vsprintf: Shuffle restricted_pointer()

This is just a preparation step for further changes.

The patch does not change the code.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-2-pmladek@suse.com
To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 791b6fa369051fe7cf4aad89e262c10e694de906..eb7b4a06e1f0af98fd96a0cbfa8f77028dc39d25 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -717,6 +717,55 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
        return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
 }
 
+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+
+static noinline_for_stack
+char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
+                        struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+       switch (kptr_restrict) {
+       case 0:
+               /* Always print %pK values */
+               break;
+       case 1: {
+               const struct cred *cred;
+
+               /*
+                * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+                * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+                */
+               if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
+                       if (spec.field_width == -1)
+                               spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
+                       return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+                * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+                * same credentials it started with. This is because
+                * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
+                * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+                * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+                * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+                */
+               cred = current_cred();
+               if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+                   !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+                   !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
+                       ptr = NULL;
+               break;
+       }
+       case 2:
+       default:
+               /* Always print 0's for %pK */
+               ptr = NULL;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+}
+
 static noinline_for_stack
 char *dentry_name(char *buf, char *end, const struct dentry *d, struct printf_spec spec,
                  const char *fmt)
@@ -1476,55 +1525,6 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
        return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
 }
 
-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
-
-static noinline_for_stack
-char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
-                        struct printf_spec spec)
-{
-       switch (kptr_restrict) {
-       case 0:
-               /* Always print %pK values */
-               break;
-       case 1: {
-               const struct cred *cred;
-
-               /*
-                * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
-                * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
-                */
-               if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
-                       if (spec.field_width == -1)
-                               spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
-                       return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
-               }
-
-               /*
-                * Only print the real pointer value if the current
-                * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
-                * same credentials it started with. This is because
-                * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
-                * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
-                * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
-                * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
-                */
-               cred = current_cred();
-               if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
-                   !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
-                   !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
-                       ptr = NULL;
-               break;
-       }
-       case 2:
-       default:
-               /* Always print 0's for %pK */
-               ptr = NULL;
-               break;
-       }
-
-       return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
-}
-
 static noinline_for_stack
 char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr,
                  struct printf_spec spec,  const char *fmt)