--- /dev/null
+From 41f140d38617e1fd3fa88c1667c1bce0cad79224 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Kelleter?= <guenther.kelleter@devolo.de>
+Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2017 17:00:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add hostapd options wpa_group_update_count and
+ wpa_pairwise_update_count
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+wpa_group_update_count and wpa_pairwise_update_count can now be used to
+set the GTK and PTK rekey retry limits (dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
+and dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount). Defaults set to current
+hardcoded value (4).
+
+Some stations may suffer from frequent deauthentications due to GTK
+rekey failures: EAPOL 1/2 frame is not answered during the total timeout
+period of currently ~3.5 seconds. For example, a Galaxy S6 with Android
+6.0.1 appears to go into power save mode for up to 5 seconds. Increasing
+wpa_group_update_count to 6 fixed this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Günther Kelleter <guenther.kelleter@devolo.de>
+---
+ hostapd/config_file.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ hostapd/hostapd.conf | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/ap/ap_config.c | 2 ++
+ src/ap/ap_config.h | 2 ++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 2 ++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c | 2 ++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 4 ++--
+ wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c | 2 ++
+ wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c | 2 ++
+ 10 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hostapd/config_file.c b/hostapd/config_file.c
+index 8cfa198c3..02693a5b1 100644
+--- a/hostapd/config_file.c
++++ b/hostapd/config_file.c
+@@ -2489,6 +2489,28 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct hostapd_config *conf,
+ bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = atoi(pos);
+ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_ptk_rekey") == 0) {
+ bss->wpa_ptk_rekey = atoi(pos);
++ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_group_update_count") == 0) {
++ char *endp;
++ unsigned long val = strtoul(pos, &endp, 0);
++
++ if (*endp || val < 1 || val > (u32) -1) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "Line %d: Invalid wpa_group_update_count=%lu; allowed range 1..4294967295",
++ line, val);
++ return 1;
++ }
++ bss->wpa_group_update_count = (u32) val;
++ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_pairwise_update_count") == 0) {
++ char *endp;
++ unsigned long val = strtoul(pos, &endp, 0);
++
++ if (*endp || val < 1 || val > (u32) -1) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "Line %d: Invalid wpa_pairwise_update_count=%lu; allowed range 1..4294967295",
++ line, val);
++ return 1;
++ }
++ bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = (u32) val;
+ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_passphrase") == 0) {
+ int len = os_strlen(pos);
+ if (len < 8 || len > 63) {
+diff --git a/hostapd/hostapd.conf b/hostapd/hostapd.conf
+index 314f3842b..1fb1bd987 100644
+--- a/hostapd/hostapd.conf
++++ b/hostapd/hostapd.conf
+@@ -1221,6 +1221,11 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1
+ # (dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict)
+ #wpa_strict_rekey=1
+
++# The number of times EAPOL-Key Message 1/2 in the RSN Group Key Handshake is
++#retried per GTK Handshake attempt. (dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount)
++# Range 1..4294967295; default: 4
++#wpa_group_update_count=4
++
+ # Time interval for rekeying GMK (master key used internally to generate GTKs
+ # (in seconds).
+ #wpa_gmk_rekey=86400
+@@ -1229,6 +1234,12 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1
+ # PTK to mitigate some attacks against TKIP deficiencies.
+ #wpa_ptk_rekey=600
+
++# The number of times EAPOL-Key Message 1/4 and Message 3/4 in the RSN 4-Way
++# Handshake are retried per 4-Way Handshake attempt.
++# (dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount)
++# Range 1..4294967295; default: 4
++#wpa_pairwise_update_count=4
++
+ # Enable IEEE 802.11i/RSN/WPA2 pre-authentication. This is used to speed up
+ # roaming be pre-authenticating IEEE 802.1X/EAP part of the full RSN
+ # authentication and key handshake before actually associating with a new AP.
