sctp: fix the issue that the cookie-ack with auth can't get processed
authorXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Wed, 2 May 2018 05:45:12 +0000 (13:45 +0800)
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Wed, 2 May 2018 15:15:33 +0000 (11:15 -0400)
When auth is enabled for cookie-ack chunk, in sctp_inq_pop, sctp
processes auth chunk first, then continues to the next chunk in
this packet if chunk_end + chunk_hdr size < skb_tail_pointer().
Otherwise, it will go to the next packet or discard this chunk.

However, it missed the fact that cookie-ack chunk's size is equal
to chunk_hdr size, which couldn't match that check, and thus this
chunk would not get processed.

This patch fixes it by changing the check to chunk_end + chunk_hdr
size <= skb_tail_pointer().

Fixes: 26b87c788100 ("net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net/sctp/inqueue.c

index 23ebc5318edc47c51230a95256064f5b2974d2f4..eb93ffe2408bde973e92b29a3b1ebff85f5099a0 100644 (file)
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ new_skb:
        skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(*ch));
        chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid.  */
 
-       if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) < skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
+       if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) <= skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
                /* This is not a singleton */
                chunk->singleton = 0;
        } else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {