bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack

Detect code patterns where malicious 'speculative store bypass' can be used
and sanitize such patterns.

 39: (bf) r3 = r10
 40: (07) r3 += -216
 41: (79) r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)   // slow read
 42: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -72) = 0  // verifier inserts this instruction
 43: (7b) *(u64 *)(r8 +0) = r3   // this store becomes slow due to r8
 44: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0)   // cpu speculatively executes this load
 45: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0)    // speculatively arbitrary 'load byte'
                                 // is now sanitized

Above code after x86 JIT becomes:
 e5: mov    %rbp,%rdx
 e8: add    $0xffffffffffffff28,%rdx
 ef: mov    0x0(%r13),%r14
 f3: movq   $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)
 fb: mov    %rdx,0x0(%r14)
 ff: mov    0x0(%rbx),%rdi
103: movzbq 0x0(%rdi),%rsi

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 7e61c395fddffea20ed6dfc8a92ad3e2f848a20e..65cfc2f59db945e1d21d6847e4b13fa7a1a23fc8 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
                s32 call_imm;                   /* saved imm field of call insn */
        };
        int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
+       int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */
        bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
 };
 

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 5dd1dcb902bf445ba50df106ee4aeb129164a4ac..2ce967a63ede004f94a242a744e1681ab8a31334 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
  */
 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
                             struct bpf_func_state *state, /* func where register points to */
-                            int off, int size, int value_regno)
+                            int off, int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx)
 {
        struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
        int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
@@ -1017,8 +1017,33 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
                state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = cur->regs[value_regno];
                state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
 
-               for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
+               for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
+                       if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC &&
+                           !env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
+                               int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off;
+                               int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE;
+
+                               /* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer
+                                * which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or
+                                * an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639
+                                * (speculative store bypass)
+                                * Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive
+                                * store of zero.
+                                */
+                               if (*poff && *poff != soff) {
+                                       /* disallow programs where single insn stores
+                                        * into two different stack slots, since verifier
+                                        * cannot sanitize them
+                                        */
+                                       verbose(env,
+                                               "insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d",
+                                               insn_idx, *poff, soff);
+                                       return -EINVAL;
+                               }
+                               *poff = soff;
+                       }
                        state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL;
+               }
        } else {
                u8 type = STACK_MISC;
 
@@ -1694,7 +1719,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 
                if (t == BPF_WRITE)
                        err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size,
-                                               value_regno);
+                                               value_regno, insn_idx);
                else
                        err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size,
                                               value_regno);
@@ -5169,6 +5194,34 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
                else
                        continue;
 
+               if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
+                   env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) {
+                       struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
+                               /* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero.
+                                * There are no memory dependencies for this store,
+                                * since it's only using frame pointer and immediate
+                                * constant of zero
+                                */
+                               BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP,
+                                          env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off,
+                                          0),
+                               /* the original STX instruction will immediately
+                                * overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value
+                                */
+                               *insn,
+                       };
+
+                       cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
+                       new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
+                       if (!new_prog)
+                               return -ENOMEM;
+
+                       delta    += cnt - 1;
+                       env->prog = new_prog;
+                       insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
+                       continue;
+               }
+
                if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
                        continue;