+diff --git a/src/ap/ap_config.c b/src/ap/ap_config.c
+index c2b80ad97..9abcab7fb 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ap_config.c
++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.c
+@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct hostapd_bss_config *bss)
+
+ bss->wpa_group_rekey = 600;
+ bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = 86400;
++ bss->wpa_group_update_count = 4;
++ bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4;
+ bss->wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
+ bss->wpa_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
+ bss->wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
+diff --git a/src/ap/ap_config.h b/src/ap/ap_config.h
+index 31b1e7762..7495dc96f 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h
++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h
+@@ -330,6 +330,8 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config {
+ int wpa_strict_rekey;
+ int wpa_gmk_rekey;
+ int wpa_ptk_rekey;
++ u32 wpa_group_update_count;
++ u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
+ int rsn_pairwise;
+ int rsn_preauth;
+ char *rsn_preauth_interfaces;
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 0bd901fbf..8c082f426 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -60,8 +60,6 @@ static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ struct wpa_group *group);
+ static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos);
+
+-static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount = 4;
+-static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount = 4;
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
+@@ -1623,7 +1621,7 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ {
+ int timeout_ms;
+ int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
+- int ctr;
++ u32 ctr;
+
+ if (sm == NULL)
+ return;
+@@ -1640,7 +1638,7 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
+ sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
+- "counter %d)", timeout_ms, ctr);
++ "counter %u)", timeout_ms, ctr);
+ eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
+ wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
+ }
+@@ -2002,7 +2000,7 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
+ sm->alt_snonce_valid = FALSE;
+
+ sm->TimeoutCtr++;
+- if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
++ if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
+ /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
+ * immediately following this. */
+ return;
+@@ -2693,7 +2691,7 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
+ sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
+
+ sm->TimeoutCtr++;
+- if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
++ if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
+ /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
+ * immediately following this. */
+ return;
+@@ -2988,11 +2986,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
+ else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
+- (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
+ wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
+- wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
+- "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
+- dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
++ wpa_auth_vlogger(
++ sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
++ "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count);
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
+ } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+@@ -3016,12 +3015,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
+ else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
+- (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
+ wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
+- wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
+- "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
+- "reached",
+- dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
++ wpa_auth_vlogger(
++ sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
++ "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count);
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
+ } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
+@@ -3056,7 +3055,7 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING)
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
+
+ sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
+- if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) {
++ if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) {
+ /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
+ * immediately following this. */
+ return;
+@@ -3154,7 +3153,7 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
+ !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
+ else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
+- (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount)
++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
+ else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
+@@ -3614,8 +3613,8 @@ int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+ "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
+ RSN_VERSION,
+ !!wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey,
+- dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount,
+- dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount,
++ wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count,
++ wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count,
+ wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group) * 8,
+ dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime,
+ dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold,
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index 9cbe3889b..0920a169d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ struct wpa_auth_config {
+ int wpa_strict_rekey;
+ int wpa_gmk_rekey;
+ int wpa_ptk_rekey;
++ u32 wpa_group_update_count;
++ u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
+ int rsn_pairwise;
+ int rsn_preauth;
+ int eapol_version;
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
+index 22518a1f1..394f77a66 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
+@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_conf(struct hostapd_bss_config *conf,
+ wconf->wpa_strict_rekey = conf->wpa_strict_rekey;
+ wconf->wpa_gmk_rekey = conf->wpa_gmk_rekey;
+ wconf->wpa_ptk_rekey = conf->wpa_ptk_rekey;
++ wconf->wpa_group_update_count = conf->wpa_group_update_count;
++ wconf->wpa_pairwise_update_count = conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count;
+ wconf->rsn_pairwise = conf->rsn_pairwise;
+ wconf->rsn_preauth = conf->rsn_preauth;
+ wconf->eapol_version = conf->eapol_version;
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 065a624ad..cda2c5065 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ Boolean AuthenticationRequest;
+ Boolean ReAuthenticationRequest;
+ Boolean Disconnect;
+- int TimeoutCtr;
+- int GTimeoutCtr;
++ u32 TimeoutCtr;
++ u32 GTimeoutCtr;
+ Boolean TimeoutEvt;
+ Boolean EAPOLKeyReceived;
+ Boolean EAPOLKeyPairwise;
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c b/wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c
+index 521a692ba..954061ae4 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c
+@@ -428,6 +428,8 @@ static int ibss_rsn_auth_init_group(struct ibss_rsn *ibss_rsn,
+ conf.wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
+ conf.eapol_version = 2;
+ conf.wpa_group_rekey = ssid->group_rekey ? ssid->group_rekey : 600;
++ conf.wpa_group_update_count = 4;
++ conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4;
+
+ ibss_rsn->auth_group = wpa_init(own_addr, &conf, &cb, ibss_rsn);
+ if (ibss_rsn->auth_group == NULL) {
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c b/wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c
+index 33040f30b..628382cbf 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c
+@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ static int __mesh_rsn_auth_init(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, const u8 *addr,
+ conf.wpa_group = rsn->group_cipher;
+ conf.eapol_version = 0;
+ conf.wpa_group_rekey = -1;
++ conf.wpa_group_update_count = 4;
++ conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ conf.ieee80211w = ieee80211w;
+ if (ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION)
+--
+2.13.6
+
--- /dev/null
+From a00e946c1c9a1f9cc65c72900d2a444ceb1f872e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 23:53:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Extra defense against PTK reinstalls in 4-way handshake
+
+Currently, reinstallations of the PTK are prevented by (1) assuring the
+same TPTK is only set once as the PTK, and (2) that one particular PTK
+is only installed once. This patch makes it more explicit that point (1)
+is required to prevent key reinstallations. At the same time, this patch
+hardens wpa_supplicant such that future changes do not accidentally
+break this property.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -1728,6 +1728,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
+ sm->ptk_set = 1;
+ os_memcpy(&sm->ptk, &sm->tptk, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ /*
++ * This assures the same TPTK in sm->tptk can never be
++ * copied twice to sm->pkt as the new PTK. In
++ * combination with the installed flag in the wpa_ptk
++ * struct, this assures the same PTK is only installed
++ * once.
++ */
++ sm->renew_snonce = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From b488a12948751f57871f09baa345e59b23959a41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 13:18:02 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Clear PMK length and check for this when deriving PTK
+
+Instead of setting the default PMK length for the cleared PMK, set the
+length to 0 and explicitly check for this when deriving PTK to avoid
+unexpected key derivation with an all-zeroes key should it be possible
+to somehow trigger PTK derivation to happen before PMK derivation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.c | 5 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 ++++---
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
+@@ -225,6 +225,11 @@ int wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t
+ u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t ptk_len;
+
++ if (pmk_len == 0) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: No PMK set for PT derivation");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
+ os_memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
+ os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -584,7 +584,8 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_
+ /* Calculate PTK which will be stored as a temporary PTK until it has
+ * been verified when processing message 3/4. */
+ ptk = &sm->tptk;
+- wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk);
++ if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk) < 0)
++ goto failed;
+ if (sm->pairwise_cipher == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
+ u8 buf[8];
+ /* Supplicant: swap tx/rx Mic keys */
+@@ -2705,8 +2706,8 @@ void wpa_sm_set_pmk_from_pmksa(struct wp
+ sm->pmk_len = sm->cur_pmksa->pmk_len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->pmk, sm->cur_pmksa->pmk, sm->pmk_len);
+ } else {
+- sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
+- os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN);
++ sm->pmk_len = 0;
++ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN_MAX);
+ }
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 6f234c1e2ee1ede29f2412b7012b3345ed8e52d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 18:37:43 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Optional AP side workaround for key reinstallation attacks
+
+This adds a new hostapd configuration parameter
+wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1 that can be used to disable
+retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that are used to install
+keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This is
+similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
+wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4
+retries and with extended timeout for messages 4/4 and group
+message 2/2 to avoid causing issues with stations that may use
+aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
+EAPOL-Key messages.
+
+This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks
+on the station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices
+cannot be updated for some reason. By removing the
+retransmissions the attacker cannot cause key reinstallation with
+a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the station side
+vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
+CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
+
+This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced
+robustness of key negotiation especially in environments with
+heavy traffic load due to the number of attempts to perform the
+key exchange is reduced significantly. As such, this workaround
+is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
+configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
+
+It is also possible to enable this in the build by default by
+adding the following to the build configuration:
+
+CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ hostapd/config_file.c | 2 ++
+ hostapd/defconfig | 4 ++++
+ hostapd/hostapd.conf | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/ap/ap_config.c | 6 ++++++
+ src/ap/ap_config.h | 1 +
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 1 +
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c | 2 ++
+ 8 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/hostapd/config_file.c
++++ b/hostapd/config_file.c
+@@ -2515,6 +2515,8 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho
+ return 1;
+ }
+ bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = (u32) val;
++ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries") == 0) {
++ bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries = atoi(pos);
+ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_passphrase") == 0) {
+ int len = os_strlen(pos);
+ if (len < 8 || len > 63) {
+--- a/hostapd/defconfig
++++ b/hostapd/defconfig
+@@ -355,3 +355,7 @@ CONFIG_IPV6=y
+ # Include internal line edit mode in hostapd_cli. This can be used to provide
+ # limited command line editing and history support.
+ #CONFIG_WPA_CLI_EDIT=y
++
++# Override default value for the wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries configuration
++# parameter. See that parameter in hostapd.conf for more details.
++#CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
+--- a/hostapd/hostapd.conf
++++ b/hostapd/hostapd.conf
+@@ -1240,6 +1240,30 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1
+ # Range 1..4294967295; default: 4
+ #wpa_pairwise_update_count=4
+
++# Workaround for key reinstallation attacks
++#
++# This parameter can be used to disable retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that
++# are used to install keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This
++# is similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
++# wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4 and with
++# extended timeout on the response to avoid causing issues with stations that
++# may use aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
++# EAPOL-Key messages.
++#
++# This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks on the
++# station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices cannot be updated
++# for some reason. By removing the retransmissions the attacker cannot cause
++# key reinstallation with a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the
++# station side vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
++# CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
++#
++# This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced robustness of
++# key negotiation especially in environments with heavy traffic load due to the
++# number of attempts to perform the key exchange is reduced significantly. As
++# such, this workaround is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
++# configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
++#wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1
++
+ # Enable IEEE 802.11i/RSN/WPA2 pre-authentication. This is used to speed up
+ # roaming be pre-authenticating IEEE 802.1X/EAP part of the full RSN
+ # authentication and key handshake before actually associating with a new AP.
