Remove all patches as they are upstreamed.
Switch upstream as it moved.
Need autoreconf now. Add PKG_INSTALL and PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL for
consistency between pachages.
Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=ipmitool
-PKG_VERSION:=1.8.18
-PKG_RELEASE:=5
+PKG_VERSION:=1.8.19
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
-PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
-PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@SF/$(PKG_NAME)
-PKG_HASH:=0c1ba3b1555edefb7c32ae8cd6a3e04322056bc087918f07189eeedfc8b81e01
+PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
+PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://codeberg.org/IPMITool/ipmitool
+PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=IPMITOOL_$(subst .,_,$(PKG_VERSION))
+PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=a3f0d3510fc47cbfd752f58084a72a09d0d5b23113bd87bf78ee32e74adcb4bc
+
+PKG_MAINTAINER:=Alexander Couzens <lynxis@fe80.eu>
PKG_LICENSE:=BSD-3-Clause
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:ipmitool_project:ipmitool
+PKG_FIXUP=autoreconf
+PKG_INSTALL:=1
+PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1
+
include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk
define Package/ipmitool
DEPENDS:=+libopenssl +libncurses +libreadline
TITLE:=Command-line interface to IPMI-enabled devices
URL:=https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool
- MAINTAINER:=Alexander Couzens <lynxis@fe80.eu>
endef
define Package/ipmitool/Default/description
endef
define Package/ipmitool/install
+ $(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/usr/bin/
+ $(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)/usr/bin/ipmitool $(1)/usr/bin/
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/usr/sbin/
- $(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/src/ipmievd $(1)/usr/sbin/
- $(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/src/ipmitool $(1)/usr/sbin/
+ $(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)/usr/sbin/ipmievd $(1)/usr/sbin/
endef
CONFIGURE_ARGS += \
+++ /dev/null
-From b57487e360916ab3eaa50aa6d021c73b6337a4a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dennis Schridde <dennis.schridde@uni-heidelberg.de>
-Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2016 17:33:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/4] ID:461 - OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility - "error: storage size
- of 'ctx' isn't known"
-
-In OpenSSL 1.1 EVP_CIPHER_CTX became opaque, cf. `man 3ssl EVP_EncryptInit`
-
-Fixes: ID:461
----
- src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
---- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-@@ -164,10 +164,10 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- uint8_t * output,
- uint32_t * bytes_written)
- {
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
-+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-
-
- *bytes_written = 0;
-@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- assert((input_length % IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0);
-
-
-- if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length))
-+ if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length))
- {
- /* Error */
- *bytes_written = 0;
-@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- {
- uint32_t tmplen;
-
-- if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
-+ if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
- {
- *bytes_written = 0;
- return; /* Error */
-@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- {
- /* Success */
- *bytes_written += tmplen;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- }
- }
- }
-@@ -239,10 +239,10 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- uint8_t * output,
- uint32_t * bytes_written)
- {
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
-+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-
-
- if (verbose >= 5)
-@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- assert((input_length % IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0);
-
-
-- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length))
-+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length))
- {
- /* Error */
- lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: decrypt update failed");
-@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- {
- uint32_t tmplen;
-
-- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
-+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
- {
- char buffer[1000];
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), buffer);
-@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- {
- /* Success */
- *bytes_written += tmplen;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- }
- }
-
+++ /dev/null
-From 77fe5635037ebaf411cae46cf5045ca819b5c145 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zdenek Styblik <stybla@turnovfree.net>
-Date: Sun, 15 Jan 2017 15:11:25 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/4] ID:461 - Make compiler happier about changes related to
- OpenSSL 1.1
-
-Complaint was that ctx isn't initialized.
----
- src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- uint8_t * output,
- uint32_t * bytes_written)
- {
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- uint8_t * output,
- uint32_t * bytes_written)
- {
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
+++ /dev/null
-From f004b4b7197fc83e7d47ec8cbcaefffa9a922717 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zdenek Styblik <stybla@turnovfree.net>
-Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 14:00:35 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/4] ID:480 - ipmitool coredumps in EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init
-
-IPMI tool coredumps due to changes introduced in ID:461. This shouldn't be
-surprise as a NULL pointer is passed to init. Commit addresses this issue by
-calling EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() instead of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(), which is
-deprecated, and by checking return value of call to former function.
