PKG_NAME:=haproxy
PKG_VERSION:=2.0.8
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/2.0/src
--- /dev/null
+commit 41898a216e92c80c1354b67613834be1b3e97864
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Fri Oct 25 14:16:14 2019 +0200
+
+ MINOR: config: warn on presence of "\n" in header values/replacements
+
+ Yves Lafon reported an interesting case where an old rsprep rule used
+ to conditionally append a header field by inserting a \n in the exising
+ value was breaking H2 in HTX mode, with the browser rightfully reporting
+ a PROTOCOL_ERROR when facing the \n. In legacy mode, since the response
+ is first parsed again as an HTTP/1 message before being converted to H2
+ the issue does not happen. We should definitely discourage from using
+ this old trick nowadays, http-request and http-response rules were made
+ exactly to end this. Let's detect this and emit a warning when present.
+ In 2.0 there is already a warning recalling that these rules are
+ deprecated and which explains what to do instead, so the user now gets
+ all the relevant information to convert them.
+
+ There is no upstream commit ID for this patch because these rules were
+ indeed removed from 2.1. This patch could be backported to 1.9 as it
+ can also trigger the problem when HTX is enabled.
+
+diff --git a/src/cfgparse-listen.c b/src/cfgparse-listen.c
+index 5454f3bb..9c3e107a 100644
+--- a/src/cfgparse-listen.c
++++ b/src/cfgparse-listen.c
+@@ -294,6 +294,12 @@ static int create_cond_regex_rule(const char *file, int line,
+ goto err_free;
+ }
+
++ if (repl && strchr(repl, '\n')) {
++ ha_warning("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' : hack involving '\\n' character in replacement string will fail with HTTP/2.\n",
++ file, line, cmd);
++ ret_code |= ERR_WARN;
++ }
++
+ if (dir == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ && warnif_misplaced_reqxxx(px, file, line, cmd))
+ ret_code |= ERR_WARN;
+
+@@ -4039,6 +4045,12 @@ stats_error_parsing:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (strchr(args[1], '\n')) {
++ ha_warning("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' : hack involving '\\n' character in new header value will fail with HTTP/2.\n",
++ file, linenum, args[0]);
++ err_code |= ERR_WARN;
++ }
++
+ wl = calloc(1, sizeof(*wl));
+ wl->cond = cond;
+ wl->s = strdup(args[1]);
+@@ -4157,6 +4169,12 @@ stats_error_parsing:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (strchr(args[1], '\n')) {
++ ha_warning("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' : hack involving '\\n' character in new header value will fail with HTTP/2.\n",
++ file, linenum, args[0]);
++ err_code |= ERR_WARN;
++ }
++
+ wl = calloc(1, sizeof(*wl));
+ wl->cond = cond;
+ wl->s = strdup(args[1]);
+++ /dev/null
---- a/Makefile
-+++ b/Makefile
-@@ -327,6 +327,15 @@ ifeq ($(TARGET),linux-glibc)
- USE_GETADDRINFO)
- endif
-
-+# For linux >= 2.6.28 and uclibc
-+ifeq ($(TARGET),linux-uclibc)
-+ set_target_defaults = $(call default_opts, \
-+ USE_POLL USE_TPROXY USE_DL USE_RT USE_NETFILTER \
-+ USE_CPU_AFFINITY USE_THREAD USE_EPOLL USE_FUTEX USE_LINUX_TPROXY \
-+ USE_ACCEPT4 USE_LINUX_SPLICE USE_PRCTL USE_THREAD_DUMP USE_NS USE_TFO \
-+ USE_GETADDRINFO)
-+endif
-+
- # Solaris 8 and above
- ifeq ($(TARGET),solaris)
- # We also enable getaddrinfo() which works since solaris 8.
