The keys are only used during initialisation so we don't need to carry them
in esp_data. Since we don't have to allocate them again, there is no need
to place a limit on the authentication key length anymore.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
struct ah_data
{
- u8 *key;
- int key_len;
u8 *work_icv;
int icv_full_len;
int icv_trunc_len;
if (!x->aalg)
goto error;
- /* null auth can use a zero length key */
- if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
- goto error;
-
if (x->encap)
goto error;
if (ahp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- ahp->key = x->aalg->alg_key;
- ahp->key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
ahp->tfm = tfm;
- if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, ahp->key, ahp->key_len))
+ if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, x->aalg->alg_key,
+ (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
goto error;
/*
if (!x->aalg)
goto error;
- /* null auth can use a zero length key */
- if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
- goto error;
-
if (x->encap)
goto error;
if (ahp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- ahp->key = x->aalg->alg_key;
- ahp->key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
ahp->tfm = tfm;
- if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, ahp->key, ahp->key_len))
+ if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, x->aalg->alg_key,
+ (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
goto error;
/*