----
- src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 14 ++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
---- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-@@ -165,10 +165,13 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- uint32_t * bytes_written)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
-+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+ if (ctx == NULL) {
-+ *bytes_written = 0;
-+ return;
-+ }
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
--
-
- *bytes_written = 0;
-
-@@ -240,11 +243,14 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- uint32_t * bytes_written)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
-+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+ if (ctx == NULL) {
-+ *bytes_written = 0;
-+ return;
-+ }
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-
--
- if (verbose >= 5)
- {
- printbuf(iv, 16, "decrypting with this IV");
+++ /dev/null
-From 1664902525a1c3771b4d8b3ccab7ea1ba6b2bdd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Holger Liebig <holger.liebig@ts.fujitsu.com>
-Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 20:43:05 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 4/4] ID:480 - Call EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() instead of
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup()
-
-Call EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() instead of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() to fix memory
-leak.
----
- src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++---------------
- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
-
---- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-@@ -165,13 +165,6 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- uint32_t * bytes_written)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-- ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-- if (ctx == NULL) {
-- *bytes_written = 0;
-- return;
-- }
-- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-
- *bytes_written = 0;
-
-@@ -185,6 +178,14 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- printbuf(input, input_length, "encrypting this data");
- }
-
-+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+ if (ctx == NULL) {
-+ lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
-+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-
- /*
- * The default implementation adds a whole block of padding if the input
-@@ -198,7 +199,6 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- {
- /* Error */
- *bytes_written = 0;
-- return;
- }
- else
- {
-@@ -206,16 +206,17 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
-
- if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
- {
-+ /* Error */
- *bytes_written = 0;
-- return; /* Error */
- }
- else
- {
- /* Success */
- *bytes_written += tmplen;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- }
- }
-+ /* performs cleanup and free */
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
-
-
-@@ -243,13 +244,6 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- uint32_t * bytes_written)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-- ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-- if (ctx == NULL) {
-- *bytes_written = 0;
-- return;
-- }
-- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-
- if (verbose >= 5)
- {
-@@ -258,12 +252,20 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- printbuf(input, input_length, "decrypting this data");
- }
-
--
- *bytes_written = 0;
-
- if (input_length == 0)
- return;
-
-+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+ if (ctx == NULL) {
-+ lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
-+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-+
- /*
- * The default implementation adds a whole block of padding if the input
- * data is perfectly aligned. We would like to keep that from happening.
-@@ -277,7 +279,6 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- /* Error */
- lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: decrypt update failed");
- *bytes_written = 0;
-- return;
- }
- else
- {
-@@ -285,20 +286,21 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
-
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
- {
-+ /* Error */
- char buffer[1000];
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), buffer);
- lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "the ERR error %s", buffer);
- lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: decrypt final failed");
- *bytes_written = 0;
-- return; /* Error */
- }
- else
- {
- /* Success */
- *bytes_written += tmplen;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- }
- }
-+ /* performs cleanup and free */
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- if (verbose >= 5)
- {
+++ /dev/null
-From cf39da53236abf02d39c6a98a645488933f3e861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 19:29:07 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] ipmitool: Fix compile with deprecated APIs disabled.
-
-From the man page:
-
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX was made opaque in OpenSSL 1.1.0. As a result,
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() appeared and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() disappeared.
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() remains as an alias for EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset().
-
-Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
----
- src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
---- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
-@@ -183,7 +183,11 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
- return;
- }
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
-+#else
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
-+#endif
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-
-@@ -262,7 +266,11 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
- lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
- return;
- }
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
-+#else
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
-+#endif
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
-
+++ /dev/null
-From 960dbb956d9f9cb05b719087faed53c88dc80956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:33:59 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 06/11] fru: Fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities
-
-Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
-https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
-
-The `read_fru_area_section` function only performs size validation of
-requested read size, and falsely assumes that the IPMI message will not
-respond with more than the requested amount of data; it uses the
-unvalidated response size to copy into `frubuf`. If the response is
-larger than the request, this can result in overflowing the buffer.
-
-The same issue affects the `read_fru_area` function.
