FWU_FIP_DEPS += fwu_certificates
endif
+# Process BRANCH_PROTECTION value and set
+# Pointer Authentication and Branch Target Identification flags
+ifeq (${BRANCH_PROTECTION},0)
+ # Default value turns off all types of branch protection
+ BP_OPTION := none
+else ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64)
+ $(error BRANCH_PROTECTION requires AArch64)
+else ifeq (${BRANCH_PROTECTION},1)
+ # Enables all types of branch protection features
+ BP_OPTION := standard
+ ENABLE_BTI := 1
+ ENABLE_PAUTH := 1
+else ifeq (${BRANCH_PROTECTION},2)
+ # Return address signing to its standard level
+ BP_OPTION := pac-ret
+ ENABLE_PAUTH := 1
+else ifeq (${BRANCH_PROTECTION},3)
+ # Extend the signing to include leaf functions
+ BP_OPTION := pac-ret+leaf
+ ENABLE_PAUTH := 1
+else
+ $(error Unknown BRANCH_PROTECTION value ${BRANCH_PROTECTION})
+endif
################################################################################
# Toolchain
TF_CFLAGS_aarch32 += -mno-unaligned-access
TF_CFLAGS_aarch64 += -mgeneral-regs-only -mstrict-align
+ifneq (${BP_OPTION},none)
+TF_CFLAGS_aarch64 += -mbranch-protection=${BP_OPTION}
+endif
+
ASFLAGS_aarch32 = $(march32-directive)
ASFLAGS_aarch64 = $(march64-directive)
endif
# If pointer authentication is used in the firmware, make sure that all the
-# registers associated to it are also saved and restored. Not doing it would
-# leak the value of the key used by EL3 to EL1 and S-EL1.
+# registers associated to it are also saved and restored.
+# Not doing it would leak the value of the keys used by EL3 to EL1 and S-EL1.
ifeq ($(ENABLE_PAUTH),1)
- ifneq ($(ARCH),aarch64)
- $(error ENABLE_PAUTH=1 requires AArch64)
- else ifeq ($(CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS),0)
- $(error ENABLE_PAUTH=1 requires CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1)
- else
- $(info ENABLE_PAUTH and CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS are experimental features)
+ ifeq ($(CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS),0)
+ $(error Pointer Authentication requires CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1)
endif
-else
- ifeq ($(CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS),1)
- ifneq ($(ARCH),aarch64)
- $(error CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1 requires AArch64)
- else
- $(info CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS is an experimental feature)
- endif
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS),1)
+ ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64)
+ $(error CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS requires AArch64)
+ else
+ $(info CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS is an experimental feature)
endif
endif
+ifeq ($(ENABLE_PAUTH),1)
+ $(info Pointer Authentication is an experimental feature)
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(ENABLE_BTI),1)
+ $(info Branch Protection is an experimental feature)
+endif
+
################################################################################
# Process platform overrideable behaviour
################################################################################
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_AMU))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_ASSERTIONS))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_MPAM_FOR_LOWER_ELS))
-$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_PAUTH))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_PIE))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_PMF))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_PSCI_STAT))
$(eval $(call assert_numeric,ARM_ARCH_MAJOR))
$(eval $(call assert_numeric,ARM_ARCH_MINOR))
+$(eval $(call assert_numeric,BRANCH_PROTECTION))
