From: Dan Williams Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 01:02:59 +0000 (-0800) Subject: x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation X-Git-Url: http://git.lede-project.org./?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fblogic.git x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com --- diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index 99081340d19a..21dbdf0e476b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -282,7 +283,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs) * regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls. */ if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) { - regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK]( + nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls); + regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr]( regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9); } @@ -318,6 +320,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that