--- /dev/null
+commit 21178a582238ee1c57d0aef73c97711741dd93ed
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Wed Oct 23 11:06:35 2019 +0200
+
+ BUG/MINOR: mux-h2: do not emit logs on backend connections
+
+ The logs were added to the H2 mux so that we can report logs in case
+ of errors that prevent a stream from being created, but as a side effect
+ these logs are emitted twice for backend connections: once by the H2 mux
+ itself and another time by the upper layer stream. It can even happen
+ more with connection retries.
+
+ This patch makes sure we do not emit logs for backend connections.
+
+ It should be backported to 2.0 and 1.9.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 9364a5fda33a2f591d5e2640249a54af8955fb8b)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c
+index 8841c0e0..afa68e80 100644
+--- a/src/mux_h2.c
++++ b/src/mux_h2.c
+@@ -1661,7 +1661,8 @@ static int h2c_handle_settings(struct h2c *h2c)
+ h2c->st0 = H2_CS_FRAME_A;
+ return 1;
+ fail:
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
++ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))
++ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ h2c_error(h2c, error);
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -2318,7 +2319,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ /* RFC7540#3.5: a GOAWAY frame MAY be omitted */
+ if (h2c->st0 == H2_CS_ERROR) {
+ h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR2;
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
++ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))
++ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ }
+ goto fail;
+ }
+@@ -2327,7 +2329,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ /* RFC7540#3.5: a GOAWAY frame MAY be omitted */
+ h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR2;
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
++ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))
++ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+@@ -2335,7 +2338,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ /* RFC7540#3.5: a GOAWAY frame MAY be omitted */
+ h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_FRAME_SIZE_ERROR);
+ h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR2;
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
++ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))
++ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+@@ -2363,7 +2367,7 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+
+ if ((int)hdr.len < 0 || (int)hdr.len > global.tune.bufsize) {
+ h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_FRAME_SIZE_ERROR);
+- if (!h2c->nb_streams) {
++ if (!h2c->nb_streams && !(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) {
+ /* only log if no other stream can report the error */
+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ }
+@@ -2381,7 +2385,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ */
+ if (hdr.len < 1) {
+ h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_FRAME_SIZE_ERROR);
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
++ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))
++ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ hdr.len--;
+@@ -2396,7 +2401,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ * frame payload or greater => error.
+ */
+ h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
++ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))
++ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+@@ -2420,7 +2426,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ ret = h2_frame_check(h2c->dft, 1, h2c->dsi, h2c->dfl, global.tune.bufsize);
+ if (ret != H2_ERR_NO_ERROR) {
+ h2c_error(h2c, ret);
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
++ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))
++ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+@@ -2458,7 +2465,7 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ * this state MUST be treated as a connection error
+ */
+ h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+- if (!h2c->nb_streams) {
++ if (!h2c->nb_streams && !(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) {
+ /* only log if no other stream can report the error */
+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ }
+@@ -2608,7 +2615,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ * frames so this one is out of sequence.
+ */
+ h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
++ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))
++ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+ goto fail;
+
+ case H2_FT_HEADERS:
+@@ -2714,10 +2722,8 @@ static int h2_process_mux(struct h2c *h2c)
+ if (unlikely(h2c->st0 == H2_CS_PREFACE && (h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))) {
+ if (unlikely(h2c_bck_send_preface(h2c) <= 0)) {
+ /* RFC7540#3.5: a GOAWAY frame MAY be omitted */
+- if (h2c->st0 == H2_CS_ERROR) {
++ if (h2c->st0 == H2_CS_ERROR)
+ h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR2;
+- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner);
+- }
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ h2c->st0 = H2_CS_SETTINGS1;
+++ /dev/null
---- a/include/common/openssl-compat.h
-+++ b/include/common/openssl-compat.h
-@@ -217,7 +217,8 @@ static inline int EVP_PKEY_base_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- #define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa 3
- #endif
-
--#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) || (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
-+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) || \
-+ (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L))
- #define X509_getm_notBefore X509_get_notBefore
- #define X509_getm_notAfter X509_get_notAfter
- #endif
--- /dev/null
+commit 74a1e4393f7a7b194abb4f428fd02c7c088f6c67
+Author: William Dauchy <w.dauchy@criteo.com>
+Date: Wed Oct 23 19:31:36 2019 +0200
+
+ MINOR: tcp: avoid confusion in time parsing init
+
+ We never enter val_fc_time_value when an associated fetcher such as `fc_rtt` is
+ called without argument. meaning `type == ARGT_STOP` will never be true and so
+ the default `data.sint = TIME_UNIT_MS` will never be set. remove this part to
+ avoid thinking default data.sint is set to ms while reading the code.