################################################################################
# Add definitions to the cpp preprocessor based on the current build options.
$(eval $(call add_define,EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_AMU))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_ASSERTIONS))
+$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_BTI))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_MPAM_FOR_LOWER_ELS))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_PAUTH))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_PIE))
lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S
endif
-ifeq (${ENABLE_PAUTH},1)
-BL1_CFLAGS += -msign-return-address=non-leaf
-endif
-
ifeq (${TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT},1)
BL1_SOURCES += bl1/bl1_fwu.c
endif
#include <el3_common_macros.S>
.globl bl2_entrypoint
- .globl bl2_vector_table
.globl bl2_el3_run_image
.globl bl2_run_next_image
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
mrs x0, sctlr_el3
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ /* ---------------------------------------------
+ * Enable PAC branch type compatibility
+ * ---------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bic x0, x0, #SCTLR_BT_BIT
+#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el3, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
mrs x0, sctlr_el1
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ /* ---------------------------------------------
+ * Enable PAC branch type compatibility
+ * ---------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bic x0, x0, #(SCTLR_BT0_BIT | SCTLR_BT1_BIT)
+#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el1, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
BL2_SOURCES += common/aarch64/early_exceptions.S
endif
-ifeq (${ENABLE_PAUTH},1)
-BL2_CFLAGS += -msign-return-address=non-leaf
-endif
-
ifeq (${BL2_AT_EL3},0)
BL2_SOURCES += bl2/${ARCH}/bl2_entrypoint.S
BL2_LINKERFILE := bl2/bl2.ld.S
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
mrs x0, sctlr_el3
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ /* --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Enable PAC branch type compatibility
+ * --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bic x0, x0, #SCTLR_BT_BIT
+#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el3, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
mrs x0, sctlr_el3
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ /* --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Enable PAC branch type compatibility
+ * --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bic x0, x0, #SCTLR_BT_BIT
+#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el3, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
BL31_SOURCES += lib/extensions/mpam/mpam.c
endif
-ifeq (${ENABLE_PAUTH},1)
-BL31_CFLAGS += -msign-return-address=non-leaf
-endif
-
ifeq (${WORKAROUND_CVE_2017_5715},1)
BL31_SOURCES += lib/cpus/aarch64/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/wa_cve_2017_5715_mmu.S
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
mrs x0, sctlr_el1
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ /* ---------------------------------------------
+ * Enable PAC branch type compatibility
+ * ---------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bic x0, x0, #(SCTLR_BT0_BIT | SCTLR_BT1_BIT)
+#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el1, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
* TSPD for the various entrypoints
* -------------------------------------------
*/
-func tsp_vector_table
+vector_base tsp_vector_table
b tsp_yield_smc_entry
b tsp_fast_smc_entry
b tsp_cpu_on_entry
b tsp_system_off_entry
b tsp_system_reset_entry
b tsp_abort_yield_smc_entry
-endfunc tsp_vector_table
/*---------------------------------------------
* This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this
BL32_LINKERFILE := bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S
-# This flag determines whether pointer authentication is used in the TSP or not
-ifeq ($(ENABLE_PAUTH),1)
-BL32_CFLAGS += -msign-return-address=non-leaf
-endif
-
# This flag determines if the TSPD initializes BL32 in tspd_init() (synchronous
# method) or configures BL31 to pass control to BL32 instead of BL33
# (asynchronous method).
to the context that is saved when doing a world switch.
The TF-A itself has support for pointer authentication at runtime
- that can be enabled by setting both options ``ENABLE_PAUTH`` and
+ that can be enabled by setting ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` option to non-zero and
``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS`` to 1. This enables pointer authentication in BL1,
BL2, BL31, and the TSP if it is used.
enabling PAuth is lower because the compiler will use the optimized
PAuth instructions rather than the backwards-compatible ones.
+Armv8.5-A
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Branch Target Identification feature is selected by ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``
+ option set to 1. This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature.
+
Armv7-A
~~~~~~~
file that contains the BL33 private key in PEM format. If ``SAVE_KEYS=1``,
this file name will be used to save the key.
+- ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication
+ and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves.
+ If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option
+ ``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use:
+- 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection
+- 1: Enables all types of branch protection features
+- 2: Return address signing to its standard level
+- 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions
+
+ The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options
+ and resulting PAuth/BTI features.
+
+ +-------+--------------+-------+-----+
+ | Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI |
+ +=======+==============+=======+=====+
+ | 0 | none | N | N |
+ +-------+--------------+-------+-----+
+ | 1 | standard | Y | Y |
+ +-------+--------------+-------+-----+
+ | 2 | pac-ret | Y | N |
+ +-------+--------------+-------+-----+
+ | 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N |
+ +-------+--------------+-------+-----+
+
+ This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature.
+ Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world
+ irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it.
+
- ``BUILD_MESSAGE_TIMESTAMP``: String used to identify the time and date of the
compilation of each build. It must be set to a C string (including quotes
where applicable). Defaults to a string that contains the time and date of
registers to be included when saving and restoring the CPU context. Default
is 0.
-- ``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS``: Boolean option that, when set to 1, allows
- Pointer Authentication for **Secure world**. This will cause the
- Armv8.3-PAuth registers to be included when saving and restoring the CPU
- context as part of a world switch. Default value is 0. Pointer Authentication
- is an experimental feature.
-
- Note that, if the CPU supports it, Pointer Authentication is allowed for
- Non-secure world irrespectively of the value of this flag. "Allowed" means
- that accesses to PAuth-related registers or execution of PAuth-related
- instructions will not be trapped to EL3. As such, usage or not of PAuth in
- Non-secure world images, depends on those images themselves.
+- ``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS``: Boolean option that, when set to 1, enables
+ Pointer Authentication for Secure world. This will cause the ARMv8.3-PAuth
+ registers to be included when saving and restoring the CPU context as
+ part of world switch. Default value is 0 and this is an experimental feature.
+ Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world irrespective
+ of the value of this flag if the CPU supports it.
- ``DEBUG``: Chooses between a debug and release build. It can take either 0
(release) or 1 (debug) as values. 0 is the default.
partitioning in EL3, however. Platform initialisation code should configure
and use partitions in EL3 as required. This option defaults to ``0``.
-- ``ENABLE_PAUTH``: Boolean option to enable Armv8.3 Pointer Authentication
- for **TF-A BL images themselves**. If enabled, the compiler must support the
- ``-msign-return-address`` option. This flag defaults to 0. Pointer
- Authentication is an experimental feature.
-
- If this flag is enabled, ``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS`` must also be enabled.
-
- ``ENABLE_PIE``: Boolean option to enable Position Independent Executable(PIE)
support within generic code in TF-A. This option is currently only supported
in BL31. Default is 0.
/* ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 definitions */
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 S3_0_C0_C6_1
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT U(28)
-#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_MASK ULL(0xf)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT U(24)
-#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_MASK ULL(0xf)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT U(8)
-#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_MASK ULL(0xf)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT U(4)
-#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_MASK ULL(0xf)
/* ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 definitions */
#define SSBS_UNAVAILABLE ULL(0) /* No architectural SSBS support */
+#define ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_SHIFT U(0)
+#define ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_MASK ULL(0xf)
+
+#define BTI_IMPLEMENTED ULL(1) /* The BTI mechanism is implemented */
+
/* ID_PFR1_EL1 definitions */
#define ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_SHIFT U(12)
#define ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_MASK U(0xf)
#define SCTLR_EE_BIT (ULL(1) << 25)
#define SCTLR_UCI_BIT (ULL(1) << 26)
#define SCTLR_EnIA_BIT (ULL(1) << 31)
+#define SCTLR_BT0_BIT (ULL(1) << 35)
+#define SCTLR_BT1_BIT (ULL(1) << 36)
+#define SCTLR_BT_BIT (ULL(1) << 36)
#define SCTLR_DSSBS_BIT (ULL(1) << 44)
#define SCTLR_RESET_VAL SCTLR_EL3_RES1
ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_ST_MASK) == 1U;
}
+static inline bool is_armv8_5_bti_present(void)
+{
+ return ((read_id_aa64pfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_SHIFT) &
+ ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_MASK) == BTI_IMPLEMENTED;
+}
+
#endif /* ARCH_FEATURES_H */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <common/asm_macros_common.S>
#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#if ENABLE_BTI && !ARM_ARCH_AT_LEAST(8, 5)
+#error Branch Target Identification requires ARM_ARCH_MINOR >= 5
+#endif
+
/*
* TLBI instruction with type specifier that implements the workaround for
* errata 813419 of Cortex-A57 or errata 1286807 of Cortex-A76.
