN.sf` -@@ -1345,13 +1347,13 @@ HTTP class - - .. js:function:: HTTP.req_get_headers(http) - -- Returns an array containing all the request headers. -+ Returns a table containing all the request headers. - - :param class_http http: The related http object. -- :returns: array of headers. -+ :returns: table of headers. - :see: :js:func:`HTTP.res_get_headers` - -- This is the form of the returned array: -+ This is the form of the returned table: - - .. code-block:: lua - -@@ -1366,13 +1368,13 @@ HTTP class - - .. js:function:: HTTP.res_get_headers(http) - -- Returns an array containing all the response headers. -+ Returns a table containing all the response headers. - - :param class_http http: The related http object. -- :returns: array of headers. -+ :returns: table of headers. - :see: :js:func:`HTTP.req_get_headers` - -- This is the form of the returned array: -+ This is the form of the returned table: - - .. code-block:: lua - -@@ -2210,12 +2212,12 @@ AppletHTTP class - - .. js:attribute:: AppletHTTP.headers - -- :returns: array -+ :returns: table - -- The attribute headers returns an array containing the HTTP -+ The attribute headers returns a table containing the HTTP - headers. The header names are always in lower case. As the header name can be - encountered more than once in each request, the value is indexed with 0 as -- first index value. The array have this form: -+ first index value. The table have this form: - - .. code-block:: lua - diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0012-BUG-MINOR-map-correctly-track-reference-to-the-last-ref_elt-being-dumped.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0012-BUG-MINOR-map-correctly-track-reference-to-the-last-ref_elt-being-dumped.patch deleted file mode 100644 index af58e5f447..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0012-BUG-MINOR-map-correctly-track-reference-to-the-last-ref_elt-being-dumped.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -commit b2219ae216a141acdf0e2a3f67d2c85aee2a2bc2 -Author: Dragan Dosen -Date: Fri May 4 16:27:15 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: map: correctly track reference to the last ref_elt being dumped - - The bug was introduced in the commit 8d85aa4 ("BUG/MAJOR: map: fix - segfault during 'show map/acl' on cli"). - - This patch should be backported to 1.8, 1.7 and 1.6. - - (cherry picked from commit 336a11f75571ad46f74a7c6247c13ed44f95da93) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/src/map.c b/src/map.c -index f40e4394..a9a1e53c 100644 ---- a/src/map.c -+++ b/src/map.c -@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ static int cli_io_handler_pat_list(struct appctx *appctx) - * reference to the last ref_elt being dumped. - */ - if (appctx->st2 == STAT_ST_LIST) { -- if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&appctx->ctx.sess.bref.users)) { -- LIST_DEL(&appctx->ctx.sess.bref.users); -- LIST_INIT(&appctx->ctx.sess.bref.users); -+ if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&appctx->ctx.map.bref.users)) { -+ LIST_DEL(&appctx->ctx.map.bref.users); -+ LIST_INIT(&appctx->ctx.map.bref.users); - } - } - return 1; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0013-BUG-MEDIUM-task-Dont-free-a-task-that-is-about-to-be-run.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0013-BUG-MEDIUM-task-Dont-free-a-task-that-is-about-to-be-run.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e802c7f6b9..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0013-BUG-MEDIUM-task-Dont-free-a-task-that-is-about-to-be-run.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,128 +0,0 @@ -commit a0f0db361978154474d76028183647d5991f3b5c -Author: Olivier Houchard -Date: Fri May 4 15:46:16 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: task: Don't free a task that is about to be run. - - While running a task, we may try to delete and free a task that is about to - be run, because it's part of the local tasks list, or because rq_next points - to it. - So flag any task that is in the local tasks list to be deleted, instead of - run, by setting t->process to NULL, and re-make rq_next a global, - thread-local variable, that is modified if we attempt to delete that task. - - Many thanks to PiBa-NL for reporting this and analysing the problem. - - This should be backported to 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 9b36cb4a414c22e13d344afbbe70684e9f2f1d49) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/include/proto/task.h b/include/proto/task.h -index cbc1a907..c1c4c07e 100644 ---- a/include/proto/task.h -+++ b/include/proto/task.h -@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ extern unsigned int nb_tasks_cur; - extern unsigned int niced_tasks; /* number of niced tasks in the run queue */ - extern struct pool_head *pool_head_task; - extern struct pool_head *pool_head_notification; -+extern THREAD_LOCAL struct task *curr_task; /* task currently running or NULL */ -+extern THREAD_LOCAL struct eb32sc_node *rq_next; /* Next task to be potentially run */ - - __decl_hathreads(extern HA_SPINLOCK_T rq_lock); /* spin lock related to run queue */ - __decl_hathreads(extern HA_SPINLOCK_T wq_lock); /* spin lock related to wait queue */ -@@ -177,8 +179,11 @@ static inline struct task *__task_unlink_rq(struct task *t) - static inline struct task *task_unlink_rq(struct task *t) - { - HA_SPIN_LOCK(TASK_RQ_LOCK, &rq_lock); -- if (likely(task_in_rq(t))) -+ if (likely(task_in_rq(t))) { -+ if (&t->rq == rq_next) -+ rq_next = eb32sc_next(rq_next, tid_bit); - __task_unlink_rq(t); -+ } - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(TASK_RQ_LOCK, &rq_lock); - return t; - } -@@ -230,7 +235,7 @@ static inline struct task *task_new(unsigned long thread_mask) - * Free a task. Its context must have been freed since it will be lost. - * The task count is decremented. - */ --static inline void task_free(struct task *t) -+static inline void __task_free(struct task *t) - { - pool_free(pool_head_task, t); - if (unlikely(stopping)) -@@ -238,6 +243,18 @@ static inline void task_free(struct task *t) - HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&nb_tasks, 1); - } - -+static inline void task_free(struct task *t) -+{ -+ /* There's no need to protect t->state with a lock, as the task -+ * has to run on the current thread. -+ */ -+ if (t == curr_task || !(t->state & TASK_RUNNING)) -+ __task_free(t); -+ else -+ t->process = NULL; -+} -+ -+ - /* Place into the wait queue, where it may already be. If the expiration - * timer is infinite, do nothing and rely on wake_expired_task to clean up. - */ -diff --git a/src/task.c b/src/task.c -index fd9acf66..3d021bb4 100644 ---- a/src/task.c -+++ b/src/task.c -@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ unsigned int nb_tasks_cur = 0; /* copy of the tasks count */ - unsigned int niced_tasks = 0; /* number of niced tasks in the run queue */ - - THREAD_LOCAL struct task *curr_task = NULL; /* task currently running or NULL */ -+THREAD_LOCAL struct eb32sc_node *rq_next = NULL; /* Next task to be potentially run */ - - __decl_hathreads(HA_SPINLOCK_T __attribute__((aligned(64))) rq_lock); /* spin lock related to run queue */ - __decl_hathreads(HA_SPINLOCK_T __attribute__((aligned(64))) wq_lock); /* spin lock related to wait queue */ -@@ -186,7 +187,6 @@ void process_runnable_tasks() - struct task *t; - int i; - int max_processed; -- struct eb32sc_node *rq_next; - struct task *local_tasks[16]; - int local_tasks_count; - int final_tasks_count; -@@ -227,8 +227,14 @@ void process_runnable_tasks() - */ - if (likely(t->process == process_stream)) - t = process_stream(t); -- else -- t = t->process(t); -+ else { -+ if (t->process != NULL) -+ t = t->process(t); -+ else { -+ __task_free(t); -+ t = NULL; -+ } -+ } - curr_task = NULL; - - if (likely(t != NULL)) { -@@ -309,8 +315,14 @@ void process_runnable_tasks() - curr_task = t; - if (likely(t->process == process_stream)) - t = process_stream(t); -- else -- t = t->process(t); -+ else { -+ if (t->process != NULL) -+ t = t->process(t); -+ else { -+ __task_free(t); -+ t = NULL; -+ } -+ } - curr_task = NULL; - if (t) - local_tasks[final_tasks_count++] = t; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0014-BUG-MINOR-lua-schedule-socket-task-upon-lua-connect.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0014-BUG-MINOR-lua-schedule-socket-task-upon-lua-connect.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f7e3cf34da..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0014-BUG-MINOR-lua-schedule-socket-task-upon-lua-connect.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -commit 52ec3578c3ddc688ae14da3cd3e7e351494603d8 -Author: PiBa-NL -Date: Sat May 5 23:51:42 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: lua: schedule socket task upon lua connect() - - The parameters like server-address, port and timeout should be set before - process_stream task is called to avoid the stream being 'closed' before it - got initialized properly. This is most clearly visible when running with - tune.lua.forced-yield=1.. So scheduling the task should not be done when - creating the lua socket, but when connect is called. The error - "socket: not yet initialised, you can't set timeouts." would then appear. - - Below code for example also shows this issue, as the sleep will - yield the lua code: - local con = core.tcp() - core.sleep(1) - con:settimeout(10) - - (cherry picked from commit 706d5ee0c366787536213ccd6dea264d20b76a22) - [wt: must be backported to 1.7 and 1.6 as well with a different patch, - see https://www.mail-archive.com/haproxy@formilux.org/msg29924.html] - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c -index 0100e7cf..5cc918c9 100644 ---- a/src/hlua.c -+++ b/src/hlua.c -@@ -2415,6 +2415,10 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_socket_connect(struct lua_State *L) - WILL_LJMP(luaL_error(L, "out of memory")); - } - xref_unlock(&socket->xref, peer); -+ -+ task_wakeup(s->task, TASK_WOKEN_INIT); -+ /* Return yield waiting for connection. */ -+ - WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_connect_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0)); - - return 0; -@@ -2566,8 +2570,6 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_socket_new(lua_State *L) - strm->flags |= SF_DIRECT | SF_ASSIGNED | SF_ADDR_SET | SF_BE_ASSIGNED; - strm->target = &socket_tcp.obj_type; - -- task_wakeup(strm->task, TASK_WOKEN_INIT); -- /* Return yield waiting for connection. */ - return 1; - - out_fail_stream: diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0015-BUG-MINOR-lua-ensure-large-proxy-IDs-can-be-represented.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0015-BUG-MINOR-lua-ensure-large-proxy-IDs-can-be-represented.patch deleted file mode 100644 index dce13e4fa6..