selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute()

It turns out that checking to see if skb->sk is NULL is not a very good
indicator of a forwarded packet as some locally generated packets also have
skb->sk set to NULL.  Fix this by not only checking the skb->sk field but also
the IP[6]CB(skb)->flags field for the IP[6]SKB_FORWARDED flag.  While we are
at it, we are calling selinux_parse_skb() much earlier than we really should
resulting in potentially wasted cycles parsing packets for information we
might no use; so shuffle the code around a bit to fix this.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 223f474bee86c9f4bcd4127d534fddc78bd49590..b520667a24bed5c992a305e8d81ee5fda540c124 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4070,20 +4070,28 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
 }
 
 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                      struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-                                      u16 family, char *addrp)
+                                      u16 family)
 {
        int err;
        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
        u32 peer_sid;
        u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+       struct avc_audit_data ad;
+       char *addrp;
+
+       AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+       ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
+       ad.u.net.family = family;
+       err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+       if (err)
+               return err;
 
        if (selinux_compat_net)
-               err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
+               err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
                                                           family, addrp);
        else
                err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
-                                  PACKET__RECV, ad);
+                                  PACKET__RECV, &ad);
        if (err)
                return err;
 
@@ -4092,12 +4100,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
                if (err)
                        return err;
                err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
-                                  SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
+                                  SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
        } else {
-               err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
+               err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
                if (err)
                        return err;
-               err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
+               err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
        }
 
        return err;
@@ -4111,6 +4119,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
        u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
        struct avc_audit_data ad;
        char *addrp;
+       u8 secmark_active;
+       u8 peerlbl_active;
 
        if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
                return 0;
@@ -4119,6 +4129,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
        if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
                family = PF_INET;
 
+       /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+        * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
+        * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+        * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+       if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+               return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
+
+       secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+       peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+       if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+               return 0;
+
        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
        ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
        ad.u.net.family = family;
@@ -4126,15 +4148,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
        if (err)
                return err;
 
-       /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
-        * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
-        * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
-        * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-       if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
-               return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
-                                                  family, addrp);
-
-       if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
+       if (peerlbl_active) {
                u32 peer_sid;
 
                err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
@@ -4148,7 +4162,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
                                   PEER__RECV, &ad);
        }
 
-       if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+       if (secmark_active) {
                err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
                                   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
                if (err)
@@ -4396,15 +4410,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
        if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
                return NF_ACCEPT;
 
+       if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
+               return NF_DROP;
+
        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
        ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
        ad.u.net.family = family;
        if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
                return NF_DROP;
 
-       if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
-               return NF_DROP;
-
        if (peerlbl_active)
                if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
                                             peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
@@ -4505,30 +4519,36 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
 
 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
                                                int ifindex,
-                                               struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-                                               u16 family,
-                                               char *addrp,
-                                               u8 proto)
+                                               u16 family)
 {
        struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
        struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+       struct avc_audit_data ad;
+       char *addrp;
+       u8 proto;
 
        if (sk == NULL)
                return NF_ACCEPT;
        sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
+       AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+       ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
+       ad.u.net.family = family;
+       if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
+               return NF_DROP;
+
        if (selinux_compat_net) {
                if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
-                                                        ad, family, addrp))
+                                                        &ad, family, addrp))
                        return NF_DROP;
        } else {
                if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
-                                SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
+                                SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
                        return NF_DROP;
        }
 
        if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
-               if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
+               if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
                        return NF_DROP;
 
        return NF_ACCEPT;
@@ -4542,23 +4562,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
        struct sock *sk;
        struct avc_audit_data ad;
        char *addrp;
-       u8 proto;
        u8 secmark_active;
        u8 peerlbl_active;
 
-       AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-       ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
-       ad.u.net.family = family;
-       if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
-               return NF_DROP;
-
        /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
         * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
         * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
         * as fast and as clean as possible. */
        if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
-               return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
-                                                  family, addrp, proto);
+               return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
 
        /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
         * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
@@ -4574,21 +4586,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
        if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
                return NF_ACCEPT;
 
-       /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
-        * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
-        * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
-        * directly from the packet */
+       /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
+        * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
+        * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
+        * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
        sk = skb->sk;
-       if (sk) {
+       if (sk == NULL) {
+               switch (family) {
+               case PF_INET:
+                       if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
+                               secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+                       else
+                               secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+                       break;
+               case PF_INET6:
+                       if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
+                               secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+                       else
+                               secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+                       break;
+               default:
+                       return NF_DROP;
+               }
+               if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
+                       if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
+                               return NF_DROP;
+               } else
+                       peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+       } else {
                struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
                peer_sid = sksec->sid;
                secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
-       } else {
-               if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
-                               return NF_DROP;
-               secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
        }
 
+       AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+       ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
+       ad.u.net.family = family;
+       if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
+               return NF_DROP;
+
        if (secmark_active)
                if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
                                 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))