.endm
#endif
+ /*
+ * Helper macro to read system register value into x0
+ */
+ .macro read reg:req
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ bti j
+#endif
+ mrs x0, \reg
+ ret
+ .endm
+
+ /*
+ * Helper macro to write value from x1 to system register
+ */
+ .macro write reg:req
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ bti j
+#endif
+ msr \reg, x1
+ ret
+ .endm
+
#endif /* ASM_MACROS_S */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
.cfi_startproc
.align \_align
\_name:
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ /* When Branch Target Identification is enabled, insert "bti jc"
+ * instruction to enable indirect calls and branches
+ */
+ bti jc
+#endif
.endm
/*
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#define OSH (U(0x2) << 6)
#define ISH (U(0x3) << 6)
+#ifdef AARCH64
+/* Guarded Page bit */
+#define GP (ULL(1) << 50)
+#endif
+
#define TABLE_ADDR_MASK ULL(0x0000FFFFFFFFF000)
/*
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
cbz x3, exit
adr x14, dcsw_loop_table // compute inner loop address
add x14, x14, x0, lsl #5 // inner loop is 8x32-bit instructions
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ add x14, x14, x0, lsl #2 // inner loop is + "bti j" instruction
+#endif
mov x0, x9
mov w8, #1
loop1:
br x14 // jump to DC operation specific loop
.macro dcsw_loop _op
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ bti j
+#endif
loop2_\_op:
lsl w7, w6, w2 // w7 = aligned max set number
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2018-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
*/
func cpuamu_cnt_read
adr x1, 1f
- lsl x0, x0, #3
- add x1, x1, x0
+ add x1, x1, x0, lsl #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ add x1, x1, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
+#endif
br x1
-1:
- mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR0_EL0
- ret
- mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR1_EL0
- ret
- mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR2_EL0
- ret
- mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR3_EL0
- ret
- mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR4_EL0
- ret
+1: read CPUAMEVCNTR0_EL0
+ read CPUAMEVCNTR1_EL0
+ read CPUAMEVCNTR2_EL0
+ read CPUAMEVCNTR3_EL0
+ read CPUAMEVCNTR4_EL0
endfunc cpuamu_cnt_read
/*
*/
func cpuamu_cnt_write
adr x2, 1f
- lsl x0, x0, #3
- add x2, x2, x0
+ add x2, x2, x0, lsl #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ add x2, x2, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
+#endif
br x2
-1:
- msr CPUAMEVCNTR0_EL0, x0
- ret
- msr CPUAMEVCNTR1_EL0, x0
- ret
- msr CPUAMEVCNTR2_EL0, x0
- ret
- msr CPUAMEVCNTR3_EL0, x0
- ret
- msr CPUAMEVCNTR4_EL0, x0
- ret
+1: write CPUAMEVCNTR0_EL0
+ write CPUAMEVCNTR1_EL0
+ write CPUAMEVCNTR2_EL0
+ write CPUAMEVCNTR3_EL0
+ write CPUAMEVCNTR4_EL0
endfunc cpuamu_cnt_write
/*
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
* and return it in `x0`.
*/
func amu_group0_cnt_read_internal
+ adr x1, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
- mov x1, x0
- lsr x1, x1, #2
- cmp x1, #0
+ tst x0, #~3
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
-
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of mrs/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
- adr x1, 1f
- lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
- add x1, x1, x0
+ add x1, x1, x0, lsl #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ add x1, x1, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
+#endif
br x1
-1:
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR00_EL0 /* index 0 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR01_EL0 /* index 1 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR02_EL0 /* index 2 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR03_EL0 /* index 3 */
- ret
+1: read AMEVCNTR00_EL0 /* index 0 */
+ read AMEVCNTR01_EL0 /* index 1 */
+ read AMEVCNTR02_EL0 /* index 2 */
+ read AMEVCNTR03_EL0 /* index 3 */
endfunc amu_group0_cnt_read_internal
/*
* Given `idx`, write `val` to the corresponding AMU counter.
*/
func amu_group0_cnt_write_internal
+ adr x2, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
- mov x2, x0
- lsr x2, x2, #2
- cmp x2, #0
+ tst x0, #~3
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
-
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of mrs/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
- adr x2, 1f
- lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
- add x2, x2, x0
+ add x2, x2, x0, lsl #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ add x2, x2, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
+#endif
br x2
-1:
- msr AMEVCNTR00_EL0, x1 /* index 0 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR01_EL0, x1 /* index 1 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR02_EL0, x1 /* index 2 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR03_EL0, x1 /* index 3 */
- ret
+1: write AMEVCNTR00_EL0 /* index 0 */
+ write AMEVCNTR01_EL0 /* index 1 */
+ write AMEVCNTR02_EL0 /* index 2 */
+ write AMEVCNTR03_EL0 /* index 3 */
endfunc amu_group0_cnt_write_internal
/*
* and return it in `x0`.
*/
func amu_group1_cnt_read_internal
+ adr x1, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
- mov x1, x0
- lsr x1, x1, #4
- cmp x1, #0
+ tst x0, #~0xF
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
-
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of mrs/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
- adr x1, 1f
- lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
- add x1, x1, x0
+ add x1, x1, x0, lsl #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ add x1, x1, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
+#endif
br x1
-1:
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR10_EL0 /* index 0 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR11_EL0 /* index 1 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR12_EL0 /* index 2 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR13_EL0 /* index 3 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR14_EL0 /* index 4 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR15_EL0 /* index 5 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR16_EL0 /* index 6 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR17_EL0 /* index 7 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR18_EL0 /* index 8 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR19_EL0 /* index 9 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1A_EL0 /* index 10 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1B_EL0 /* index 11 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1C_EL0 /* index 12 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1D_EL0 /* index 13 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1E_EL0 /* index 14 */
- ret
- mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1F_EL0 /* index 15 */
- ret
+1: read AMEVCNTR10_EL0 /* index 0 */
+ read AMEVCNTR11_EL0 /* index 1 */
+ read AMEVCNTR12_EL0 /* index 2 */
+ read AMEVCNTR13_EL0 /* index 3 */
+ read AMEVCNTR14_EL0 /* index 4 */
+ read AMEVCNTR15_EL0 /* index 5 */
+ read AMEVCNTR16_EL0 /* index 6 */
+ read AMEVCNTR17_EL0 /* index 7 */
+ read AMEVCNTR18_EL0 /* index 8 */
+ read AMEVCNTR19_EL0 /* index 9 */
+ read AMEVCNTR1A_EL0 /* index 10 */
+ read AMEVCNTR1B_EL0 /* index 11 */
+ read AMEVCNTR1C_EL0 /* index 12 */
+ read AMEVCNTR1D_EL0 /* index 13 */
+ read AMEVCNTR1E_EL0 /* index 14 */
+ read AMEVCNTR1F_EL0 /* index 15 */
endfunc amu_group1_cnt_read_internal
/*
* Given `idx`, write `val` to the corresponding AMU counter.
*/
func amu_group1_cnt_write_internal
+ adr x2, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
- mov x2, x0
- lsr x2, x2, #4
- cmp x2, #0
+ tst x0, #~0xF
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
-
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of mrs/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
- adr x2, 1f
- lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
- add x2, x2, x0
+ add x2, x2, x0, lsl #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ add x2, x2, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
+#endif
br x2
-1:
- msr AMEVCNTR10_EL0, x1 /* index 0 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR11_EL0, x1 /* index 1 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR12_EL0, x1 /* index 2 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR13_EL0, x1 /* index 3 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR14_EL0, x1 /* index 4 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR15_EL0, x1 /* index 5 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR16_EL0, x1 /* index 6 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR17_EL0, x1 /* index 7 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR18_EL0, x1 /* index 8 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR19_EL0, x1 /* index 9 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR1A_EL0, x1 /* index 10 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR1B_EL0, x1 /* index 11 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR1C_EL0, x1 /* index 12 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR1D_EL0, x1 /* index 13 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR1E_EL0, x1 /* index 14 */
- ret
- msr AMEVCNTR1F_EL0, x1 /* index 15 */
- ret
+1: write AMEVCNTR10_EL0 /* index 0 */
+ write AMEVCNTR11_EL0 /* index 1 */
+ write AMEVCNTR12_EL0 /* index 2 */
+ write AMEVCNTR13_EL0 /* index 3 */
+ write AMEVCNTR14_EL0 /* index 4 */
+ write AMEVCNTR15_EL0 /* index 5 */
+ write AMEVCNTR16_EL0 /* index 6 */
+ write AMEVCNTR17_EL0 /* index 7 */
+ write AMEVCNTR18_EL0 /* index 8 */
+ write AMEVCNTR19_EL0 /* index 9 */
+ write AMEVCNTR1A_EL0 /* index 10 */
+ write AMEVCNTR1B_EL0 /* index 11 */
+ write AMEVCNTR1C_EL0 /* index 12 */
+ write AMEVCNTR1D_EL0 /* index 13 */
+ write AMEVCNTR1E_EL0 /* index 14 */
+ write AMEVCNTR1F_EL0 /* index 15 */
endfunc amu_group1_cnt_write_internal
/*
* with the value `val`.
