Fix ACC_MODE() for real

commit 5300990c0370e804e49d9a59d928c5d53fb73487 had stepped on a rather
nasty mess: definitions of ACC_MODE used to be different.  Fixed the
resulting breakage, converting them to variant that takes O_... value;
all callers have that and it actually simplifies life (see tomoyo part
of changes).

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1b26b1620664221e9f60a0d69c40ff528becb6a0..d930f1856ed2858433c9cdcdfaef065c38699aac 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
                open_flag |= O_DSYNC;
 
        if (!acc_mode)
-               acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(flag);
+               acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(open_flag);
 
        /* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
        if (flag & O_TRUNC)

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 9147ca88f253ec1bd35b70b5313cd9f63c0a61d5..b1bcb275b596962ececfc157ee8d78e7ea61a090 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2463,7 +2463,7 @@ int proc_nr_files(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 
 int __init get_filesystem_list(char *buf);
 
-#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
+#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
 #define OPEN_FMODE(flag) ((__force fmode_t)((flag + 1) & O_ACCMODE))
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 8a00ade85166615a67fc768f595e00ac782b0863..2aceebf5f3546f1dffa2594d04fa12cc0702923b 100644 (file)
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -80,9 +80,8 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
        /*
         * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
-        * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
         */
-       return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1);
+       return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, O_RDONLY);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
@@ -184,10 +183,6 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
 {
        int flags = f->f_flags;
-
-       if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE)
-               flags++;
-       flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC);
        /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
        if (current->in_execve)
                return 0;