+++ /dev/null
---- a/hosts_access.c
-+++ b/hosts_access.c
-@@ -240,6 +240,26 @@ struct request_info *request;
- }
- }
-
-+/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */
-+
-+static int hostfile_match(path, host)
-+char *path;
-+struct hosts_info *host;
-+{
-+ char tok[BUFSIZ];
-+ int match = NO;
-+ FILE *fp;
-+
-+ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) {
-+ while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host)))
-+ /* void */ ;
-+ fclose(fp);
-+ } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
-+ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path);
-+ }
-+ return (match);
-+}
-+
- /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */
-
- static int host_match(tok, host)
-@@ -267,6 +287,8 @@ struct host_info *host;
- tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */
- return (NO);
- #endif
-+ } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */
-+ return (hostfile_match(tok, host));
- } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */
- char *name = eval_hostname(host);
- return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
---- a/tcpd.h
-+++ b/tcpd.h
-@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-+#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
-+#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
-+
-+/* someone else may have defined this */
-+#undef __P
-+
-+/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */
-+#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus)
-+#define __P(args) args
-+#else
-+#define __P(args) ()
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */
-+#include <netinet/in.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+
-+__BEGIN_DECLS
-+
- /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */
-
- #define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */
-@@ -25,10 +44,10 @@ struct request_info {
- char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */
- struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */
- struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */
-- void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */
-- void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */
-- void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */
-- void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */
-+ void (*sink) __P((int)); /* datagram sink function or 0 */
-+ void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */
-+ void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */
-+ void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */
- struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */
- };
-
-@@ -61,25 +80,30 @@ extern char paranoid[];
- /* Global functions. */
-
- #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
--extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */
-+extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); /* get/validate client host info */
- #else
- #define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */
- #endif
-
--extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */
--extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */
--extern char *percent_x(); /* do %<char> expansion */
--extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
--extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */
--extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */
--extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */
--extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */
--extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */
-+extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); /* execute shell command */
-+extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do %<char> expansion */
-+extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
-+extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */
-+extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */
-+extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); /* fgets() on steroids */
-+extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); /* strchr() and split */
-+extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */
-
- /* Global variables. */
-
-+#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
-+extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
-+extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
-+#else
- extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */
- extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */
-+#endif
-+
- extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */
- extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */
- extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */
-@@ -92,9 +116,14 @@ extern int resident; /* > 0 if residen
- */
-
- #ifdef __STDC__
-+extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request);
-+extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr,
-+ char *client_user);
- extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...);
- extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...);
- #else
-+extern int hosts_access();
-+extern int hosts_ctl();
- extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */
- extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */
- #endif
-@@ -117,27 +146,31 @@ extern struct request_info *request_set(
- * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results.
- */
-
--extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */
--extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */
--extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */
--extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */
--extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */
--extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */
-+extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); /* client user */
-+extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable hostname */
-+extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable host address */
-+extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); /* host name or address */
-+extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */
-+extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */
- #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */
- #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */
-
- /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */
-
--extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */
--extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */
--extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */
-+/* look up endpoint addresses */
-+extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *));
-+/* translate address to hostname */
-+extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *));
-+/* address to printable address */
-+extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *));
-+
- #define sock_methods(r) \
- { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; }
-
- /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */
-
- #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
--extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
-+extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
- #endif
-
- /*
-@@ -178,7 +211,7 @@ extern struct tcpd_context tcpd_context;
- * behavior.
- */
-
--extern void process_options(); /* execute options */
-+extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */
- extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */
-
- /* Bug workarounds. */
-@@ -217,3 +250,7 @@ extern char *fix_strtok();
- #define strtok my_strtok
- extern char *my_strtok();
- #endif
-+
-+__END_DECLS
-+
-+#endif /* tcpd.h */
---- a/Makefile
-+++ b/Makefile
-@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-+GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h)
-+
- # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20
-
-+# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable
-+HOSTNAME =
-+
- what:
- @echo
- @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:"
-@@ -19,7 +24,7 @@ what:
- @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)"
- @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543"
- @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix"
-- @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
-+ @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
- @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4"
- @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2"
- @echo " uts215 uxp"
-@@ -43,8 +48,8 @@ what:
- # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx
- #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc
- #
--# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX
--#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
-+# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux
-+REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
- #
- # BSD 4.4
- #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec
-@@ -141,10 +146,21 @@ freebsd:
- LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \
- EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all
-
-+ifneq ($(GLIBC),0)
-+MYLIB=-lnsl
-+endif
-+
- linux:
- @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
-- LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \
-- NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all
-+ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
-+ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
-+ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
-+
-+gnu:
-+ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
-+ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
-+ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
-+ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
-
- # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x.
- hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10:
-@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ AR = ar
- # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module
- # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv().
-
--AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
-+#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
- #AUX_OBJ= environ.o
- #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o
-
-@@ -454,7 +470,8 @@ AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
- # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work
- # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions.
-
--BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
-+BUGS =
-+#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
- #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG
- #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG
-
-@@ -464,7 +481,7 @@ BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS
- # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following
- # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control.
- #
--#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
-+NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
-
- ###############################################################
- # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog()
-@@ -491,7 +508,7 @@ VSYSLOG = -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog
- # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions
- # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn).
- #
--#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions.
-+STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions.
-
- ################################################################
- # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records
-@@ -514,7 +531,7 @@ VSYSLOG = -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog
- #
- # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file.
-
--FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
-+FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
-
- # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged.
-
-@@ -610,7 +627,7 @@ TABLES = -DHOSTS_DENY=\"/etc/hosts.deny\
- # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname
- # lookups altogether, see the next section.
-
--PARANOID= -DPARANOID
-+#PARANOID= -DPARANOID
-
- ########################################
- # Optional: turning off hostname lookups
-@@ -623,7 +640,7 @@ PARANOID= -DPARANOID
- # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid
- # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition.
-
--HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
-+#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
-
- #############################################
- # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking
-@@ -649,28 +666,46 @@ HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
- # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives,
- # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details.
- #
--# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
-+KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
-
- ## End configuration options
- ############################
-
- # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs.
-
-+CC = gcc
- SHELL = /bin/sh
--.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c
-+.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c
-+
-+SOMAJOR = 0
-+SOMINOR = 7.6
-+
-+LIB = libwrap.a
-+SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR)
-+SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR)
-+SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so
-+SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap
-
--CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
-+shared/%.o: %.c
-+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
-+
-+CFLAGS = -O2 -g -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
- $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \
- -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \
- -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \
- $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \
- $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME)
-
-+SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS)
-+SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT
-+
- LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \
- hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \
- $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \
- update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o
-
-+SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ));
-+
- FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o
-
- KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \
-@@ -684,46 +719,78 @@ KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c h
- refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \
- scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS
-
--LIB = libwrap.a
--
--all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk
-+all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB)
-
- # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed.
-
- config-check:
- @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; }
-- @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
-- if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
-- then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
-- else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \
-+ @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \
-+ if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \
-+ then rm cflags.new ; \
-+ else mv cflags.new cflags ; \
- fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-+ @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi
-
- $(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ)
- rm -f $(LIB)
- $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ)
- -$(RANLIB) $(LIB)
-
--tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB)
-- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
-+$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ)
-+ rm -f $(SHLIB)
-+ $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ)
-+ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ)
-+ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO)
-+
-+tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB)
-+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-
--miscd: miscd.o $(LIB)
-- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
-+miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB)
-+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-
--safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB)
-- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
-+safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB)
-+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-
- TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
-
--tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB)
-- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
-+tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
-+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-
--try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB)
-- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
-+try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB)
-+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-
- TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
-
--tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB)
-- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
-+tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
-+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-+
-+install: install-lib install-bin install-dev
-+
-+install-lib:
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/lib/
-+ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ))
-+
-+install-bin:
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
-+
-+install-dev:
-+ ln -s /lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO))
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/
-+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
-+ ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3
-+ ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3
-+ ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3
-
- shar: $(KIT)
- @shar $(KIT)
-@@ -739,7 +806,8 @@ archive:
-
- clean:
- rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \
-- cflags
-+ cflags libwrap*.so*
-+ rm -rf shared
-
- tidy: clean
- chmod -R a+r .
-@@ -885,5 +953,6 @@ update.o: cflags
- update.o: mystdarg.h
- update.o: tcpd.h
- vfprintf.o: cflags
-+weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h
- workarounds.o: cflags
- workarounds.o: tcpd.h
---- a/hosts_access.5
-+++ b/hosts_access.5
-@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ name, host name/address) patterns. Exam
- impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
- quick introduction.
- .PP
--An extended version of the access control language is described in the
--\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at
--program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.
-+The extended version of the access control language is described in the
-+\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes
-+the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR
- .PP
- In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a
- network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
-@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ A newline character is ignored when it i
- character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
- easier to edit.