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0015-BUG-MINOR-lua-ensure-large-proxy-IDs-can-be-represented.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -commit edb4427ab7c070a16cb9a23460f68b3fc3c041bb -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Sun May 6 14:50:09 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: lua: ensure large proxy IDs can be represented - - In function hlua_fcn_new_proxy() too small a buffer was passed to - snprintf(), resulting in large proxy or listener IDs to make - snprintf() fail. It is unlikely to meet this case but let's fix it - anyway. - - This fix must be backported to all stable branches where it applies. - - (cherry picked from commit 29d698040d6bb56b29c036aeba05f0d52d8ce94b) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/src/hlua_fcn.c b/src/hlua_fcn.c -index a8d53d45..1df08f85 100644 ---- a/src/hlua_fcn.c -+++ b/src/hlua_fcn.c -@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ int hlua_fcn_new_proxy(lua_State *L, struct proxy *px) - struct server *srv; - struct listener *lst; - int lid; -- char buffer[10]; -+ char buffer[17]; - - lua_newtable(L); - -@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ int hlua_fcn_new_proxy(lua_State *L, struct proxy *px) - if (lst->name) - lua_pushstring(L, lst->name); - else { -- snprintf(buffer, 10, "sock-%d", lid); -+ snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "sock-%d", lid); - lid++; - lua_pushstring(L, buffer); - } diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0016-BUG-MEDIUM-http-dont-always-abort-transfers-on-CF_SHUTR.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0016-BUG-MEDIUM-http-dont-always-abort-transfers-on-CF_SHUTR.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0605b205df..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0016-BUG-MEDIUM-http-dont-always-abort-transfers-on-CF_SHUTR.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -commit 1c10e5b1b95142bb3ac385be1e60d8b180b2e99e -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Wed May 16 11:35:05 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: http: don't always abort transfers on CF_SHUTR - - Pawel Karoluk reported on Discourse[1] that HTTP/2 breaks url_param. - - Christopher managed to track it down to the HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN flag - which is set there to ensure the connection is validated before sending - the headers, as we may need to rewind the stream and hash again upon - redispatch. What happens is that in the forwarding code we refrain - from forwarding when this flag is set and the connection is not yet - established, and for this we go through the missing_data_or_waiting - path. This exit path was initially designed only to wait for data - from the client, so it rightfully checks whether or not the client - has already closed since in that case it must not wait for more data. - But it also has the side effect of aborting such a transfer if the - client has closed after the request, which is exactly what happens - in H2. - - A study on the code reveals that this whole combined check should - be revisited : while it used to be true that waiting had the same - error conditions as missing data, it's not true anymore. Some other - corner cases were identified, such as the risk to report a server - close instead of a client timeout when waiting for the client to - read the last chunk of data if the shutr is already present, or - the risk to fail a redispatch when a client uploads some data and - closes before the connection establishes. The compression seems to - be at risk of rare issues there if a write to a full buffer is not - yet possible but a shutr is already queued. - - At the moment these risks are extremely unlikely but they do exist, - and their impact is very minor since it mostly concerns an issue not - being optimally handled, and the fixes risk to cause more serious - issues. Thus this patch only focuses on how the HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN - is handled and leaves the rest untouched. - - This patch needs to be backported to 1.8, and could be backported to - earlier versions to properly take care of HTTP/1 requests passing via - url_param which are closed immediately after the headers, though this - is unlikely as this behaviour is only exhibited by scripts. - - [1] https://discourse.haproxy.org/t/haproxy-1-8-x-url-param-issue-in-http2/2482/13 - - (cherry picked from commit ba20dfc50161ba705a746d54ebc1a0a45c46beab) - Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau - -diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c -index 4c18a27c..b384cef1 100644 ---- a/src/proto_http.c -+++ b/src/proto_http.c -@@ -4865,7 +4865,8 @@ int http_request_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit) - if (!(s->res.flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)) { - channel_auto_connect(req); - req->flags |= CF_WAKE_CONNECT; -- goto missing_data_or_waiting; -+ channel_dont_close(req); /* don't fail on early shutr */ -+ goto waiting; - } - msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN; - } -@@ -4949,6 +4950,7 @@ int http_request_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit) - goto return_bad_req_stats_ok; - } - -+ waiting: - /* waiting for the last bits to leave the buffer */ - if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW) - goto aborted_xfer; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0017-BUG-MEDIUM-pollers-Use-a-global-list-for-fd-shared-between-threads.