--- /dev/null
+From b667237b3a84f601ef5a707ce8eb861c3a5002d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:38:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cert-cache: Prevent crash due to integer overflow/sign change
+
+random() allocates values in the range [0, RAND_MAX], with RAND_MAX usually
+equaling INT_MAX = 2^31-1. Previously, values between 0 and 31 were added
+directly to that offset before applying`% CACHE_SIZE` to get an index into
+the cache array. If the random value was very high, this resulted in an
+integer overflow and a negative index value and, therefore, an out-of-bounds
+access of the array and in turn dereferencing invalid pointers when trying
+to acquire the read lock. This most likely results in a segmentation fault.
+
+Fixes: 764e8b2211ce ("reimplemented certificate cache")
+Fixes: CVE-2021-41991
+---
+ src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c
++++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c
+@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void cache(private_cert_cache_t *
+ for (try = 0; try < REPLACE_TRIES; try++)
+ {
+ /* replace a random relation */
+- offset = random();
++ offset = random() % CACHE_SIZE;
+ for (i = 0; i < CACHE_SIZE; i++)
+ {
+ rel = &this->relations[(i + offset) % CACHE_SIZE];