virtio: rng: add derating factor for use by hwrng core

The khwrngd thread is started when a hwrng device of sufficient
quality is registered.  The virtio-rng device is backed by the
hypervisor, and we trust the hypervisor to provide real entropy.

A malicious or badly-implemented hypervisor is a scenario that's
irrelevant -- such a setup is bound to cause all sorts of badness, and a
compromised hwrng is the least of the user's worries.

Given this, we might as well assume that the quality of randomness we
receive is perfectly trustworthy.  Hence, we use 100% for the factor,
indicating maximum confidence in the source.

Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Amos Kong <akong@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
index 0027137daa561500ea8089423b3c22eb34f1bb84..2e3139eda93b687568aeda1698c5022eb9144c64 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static int probe_common(struct virtio_device *vdev)
                .cleanup = virtio_cleanup,
                .priv = (unsigned long)vi,
                .name = vi->name,
+               .quality = 1000,
        };
        vdev->priv = vi;