- .IP \(bu
--Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
-+Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored.
- This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
- are easier to read.
- .IP \(bu
-@@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ checks are case insensitive.
- .SH PATTERNS
- The access control language implements the following patterns:
- .IP \(bu
--A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if
-+A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if
- the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For
--example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name
--`wzv.win.tue.nl\'.
-+example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name
-+`wzv.win.tue.nl'.
- .IP \(bu
--A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if
-+A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if
- its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the
--pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
-+pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
- Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x).
- .IP \(bu
--A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS
-+A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS
- (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host
- member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
- for daemon process names or for client user names.
- .IP \(bu
--An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a
--`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the
--bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask
--pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the
--range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'.
-+An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a
-+`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the
-+bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask
-+pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the
-+range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'.
-+.IP \(bu
-+A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file
-+name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name
-+or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is
-+zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns
-+separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere
-+a host name or address pattern can be used.
- .SH WILDCARDS
- The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
- .IP ALL
-@@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ without -DPARANOID when you want more co
- .ne 6
- .SH OPERATORS
- .IP EXCEPT
--Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct
-+Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct
- matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches
- \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
- client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
--language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\'
--would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'.
-+language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c'
-+would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'.
- .br
- .ne 6
- .SH SHELL COMMANDS
- If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that
- command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section).
- The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard
--input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\'
-+input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&'
- at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has
- completed.
- .PP
-@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ depending on how much information is ava
- .IP %u
- The client user name (or "unknown").
- .IP %%
--Expands to a single `%\' character.
-+Expands to a single `%' character.
- .PP
- Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
- underscores.
-@@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ A positive IDENT lookup result (the clie
- less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
- client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
- harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
--the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
-+the client's IDENT server is lying.
- .PP
--Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services.
-+Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.
- .SH EXAMPLES
- The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
- policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language
-@@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup
- .br
- ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
- .PP
--The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\'
-+The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.'
- in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
- netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
- \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
-@@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain
- /etc/hosts.deny:
- .in +3
- .nf
--in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
-- /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &
-+in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
-+ /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
- .fi
- .PP
- The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
-@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ control rule; when the length of an acce
- capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
- terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
- expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
--that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
-+that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
- .SH FILES
- .na
- .nf
---- a/rfc931.c
-+++ b/rfc931.c
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#) rfc931.c 1.
-
- int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */
-
--static jmp_buf timebuf;
-+static sigjmp_buf timebuf;
-
- /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */
-
-@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ int protocol;
- static void timeout(sig)
- int sig;
- {
-- longjmp(timebuf, sig);
-+ siglongjmp(timebuf, sig);
- }
-
- /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */
-@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ char *dest;
- * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server.
- */
-
-- if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) {
-+ if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) {
- signal(SIGALRM, timeout);
- alarm(rfc931_timeout);
-
---- a/tcpd.8
-+++ b/tcpd.8
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ configuration files.
- .PP
- The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
- systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have
--no `in.\' prefix to their name.
-+no `in.' prefix to their name.
- .SH EXAMPLE 2
- This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons
- are left in their original place.
-@@ -110,26 +110,26 @@ finger stream tcp nowait nobody /us
- becomes:
- .sp
- .ti +5
--finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd
-+finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd
- .sp
- .fi
- .PP
- The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
- systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the
--daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
-+daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
- field in the inetd configuration file.
- .PP
- Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be
--covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
-+covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
- process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to
--execute the `inetimp\' command.
-+execute the `inetimp' command.
