ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
authorTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Mon, 9 Oct 2017 09:09:20 +0000 (11:09 +0200)
committerTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Wed, 11 Oct 2017 07:58:18 +0000 (09:58 +0200)
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing.  snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
 =============================================================================
 BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G    B          ): kasan: bad access detected
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
  ___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
  __slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
   kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
  snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
  snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
  SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
 INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
  __slab_free+0x204/0x310
  kfree+0x15f/0x180
  port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
  snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
  snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
  snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
  snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
  SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
  [<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
  [<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
  [<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
  [<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
  [<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
  [<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
  [<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
  .....

We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use.  Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.

This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.

Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c

index ea2d0ae85bd367d5ea70068ee74d925a349789c3..6c9cba2166d95b3b9175cc9eb39ca14e3a14f0f5 100644 (file)
@@ -1259,6 +1259,7 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
        struct snd_seq_port_info *info = arg;
        struct snd_seq_client_port *port;
        struct snd_seq_port_callback *callback;
+       int port_idx;
 
        /* it is not allowed to create the port for an another client */
        if (info->addr.client != client->number)
@@ -1269,7 +1270,9 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
        if (client->type == USER_CLIENT && info->kernel) {
-               snd_seq_delete_port(client, port->addr.port);
+               port_idx = port->addr.port;
+               snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
+               snd_seq_delete_port(client, port_idx);
                return -EINVAL;
        }
        if (client->type == KERNEL_CLIENT) {
@@ -1290,6 +1293,7 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
 
        snd_seq_set_port_info(port, info);
        snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start(port->addr.client, port->addr.port);
+       snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
 
        return 0;
 }
index 0a7020c82bfc76ac295d084fa2d98abe5dc5f647..d21ece9f8d7365e5e621156f1e44b85aa11eb1a1 100644 (file)
@@ -122,7 +122,9 @@ static void port_subs_info_init(struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp)
 }
 
 
-/* create a port, port number is returned (-1 on failure) */
+/* create a port, port number is returned (-1 on failure);
+ * the caller needs to unref the port via snd_seq_port_unlock() appropriately
+ */
 struct snd_seq_client_port *snd_seq_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
                                                int port)
 {
@@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ struct snd_seq_client_port *snd_seq_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
        snd_use_lock_init(&new_port->use_lock);
        port_subs_info_init(&new_port->c_src);
        port_subs_info_init(&new_port->c_dest);
+       snd_use_lock_use(&new_port->use_lock);
 
        num = port >= 0 ? port : 0;
        mutex_lock(&client->ports_mutex);
@@ -165,9 +168,9 @@ struct snd_seq_client_port *snd_seq_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
        list_add_tail(&new_port->list, &p->list);
        client->num_ports++;
        new_port->addr.port = num;      /* store the port number in the port */
+       sprintf(new_port->name, "port-%d", num);
        write_unlock_irqrestore(&client->ports_lock, flags);
        mutex_unlock(&client->ports_mutex);
-       sprintf(new_port->name, "port-%d", num);
 
        return new_port;
 }