----
- lib/ipmi_fru.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c
-+++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c
-@@ -615,7 +615,10 @@ int
- read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
- uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf)
- {
-- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish;
-+ uint32_t off = offset;
-+ uint32_t tmp;
-+ uint32_t finish;
-+ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer;
- struct ipmi_rs * rsp;
- struct ipmi_rq req;
- uint8_t msg_data[4];
-@@ -628,10 +631,12 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, s
-
- finish = offset + length;
- if (finish > fru->size) {
-+ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size);
- finish = fru->size;
- lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, "
- "Adjusting to %d",
- offset + length, finish - offset);
-+ length = finish - offset;
- }
-
- memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
-@@ -667,6 +672,7 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, s
- }
- }
-
-+ size_left_in_buffer = length;
- do {
- tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off;
- msg_data[0] = id;
-@@ -707,9 +713,18 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, s
- }
-
- tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0];
-+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
-+ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1
-+ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer)
-+ {
-+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
- memcpy(frubuf, rsp->data + 1, tmp);
- off += tmp;
- frubuf += tmp;
-+ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp;
- /* sometimes the size returned in the Info command
- * is too large. return 0 so higher level function
- * still attempts to parse what was returned */
-@@ -742,7 +757,9 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf *
- uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf)
- {
- static uint32_t fru_data_rqst_size = 20;
-- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish;
-+ uint32_t off = offset;
-+ uint32_t tmp, finish;
-+ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer;
- struct ipmi_rs * rsp;
- struct ipmi_rq req;
- uint8_t msg_data[4];
-@@ -755,10 +772,12 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf *
-
- finish = offset + length;
- if (finish > fru->size) {
-+ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size);
- finish = fru->size;
- lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, "
- "Adjusting to %d",
- offset + length, finish - offset);
-+ length = finish - offset;
- }
-
- memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
-@@ -773,6 +792,8 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf *
- if (fru->access && fru_data_rqst_size > 16)
- #endif
- fru_data_rqst_size = 16;
-+
-+ size_left_in_buffer = length;
- do {
- tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off;
- msg_data[0] = id;
-@@ -804,8 +825,16 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf *
- }
-
- tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0];
-+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
-+ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1
-+ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer)
-+ {
-+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
- memcpy((frubuf + off)-offset, rsp->data + 1, tmp);
- off += tmp;
-+ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp;
-
- /* sometimes the size returned in the Info command
- * is too large. return 0 so higher level function
+++ /dev/null
-From 910e5782b7d9f222d4e34d3505d0d636ff757103 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:44:18 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 07/11] fru: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_spd_print_fru
-
-Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
-https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
-
-The `ipmi_spd_print_fru` function has a similar issue as the one fixed
-by the previous commit in `read_fru_area_section`. An initial request is
-made to get the `fru.size`, which is used as the size for the allocation
-of `spd_data`. Inside a loop, further requests are performed to get the
-copy sizes which are not checked before being used as the size for a
-copy into the buffer.
----
- lib/dimm_spd.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/lib/dimm_spd.c
-+++ b/lib/dimm_spd.c
-@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * in
- struct ipmi_rq req;
- struct fru_info fru;
- uint8_t *spd_data, msg_data[4];
-- int len, offset;
-+ uint32_t len, offset;
-
- msg_data[0] = id;
-
-@@ -1697,6 +1697,13 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * in
- }
-
- len = rsp->data[0];
-+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
-+ || len > rsp->data_len - 1
-+ || len > fru.size - offset)
-+ {
-+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
- memcpy(&spd_data[offset], rsp->data + 1, len);
- offset += len;
- } while (offset < fru.size);
+++ /dev/null
-From 4f7778ed232a92bde388f38917b94f458a82c78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:51:49 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 08/11] session: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_get_session_info
-
-Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
-https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
-
-The `ipmi_get_session_info` function does not properly check the
-response `data_len`, which is used as a copy size, allowing stack buffer
-overflow.