- .SH EXAMPLE 3
- In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret"
- or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it
- specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example:
- .nf
- .sp
-- ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
-+ ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd
- .sp
- .fi
- .PP
---- a/hosts_access.3
-+++ b/hosts_access.3
-@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
- hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library
- .SH SYNOPSIS
- .nf
--#include "tcpd.h"
-+#include <tcpd.h>
-
- extern int allow_severity;
- extern int deny_severity;
---- a/options.c
-+++ b/options.c
-@@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ static struct syslog_names log_fac[] = {
- #ifdef LOG_CRON
- "cron", LOG_CRON,
- #endif
-+#ifdef LOG_FTP
-+ "ftp", LOG_FTP,
-+#endif
- #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0
- "local0", LOG_LOCAL0,
- #endif
---- a/fix_options.c
-+++ b/fix_options.c
-@@ -35,7 +35,12 @@ struct request_info *request;
- #ifdef IP_OPTIONS
- unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp;
- char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp;
-+#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
- int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto;
-+#else /* __GLIBC__ */
-+ size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf);
-+ int ipproto;
-+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
- struct protoent *ip;
- int fd = request->fd;
- unsigned int opt;
---- a/workarounds.c
-+++ b/workarounds.c
-@@ -163,7 +163,11 @@ int *fromlen;
- int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len)
- int sock;
- struct sockaddr *sa;
-+#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
- int *len;
-+#else /* __GLIBC__ */
-+size_t *len;
-+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
- {
- int ret;
- struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;
---- a/socket.c
-+++ b/socket.c
-@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ struct request_info *request;
- {
- static struct sockaddr_in client;
- static struct sockaddr_in server;
-+#if !defined (__GLIBC__)
- int len;
-+#else /* __GLIBC__ */
-+ size_t len;
-+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
- char buf[BUFSIZ];
- int fd = request->fd;
-
-@@ -224,7 +228,11 @@ int fd;
- {
- char buf[BUFSIZ];
- struct sockaddr_in sin;
-+#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
- int size = sizeof(sin);
-+#else /* __GLIBC__ */
-+ size_t size = sizeof(sin);
-+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
-
- /*
- * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a
---- a/safe_finger.c
-+++ b/safe_finger.c
-@@ -26,21 +26,24 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#) safe_finger
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
-+#include <syslog.h>
-
- extern void exit();
-
- /* Local stuff */
-
--char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin";
-+char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin";
-
- #define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */
- #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */
- #define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */
- #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */
- #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */
--#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */
-+#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */
-
- int finger_pid;
-+int allow_severity = SEVERITY;
-+int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
-
- void cleanup(sig)
- int sig;
---- a/hosts_options.5
-+++ b/hosts_options.5
-@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ Notice the leading dot on the domain nam
- Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after
- performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5)
- manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr
--connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the
-+connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the
- conversation with the client host. Example:
- .sp
- .nf
- .ti +3
--spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) &
-+spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) &
- .fi
- .sp
- executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger
---- a/tcpdchk.c
-+++ b/tcpdchk.c
-@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ char *pat;
- {
- if (pat[0] == '@') {
- tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat);
-+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
-+ tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat);
- } else if (pat[0] == '.') {
- tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat);
- } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
-@@ -382,6 +384,8 @@ char *pat;
- {
- if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */
- tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat);
-+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
-+ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat);
- } else if (pat[0] == '.') {
- tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat);
- } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
-@@ -402,8 +406,13 @@ char *pat;
- static int check_host(pat)
- char *pat;
- {
-+ char buf[BUFSIZ];
- char *mask;
- int addr_count = 1;
-+ FILE *fp;
-+ struct tcpd_context saved_context;
-+ char *cp;
-+ char *wsp = " \t\r\n";
-
- if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */
- #ifdef NO_NETGRENT
-@@ -422,6 +431,21 @@ char *pat;
- tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled");
- #endif
- #endif
-+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */
-+ if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) {
-+ saved_context = tcpd_context;
-+ tcpd_context.file = pat;
-+ tcpd_context.line = 0;
-+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) {
-+ tcpd_context.line++;
-+ for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp))
-+ check_host(cp);
-+ }
-+ tcpd_context = saved_context;
-+ fclose(fp);
-+ } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
-+ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat);
-+ }
- } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */
- if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE
- || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE)
---- a/percent_m.c
-+++ b/percent_m.c
-@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#) percent_m.c
- #include <string.h>
-
- extern int errno;
--#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED
-+#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR)
- extern char *sys_errlist[];
- extern int sys_nerr;
- #endif
-@@ -29,11 +29,15 @@ char *ibuf;
-
- while (*bp = *cp)
- if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') {
-+#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR
-+ strcpy(bp, strerror(errno));
-+#else
- if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) {
- strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]);
- } else {
- sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno);
- }
-+#endif
- bp += strlen(bp);
- cp += 2;
- } else {
---- a/scaffold.c
-+++ b/scaffold.c
-@@ -180,10 +180,12 @@ struct request_info *request;
-
- /* ARGSUSED */
-
--void rfc931(request)
--struct request_info *request;
-+void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest)
-+struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin;
-+struct sockaddr_in *our_sin;
-+char *dest;
- {
-- strcpy(request->user, unknown);
-+ strcpy(dest, unknown);
- }
-
- /* check_path - examine accessibility */
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/weak_symbols.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
-+ /*
-+ * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50
-+ *
-+ * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org>
-+ */
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
-+#include <syslog.h>
-+int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
-+int allow_severity = SEVERITY;
-+#endif
projects / openwrt / svn-archive / archive.git / commitdiff