x86/entry/64: Interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH instructions

Same as is done for syscalls, interleave XOR with PUSH instructions
for exceptions/interrupts, in order to minimize the cost of the
additional instructions required for register clearing.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-4-linux@dominikbrodowski.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 3bda31736a7b4c6392cf83c406ac617cb6df7a40..a05cbb81268d9b91f74542b3eaddd7abb8acc733 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -101,44 +101,42 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
        addq    $-(15*8), %rsp
        .endm
 
-       .macro SAVE_REGS offset=0
+       .macro SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS offset=0
+       /*
+        * Save registers and sanitize registers of values that a
+        * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
+        * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
+        * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
+        * Interleave XOR with PUSH for better uop scheduling:
+        */
        movq %rdi, 14*8+\offset(%rsp)
        movq %rsi, 13*8+\offset(%rsp)
        movq %rdx, 12*8+\offset(%rsp)
        movq %rcx, 11*8+\offset(%rsp)
        movq %rax, 10*8+\offset(%rsp)
        movq %r8,  9*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorq %r8, %r8                           /* nospec r8 */
        movq %r9,  8*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorq %r9, %r9                           /* nospec r9 */
        movq %r10, 7*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorq %r10, %r10                         /* nospec r10 */
        movq %r11, 6*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorq %r11, %r11                         /* nospec r11 */
        movq %rbx, 5*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorl %ebx, %ebx                         /* nospec rbx */
        movq %rbp, 4*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorl %ebp, %ebp                         /* nospec rbp */
        movq %r12, 3*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorq %r12, %r12                         /* nospec r12 */
        movq %r13, 2*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorq %r13, %r13                         /* nospec r13 */
        movq %r14, 1*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorq %r14, %r14                         /* nospec r14 */
        movq %r15, 0*8+\offset(%rsp)
+       xorq %r15, %r15                         /* nospec r15 */
        UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset
        .endm
 
-       /*
-        * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
-        * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
-        * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
-        * a speculative execution gadget:
-        */
-       .macro CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
-       xorl %ebp, %ebp
-       xorl %ebx, %ebx
-       xorq %r8, %r8
-       xorq %r9, %r9
-       xorq %r10, %r10
-       xorq %r11, %r11
-       xorq %r12, %r12
-       xorq %r13, %r13
-       xorq %r14, %r14
-       xorq %r15, %r15
-       .endm
-
        .macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0
        popq %r15
        popq %r14
@@ -177,7 +175,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
  * is just setting the LSB, which makes it an invalid stack address and is also
  * a signal to the unwinder that it's a pt_regs pointer in disguise.
  *
- * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* SAVE_REGS because it corrupts
+ * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS because it corrupts
  * the original rbp.
  */
 .macro ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER ptregs_offset=0

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 7351c91fb7df44a86a2ff1474ed3a9be8094d0a2..07692b44800de34e5d3b8cae868d91a6f3a07401 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -565,8 +565,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
 1:
 
        ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
-       SAVE_REGS
-       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+       SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS
        ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 
        testb   $3, CS(%rsp)
@@ -1114,8 +1113,7 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
        UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
        pushq   $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
        ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
-       SAVE_REGS
-       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+       SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS
        ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
        jmp     error_exit
 END(xen_failsafe_callback)
@@ -1159,8 +1157,7 @@ idtentry machine_check            do_mce                  has_error_code=0        paranoid=1
 ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
        UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
        cld
-       SAVE_REGS 8
-       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+       SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS 8
        ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
        movl    $1, %ebx
        movl    $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
@@ -1211,8 +1208,7 @@ END(paranoid_exit)
 ENTRY(error_entry)
        UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
        cld
-       SAVE_REGS 8
-       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+       SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS 8
        ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
        testb   $3, CS+8(%rsp)
        jz      .Lerror_kernelspace
@@ -1399,18 +1395,34 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
        pushq   (%rdx)          /* pt_regs->dx */
        pushq   %rcx            /* pt_regs->cx */
        pushq   %rax            /* pt_regs->ax */
+       /*
+        * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
+        * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
+        * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
+        * a speculative execution gadget. Interleave XOR with PUSH
+        * for better uop scheduling:
+        */
        pushq   %r8             /* pt_regs->r8 */
+       xorq    %r8, %r8        /* nospec   r8 */
        pushq   %r9             /* pt_regs->r9 */
+       xorq    %r9, %r9        /* nospec   r9 */
        pushq   %r10            /* pt_regs->r10 */
+       xorq    %r10, %r10      /* nospec   r10 */
        pushq   %r11            /* pt_regs->r11 */
+       xorq    %r11, %r11      /* nospec   r11*/
        pushq   %rbx            /* pt_regs->rbx */
+       xorl    %ebx, %ebx      /* nospec   rbx*/
        pushq   %rbp            /* pt_regs->rbp */
+       xorl    %ebp, %ebp      /* nospec   rbp*/
        pushq   %r12            /* pt_regs->r12 */
+       xorq    %r12, %r12      /* nospec   r12*/
        pushq   %r13            /* pt_regs->r13 */
+       xorq    %r13, %r13      /* nospec   r13*/
        pushq   %r14            /* pt_regs->r14 */
+       xorq    %r14, %r14      /* nospec   r14*/
        pushq   %r15            /* pt_regs->r15 */
+       xorq    %r15, %r15      /* nospec   r15*/
        UNWIND_HINT_REGS
-       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
        ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 
        /*