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0017-BUG-MEDIUM-pollers-Use-a-global-list-for-fd-shared-between-threads.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b3ae30e519..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0017-BUG-MEDIUM-pollers-Use-a-global-list-for-fd-shared-between-threads.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,709 +0,0 @@ -commit 954db1d01a3d706d4cacd288f28e8517a635d36e -Author: Olivier Houchard -Date: Thu May 17 18:34:02 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: pollers: Use a global list for fd shared between threads. - - With the old model, any fd shared by multiple threads, such as listeners - or dns sockets, would only be updated on one threads, so that could lead - to missed event, or spurious wakeups. - To avoid this, add a global list for fd that are shared, and only remove - entries from this list when every thread as updated its poller. - This subtly changes the semantics of updt_fd_polling(), as it now unlocks - the FD_LOCK on exit. - - This is similar in spirit to commit 6b96f7289c2f401deef4bdc6e20792360807dde4 - (with the bugfix from c55b88ece616afe0b28dc81eb39bad37b5f9c33f) applied, - but had to be rewrote, because of the differences between 1.8 and master. - - This should only be applied to 1.8. - -diff --git a/include/common/hathreads.h b/include/common/hathreads.h -index 325a869a..86db4d5c 100644 ---- a/include/common/hathreads.h -+++ b/include/common/hathreads.h -@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ void thread_exit_sync(void); - int thread_no_sync(void); - int thread_need_sync(void); - -+extern unsigned long all_threads_mask; -+ - #if defined(DEBUG_THREAD) || defined(DEBUG_FULL) - - /* WARNING!!! if you update this enum, please also keep lock_label() up to date below */ -@@ -209,6 +211,7 @@ enum lock_label { - FDTAB_LOCK, - FDCACHE_LOCK, - FD_LOCK, -+ FD_UPDATE_LOCK, - POLL_LOCK, - TASK_RQ_LOCK, - TASK_WQ_LOCK, -@@ -330,6 +333,7 @@ static inline const char *lock_label(enum lock_label label) - case FDCACHE_LOCK: return "FDCACHE"; - case FD_LOCK: return "FD"; - case FDTAB_LOCK: return "FDTAB"; -+ case FD_UPDATE_LOCK: return "FD_UPDATE"; - case POLL_LOCK: return "POLL"; - case TASK_RQ_LOCK: return "TASK_RQ"; - case TASK_WQ_LOCK: return "TASK_WQ"; -diff --git a/include/proto/fd.h b/include/proto/fd.h -index bb91bb2c..b6199ccf 100644 ---- a/include/proto/fd.h -+++ b/include/proto/fd.h -@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ extern THREAD_LOCAL int fd_nbupdt; // number of updates in the list - __decl_hathreads(extern HA_SPINLOCK_T __attribute__((aligned(64))) fdtab_lock); /* global lock to protect fdtab array */ - __decl_hathreads(extern HA_RWLOCK_T __attribute__((aligned(64))) fdcache_lock); /* global lock to protect fd_cache array */ - __decl_hathreads(extern HA_SPINLOCK_T __attribute__((aligned(64))) poll_lock); /* global lock to protect poll info */ -+__decl_hathreads(extern HA_SPINLOCK_T __attribute__((aligned(64))) fd_updt_lock); /* global lock to protect the update list */ -+ -+extern struct fdlist update_list; // Global update list - - /* Deletes an FD from the fdsets, and recomputes the maxfd limit. - * The file descriptor is also closed. -@@ -96,14 +99,70 @@ void fd_process_cached_events(); - - /* Mark fd as updated for polling and allocate an entry in the update list - * for this if it was not already there. This can be done at any time. -+ * This function expects the FD lock to be locked, and returns with the -+ * FD lock unlocked. - */ - static inline void updt_fd_polling(const int fd) - { -- if (fdtab[fd].update_mask & tid_bit) -+ if ((fdtab[fd].update_mask & fdtab[fd].thread_mask) == -+ fdtab[fd].thread_mask) { -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - /* already scheduled for update */ - return; -- fdtab[fd].update_mask |= tid_bit; -- fd_updt[fd_nbupdt++] = fd; -+ } -+ if (fdtab[fd].thread_mask == tid_bit) { -+ fdtab[fd].update_mask |= tid_bit; -+ fd_updt[fd_nbupdt++] = fd; -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ } else { -+ /* This is ugly, but we can afford to unlock the FD lock -+ * before we acquire the fd_updt_lock, to prevent a -+ * lock order reversal, because this function is only called -+ * from fd_update_cache(), and all users of fd_update_cache() -+ * used to just unlock the fd lock just after, anyway. -+ */ -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); -+ /* If update_mask is non-nul, then it's already in the list -+ * so we don't have to add it. -+ */ -+ if (fdtab[fd].update_mask == 0) { -+ if (update_list.first == -1) { -+ update_list.first = update_list.last = fd; -+ fdtab[fd].update.next = fdtab[fd].update.prev = -1; -+ } else { -+ fdtab[update_list.last].update.next = fd; -+ fdtab[fd].update.prev = update_list.last; -+ fdtab[fd].update.next = -1; -+ update_list.last = fd; -+ } -+ } -+ fdtab[fd].update_mask |= fdtab[fd].thread_mask; -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); -+ -+ } -+} -+ -+/* Called from the poller to acknoledge we read an entry from the global -+ * update list, to remove our bit from the update_mask, and remove it from -+ * the list if we were the last one. -+ */ -+/* Expects to be called with the FD lock and the FD update lock held */ -+static inline void done_update_polling(int fd) -+{ -+ fdtab[fd].update_mask &= ~tid_bit; -+ if ((fdtab[fd].update_mask & all_threads_mask) == 0) { -+ if (fdtab[fd].update.prev != -1) -+ fdtab[fdtab[fd].update.prev].update.next = -+ fdtab[fd].update.next; -+ else -+ update_list.first = fdtab[fd].update.next; -+ if (fdtab[fd].update.next != -1) -+ fdtab[fdtab[fd].update.next].update.prev = -+ fdtab[fd].update.prev; -+ else -+ update_list.last = fdtab[fd].update.prev; -+ } - } - - -@@ -175,13 +234,6 @@ static inline int fd_compute_new_polled_status(int state) - */ - static inline void fd_update_cache(int fd) - { -- /* 3 states for each direction require a polling update */ -- if ((fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_POLLED_R | FD_EV_ACTIVE_R)) == FD_EV_POLLED_R || -- (fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_POLLED_R | FD_EV_READY_R | FD_EV_ACTIVE_R)) == FD_EV_ACTIVE_R || -- (fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_POLLED_W | FD_EV_ACTIVE_W)) == FD_EV_POLLED_W || -- (fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_POLLED_W | FD_EV_READY_W | FD_EV_ACTIVE_W)) == FD_EV_ACTIVE_W) -- updt_fd_polling(fd); -- - /* only READY and ACTIVE states (the two with both flags set) require a cache entry */ - if (((fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_READY_R | FD_EV_ACTIVE_R)) == (FD_EV_READY_R | FD_EV_ACTIVE_R)) || - ((fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_READY_W | FD_EV_ACTIVE_W)) == (FD_EV_READY_W | FD_EV_ACTIVE_W))) { -@@ -190,6 +242,14 @@ static inline void fd_update_cache(int fd) - else { - fd_release_cache_entry(fd); - } -+ /* 3 states for each direction require a polling update */ -+ if ((fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_POLLED_R | FD_EV_ACTIVE_R)) == FD_EV_POLLED_R || -+ (fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_POLLED_R | FD_EV_READY_R | FD_EV_ACTIVE_R)) == FD_EV_ACTIVE_R || -+ (fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_POLLED_W | FD_EV_ACTIVE_W)) == FD_EV_POLLED_W || -+ (fdtab[fd].state & (FD_EV_POLLED_W | FD_EV_READY_W | FD_EV_ACTIVE_W)) == FD_EV_ACTIVE_W) -+ updt_fd_polling(fd); -+ else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* -@@ -271,8 +331,9 @@ static inline void fd_stop_recv(int fd) - if (fd_recv_active(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state &= ~FD_EV_ACTIVE_R; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Disable processing send events on fd */ -@@ -282,8 +343,9 @@ static inline void fd_stop_send(int fd) - if (fd_send_active(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state &= ~FD_EV_ACTIVE_W; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Disable processing of events on fd for both directions. */ -@@ -293,8 +355,9 @@ static inline void fd_stop_both(int fd) - if (fd_active(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state &= ~FD_EV_ACTIVE_RW; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Report that FD cannot receive anymore without polling (EAGAIN detected). */ -@@ -304,8 +367,9 @@ static inline void fd_cant_recv(const int fd) - if (fd_recv_ready(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state &= ~FD_EV_READY_R; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Report that FD can receive anymore without polling. */ -@@ -315,8 +379,9 @@ static inline void fd_may_recv(const int fd) - if (!fd_recv_ready(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state |= FD_EV_READY_R; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Disable readiness when polled. This is useful to interrupt reading when it -@@ -330,8 +395,9 @@ static inline void fd_done_recv(const int fd) - if (fd_recv_polled(fd) && fd_recv_ready(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state &= ~FD_EV_READY_R; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Report that FD cannot send anymore without polling (EAGAIN detected). */ -@@ -341,8 +407,9 @@ static inline void fd_cant_send(const int fd) - if (fd_send_ready(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state &= ~FD_EV_READY_W; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Report that FD can send anymore without polling (EAGAIN detected). */ -@@ -352,8 +419,9 @@ static inline void fd_may_send(const int fd) - if (!fd_send_ready(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state |= FD_EV_READY_W; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Prepare FD to try to receive */ -@@ -363,8 +431,9 @@ static inline void fd_want_recv(int fd) - if (!fd_recv_active(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state |= FD_EV_ACTIVE_R; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Prepare FD to try to send */ -@@ -374,8 +443,9 @@ static inline void fd_want_send(int fd) - if (!fd_send_active(fd)) { - fdtab[fd].state |= FD_EV_ACTIVE_W; - fd_update_cache(fd); /* need an update entry to change the state */ -- } -- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ /* the FD lock is unlocked by fd_update_cache() */ -+ } else -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - } - - /* Update events seen for FD and its state if needed. This should be called -diff --git a/include/types/fd.h b/include/types/fd.h -index 9f2c5fee..8e34c624 100644 ---- a/include/types/fd.h -+++ b/include/types/fd.h -@@ -90,11 +90,24 @@ enum fd_states { - */ - #define DEAD_FD_MAGIC 0xFDDEADFD - -+struct fdlist_entry { -+ int next; -+ int prev; -+} __attribute__ ((aligned(8))); -+ -+/* head of the fd list */ -+struct fdlist { -+ int first; -+ int last; -+} __attribute__ ((aligned(8))); -+ -+ - /* info about one given fd */ - struct fdtab { - __decl_hathreads(HA_SPINLOCK_T lock); - unsigned long thread_mask; /* mask of thread IDs authorized to process the task */ - unsigned long polled_mask; /* mask of thread IDs currently polling this fd */ -+ struct fdlist_entry update; /* Entry in the global update list */ - unsigned long update_mask; /* mask of thread IDs having an update for fd */ - void (*iocb)(int fd); /* I/O handler */ - void *owner; /* the connection or listener associated with this fd, NULL if closed */ -diff --git a/src/ev_epoll.c b/src/ev_epoll.c -index 124b8163..adc15acd 100644 ---- a/src/ev_epoll.c -+++ b/src/ev_epoll.c -@@ -59,13 +59,51 @@ REGPRM1 static void __fd_clo(int fd) - } - } - -+static void _update_fd(int fd) -+{ -+ int en, opcode; -+ -+ en = fdtab[fd].state; -+ -+ if (fdtab[fd].polled_mask & tid_bit) { -+ if (!(fdtab[fd].thread_mask & tid_bit) || !(en & FD_EV_POLLED_RW)) { -+ /* fd removed from poll list */ -+ opcode = EPOLL_CTL_DEL; -+ HA_ATOMIC_AND(&fdtab[fd].polled_mask, ~tid_bit); -+ } -+ else { -+ /* fd status changed */ -+ opcode = EPOLL_CTL_MOD; -+ } -+ } -+ else if ((fdtab[fd].thread_mask & tid_bit) && (en & FD_EV_POLLED_RW)) { -+ /* new fd in the poll list */ -+ opcode = EPOLL_CTL_ADD; -+ HA_ATOMIC_OR(&fdtab[fd].polled_mask, tid_bit); -+ } -+ else { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* construct the epoll events based on new state */ -+ ev.events = 0; -+ if (en & FD_EV_POLLED_R) -+ ev.events |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDHUP; -+ -+ if (en & FD_EV_POLLED_W) -+ ev.events |= EPOLLOUT; -+ -+ ev.data.fd = fd; -+ epoll_ctl(epoll_fd[tid], opcode, fd, &ev); -+} -+ - /* - * Linux epoll() poller - */ - REGPRM2 static void _do_poll(struct poller *p, int exp) - { - int status, eo, en; -- int fd, opcode; -+ int fd; - int count; - int updt_idx; - int wait_time; -@@ -89,39 +127,31 @@ REGPRM2 static void _do_poll(struct poller *p, int exp) - en = fd_compute_new_polled_status(eo); - fdtab[fd].state = en; - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -- -- if (fdtab[fd].polled_mask & tid_bit) { -- if (!(fdtab[fd].thread_mask & tid_bit) || !(en & FD_EV_POLLED_RW)) { -- /* fd removed from poll list */ -- opcode = EPOLL_CTL_DEL; -- HA_ATOMIC_AND(&fdtab[fd].polled_mask, ~tid_bit); -- } -- else { -- /* fd status changed */ -- opcode = EPOLL_CTL_MOD; -- } -- } -- else if ((fdtab[fd].thread_mask & tid_bit) && (en & FD_EV_POLLED_RW)) { -- /* new fd in the poll list */ -- opcode = EPOLL_CTL_ADD; -- HA_ATOMIC_OR(&fdtab[fd].polled_mask, tid_bit); -- } -+ _update_fd(fd); -+ } -+ fd_nbupdt = 0; -+ /* Scan the global update list */ -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); -+ for (fd = update_list.first; fd != -1; fd = fdtab[fd].update.next) { -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ if (fdtab[fd].update_mask & tid_bit) -+ done_update_polling(fd); - else { -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - continue; - } -+ fdtab[fd].new = 0; - -- /* construct the epoll events based on new state */ -- ev.events = 0; -- if (en & FD_EV_POLLED_R) -- ev.events |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDHUP; -- -- if (en & FD_EV_POLLED_W) -- ev.events |= EPOLLOUT; -+ eo = fdtab[fd].state; -+ en = fd_compute_new_polled_status(eo); -+ fdtab[fd].state = en; - -- ev.data.fd = fd; -- epoll_ctl(epoll_fd[tid], opcode, fd, &ev); -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ if (!fdtab[fd].owner) -+ continue; -+ _update_fd(fd); - } -- fd_nbupdt = 0; -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); - - /* compute the epoll_wait() timeout */ - if (!exp) -@@ -208,8 +238,10 @@ static int init_epoll_per_thread() - * fd for this thread. Let's just mark them as updated, the poller will - * do the rest. - */ -- for (fd = 0; fd < maxfd; fd++) -+ for (fd = 0; fd < maxfd; fd++) { -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - updt_fd_polling(fd); -+ } - - return 1; - fail_fd: -diff --git a/src/ev_kqueue.c b/src/ev_kqueue.c -index 8cd6dd84..642de8b3 100644 ---- a/src/ev_kqueue.c -+++ b/src/ev_kqueue.c -@@ -33,6 +33,41 @@ static int kqueue_fd[MAX_THREADS]; // per-thread kqueue_fd - static THREAD_LOCAL struct kevent *kev = NULL; - static struct kevent *kev_out = NULL; // Trash buffer for kevent() to write the eventlist in - -+static int _update_fd(int fd, int start) -+{ -+ int en; -+ int changes = start; -+ -+ en = fdtab[fd].state; -+ -+ if (!(fdtab[fd].thread_mask & tid_bit) || !(en & FD_EV_POLLED_RW)) { -+ if (!(fdtab[fd].polled_mask & tid_bit)) { -+ /* fd was not watched, it's still not */ -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* fd totally removed from poll list */ -+ EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_READ, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, NULL); -+ EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_WRITE, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, NULL); -+ HA_ATOMIC_AND(&fdtab[fd].polled_mask, ~tid_bit); -+ } -+ else { -+ /* OK fd has to be monitored, it was either added or changed */ -+ -+ if (en & FD_EV_POLLED_R) -+ EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_READ, EV_ADD, 0, 0, NULL); -+ else if (fdtab[fd].polled_mask & tid_bit) -+ EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_READ, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, NULL); -+ -+ if (en & FD_EV_POLLED_W) -+ EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_WRITE, EV_ADD, 0, 0, NULL); -+ else if (fdtab[fd].polled_mask & tid_bit) -+ EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_WRITE, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, NULL); -+ -+ HA_ATOMIC_OR(&fdtab[fd].polled_mask, tid_bit); -+ } -+ return changes; -+} -+ - /* - * kqueue() poller - */ -@@ -66,32 +101,32 @@ REGPRM2 static void _do_poll(struct poller *p, int exp) - fdtab[fd].state = en; - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - -- if (!