From: Darrel Goeddel Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2006 21:56:39 +0000 (-0500) Subject: [PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constants X-Git-Url: http://git.lede-project.org./?a=commitdiff_plain;h=3a6b9f85c641a3b89420b0c8150ed377526a1fe1;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fblogic.git [PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constants This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++---- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++------------- 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index a489104ae3a4..c211f0a2abb4 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -151,12 +151,17 @@ #define AUDIT_PERS 10 #define AUDIT_ARCH 11 #define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12 -#define AUDIT_SE_USER 13 /* security label user */ -#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE 14 /* security label role */ -#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE 15 /* security label type */ -#define AUDIT_SE_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */ -#define AUDIT_SE_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */ +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_USER 13 /* security label user */ +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE 14 /* security label role */ +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE 15 /* security label type */ +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */ +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */ #define AUDIT_PPID 18 +#define AUDIT_OBJ_USER 19 +#define AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE 20 +#define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21 +#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW 22 +#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23 /* These are ONLY useful when checking * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */ diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index e98db08fc6df..40a9931a13e2 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -470,11 +470,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: break; - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); if (IS_ERR(str)) goto exit_free; @@ -611,11 +611,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->fields[i] = f->type; data->fieldflags[i] = f->op; switch(f->type) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: data->buflen += data->values[i] = audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str); break; @@ -654,11 +654,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) return 1; switch(a->fields[i].type) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str)) return 1; break; @@ -774,11 +774,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old, * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) { switch (new->fields[i].type) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i], &old->fields[i]); break; @@ -1537,11 +1537,11 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule) for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; switch (f->type) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: return 1; } } diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 316657855165..1d24fade17e6 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -321,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (ctx) result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val); break; - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating a temporary error. We simply treat this as a match for now to avoid losing information that diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e9548bc049e1..92e80b99d183 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1845,15 +1845,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, return -ENOTSUPP; switch (field) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */ if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL) return -EINVAL; break; - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */ if (strchr(rulestr, '-')) return -EINVAL; @@ -1874,29 +1874,29 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting; switch (field) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr); if (!userdatum) rc = -EINVAL; else tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value; break; - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr); if (!roledatum) rc = -EINVAL; else tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value; break; - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr); if (!typedatum) rc = -EINVAL; else tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value; break; - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC); break; } @@ -1948,7 +1948,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through without a match */ switch (field) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: switch (op) { case AUDIT_EQUAL: match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user); @@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, break; } break; - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: switch (op) { case AUDIT_EQUAL: match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role); @@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, break; } break; - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: switch (op) { case AUDIT_EQUAL: match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type); @@ -1978,9 +1978,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, break; } break; - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: - level = (field == AUDIT_SE_SEN ? + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ? &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]); switch (op) { case AUDIT_EQUAL: