--- /dev/null
+From d7d1bc8f08eea1a85ab0d794bc1561659462d937 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 13:26:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ConnectionExists: for NTLM re-use, require credentials to
+ match
+
+CVE-2015-3143
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422A.html
+Reported-by: Paras Sethia
+---
+ lib/url.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -3184,7 +3184,11 @@ ConnectionExists(struct SessionHandle *d
+ }
+
+ if((!(needle->handler->flags & PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST)) ||
++#if defined(USE_NTLM)
++ (wantNTLMhttp || check->ntlm.state != NTLMSTATE_NONE)) {
++#else
+ wantNTLMhttp) {
++#endif
+ /* This protocol requires credentials per connection or is HTTP+NTLM,
+ so verify that we're using the same name and password as well */
+ if(!strequal(needle->user, check->user) ||
--- /dev/null
+From 6218ded6001ea330e589f92b6b2fa12777752b5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 23:52:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fix_hostname: zero length host name caused -1 index offset
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If a URL is given with a zero-length host name, like in "http://:80" or
+just ":80", `fix_hostname()` will index the host name pointer with a -1
+offset (as it blindly assumes a non-zero length) and both read and
+assign that address.
+
+CVE-2015-3144
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422D.html
+Reported-by: Hanno Böck
+---
+ lib/url.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -3606,7 +3606,7 @@ static void fix_hostname(struct SessionH
+ host->dispname = host->name;
+
+ len = strlen(host->name);
+- if(host->name[len-1] == '.')
++ if(len && (host->name[len-1] == '.'))
+ /* strip off a single trailing dot if present, primarily for SNI but
+ there's no use for it */
+ host->name[len-1]=0;
--- /dev/null
+From ea595c516bc936a514753597aa6c59fd6eb0765e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 16:37:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cookie: cookie parser out of boundary memory access
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The internal libcurl function called sanitize_cookie_path() that cleans
+up the path element as given to it from a remote site or when read from
+a file, did not properly validate the input. If given a path that
+consisted of a single double-quote, libcurl would index a newly
+allocated memory area with index -1 and assign a zero to it, thus
+destroying heap memory it wasn't supposed to.
+
+CVE-2015-3145
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422C.html
+Reported-by: Hanno Böck
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
++++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -236,11 +236,14 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* some stupid site sends path attribute with '"'. */
++ len = strlen(new_path);
+ if(new_path[0] == '\"') {
+- memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), strlen(new_path));
++ memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), len);
++ len--;
+ }
+- if(new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] == '\"') {
+- new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] = 0x0;
++ if(len && (new_path[len - 1] == '\"')) {
++ new_path[len - 1] = 0x0;
++ len--;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC6265 5.2.4 The Path Attribute */
+@@ -252,8 +255,7 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const
+ }
+
+ /* convert /hoge/ to /hoge */
+- len = strlen(new_path);
+- if(1 < len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') {
++ if(len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') {
+ new_path[len - 1] = 0x0;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 6abfb512ed22c2de891a4398616d81a2a0690b5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2015 23:50:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] http_done: close Negotiate connections when done
+
+When doing HTTP requests Negotiate authenticated, the entire connnection
+may become authenticated and not just the specific HTTP request which is
+otherwise how HTTP works, as Negotiate can basically use NTLM under the
+hood. curl was not adhering to this fact but would assume that such
+requests would also be authenticated per request.
+
+CVE-2015-3148
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422B.html
+Reported-by: Isaac Boukris
+---
+ lib/http.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/lib/http.c
++++ b/lib/http.c
+@@ -1493,8 +1493,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_done(struct connectda
+
+ #ifdef USE_SPNEGO
+ if(data->state.proxyneg.state == GSS_AUTHSENT ||
+- data->state.negotiate.state == GSS_AUTHSENT)
++ data->state.negotiate.state == GSS_AUTHSENT) {
++ /* add forbid re-use if http-code != 401 as a WA
++ * only needed for 401 that failed handling
++ * otherwie state will be RECV with current code */
++ if((data->req.httpcode != 401) && (data->req.httpcode != 407))
++ connclose(conn, "Negotiate transfer completed");
+ Curl_cleanup_negotiate(data);
++ }
+ #endif
+
+ /* set the proper values (possibly modified on POST) */
--- /dev/null
+From 69a2e8d7ec581695a62527cb2252e7350f314ffa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 15:58:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CURLOPT_HEADEROPT: default to separate
+
+Make the HTTP headers separated by default for improved security and
+reduced risk for information leakage.
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150429.html
+Reported-by: Yehezkel Horowitz, Oren Souroujon
+---
+ docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3 | 12 ++++++------
+ lib/url.c | 1 +
+ tests/data/test1527 | 2 +-
+ tests/data/test287 | 2 +-
+ tests/libtest/lib1527.c | 1 +
+ 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3
++++ b/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+ .\" * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ .\" * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ .\" *
+-.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2014, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
++.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ .\" *
+ .\" * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ .\" * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_setopt(CURL *handle,
+ Pass a long that is a bitmask of options of how to deal with headers. The two
+ mutually exclusive options are:
+
+-\fBCURLHEADER_UNIFIED\fP - keep working as before. This means
+-\fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers will be used in requests both to servers
+-and proxies. With this option enabled, \fICURLOPT_PROXYHEADER(3)\fP will not
+-have any effect.
++\fBCURLHEADER_UNIFIED\fP - the headers specified in
++\fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP will be used in requests both to servers and
++proxies. With this option enabled, \fICURLOPT_PROXYHEADER(3)\fP will not have
++any effect.
+
+ \fBCURLHEADER_SEPARATE\fP - makes \fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers only get
+ sent to a server and not to a proxy. Proxy headers must be set with
+@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ headers. When doing CONNECT, libcurl wil
+ headers only to the proxy and then \fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers only to
+ the server.
+ .SH DEFAULT
+-CURLHEADER_UNIFIED
++CURLHEADER_SEPARATE (changed in 7.42.1, ased CURLHEADER_UNIFIED before then)
+ .SH PROTOCOLS
+ HTTP
+ .SH EXAMPLE
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct Us
+ set->ssl_enable_alpn = TRUE;
+
+ set->expect_100_timeout = 1000L; /* Wait for a second by default. */
++ set->sep_headers = TRUE; /* separated header lists by default */
+ return result;
+ }
+
+--- a/tests/data/test1527
++++ b/tests/data/test1527
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ http-proxy
+ lib1527
+ </tool>
+ <name>
+-Check same headers are generated without CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER
++Check same headers are generated with CURLOPT_HEADEROPT == CURLHEADER_UNIFIED
+ </name>
+ <command>
+ http://the.old.moo.1527:%HTTPPORT/1527 %HOSTIP:%PROXYPORT
+--- a/tests/data/test287
++++ b/tests/data/test287
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ http
+ HTTP proxy CONNECT with custom User-Agent header
+ </name>
+ <command>
+-http://test.remote.example.com.287:%HTTPPORT/path/287 -H "User-Agent: looser/2007" --proxy http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT --proxytunnel
++http://test.remote.example.com.287:%HTTPPORT/path/287 -H "User-Agent: looser/2015" --proxy http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT --proxytunnel --proxy-header "User-Agent: looser/2007"
+ </command>
+ </client>
+
+--- a/tests/libtest/lib1527.c
++++ b/tests/libtest/lib1527.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int test(char *URL)
+ test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, read_callback);
+ test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL, 1L);
+ test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, strlen(data));
++ test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HEADEROPT, CURLHEADER_UNIFIED);
+
+ res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
+
--- /dev/null
+From e6d7c30734487246e83b95520e81bc1ccf0a2376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 20:04:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] http: do not leak basic auth credentials on re-used
+ connections
+
+CVE-2015-3236
+
+This partially reverts commit curl-7_39_0-237-g87c4abb
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150617A.html
+---
+ lib/http.c | 16 ++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/http.c
++++ b/lib/http.c
+@@ -2333,20 +2333,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct connectdata *c
+ te
+ );
+
+- /*
+- * Free userpwd for Negotiate/NTLM. Cannot reuse as it is associated with
+- * the connection and shouldn't be repeated over it either.
+- */
+- switch (data->state.authhost.picked) {
+- case CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE:
+- case CURLAUTH_NTLM:
+- case CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB:
+- Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.userpwd);
+- break;
+- }
++ /* clear userpwd to avoid re-using credentials from re-used connections */
++ Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.userpwd);
+
+ /*
+- * Same for proxyuserpwd
++ * Free proxyuserpwd for Negotiate/NTLM. Cannot reuse as it is associated
++ * with the connection and shouldn't be repeated over it either.
+ */
+ switch (data->state.authproxy.picked) {
+ case CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE:
--- /dev/null
+From d2f1a8bdce9d77a277d05adae025d369c1bdd9e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Fri, 22 May 2015 10:28:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] SMB: rangecheck values read off incoming packet
+
+CVE-2015-3237
+
+Detected by Coverity. CID 1299430.
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150617B.html
+---
+ lib/smb.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/smb.c
++++ b/lib/smb.c
+@@ -783,9 +783,15 @@ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct
+ off = Curl_read16_le(((unsigned char *) msg) +
+ sizeof(struct smb_header) + 13);
+ if(len > 0) {
+- result = Curl_client_write(conn, CLIENTWRITE_BODY,
+- (char *)msg + off + sizeof(unsigned int),
+- len);
++ struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc;
++ if(off + sizeof(unsigned int) + len > smbc->got) {
++ failf(conn->data, "Invalid input packet");
++ result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
++ }
++ else
++ result = Curl_client_write(conn, CLIENTWRITE_BODY,
++ (char *)msg + off + sizeof(unsigned int),
++ len);
+ if(result) {
+ req->result = result;
+ next_state = SMB_CLOSE;
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
-@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP) $(VC7_LIBVCPROJ) $(VC7_SRCVCPROJ) \
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP)
bin_SCRIPTS = curl-config
SUBDIRS = lib src include
pkgconfig_DATA = libcurl.pc
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP) $(VC7_LIBVCPROJ) $(VC7_SRCVCPROJ) \
+@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP)
bin_SCRIPTS = curl-config
SUBDIRS = lib src include
projects / openwrt / svn-archive / archive.git / commitdiff