When beacon length is not a multiple of 4, the beacon could be sent with
the last 1-3 bytes corrupted. The skb data is guaranteed to have enough
room for reading beyond the end, because it is always followed by
skb_shared_info, so rounding up is safe.
All other callers of mt76_wr_copy have multiple-of-4 length already.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
static void mt76_mmio_copy(struct mt76_dev *dev, u32 offset, const void *data,
int len)
{
- __iowrite32_copy(dev->mmio.regs + offset, data, len >> 2);
+ __iowrite32_copy(dev->mmio.regs + offset, data, DIV_ROUND_UP(len, 4));
}
static int mt76_mmio_wr_rp(struct mt76_dev *dev, u32 base,
int i, ret;
mutex_lock(&usb->usb_ctrl_mtx);
- for (i = 0; i < (len / 4); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(len, 4); i++) {
put_unaligned_le32(val[i], usb->data);
ret = __mt76u_vendor_request(dev, MT_VEND_MULTI_WRITE,
USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_VENDOR,