x86/efi: Access EFI MMIO data as unencrypted when SEV is active
authorBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Fri, 20 Jul 2018 01:28:46 +0000 (10:28 +0900)
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Sun, 22 Jul 2018 12:10:38 +0000 (14:10 +0200)
SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
flash.

The following commit:

  1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active")

unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data as 'encrypted' (C=1).

When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO
should be mapped as 'unencrypted' so that both guest and hypervisor can
access the data.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.15.x
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted ...")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180720012846.23560-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c

index 77873ce700ae7d703a3385719282dbd31a092ed9..5f2eb32316073f15307aa28ac8b37a17230ea751 100644 (file)
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
        if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
                flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
 
-       if (sev_active())
+       if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
                flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
 
        pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;