----
- lib/ipmi_session.c | 12 ++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
---- a/lib/ipmi_session.c
-+++ b/lib/ipmi_session.c
-@@ -309,8 +309,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf
- }
- else
- {
-- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len);
-- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len);
-+ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data,
-+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
-+ print_session_info(&session_info,
-+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
- }
- break;
-
-@@ -341,8 +343,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf
- break;
- }
-
-- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len);
-- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len);
-+ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data,
-+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
-+ print_session_info(&session_info,
-+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
-
- } while (i <= session_info.session_slot_count);
- break;
+++ /dev/null
-From 743dd4faa302f22950e4438cf684e1e398eb47eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:56:38 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 09/11] channel: Fix buffer overflow
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
-https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
-
-The `ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites` function does not properly check
-the final response’s `data_len`, which can lead to stack buffer overflow
-on the final copy.
----
- lib/ipmi_channel.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/lib/ipmi_channel.c
-+++ b/lib/ipmi_channel.c
-@@ -413,7 +413,10 @@ ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites(struct ip
- lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Unable to Get Channel Cipher Suites");
- return -1;
- }
-- if (rsp->ccode > 0) {
-+ if (rsp->ccode
-+ || rsp->data_len < 1
-+ || rsp->data_len > sizeof(uint8_t) + 0x10)
-+ {
- lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Get Channel Cipher Suites failed: %s",
- val2str(rsp->ccode, completion_code_vals));
- return -1;
+++ /dev/null
-From e048e9c65a52f0879d482531e70735c1d314d43a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:06:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 10/11] lanp: Fix buffer overflows in get_lan_param_select
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
-https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
-
-The `get_lan_param_select` function is missing a validation check on the
-response’s `data_len`, which it then returns to caller functions, where
-stack buffer overflow can occur.
----
- lib/ipmi_lanp.c | 14 +++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
---- a/lib/ipmi_lanp.c
-+++ b/lib/ipmi_lanp.c
-@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
- if (p == NULL) {
- return (-1);
- }
-- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
-+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
- /* set new ipaddr */
- memcpy(data+3, temp, 4);
- printf("Setting LAN Alert %d IP Address to %d.%d.%d.%d\n", alert,
-@@ -1824,7 +1824,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
- if (p == NULL) {
- return (-1);
- }
-- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
-+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
- /* set new macaddr */
- memcpy(data+7, temp, 6);
- printf("Setting LAN Alert %d MAC Address to "
-@@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
- if (p == NULL) {
- return (-1);
- }
-- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
-+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
-
- if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "def", 3) == 0 ||
- strncasecmp(argv[1], "default", 7) == 0) {
-@@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
- if (p == NULL) {
- return (-1);
- }
-- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
-+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
-
- if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "on", 2) == 0 ||
- strncasecmp(argv[1], "yes", 3) == 0) {
-@@ -1889,7 +1889,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
- if (p == NULL) {
- return (-1);
- }
-- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
-+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
-
- if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "pet", 3) == 0) {
- printf("Setting LAN Alert %d destination to PET Trap\n", alert);
-@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
- if (p == NULL) {
- return (-1);
- }
-- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
-+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
-
- if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[2]) != 0) {
- lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid time: %s", argv[1]);
-@@ -1933,7 +1933,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
- if (p == NULL) {
- return (-1);
- }
-- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
-+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
-
- if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[3]) != 0) {
- lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid retry: %s", argv[1]);
+++ /dev/null
-From 98b47424cf548f58c4d295fa8235210406ea85ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:13:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 11/11] fru, sdr: Fix id_string buffer overflows
-
-Final part of the fixes for CVE-2020-5208, see
-https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
-
-9 variants of stack buffer overflow when parsing `id_string` field of
-SDR records returned from `CMD_GET_SDR` command.
-
-SDR record structs have an `id_code` field, and an `id_string` `char`
-array.
-
-The length of `id_string` is calculated as `(id_code & 0x1f) + 1`,
-which can be larger than expected 16 characters (if `id_code = 0xff`,
-then length will be `(0xff & 0x1f) + 1 = 32`).
-
-In numerous places, this can cause stack buffer overflow when copying
-into fixed buffer of size `17` bytes from this calculated length.