+
+ Signed-off-by: William Dauchy <w.dauchy@criteo.com>
+
+ [Cf: This patch may safely backported as far as 1.7. But no matter if not.]
+
+ (cherry picked from commit b705b4d7d308d1132a772f3ae2d6113447022a60)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/proto_tcp.c b/src/proto_tcp.c
+index c3578ea2..cfd58e60 100644
+--- a/src/proto_tcp.c
++++ b/src/proto_tcp.c
+@@ -1569,10 +1569,6 @@ smp_fetch_dport(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void
+ */
+ static int val_fc_time_value(struct arg *args, char **err)
+ {
+- if (args[0].type == ARGT_STOP) {
+- args[0].type = ARGT_SINT;
+- args[0].data.sint = TIME_UNIT_MS;
+- }
+ if (args[0].type == ARGT_STR) {
+ if (strcmp(args[0].data.str.area, "us") == 0) {
+ free(args[0].data.str.area);
--- /dev/null
+commit d4f20fadd9c3145de0eb5f5434f57b9fffc61062
+Author: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.com>
+Date: Fri Oct 25 21:10:14 2019 +0200
+
+ BUG/MINOR: cli: don't call the kw->io_release if kw->parse failed
+
+ The io_release() callback of the cli_kw is supposed to be used to clean
+ what an io_handler() has made. It is called once the work in the IO
+ handler is finished, or when the connection was aborted by the client.
+
+ This patch fixes a bug where the io_release callback was called even
+ when the parse() callback failed. Which means that the io_release() could
+ called even if the io_handler() was not called.
+
+ Should be backported in every versions that have a cli_kw->release().
+ (as far as 1.7)
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 90b098c921e15f912dbde42658e34780f0ba446d)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/cli.c b/src/cli.c
+index 9a9f80f9..c063fbf0 100644
+--- a/src/cli.c
++++ b/src/cli.c
+@@ -570,10 +570,19 @@ static int cli_parse_request(struct appctx *appctx)
+
+ appctx->io_handler = kw->io_handler;
+ appctx->io_release = kw->io_release;
+- /* kw->parse could set its own io_handler or ip_release handler */
+- if ((!kw->parse || kw->parse(args, payload, appctx, kw->private) == 0) && appctx->io_handler) {
+- appctx->st0 = CLI_ST_CALLBACK;
+- }
++
++ if (kw->parse && kw->parse(args, payload, appctx, kw->private) != 0)
++ goto fail;
++
++ /* kw->parse could set its own io_handler or io_release handler */
++ if (!appctx->io_handler)
++ goto fail;
++
++ appctx->st0 = CLI_ST_CALLBACK;
++ return 1;
++fail:
++ appctx->io_handler = NULL;
++ appctx->io_release = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+commit 074230876d05bdf3fe33893889b326da14ab8ae9
+Author: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+Date: Thu Oct 24 10:31:01 2019 +0200
+
+ BUG/MINOR: mux-h2: Don't pretend mux buffers aren't full anymore if nothing sent
+
+ In h2_send(), when something is sent, we remove the flags
+ (H2_CF_MUX_MFULL|H2_CF_DEM_MROOM) on the h2 connection. This way, we are able to
+ wake up all streams waiting to send data. Unfortunatly, these flags are
+ unconditionally removed, even when nothing was sent. So if the h2c is blocked
+ because the mux buffers are full and we are unable to send anything, all streams
+ in the send_list are woken up for nothing. Now, we only remove these flags if at
+ least a send succeeds.