(fdtab[fd].thread_mask & tid_bit) || !(en & FD_EV_POLLED_RW)) { -- if (!(fdtab[fd].polled_mask & tid_bit)) { -- /* fd was not watched, it's still not */ -- continue; -- } -- /* fd totally removed from poll list */ -- EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_READ, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, NULL); -- EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_WRITE, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, NULL); -- HA_ATOMIC_AND(&fdtab[fd].polled_mask, ~tid_bit); -- } -- else { -- /* OK fd has to be monitored, it was either added or changed */ -+ changes = _update_fd(fd, changes); -+ } - -- if (en & FD_EV_POLLED_R) -- EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_READ, EV_ADD, 0, 0, NULL); -- else if (fdtab[fd].polled_mask & tid_bit) -- EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_READ, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, NULL); -+ /* Scan the global update list */ -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); -+ for (fd = update_list.first; fd != -1; fd = fdtab[fd].update.next) { -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ if (fdtab[fd].update_mask & tid_bit) -+ done_update_polling(fd); -+ else { -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ continue; -+ } -+ fdtab[fd].new = 0; - -- if (en & FD_EV_POLLED_W) -- EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_WRITE, EV_ADD, 0, 0, NULL); -- else if (fdtab[fd].polled_mask & tid_bit) -- EV_SET(&kev[changes++], fd, EVFILT_WRITE, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, NULL); -+ eo = fdtab[fd].state; -+ en = fd_compute_new_polled_status(eo); -+ fdtab[fd].state = en; - -- HA_ATOMIC_OR(&fdtab[fd].polled_mask, tid_bit); -- } -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ if (!fdtab[fd].owner) -+ continue; -+ changes = _update_fd(fd, changes); - } -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); -+ - if (changes) { - #ifdef EV_RECEIPT - kev[0].flags |= EV_RECEIPT; -@@ -189,8 +224,10 @@ static int init_kqueue_per_thread() - * fd for this thread. Let's just mark them as updated, the poller will - * do the rest. - */ -- for (fd = 0; fd < maxfd; fd++) -+ for (fd = 0; fd < maxfd; fd++) { -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - updt_fd_polling(fd); -+ } - - return 1; - fail_fd: -diff --git a/src/ev_poll.c b/src/ev_poll.c -index b7cc0bb3..c913ced2 100644 ---- a/src/ev_poll.c -+++ b/src/ev_poll.c -@@ -104,6 +104,51 @@ REGPRM2 static void _do_poll(struct poller *p, int exp) - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(POLL_LOCK, &poll_lock); - } - } -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); -+ for (fd = update_list.first; fd != -1; fd = fdtab[fd].update.next) { -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ if (fdtab[fd].update_mask & tid_bit) { -+ /* Cheat a bit, as the state is global to all pollers -+ * we don't need every thread ot take care of the -+ * update. -+ */ -+ fdtab[fd].update_mask &= ~all_threads_mask; -+ done_update_polling(fd); -+ } else { -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ if (!fdtab[fd].owner) { -+ activity[tid].poll_drop++; -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ fdtab[fd].new = 0; -+ -+ eo = fdtab[fd].state; -+ en = fd_compute_new_polled_status(eo); -+ fdtab[fd].state = en; -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ -+ if ((eo ^ en) & FD_EV_POLLED_RW) { -+ /* poll status changed, update the lists */ -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(POLL_LOCK, &poll_lock); -+ if ((eo & ~en) & FD_EV_POLLED_R) -+ hap_fd_clr(fd, fd_evts[DIR_RD]); -+ else if ((en & ~eo) & FD_EV_POLLED_R) -+ hap_fd_set(fd, fd_evts[DIR_RD]); -+ -+ if ((eo & ~en) & FD_EV_POLLED_W) -+ hap_fd_clr(fd, fd_evts[DIR_WR]); -+ else if ((en & ~eo) & FD_EV_POLLED_W) -+ hap_fd_set(fd, fd_evts[DIR_WR]); -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(POLL_LOCK, &poll_lock); -+ } -+ -+ } -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); - fd_nbupdt = 0; - - nbfd = 0; -diff --git a/src/ev_select.c b/src/ev_select.c -index 5f3486ed..bde923ea 100644 ---- a/src/ev_select.c -+++ b/src/ev_select.c -@@ -70,7 +70,42 @@ REGPRM2 static void _do_poll(struct poller *p, int exp) - en = fd_compute_new_polled_status(eo); - fdtab[fd].state = en; - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ if ((eo ^ en) & FD_EV_POLLED_RW) { -+ /* poll status changed, update the lists */ -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(POLL_LOCK, &poll_lock); -+ if ((eo & ~en) & FD_EV_POLLED_R) -+ FD_CLR(fd, fd_evts[DIR_RD]); -+ else if ((en & ~eo) & FD_EV_POLLED_R) -+ FD_SET(fd, fd_evts[DIR_RD]); -+ -+ if ((eo & ~en) & FD_EV_POLLED_W) -+ FD_CLR(fd, fd_evts[DIR_WR]); -+ else if ((en & ~eo) & FD_EV_POLLED_W) -+ FD_SET(fd, fd_evts[DIR_WR]); -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(POLL_LOCK, &poll_lock); -+ } -+ } -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); -+ for (fd = update_list.first; fd != -1; fd = fdtab[fd].update.next) { -+ HA_SPIN_LOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ if (fdtab[fd].update_mask & tid_bit) { -+ /* Cheat a bit, as the state is global to all pollers -+ * we don't need every thread ot take care of the -+ * update. -+ */ -+ fdtab[fd].update_mask &= ~all_threads_mask; -+ done_update_polling(fd); -+ } else { -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); -+ continue; -+ } - -+ fdtab[fd].new = 0; -+ -+ eo = fdtab[fd].state; -+ en = fd_compute_new_polled_status(eo); -+ fdtab[fd].state = en; -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_LOCK, &fdtab[fd].lock); - if ((eo ^ en) & FD_EV_POLLED_RW) { - /* poll status changed, update the lists */ - HA_SPIN_LOCK(POLL_LOCK, &poll_lock); -@@ -85,7 +120,9 @@ REGPRM2 static void _do_poll(struct poller *p, int exp) - FD_SET(fd, fd_evts[DIR_WR]); - HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(POLL_LOCK, &poll_lock); - } -+ - } -+ HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(FD_UPDATE_LOCK, &fd_updt_lock); - fd_nbupdt = 0; - - /* let's restore fdset state */ -diff --git a/src/fd.c b/src/fd.c -index b64130ed..a134e93e 100644 ---- a/src/fd.c -+++ b/src/fd.c -@@ -175,9 +175,12 @@ unsigned long fd_cache_mask = 0; // Mask of threads with events in the cache - THREAD_LOCAL int *fd_updt = NULL; // FD updates list - THREAD_LOCAL int fd_nbupdt = 0; // number of updates in the list - -+struct fdlist update_list; // Global update list - __decl_hathreads(HA_SPINLOCK_T fdtab_lock); /* global lock to protect fdtab array */ - __decl_hathreads(HA_RWLOCK_T fdcache_lock); /* global lock to protect fd_cache array */ - __decl_hathreads(HA_SPINLOCK_T poll_lock); /* global lock to protect poll info */ -+__decl_hathreads(HA_SPINLOCK_T) fd_updt_lock; /* global lock to protect the update list */ -+ - - /* Deletes an FD from the fdsets, and recomputes the maxfd limit. - * The file descriptor is also closed. -@@ -341,6 +344,9 @@ int init_pollers() - HA_SPIN_INIT(&fdtab_lock); - HA_RWLOCK_INIT(&fdcache_lock); - HA_SPIN_INIT(&poll_lock); -+ HA_SPIN_INIT(&fd_updt_lock); -+ update_list.first = update_list.last = -1; -+ - do { - bp = NULL; - for (p = 0; p < nbpollers; p++) -diff --git a/src/hathreads.c b/src/hathreads.c -index 944a0d5b..66ed482a 100644 ---- a/src/hathreads.c -+++ b/src/hathreads.c -@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ void thread_sync_io_handler(int fd) - static HA_SPINLOCK_T sync_lock; - static int threads_sync_pipe[2]; - static unsigned long threads_want_sync = 0; --static unsigned long all_threads_mask = 0; -+unsigned long all_threads_mask = 0; - - #if defined(DEBUG_THREAD) || defined(DEBUG_FULL) - struct lock_stat lock_stats[LOCK_LABELS]; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/0018-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-properly-protect-SSL-cert-generation.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/0018-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-properly-protect-SSL-cert-generation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b94bce9392..0000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/0018-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-properly-protect-SSL-cert-generation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -commit f571613244e4c02ca7aada30c89a6244d09d58d4 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu May 17 10:56:47 2018 +0200 - - BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: properly protect SSL cert generation - - Commit 821bb9b ("MAJOR: threads/ssl: Make SSL part thread-safe") added - insufficient locking to the cert lookup and generation code : it uses - lru64_lookup(), which will automatically remove and add a list element - to the LRU list. It cannot be simply read-locked. - - A long-term improvement should consist in using a lockless mechanism - in lru64_lookup() to safely move the list element at the head. For now - let's simply use a write lock during the lookup. The effect will be - minimal since it's used only in conjunction with automatically generated - certificates, which are much more expensive and rarely used. - - This fix must be backported to 1.8. - - (cherry picked from commit 03f4ec47d9ffff629b07dcba9f0f134a7c7e44b2) - Signed-off-by: William Lallemand - -diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c -index 1196d111..9fb2bb15 100644 ---- a/src/ssl_sock.c -+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c -@@ -1812,15 +1812,15 @@ ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert(unsigned int key, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SS - struct lru64 *lru = NULL; - - if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) { -- HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); -+ HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); - lru = lru64_lookup(key, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, bind_conf->ca_sign_cert, 0); - if (lru && lru->domain) { - if (ssl) - SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, (SSL_CTX *)lru->data); -- HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); -+ HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); - return (SSL_CTX *)lru->data; - } -- HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); -+ HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); - } - return NULL; - }