----
- lib/ipmi_fru.c | 2 +-
- lib/ipmi_sdr.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
---- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c
-+++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c
-@@ -3062,7 +3062,7 @@ ipmi_fru_print(struct ipmi_intf * intf,
- return 0;
-
- memset(desc, 0, sizeof(desc));
-- memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, fru->id_code & 0x01f);
-+ memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, __min(fru->id_code & 0x01f, sizeof(desc)));
- desc[fru->id_code & 0x01f] = 0;
- printf("FRU Device Description : %s (ID %d)\n", desc, fru->device_id);
-
---- a/lib/ipmi_sdr.c
-+++ b/lib/ipmi_sdr.c
-@@ -2084,7 +2084,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_eventonly(struct i
- return -1;
-
- memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
-- snprintf(desc, (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", sensor->id_string);
-+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, sensor->id_string);
-
- if (verbose) {
- printf("Sensor ID : %s (0x%x)\n",
-@@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_mc_locator(struct
- return -1;
-
- memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
-- snprintf(desc, (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", mc->id_string);
-+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, mc->id_string);
-
- if (verbose == 0) {
- if (csv_output)
-@@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_generic_locator(st
- char desc[17];
-
- memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
-- snprintf(desc, (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", dev->id_string);
-+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, dev->id_string);
-
- if (!verbose) {
- if (csv_output)
-@@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_fru_locator(struct
- char desc[17];
-
- memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
-- snprintf(desc, (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", fru->id_string);
-+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, fru->id_string);
-
- if (!verbose) {
- if (csv_output)
-@@ -2489,35 +2489,43 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_name_from_rawentry(struct
-
- int rc =0;
- char desc[17];
-+ const char *id_string;
-+ uint8_t id_code;
- memset(desc, ' ', sizeof (desc));
-
- switch ( type) {
- case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_FULL_SENSOR:
- record.full = (struct sdr_record_full_sensor *) raw;
-- snprintf(desc, (record.full->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
-- (const char *)record.full->id_string);
-+ id_code = record.full->id_code;
-+ id_string = record.full->id_string;
- break;
-+
- case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_COMPACT_SENSOR:
- record.compact = (struct sdr_record_compact_sensor *) raw ;
-- snprintf(desc, (record.compact->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
-- (const char *)record.compact->id_string);
-+ id_code = record.compact->id_code;
-+ id_string = record.compact->id_string;
- break;
-+
- case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_EVENTONLY_SENSOR:
- record.eventonly = (struct sdr_record_eventonly_sensor *) raw ;
-- snprintf(desc, (record.eventonly->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
-- (const char *)record.eventonly->id_string);
-- break;
-+ id_code = record.eventonly->id_code;
-+ id_string = record.eventonly->id_string;
-+ break;
-+
- case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_MC_DEVICE_LOCATOR:
- record.mcloc = (struct sdr_record_mc_locator *) raw ;
-- snprintf(desc, (record.mcloc->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
-- (const char *)record.mcloc->id_string);
-+ id_code = record.mcloc->id_code;
-+ id_string = record.mcloc->id_string;
- break;
-+
- default:
- rc = -1;
-- break;
-- }
-+ }
-+ if (!rc) {
-+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (id_code & 0x1f) + 1, id_string);
-+ }
-
-- lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc);
-+ lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc);
- return rc;
- }
-
+++ /dev/null
-From c3939dac2c060651361fc71516806f9ab8c38901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vaclav Dolezal <vdolezal@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 11:26:32 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] hpmfwupg: move variable definition to .c file
-
-Signed-off-by: Vaclav Dolezal <vdolezal@redhat.com>
----
- include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h | 2 +-
- lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h
-+++ b/include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h
-@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ typedef struct _VERSIONINFO {
- char descString[HPMFWUPG_DESC_STRING_LENGTH + 1];
- }VERSIONINFO, *PVERSIONINFO;
-
--VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX];
-+extern VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX];
-
- #define TARGET_VER (0x01)
- #define ROLLBACK_VER (0x02)
---- a/lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c
-+++ b/lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ ipmi_intf_get_max_request_data_size(stru
-
- extern int verbose;
-
-+VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX];
-+
- int HpmfwupgUpgrade(struct ipmi_intf *intf, char *imageFilename,
- int activate, int, int);
- int HpmfwupgValidateImageIntegrity(struct HpmfwupgUpgradeCtx *pFwupgCtx);
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