+--- a/src/ap/ap_config.c
++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ static void hostapd_config_free_vlan(str
+ }
+
+
++#ifndef DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES
++#define DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES 0
++#endif /* DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES */
++
+ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct hostapd_bss_config *bss)
+ {
+ dl_list_init(&bss->anqp_elem);
+@@ -57,6 +61,8 @@ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct
+ bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = 86400;
+ bss->wpa_group_update_count = 4;
+ bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4;
++ bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries =
++ DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES;
+ bss->wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
+ bss->wpa_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
+ bss->wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
+--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h
++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h
+@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config {
+ int wpa_ptk_rekey;
+ u32 wpa_group_update_count;
+ u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
++ int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
+ int rsn_pairwise;
+ int rsn_preauth;
+ char *rsn_preauth_interfaces;
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wp
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
++static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans = 4000; /* ms */
+
+ /* TODO: make these configurable */
+ static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
+@@ -1629,6 +1630,9 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_au
+ eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
+ else
+ timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
++ if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++ (!pairwise || (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)))
++ timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans;
+ if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
+ sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
+@@ -2700,6 +2704,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
+ sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
+
+ sm->TimeoutCtr++;
++ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++ sm->TimeoutCtr > 1) {
++ /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
++ return;
++ }
+ if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
+ /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
+ * immediately following this. */
+@@ -3027,7 +3036,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
+ else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
+- sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count ||
++ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++ sm->TimeoutCtr > 1)) {
+ wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
+ wpa_auth_vlogger(
+ sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
+@@ -3067,6 +3078,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
+
+ sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
++ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++ sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1) {
++ /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
++ return;
++ }
+ if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) {
+ /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
+ * immediately following this. */
+@@ -3165,7 +3181,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
+ !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
+ else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
+- sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count)
++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count ||
++ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++ sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1))
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
+ else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct wpa_auth_config {
+ int wpa_ptk_rekey;
+ u32 wpa_group_update_count;
+ u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
++ int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
+ int rsn_pairwise;
+ int rsn_preauth;
+ int eapol_version;
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_conf(struct
+ wconf->wpa_gmk_rekey = conf->wpa_gmk_rekey;
+ wconf->wpa_ptk_rekey = conf->wpa_ptk_rekey;
+ wconf->wpa_group_update_count = conf->wpa_group_update_count;
++ wconf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries =
++ conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
+ wconf->wpa_pairwise_update_count = conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count;
+ wconf->rsn_pairwise = conf->rsn_pairwise;
+ wconf->rsn_preauth = conf->rsn_preauth;
--- /dev/null
+From a6ea665300919d6a3af22b1f4237203647fda93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 00:01:11 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Additional consistentcy checks for PTK component lengths
+
+Verify that TK, KCK, and KEK lengths are set to consistent values within
+struct wpa_ptk before using them in supplicant. This is an additional
+layer of protection against unexpected states.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.c | 6 ++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, siz
+ {
+ u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN];
+
++ if (key_len == 0) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: KCK not set - cannot calculate MIC");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ switch (ver) {
+ #ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
+ case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4:
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -710,6 +710,11 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st
+
+ alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
++ if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK length mismatch: %d != %lu",
++ keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
++ return -1;
++ }
+ rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+
+ if (sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) {
+@@ -730,6 +735,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st
+
+ /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
++ sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
+ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+@@ -1699,9 +1705,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
+ os_memcpy(mic, key + 1, mic_len);
+ if (sm->tptk_set) {
+ os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
+- wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
+- ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
+- if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
++ if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len,
++ sm->key_mgmt,
++ ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
++ os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC "
+ "when using TPTK - ignoring TPTK");
+@@ -1724,9 +1731,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
+
+ if (!ok && sm->ptk_set) {
+ os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
+- wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
+- ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
+- if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
++ if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len,
++ sm->key_mgmt,
++ ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
++ os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC - "
+ "dropping packet");
+@@ -3689,6 +3697,11 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_s
+
+ alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
++ if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK length mismatch: %u != %lu",
++ keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
++ goto fail;
++ }
+ rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Set TK to driver",
+ sm->ptk.tk, keylen);
--- /dev/null
+From c0fe5f125a9d4a6564e1f4956ccc3809bf2fd69d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 01:15:24 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Clear BSSID information in supplicant state machine on
+ disconnection
+
+This fixes a corner case where RSN pre-authentication candidate from
+scan results was ignored if the station was associated with that BSS
+just before running the new scan for the connection.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2662,6 +2662,7 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_s
+ wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+
+ sm->msg_3_of_4_ok = 0;
++ os_memset(sm->bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN);
+ }
+
+
projects / openwrt / staging / hauke.git / commitdiff