+
+ This patch must be backport to 2.0.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 69fe5cea213afd0c7465094e9dfead93143dcf3f)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c
+index afa68e80..ac34a723 100644
+--- a/src/mux_h2.c
++++ b/src/mux_h2.c
+@@ -2943,7 +2943,8 @@ static int h2_send(struct h2c *h2c)
+ offer_buffers(NULL, tasks_run_queue);
+
+ /* wrote at least one byte, the buffer is not full anymore */
+- h2c->flags &= ~(H2_CF_MUX_MFULL | H2_CF_DEM_MROOM);
++ if (sent)
++ h2c->flags &= ~(H2_CF_MUX_MFULL | H2_CF_DEM_MROOM);
+ }
+
+ if (conn->flags & CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH) {
--- /dev/null
+commit 27ebcefd41b3e44395c3fe71939ef98b03f98e7b
+Author: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+Date: Fri Oct 25 10:21:01 2019 +0200
+
+ BUG/MAJOR: stream-int: Don't receive data from mux until SI_ST_EST is reached
+
+ This bug is pretty pernicious and have serious consequences : In 2.1, an
+ infinite loop in process_stream() because the backend stream-interface remains
+ in the ready state (SI_ST_RDY). In 2.0, a call in loop to process_stream()
+ because the stream-interface remains blocked in the connect state
+ (SI_ST_CON). In both cases, it happens after a connection retry attempt. In 1.9,
+ it seems to not happen. But it may be just by chance or just because it is
+ harder to get right conditions to trigger the bug. However, reading the code,
+ the bug seems to exist too.
+
+ Here is how the bug happens in 2.1. When we try to establish a new connection to
+ a server, the corresponding stream-interface is first set to the connect state
+ (SI_ST_CON). When the underlying connection is known to be connected (the flag
+ CO_FL_CONNECTED set), the stream-interface is switched to the ready state
+ (SI_ST_RDY). It is a transient state between the connect state (SI_ST_CON) and
+ the established state (SI_ST_EST). It must be handled on the next call to
+ process_stream(), which is responsible to operate the transition. During all
+ this time, errors can occur. A connection error or a client abort. The transient
+ state SI_ST_RDY was introduced to let a chance to process_stream() to catch
+ these errors before considering the connection as fully established.
+ Unfortunatly, if a read0 is catched in states SI_ST_CON or SI_ST_RDY, it is
+ possible to have a shutdown without transition to SI_ST_DIS (in fact, here,
+ SI_ST_CON is swichted to SI_ST_RDY). This happens if the request was fully
+ received and analyzed. In this case, the flag SI_FL_NOHALF is set on the backend
+ stream-interface. If an error is also reported during the connect, the behavior
+ is undefined because an error is returned to the client and a connection retry
+ is performed. So on the next connection attempt to the server, if another error
+ is reported, a client abort is detected. But the shutdown for writes was already
+ done. So the transition to the state SI_ST_DIS is impossible. We stay in the
+ state SI_ST_RDY. Because it is a transient state, we loop in process_stream() to
+ perform the transition.
+
+ It is hard to understand how the bug happens reading the code and even harder to
+ explain. But there is a trivial way to hit the bug by sending h2 requests to a
+ server only speaking h1. For instance, with the following config :
+
+ listen tst
+ bind *:80
+ server www 127.0.0.1:8000 proto h2 # in reality, it is a HTTP/1.1 server
+
+ It is a configuration error, but it is an easy way to observe the bug. Note it
+ may happen with a valid configuration.