*/
func amu_group1_set_evtype_internal
+ adr x2, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
- mov x2, x0
- lsr x2, x2, #4
- cmp x2, #0
+ tst x0, #~0xF
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
/* val should be between [0, 65535] */
- mov x2, x1
- lsr x2, x2, #16
- cmp x2, #0
+ tst x1, #~0xFFFF
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
-
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of msr/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
- adr x2, 1f
- lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
- add x2, x2, x0
+ add x2, x2, x0, lsl #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ add x2, x2, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
+#endif
br x2
-1:
- msr AMEVTYPER10_EL0, x1 /* index 0 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER11_EL0, x1 /* index 1 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER12_EL0, x1 /* index 2 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER13_EL0, x1 /* index 3 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER14_EL0, x1 /* index 4 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER15_EL0, x1 /* index 5 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER16_EL0, x1 /* index 6 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER17_EL0, x1 /* index 7 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER18_EL0, x1 /* index 8 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER19_EL0, x1 /* index 9 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER1A_EL0, x1 /* index 10 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER1B_EL0, x1 /* index 11 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER1C_EL0, x1 /* index 12 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER1D_EL0, x1 /* index 13 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER1E_EL0, x1 /* index 14 */
- ret
- msr AMEVTYPER1F_EL0, x1 /* index 15 */
- ret
+1: write AMEVTYPER10_EL0 /* index 0 */
+ write AMEVTYPER11_EL0 /* index 1 */
+ write AMEVTYPER12_EL0 /* index 2 */
+ write AMEVTYPER13_EL0 /* index 3 */
+ write AMEVTYPER14_EL0 /* index 4 */
+ write AMEVTYPER15_EL0 /* index 5 */
+ write AMEVTYPER16_EL0 /* index 6 */
+ write AMEVTYPER17_EL0 /* index 7 */
+ write AMEVTYPER18_EL0 /* index 8 */
+ write AMEVTYPER19_EL0 /* index 9 */
+ write AMEVTYPER1A_EL0 /* index 10 */
+ write AMEVTYPER1B_EL0 /* index 11 */
+ write AMEVTYPER1C_EL0 /* index 12 */
+ write AMEVTYPER1D_EL0 /* index 13 */
+ write AMEVTYPER1E_EL0 /* index 14 */
+ write AMEVTYPER1F_EL0 /* index 15 */
endfunc amu_group1_set_evtype_internal
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <platform_def.h>
+#include <arch_features.h>
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <common/debug.h>
#include <lib/utils_def.h>
if (mem_type == MT_MEMORY) {
desc |= LOWER_ATTRS(ATTR_IWBWA_OWBWA_NTR_INDEX | ISH);
+
+ /* Check if Branch Target Identification is enabled */
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+ /* Set GP bit for block and page code entries
+ * if BTI mechanism is implemented.
+ */
+ if (is_armv8_5_bti_present() &&
+ ((attr & (MT_TYPE_MASK | MT_RW |
+ MT_EXECUTE_NEVER)) == MT_CODE)) {
+ desc |= GP;
+ }
+#endif
} else {
assert(mem_type == MT_NON_CACHEABLE);
desc |= LOWER_ATTRS(ATTR_NON_CACHEABLE_INDEX | OSH);
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
}
printf(((LOWER_ATTRS(NS) & desc) != 0ULL) ? "-NS" : "-S");
+
+#ifdef AARCH64
+ /* Check Guarded Page bit */
+ if ((desc & GP) != 0ULL) {
+ printf("-GP");
+ }
+#endif
}
static const char * const level_spacers[] = {
# when BL2_AT_EL3 is 1.
BL2_IN_XIP_MEM := 0
+# Select the branch protection features to use.
+BRANCH_PROTECTION := 0
+
# By default, consider that the platform may release several CPUs out of reset.
# The platform Makefile is free to override this value.
COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU := 0
# Flag to enable exception handling in EL3
EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING := 0
-# Flag to enable Pointer Authentication
+# Flag to enable Branch Target Identification.
+# Internal flag not meant for direct setting.
+# Use BRANCH_PROTECTION to enable BTI.
+ENABLE_BTI := 0
+
+# Flag to enable Pointer Authentication.
+# Internal flag not meant for direct setting.
+# Use BRANCH_PROTECTION to enable PAUTH.
ENABLE_PAUTH := 0
# Build flag to treat usage of deprecated platform and framework APIs as error.