capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap

Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 4c9af6ef24b62f7ecdcdd3e392319683caf39639..13661d34f842f7397829f0bea8e3923797a3b760 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
 static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
                                          struct linux_binprm *bprm,
                                          bool *effective,
-                                         bool *has_cap)
+                                         bool *has_fcap)
 {
        struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
        unsigned i;
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
                *effective = true;
 
        if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
-               *has_cap = true;
+               *has_fcap = true;
 
        CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
                __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
  * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
  * constructed by execve().
  */
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
 {
        int rc = 0;
        struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
                goto out;
        }
 
-       rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
+       rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
        if (rc == -EINVAL)
                printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
                       __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ out:
  * set UID root and nothing is changed.  If we are root, cap_permitted is
  * updated.  If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
  */
-static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
                                   bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
 {
        const struct cred *old = current_cred();
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
         * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
         * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
         */
-       if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
+       if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
                warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
                return;
        }
@@ -759,20 +759,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
        const struct cred *old = current_cred();
        struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
-       bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+       bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
        int ret;
        kuid_t root_uid;
 
        if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
                return -EPERM;
 
-       ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
+       ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
        if (ret < 0)
                return ret;
 
        root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
 
-       handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
+       handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
 
        /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
        if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
 
        /* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
-       if (has_cap || is_setid)
+       if (has_fcap || is_setid)
                cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
 
        /*