+
+ So, after a careful analyzis, it appears that si_cs_recv() should never be
+ called for a not fully established stream-interface. This way the connection
+ retries will be performed before reporting an error to the client. Thus, if a
+ shutdown is performed because a read0 is handled, the stream-interface is
+ inconditionnaly set to the transient state SI_ST_DIS.
+
+ This patch must be backported to 2.0 and 1.9. However on these versions, this
+ patch reveals a design flaw about connections and a bad way to perform the
+ connection retries. We are working on it.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 04400bc7875fcc362495b0f25e75ba6fc2f44850)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/stream_interface.c b/src/stream_interface.c
+index ef0fea7f..211fe2d7 100644
+--- a/src/stream_interface.c
++++ b/src/stream_interface.c
+@@ -1215,6 +1215,10 @@ int si_cs_recv(struct conn_stream *cs)
+ int read_poll = MAX_READ_POLL_LOOPS;
+ int flags = 0;
+
++ /* If not established yet, do nothing. */
++ if (si->state != SI_ST_EST)
++ return 0;
++
+ /* If another call to si_cs_recv() failed, and we subscribed to
+ * recv events already, give up now.
+ */
+@@ -1293,8 +1297,6 @@ int si_cs_recv(struct conn_stream *cs)
+ ic->total += ret;
+ cur_read += ret;
+ ic->flags |= CF_READ_PARTIAL;
+- if (si->state == SI_ST_CON)
+- si->state = SI_ST_RDY;
+ }
+
+ if (cs->flags & CS_FL_EOS)
+@@ -1391,8 +1393,6 @@ int si_cs_recv(struct conn_stream *cs)
+
+ ic->flags |= CF_READ_PARTIAL;
+ ic->total += ret;
+- if (si->state == SI_ST_CON)
+- si->state = SI_ST_RDY;
+
+ if ((ic->flags & CF_READ_DONTWAIT) || --read_poll <= 0) {
+ /* we're stopped by the channel's policy */
+@@ -1544,16 +1544,7 @@ static void stream_int_read0(struct stream_interface *si)
+
+ si_done_get(si);
+
+- /* Don't change the state to SI_ST_DIS yet if we're still
+- * in SI_ST_CON, otherwise it means sess_establish() hasn't
+- * been called yet, and so the analysers would not run. However
+- * it's fine to switch to SI_ST_RDY as we have really validated
+- * the connection.
+- */
+- if (si->state == SI_ST_EST)
+- si->state = SI_ST_DIS;
+- else if (si->state == SI_ST_CON)
+- si->state = SI_ST_RDY;
++ si->state = SI_ST_DIS;
+ si->exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ return;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -327,6 +327,15 @@ ifeq ($(TARGET),linux-glibc)
+ USE_GETADDRINFO)
+ endif
+
++# For linux >= 2.6.28 and uclibc
++ifeq ($(TARGET),linux-uclibc)
++ set_target_defaults = $(call default_opts, \
++ USE_POLL USE_TPROXY USE_DL USE_RT USE_NETFILTER \
++ USE_CPU_AFFINITY USE_THREAD USE_EPOLL USE_FUTEX USE_LINUX_TPROXY \
++ USE_ACCEPT4 USE_LINUX_SPLICE USE_PRCTL USE_THREAD_DUMP USE_NS USE_TFO \
++ USE_GETADDRINFO)
++endif
++
+ # Solaris 8 and above
+ ifeq ($(TARGET),solaris)
+ # We also enable getaddrinfo() which works since solaris 8.
--- /dev/null
+--- a/include/common/openssl-compat.h
++++ b/include/common/openssl-compat.h
+@@ -217,7 +217,8 @@ static inline int EVP_PKEY_base_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ #define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa 3
+ #endif
+
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) || (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) || \
++ (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L))
+ #define X509_getm_notBefore X509_get_notBefore
+ #define X509_getm_notAfter X509_get_notAfter
+ #endif
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