gnurl: update source to 7.43.0
authorDaniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Thu, 13 Aug 2015 08:24:14 +0000 (10:24 +0200)
committerDaniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Thu, 13 Aug 2015 08:25:15 +0000 (10:25 +0200)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
net/gnurl/Makefile
net/gnurl/patches/010-backport-gtls-add-support-for-CURLOPT_CAPATH.patch [deleted file]
net/gnurl/patches/011-CVE-2015-3144.patch [deleted file]
net/gnurl/patches/012-CVE-2015-3145.patch [deleted file]
net/gnurl/patches/014-CVE-2015-3153.patch [deleted file]
net/gnurl/patches/015-CVE-2015-3236.patch [deleted file]
net/gnurl/patches/100-check_long_long.patch

index b9dea2feac5fee63e739630823c7b270876a1eec..141bb9b31fbab91775c8c3ddf68ec4c21d1e553f 100644 (file)
@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=gnurl
-PKG_VERSION:=7.40.0
-PKG_RELEASE:=6
+PKG_VERSION:=7.43.0
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://gnunet.org/sites/default/files
 
-PKG_MD5SUM:=f816deb0c1401c841780ec6b91985a14
+PKG_MD5SUM:=67c6667d8843cc514b230f2ce8d80f0e
 
 PKG_LICENSE:=MIT
 PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
diff --git a/net/gnurl/patches/010-backport-gtls-add-support-for-CURLOPT_CAPATH.patch b/net/gnurl/patches/010-backport-gtls-add-support-for-CURLOPT_CAPATH.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 563f5f3..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-From 5a1614cecdd57cab8b4ae3e9bc19dfff5ba77e80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@ghedini.me>
-Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2015 20:11:06 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] gtls: add support for CURLOPT_CAPATH
-
----
- acinclude.m4                       |  4 ++--
- docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_CAPATH.3 |  5 ++---
- lib/vtls/gtls.c                    | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- lib/vtls/gtls.h                    |  3 +++
- 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
---- a/acinclude.m4
-+++ b/acinclude.m4
-@@ -2614,8 +2614,8 @@ AC_HELP_STRING([--without-ca-path], [Don
-     capath="no"
-   elif test "x$want_capath" != "xno" -a "x$want_capath" != "xunset"; then
-     dnl --with-ca-path given
--    if test "x$OPENSSL_ENABLED" != "x1" -a "x$POLARSSL_ENABLED" != "x1"; then
--      AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ca-path only works with openSSL or PolarSSL])
-+    if test "x$OPENSSL_ENABLED" != "x1" -a "x$GNUTLS_ENABLED" != "x1" -a "x$POLARSSL_ENABLED" != "x1"; then
-+      AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ca-path only works with OpenSSL, GnuTLS or PolarSSL])
-     fi
-     capath="$want_capath"
-     ca="no"
---- a/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_CAPATH.3
-+++ b/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_CAPATH.3
-@@ -43,9 +43,8 @@ All TLS based protocols: HTTPS, FTPS, IM
- .SH EXAMPLE
- TODO
- .SH AVAILABILITY
--This option is OpenSSL-specific and does nothing if libcurl is built to use
--GnuTLS. NSS-powered libcurl provides the option only for backward
--compatibility.
-+This option is supported by the OpenSSL, GnuTLS and PolarSSL backends. The NSS
-+backend provides the option only for backward compatibility.
- .SH RETURN VALUE
- Returns CURLE_OK if TLS enabled, and CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION if not, or
- CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY if there was insufficient heap space.
---- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
-+++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
-@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ static bool gtls_inited = FALSE;
- #      define HAS_ALPN
- #    endif
- #  endif
-+
-+#  if (GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030306)
-+#    define HAS_CAPATH
-+#  endif
- #endif
- /*
-@@ -463,6 +467,24 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct connectdata *c
-             rc, data->set.ssl.CAfile);
-   }
-+#ifdef HAS_CAPATH
-+  if(data->set.ssl.CApath) {
-+    /* set the trusted CA cert directory */
-+    rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_dir(conn->ssl[sockindex].cred,
-+                                                data->set.ssl.CApath,
-+                                                GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
-+    if(rc < 0) {
-+      infof(data, "error reading ca cert file %s (%s)\n",
-+            data->set.ssl.CAfile, gnutls_strerror(rc));
-+      if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
-+        return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
-+    }
-+    else
-+      infof(data, "found %d certificates in %s\n",
-+            rc, data->set.ssl.CApath);
-+  }
-+#endif
-+
-   if(data->set.ssl.CRLfile) {
-     /* set the CRL list file */
-     rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(conn->ssl[sockindex].cred,
---- a/lib/vtls/gtls.h
-+++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.h
-@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ void Curl_gtls_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp
-                       unsigned char *md5sum, /* output */
-                       size_t md5len);
-+/* this backend supports the CAPATH option */
-+#define have_curlssl_ca_path 1
-+
- /* API setup for GnuTLS */
- #define curlssl_init Curl_gtls_init
- #define curlssl_cleanup Curl_gtls_cleanup
diff --git a/net/gnurl/patches/011-CVE-2015-3144.patch b/net/gnurl/patches/011-CVE-2015-3144.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 3d75216..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 6218ded6001ea330e589f92b6b2fa12777752b5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
-Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 23:52:04 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] fix_hostname: zero length host name caused -1 index offset
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-If a URL is given with a zero-length host name, like in "http://:80" or
-just ":80", `fix_hostname()` will index the host name pointer with a -1
-offset (as it blindly assumes a non-zero length) and both read and
-assign that address.
-
-CVE-2015-3144
-
-Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422D.html
-Reported-by: Hanno Böck
----
- lib/url.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/lib/url.c
-+++ b/lib/url.c
-@@ -3602,7 +3602,7 @@ static void fix_hostname(struct SessionH
-   host->dispname = host->name;
-   len = strlen(host->name);
--  if(host->name[len-1] == '.')
-+  if(len && (host->name[len-1] == '.'))
-     /* strip off a single trailing dot if present, primarily for SNI but
-        there's no use for it */
-     host->name[len-1]=0;
diff --git a/net/gnurl/patches/012-CVE-2015-3145.patch b/net/gnurl/patches/012-CVE-2015-3145.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index c7ecbe9..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From ea595c516bc936a514753597aa6c59fd6eb0765e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
-Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 16:37:40 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] cookie: cookie parser out of boundary memory access
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The internal libcurl function called sanitize_cookie_path() that cleans
-up the path element as given to it from a remote site or when read from
-a file, did not properly validate the input. If given a path that
-consisted of a single double-quote, libcurl would index a newly
-allocated memory area with index -1 and assign a zero to it, thus
-destroying heap memory it wasn't supposed to.
-
-CVE-2015-3145
-
-Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422C.html
-Reported-by: Hanno Böck
----
- lib/cookie.c | 12 +++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
---- a/lib/cookie.c
-+++ b/lib/cookie.c
-@@ -236,11 +236,14 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const
-     return NULL;
-   /* some stupid site sends path attribute with '"'. */
-+  len = strlen(new_path);
-   if(new_path[0] == '\"') {
--    memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), strlen(new_path));
-+    memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), len);
-+    len--;
-   }
--  if(new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] == '\"') {
--    new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] = 0x0;
-+  if(len && (new_path[len - 1] == '\"')) {
-+    new_path[len - 1] = 0x0;
-+    len--;
-   }
-   /* RFC6265 5.2.4 The Path Attribute */
-@@ -252,8 +255,7 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const
-   }
-   /* convert /hoge/ to /hoge */
--  len = strlen(new_path);
--  if(1 < len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') {
-+  if(len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') {
-     new_path[len - 1] = 0x0;
-   }
diff --git a/net/gnurl/patches/014-CVE-2015-3153.patch b/net/gnurl/patches/014-CVE-2015-3153.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index f6d37d4..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-From 69a2e8d7ec581695a62527cb2252e7350f314ffa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
-Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 15:58:21 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] CURLOPT_HEADEROPT: default to separate
-
-Make the HTTP headers separated by default for improved security and
-reduced risk for information leakage.
-
-Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150429.html
-Reported-by: Yehezkel Horowitz, Oren Souroujon
----
- docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3 | 12 ++++++------
- lib/url.c                             |  1 +
- tests/data/test1527                   |  2 +-
- tests/data/test287                    |  2 +-
- tests/libtest/lib1527.c               |  1 +
- 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
---- a/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3
-+++ b/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3
-@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
- .\" *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
- .\" *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
- .\" *
--.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2014, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
-+.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
- .\" *
- .\" * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
- .\" * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
-@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_setopt(CURL *handle,
- Pass a long that is a bitmask of options of how to deal with headers. The two
- mutually exclusive options are:
--\fBCURLHEADER_UNIFIED\fP - keep working as before. This means
--\fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers will be used in requests both to servers
--and proxies. With this option enabled, \fICURLOPT_PROXYHEADER(3)\fP will not
--have any effect.
-+\fBCURLHEADER_UNIFIED\fP - the headers specified in
-+\fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP will be used in requests both to servers and
-+proxies. With this option enabled, \fICURLOPT_PROXYHEADER(3)\fP will not have
-+any effect.
- \fBCURLHEADER_SEPARATE\fP - makes \fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers only get
- sent to a server and not to a proxy. Proxy headers must be set with
-@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ headers. When doing CONNECT, libcurl wil
- headers only to the proxy and then \fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers only to
- the server.
- .SH DEFAULT
--CURLHEADER_UNIFIED
-+CURLHEADER_SEPARATE (changed in 7.42.1, ased CURLHEADER_UNIFIED before then)
- .SH PROTOCOLS
- HTTP
- .SH EXAMPLE
---- a/lib/url.c
-+++ b/lib/url.c
-@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct Us
-   set->ssl_enable_alpn = TRUE;
-   set->expect_100_timeout = 1000L; /* Wait for a second by default. */
-+  set->sep_headers = TRUE; /* separated header lists by default */
-   return result;
- }
---- a/tests/data/test1527
-+++ b/tests/data/test1527
-@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ http-proxy
- lib1527
- </tool>
-  <name>
--Check same headers are generated without CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER
-+Check same headers are generated with CURLOPT_HEADEROPT == CURLHEADER_UNIFIED
-  </name>
-  <command>
-  http://the.old.moo.1527:%HTTPPORT/1527 %HOSTIP:%PROXYPORT
---- a/tests/data/test287
-+++ b/tests/data/test287
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ http
- HTTP proxy CONNECT with custom User-Agent header
-  </name>
-  <command>
--http://test.remote.example.com.287:%HTTPPORT/path/287 -H "User-Agent: looser/2007" --proxy http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT --proxytunnel
-+http://test.remote.example.com.287:%HTTPPORT/path/287 -H "User-Agent: looser/2015" --proxy http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT --proxytunnel --proxy-header "User-Agent: looser/2007"
- </command>
- </client>
---- a/tests/libtest/lib1527.c
-+++ b/tests/libtest/lib1527.c
-@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int test(char *URL)
-   test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, read_callback);
-   test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL, 1L);
-   test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, strlen(data));
-+  test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HEADEROPT, CURLHEADER_UNIFIED);
-   res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
diff --git a/net/gnurl/patches/015-CVE-2015-3236.patch b/net/gnurl/patches/015-CVE-2015-3236.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 41197a2..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From e6d7c30734487246e83b95520e81bc1ccf0a2376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 20:04:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] http: do not leak basic auth credentials on re-used
- connections
-
-CVE-2015-3236
-
-This partially reverts commit curl-7_39_0-237-g87c4abb
-
-Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150617A.html
----
- lib/http.c | 16 ++++------------
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
---- a/lib/http.c
-+++ b/lib/http.c
-@@ -2327,20 +2327,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct connectdata *c
-                      te
-       );
--  /*
--   * Free userpwd for Negotiate/NTLM. Cannot reuse as it is associated with
--   * the connection and shouldn't be repeated over it either.
--   */
--  switch (data->state.authhost.picked) {
--  case CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE:
--  case CURLAUTH_NTLM:
--  case CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB:
--    Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.userpwd);
--    break;
--  }
-+  /* clear userpwd to avoid re-using credentials from re-used connections */
-+  Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.userpwd);
-   /*
--   * Same for proxyuserpwd
-+   * Free proxyuserpwd for Negotiate/NTLM. Cannot reuse as it is associated
-+   * with the connection and shouldn't be repeated over it either.
-    */
-   switch (data->state.authproxy.picked) {
-   case CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE:
index 7faa45169676ba117211e06f91c2ca429ac56b3e..21e45647eead24f347dc88cf1ae962ec0dde703c 100644 (file)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2879,6 +2879,7 @@ CURL_VERIFY_RUNTIMELIBS
+@@ -2954,6 +2954,7 @@ CURL_VERIFY_RUNTIMELIBS
  
  AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(size_t)
  AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(long)